Thomas Aquinas
ON CHARITY
translated by Lottie H. Kendzierski
Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1960
Article 1: Whether Charity Is Something Created in the Soul, or Is it the Holy Spirit Itself?
It seems that charity is not something created in the soul.
1. For, as Augustine says, just as the soul is the life of the body, so God is the life of the soul. But the soul is immediately the life of the body. Therefore God is immediately the life of the soul. Therefore, since a soul is said to be alive from the fact that it has charity, as is said (1 John iii. 14), He that loveth not, abideth in death, man is not in charity through something which is a medium between God and man, but through God Himself. Charity, therefore, is not something created in the soul, but is God Himself.
2. But it was objected that the comparison is applied only in this respect, that the soul is the life of the body as a mover, and not insofar as it is the life of the body as a form. But on the contrary, in proportion as any agent is more powerful, to that extent it requires less of a disposition in the patient; e.g., the less dry the wood is, the greater must be the fire sufficient to burn it. But God is an agent of infinite power. Therefore, if He is the life of the soul, as moving it to