TREATISE ON SEPARATE SUBSTANCES
by
Thomas Aquinas
translated by
Francis J. Lescoe
West Hartford CN: Saint Joseph College, 1959
edited and html-formated by Joseph Kenny, O.P.
CONTENTS
CHAPTER I
THE OPINION OF THE EARLY PHILOSOPHERS AND OF PLATO
Since we cannot be present at the holy ceremonies in honor of the angels, we should not let this time of devotion go by fruitlessly; rather, such time as we do not spend in singing their praises, we should spend in writing about them. And because our aim is to present as best we can the excellence of the holy angels, we ought to begin with man’s earliest conjectures about the angels. In this way, we shall be in a position to accept whatever we find that agrees with faith, and refute whatever is opposed to Catholic teaching.
2.—The first of those who philosophized on the natures of things believed that only bodies
existed and held that the first principles of things were certain corporeal elements, either one
or several.
And if they held the first principle to be one, either they thought it was water, as
Thales of Miletus did, or air as Diogenes, or fire as Heraclitus.
If they thought the principles
to be several, they thought them to be either finite in number, as did Empedocles, who posited
four elements and along with them, two moving principles, namely, love and strife;
or
infinite in number, as in the case of Democritus and Anaxagoras, both of whom posited an
infinite number of minimal parts as the principles of all things, except that Democritus held
that these parts were similar in kind, differing only in figure, order, and position.
Anaxagoras, on the other hand, thought that in the case of diverse things which have similar
parts, the first principles are the infinite minimal parts.
Moreover, since all of these philosophers had the natural conviction that they should consider as god that which was the first principle of things, just as each of them had attributed to a certain corporeal element the rank of a first principle, so he likewise felt that the name and honor of divinity should be given to this element. These things were mid for this reason, that for all of these men and their followers, it was the case that no incorporeal substances, which we call “angels”, existed.
The Epicureans, however, who traced their origin to the teachings of Democritus, posited
certain corporeal gods, resembling human beings in appearance,
whom they held completely
free and without any cares, so that by enjoying ceaseless pleasures, they would be blessed.
This teaching had such a far-reaching effect that it influenced even Jewish worshipers of God,
a sect of whom, the Sadducees, held that neither angels nor spirits existed.
3.—The early philosophers, however, opposed this opinion in three ways. For although, at
first, Anaxagoras with the other Natural Philosophers posited certain material or corporeal
principles, nevertheless, he was the first among the philosophers to assert a certain
incorporeal principle, namely, an intellect.
Since indeed, according to his view, all corporeal
things were mixed in all things, it did not seem possible that corporeal bodies could have
been distinguished from one another, unless there existed some principle of distinction which
was itself completely unmixed and had nothing in common with corporeal nature.
But, although Anaxagoras’ opinion was much closer to the truth than that of the philosophers who posited only a corporeal nature, yet it falls short of the truth in two respects.
First, because it is apparent from his position that he posited only one separate intellect which had produced this world by distinguishing what was mixed. But since we attribute the establishment of the world to God, from this point of view, we can gather nothing from his opinion as to the incorporeal substances, which we call angels and which axe below God and above corporeal natures.
Second, because concerning the intellect, which he said to be one and unmixed, he seems to have failed in this respect, since he did not sufficiently express its power and eminence. Instead of defining this intellect, which he considered to be separate, as the universal principle of being, he makes it to be only a distinguishing principle, for he did not hold that the bodies that were mixed with one another, received being (esse) from the separate intellect; they received from it only distinctions.
4.—Plato therefore proceeded by a more adequate way to refute the opinion of these early
Naturalists.
For since the early Naturalists had held that man could not know the definite
truth of things, both because of the continuous passing of corporeal things and because of the
deception of the senses by which bodies are known, Plato posited certain natures, separate
from the matter of flowing things, in which truth remained abiding.
By adhering to these
natures, our soul knew the truth.
Hence, as the intellect in knowing truth, apprehends certain
things beyond the matter of sensible things, Plato thus believed that there existed certain
realities separate from sensible things.
Now our intellect uses a two-fold abstraction in arriving at the understanding of truth: One,
according as it grasps mathematical numbers, magnitudes, and figures without the
understanding of sensible matter; for, in understanding the number two or three, or a line, a
surface, a triangle, or a square, there is not included together with it in our apprehension
anything pertaining to what is hot or cold, or the like, which is perceptible by sense. The
intellect, however, uses another abstraction when it understands something universal without
the consideration of something particulax, as when we understand man without including in
our understanding anything about Socrates, Plato, or any other individual. The same appears
in other cases.
5.—Plato accordingly posited two classes of beings abstracted from sensible things, namely,
mathematicals, and universals to which he gave the name of Forms or Ideas.
There
appeared, however, to be this difference between them, namely, that in the case of
mathematicals, we can grasp several members of one species, for example, two equal lines or
two identical equilateral triangles; whereas with Forms, this is absolutely impossible; man,
for example, taken universally is only one in Form.
And so, Plato posited mathematicals
between Forms or Ideas and sensible things; since mathematicals agree with sensible things in
that many are contained in the same species, and they agree with the Forms in that they are
separate from sensible matter.
Further, among Forms themselves, he posited a certain order,
on the ground that according as something was simpler in the intellect, so fax was it prior
within the order of things. Now that which is first in the intellect is the one and the good; for
he understands nothing who does not understand something one, and the one and the good
follow upon one another. Hence Plato held that the first Idea of the One, which he called the
One-in-itself and the Goodin-itself, was the first principle of things and this Idea he said was
the highest good.
Under this One, he established among the substances separate from
matter
diverse orders of participating and participated beings, all of which orders he called
secondary gods,
as being certain unities below the first simple unity.
6.—Again, inasmuch as all Forms participate in the One, the intellect likewise must participate
in the Forms of things in order to have understanding.
Therefore, just as under the highest
God, who is the prime unity, simple and unparticipated, other Forms of things exist as
secondary unities and gods; so, under the order of these Forms or unities, he posited an order
of separate intellects, which participate in the above-mentioned Forms in order to have actual
understanding.
Among these intellects, an intellect is higher according as it is nearer to the first intellect which has full participation in the Forms; just as among the gods or unities, that one is higher which shares more perfectly in the first unity.
Although Plato distinguished between the gods and the intellects, he did not mean to imply
that the gods could not have understanding. It was his desire, rather, that they should
understand in a supra-intellectual manner; that is, instead of understanding by participating in
certain Forms, they should have understanding through themselves, with the proviso that
every one of them was good and one only through participating in the first One and Good.
Again, because we see that certain souls possess understanding which, however, does not
befit a soul by the fact that it is a soul, otherwise it would follow that every soul is an intellect
and that it would he intelligent in its whole nature, he further posited that under the order of
the separate intellects, there was an order of souls, the nobler of which participate in
intellectual power, while the lowest of them are lacking in it.
Again, because bodies do not
seem to be capable of moving themselves unless they have a soul, Plato held that self-motion
belongs to bodies insofar as they participate in soul, since those bodies lacking in this
participation, are not moved, unless they are moved by another. Whence he considered it to
be an essential property of souls that they move themselves.
7.—In this way, below the order of souls, Plato posited the order of bodies, but in such a
manner that the highest of the bodies, namely, the first heavens, which is moved by its own
motion, receives motion from the highest soul, and so on to the very lowest of the heavenly
bodies. Below these, furthermore, the Platonists placed immortal bodies, namely, aëreal or
ethereal bodies, which participate eternally in soul. Some of these they considered to be
altogether independent of earthly bodies and these they said to be bodies of demons; others
became entombed in earthly bodies, which is the case with human souls.
For they did not
believe that this earthly human body which we touch and see, participates immediately in the
soul; rather, there is another nobler body belonging to the soul, incorruptible and everlasting,
even ass the soul itself is incorruptible
in such wise that the soul with its everlasting and
invisible body is in this grosser body not as a form in matter but as a sailor in a ship.
And
just as they said that some men were good and others wicked, so too, with the demons. But
the heavenly souls, the separate intellects and all the gods, they said were all good.
In this way, therefore, between us and the highest God, it is clear that they posited four orders,
namely, that of the secondary gods, that of the separate intellects, that of the heavenly souls,
and that of the good or wicked demons. If all these things were true, then all these
intermediate orders would be called by us “angels”, for Sacred Scripture refers to the demons
themselves as angels.
The souls themselves of the heavenly bodies, on the assumption that
these are animated, should also be numbered among the angels, as Augustine determines in
the Enchiridion.
CHAPTER II
ARISTOTLE’S OPINION
8.—But the basis of this position is found to be without foundation, for it is not necessary that
what the intellect understands separately should have a separate existence (esse) in reality.
Hence, neither should we posit separate universals subsisting outside singulars nor likewise
mathematicals outside sensible things; for universals are the essences of particular things
themselves and mathematicals are certain limits of sensible bodies.
That is why Aristotle
proceeded by a more manifest and surer way, namely, by way of motion, to investigate
substances that are separate from matter.
First, he established by both reason and examples, the fact that everything moved is moved by
another; and that if something is said to be self-moved, this is not true of it according to the
same part but according to diverse parts of itself, so that one part is moving and another is
moved.
Furthermore, since it is not possible to proceed to infinity among movers and things
moved, because if the first mover is taken away, it would follow that the other movers as
well, would not be moved, we must therefore arrive at some first unmoved mover and some
first movable which is moved by itself, in the manner already indicated; for that which is
through itself, is prior to and the cause of that which is through another.
Furthermore, Aristotle aimed to establish the eternity of motion and that only an infinite
power can move in an infinite time, and likewise that no power belonging to a magnitude is
an infinite power.
From these premises he concluded that the power of the first mover is not
a power belonging to any body; therefore the first mover must be incorporeal and without
magnitude.
9.—Again, since in the class of movable beings, that which is desirable is present as an
unmoved mover, whereas the one desiring is present as a moved mover, Aristotle further
concluded that the first unmoved mover is as an appetible good and that the first self-moved
mover, namely the first movable, is moved through a desire of that unmoved mover.
However, we must furthermore keep in mind that in the order of appetites and of appetible
objects, the first is that which is through itself an object of understanding, for intellective
appetite seeks that which is good through itself; whereas sensitive appetite cannot rise to the
appetition of that which is good in itself but only that which appears good. For that which is
simply and absolutely good does not fall under the apprehension of sense but only of the
intellect.
The first movable, therefore, seeks the first mover with an intellectual appetite and from this
it can be inferred that the first movable is appetitive and intelligent. And since only a body is
moved, we may infer that the first movable is a body animated by an intellectual soul. But the
prime movable, namely the first heavens, is not the only one moved with an eternal motion;
but also all the lesser spheres of the heavenly bodies likewise are.
Therefore each of the
heavenly bodies is animated by its own soul and each has its own separate appetible object
which is the proper end of its motion.
10. -There are, accordingly, many separate substances that are in no way united to any bodies;
there are, likewise, many intellectual substances united to heavenly bodies. Aristotle attempts
to find out the number of these on the basis of the number of motions of the heavenly
bodies.
But one of his followers, namely Avicenna
assigns the number of these substances
not according to the number of motions but rather according to the number of the planets and
the other higher bodies, namely, the sphere of the fixed stars and the sphere without stars. For
many motions seem to be ordered to the motion of one star, and just as all the other heavenly
bodies are under one highest heaven by whose motion all the other bodies are revolving, so
likewise, all the other separate substances are ordered under the ‘first separate substance
which is the one God. And in like manner, all the souls of the other heavenly bodies are
ordered under the soul of the first heaven. Under the heavenly bodies according to Aristotle,
the only animated bodies are those of animals and plants.
For he did not hold that any
simple and elementary body could be animated because a simple body cannot be a suitable
organ of touch which of necessity belongs to every animal.
Between us and the heavenly
bodies, Aristotle did not locate any intervening animate body. Thus, according to the position
of Aristotle, between us and the highest God, there exists only a two-fold order of intellectual
substances, namely, the separate substances which are the ends of the heavenly motions; and
the souls of the spheres, which move through appetite and desire.
11.—Now this position of Aristotle seems to be surer because it does not depart greatly from that which is evident according to sense; yet it seems to be less adequate than the position of Plato.
In the first place, there are many things which are evident according to senses, for which an
explanation cannot be given on the basis of what Aristotle teaches. For we see in men who
are possessed by devils and in the works of sorcerers, certain phenomena which do not seem
capable of taking place except through some intellectual substance. Certain followers of
Aristotle, as is evident in Porphyry’s letter to Anebontes the Egyptian,
tried to reduce the
causes of these phenomena to the power of the heavenly bodies, as if the works of the
sorcerers attained certain unusual and marvelous results under the influence of certain
constellations. Furthermore, they say that it is through the influence of the stars that persons
who are possessed sometimes foretell future events, for the realization of which there is a
certain disposition in nature through the heavenly bodies. But in such cases, there are
manifestly certain works which cannot in any way be reduced to a corporeal cause. For
example, that people in a trance should speak in a cultivated way of sciences which they do
not know, since they are unlettered folk; and that those who have scarcely left the village in
which they were born, speak with fluency the vernacular of a foreign people. Likewise, in the
works of magicians, certain images are said to be conjured up which answer questions and
move about, all of which could not be accomplished by any corporeal cause. Therefore, as the
Platonists see it, who could evidently assign a cause of these effects, except to say that these
are brought about through demons.
12.—Second because it seems unbefitting that immaterial substances should be limited to the number of corporeal substances. For those beings that are higher do not exist for the sake of those that are lower. But on the contrary, that because of which something else exists, is the more noble. Now one cannot sufficiently ascertain the nature of an end from that which is for the end, but rather the other way about. Hence, one cannot adequately ascertain the magnitude and power of higher beings by a consideration of the lower ones. This truth is especially evident in the order of corporeal beings, for it is impossible to reckon the magnitude and number of heavenly bodies from the disposition of the elementary bodies, which are as nothing in comparison to them. But the immaterial substances surpass corporeal substances much more than the heavenly bodies surpass elementary ones. In view of this, the number, power, and disposition of immaterial substances cannot be adequately grasped from the number of heavenly movements.
13.—Let us assume the procedure and even the very words of Aristotle’s proof in order that
this truth may be more particularly made manifest. Now Aristotle assumes that there can be
no motion in the heavens unless it is ordered to the accomplishment of something.
This
assumption is sufficiently probable. For all the substances of the spheres seem to exist for the
sake of the stars which are nobler among the heavenly bodies and have a more evident
influence. Aristotle further assumes that all the higher substances, impassible and immaterial,
are ends, being of themselves most excellent; and this assumption is reasonable.
For the
good has the nature of an end, and hence among beings, those that are by their very nature
noblest, are ends for other beings.
But the conclusion of Aristotle that the number of immaterial substances is determined by the
number of heavenly movements
does not necessarily follow. For an end is both proximate
and remote. And the proximate end of the highest heavens is not necessarily the highest
immaterial substance which is the all-high God, but it is more probable that there are many
orders of immaterial substances between the first immaterial substance and the heavenly
body. The lower of these immaterial substances is ordered to the higher as to an end and a
heavenly body is ordered to the lowest of these as to its proximate end. For each thing must in
some way be proportioned to its proximate end. Accordingly, because of the greatest possible
distance between the first immaterial substance and any corporeal substance, it is not
probable
that a corporeal substance should be ordered to the highest substance as to its
proximate end.
14.—Hence even Avicenna
posited that the immediate end of any of the heavenly movements
was not the first cause but a certain first intelligence; and the same can likewise be said of the
lower motions of the heavenly bodies. Hence that there should not be more immaterial
substances than the number of heavenly motions is not a necessary fact. And Aristotle
himself, suspecting this fact, did not advance this position as necessary but only as probable.
For when he had enumerated the heavenly movements and before he offered the
aforementioned explanation, he states, “Accordingly, it is reasonable to posit so many
substances and immovable principles. But why it should be necessary, we shall leave to more
capable individuals to pronounce.”
Aristotle therefore did not consider himself equal to the
task of reaching a necessary conclusion in such matters.
Furthermore, it may seem to someone that Aristotle’s aforesaid reasoning for positing
immaterial substances is improper because it is based on the everlastingness of motion, which
is contrary to the truth of faith. But if we follow his reason carefully, we can see that his
argumentation still holds, even if the eternity of motion is denied. For, just as the infinite
power of a mover can be proved from the eternity of motion, so too, the same can be proved
from the uniformity of motion. For a mover that cannot always be in motion, must necessarily
move at one time faster and at another time more slowly according as his power gradually
slows down in motion. But in the domain of heavenly movements there is a complete
uniformity. We may therefore conclude that the mover of the first motion has the power to
move everlastingly and we would thus arrive at the same conclusion.
CHAPTER III
HOW ARISTOTLE AND PLATO AGREE
15.—After having examined these points, we can easily determine wherein Plato’s and Aristotle’s positions on the immaterial substances agree and wherein they differ.
In the first place, Plato and Aristotle agree on the manner of their existence. For Plato
held
that all lower immaterial substances are one and good by participation in the first, which is
essentially one and good. Now whatever participates in something, receives that which it
participates from the one from whom it participates; and to this extent that from which it
participates is its cause, just as air has light which it participates from the sun which is the
cause of its illumination. Therefore, according to Plato, the highest God is the reason why all
immaterial substances are each one of them one and good.
Aristotle, too, held this opinion
because, as he himself says, “that which is most being and most truth is the cause of being
and truth for all other things.”
16.—Secondly, Plato and Aristotle agree as to the condition of their nature, for both held that
all such substances are completely free of matter, although not free from the composition of
potency and act, for every participating being must be composed of potency and act. For that
which is received as participated, must be the act of the participating substance itself. And
thus, since Plato held that all substances below the highest, which is by itself one and good,
are participants, they are, of necessity composed of potency and act.
This must likewise be
said according to Aristotle’s position, for he maintained that the nature of the true and the
good is attributed to act.
Hence, that which is the first truth and the first good must be pure
act. And whatever beings fall short of it, must have a certain admixture of potency.
17.—Thirdly, Plato and Aristotle agree on the nature of providence. Plato held that the highest
God, from the fact that He is the One itself and the Good itself, has as His property from the
root nature of goodness, to have providence over all lower things; and every lower thing
insofar as it participates in the goodness of the first good, likewise acts as a providence over
the things which come after it, and not only of the same order but of diverse orders as well.
Accordingly, the first separate intellect is a providence over the whole order of separate
intellects, and each higher intellect over a lower intellect; and the whole order of separate
intellects is a providence over the order of souls and the lower orders.
Furthermore, Plato thought that this same fact could be observed among souls themselves,
namely, that the highest souls of the heavens exercise a providence over all the lower souls
and over the whole generation of lower bodies; and in the same way, that the higher souls
exercise a providence over the lower ones
i.e., the souls of the demons over the souls of
men. For the Platonists held that demons acted as mediators between us and the higher
substances.
With this view of providence, Aristotle likewise does not disagree. For he posits one separate
good, acting as a providence over all things in the manner of a single commander or master
under whom are diverse orders of things in such wise that the higher orders of things achieve
the order of perfect providence,
and hence no defect is found in them. But lower beings
which are able to receive the order of a less perfect providence are open to many defects, just
as in a home, the children, who perfectly share in the rule of the father, fall short either in few
things or in none; whereas the actions of slaves are found to lack order in many respects.
Hence among inferior bodies, failings arise in the natural order [an order] which is never
found to be lacking among higher bodies. In the same way, human souls themselves
frequently fall short of the understanding of the truth and of the right appetite of the true good
but this is not found among the higher souls or intellects. For this reason, Plato himself
posited that certain demons were good and others were wicked, as were men; whereas the
gods, the intellects, and the souls of the heavens were completely without wickedness.
These are the three points on which the opinion of Plato concerning the separate substances is
found to be in agreement with that of Aristotle.
CHAPTER IV
HOW THE ABOVE POSITIONS OF PLATO AND ARISTOTLE DIFFER
18.—There are other respects in which Plato and Aristotle differ: First, as has been said
above,
Plato posited above the souls of the heavens, a two-fold order of immaterial
substances, namely, the intellects and the gods. He declared these gods were the separate
intelligible Forms
by participation in which the intellects have understanding.
But
Aristotle, since he did not posit any separate universals, posited only a single order of things
above the souls of the heavens. He held, moreover, that the first among these was the highest
God, just as Plato held that the highest God was first in the order of Forms, among which the
highest God is the very Idea of the One and the Good. But Aristotle held that this order
comprised both, namely, so that it was both understanding and understood, so that thus the
highest God would understand not by participation in something higher that would be His
perfection but through His own essence.
And Aristotle likewise held the same opinion as to
the other separate substances ordered below the highest God,
except that as they fall short of
the simplicity of the First and of His highest perfection, their understanding can be perfected
by participation in the higher substances.
Thus, according to Aristotle, such substances
which are the ends of the heavenly motions are both understanding intellects and intelligible
Forms.
But this is not to be understood in the sense that they are the forms or natures of
sensible substances, as the Platonists asserted,
but altogether higher forms.
They differ, secondly, because Plato did not restrict the number of separate intellects to the
number of heavenly movements. It was not on this account that Plato was moved to posit
separate intellects but rather by considering the very nature of things in themselves. Aristotle,
on the other hand, not wishing to be diverted from sensible things, came to posit separate
intellectual substances as a result of the sole consideration of motion, as we have said
above,
and for this reason, limited the number of the substance’s to the number of heavenly
motions.
Third, they differ because Aristotle did not posit any souls intermediate between the souls of
the heavens and the souls of men, as did Plato.
Hence, we find that neither Aristotle nor any
of his followers has made mention of demons.This then is what we have gathered from
various writings concerning the opinions of Plato and Aristotle on the separate substances.
CHAPTER V
THE OPINION OF AVICEBRON AND HIS ARGUMENTS FOR IT
19.—Among those who came after Plato and Aristotle, some departed from their positions and
fell into error. First among these was Avicebron who, in the book The Fount of Life, held that
separate substances were of a different state.
For he held that all substances established
below God are composed of matter and form
an opinion that disagrees both with the view of
Plato and the view of Aristotle.
Avicebron seems to have been twice deceived: First,
because he thought that according to the intelligible composition found in the genera of
things, inasmuch, namely, as a species is composed of genus and difference, there would
likewise be understood such a composition in things themselves, so that in the case of each
and every thing existing in a genus, the genus is matter and the difference is form.
Secondly,
because he thought that “to be” in potency, “to be” a subject, and “to be” a recipient would in
all cases be said according to one notion. Therefore, basing himself upon these two positions,
he proceeded in a certain reductive way in investigating the composition of all things up to
intellectual substances.
20.—In the first place, he noticed in the case of artificial things that they are composed of an
artificial form and of matter, which is a certain natural thing, for example, iron or wood,
which is disposed to the artificial form as potency to act.
Furthermore, he observed that such
particular natural bodies were composed of elements.
Hence he asserted that the four
elements are related to the particular natural forms, e.g., of stone or iron, as matter to form
and potency to act. Moreover, he noted that the four elements agree in that each one of them
is a body and they differ according to contrary qualities.
Hence in the third place, he held
that body itself is the matter of the elements, which matter he named universal natural matter,
and that the forms of this matter are the qualities of the elements. But because he observed
that a heavenly body agrees with the elements in corporeity but differs from them in not being
receptive of contrary qualities
he placed the matter of a heavenly body in a fourth order,
which likewise is related to the form of heavenly body as potency is to act. Avicebron thus
posited four orders of corporeal matter.
21.—Again, because he saw that every body signifies a certain substance with length, width,
and thickness, he thought that the body, insofar as it is such a body, has three dimensions
which are as form; substance, which is the subject of quantity and the other genera of
accidents, is matter of the body so far as it is a body.
Thus, therefore, as he himself says, the
substance which supports the nine predicaments is the prime spiritual matter.
And just, as he
posited in universal corporeal matter, which he called a body, something higher which was
not receptive of contrary qualities, (namely, the matter of the body of the heavens), and
something lower which is receptive of contrary qualities, which he believed to be the matter
of the four elements,
—so likewise, in substance itself, he posited something higher which is
not receptive of quantity and which he considered to be a separate substance and something
lower which is receptive of quantity, which he posited as the incorporeal matter of bodies.
22.—Furthermore, he asserted that the separate or spiritual substances themselves are
composed of matter and form. This he proved by several arguments:
First, because he held
that there would be no diversity among spiritual substances unless they were composed of
matter and form.
For if they are not composed of matter and form, they are either matter
alone or form alone. If they are matter alone, then spiritual substances cannot be many
because matter of itself is one and is diversified through forms. In like manner, if a spiritual
substance is form alone, no cause of the diversification of spiritual substances can be
assigned. For if you say that they are diverse according to perfection and imperfection, it
would then follow that spiritual substance is the subject of perfection and imperfection. But to
be a subject belongs to the nature of matter and not to the nature of form. Therefore, it
remains either that spiritual substances are not many or that they are composed of matter and
form.
His second reason is that the concept of spirituality is outside the concept of corporeity. And
thus corporeal spiritual substances have something in which they differ and likewise in which
they agree since each is a substance. Hence, just as in the case of corporeal substance,
substance is as matter upholding corporeity, so in the case of spiritual substance, substance is
as matter upholding spirituality. And according as matter participates more or less in the form
of spirituality, spiritual substances are accordingly higher or lower, just as the finer the air is,
the more it participates in clarity.
23.—His third reason is that esse is found in common among spiritual substances as in higher
beings, and in corporeal substances as in lower beings. Therefore, that which follows upon
esse in corporeal substances will also follow upon esse in spiritual ones. But a three-fold
order is found in corporeal substances, namely, a gross body which is the body of the
elements, a refined body which is the heavenly body, and finally, the matter and form of
body. Therefore, in a spiritual substance there is found a lower spiritual substance, for
example, one which is joined to a body, and a more excellent one which is not joined to a
body, and again, matter and form from which a spiritual substance is composed.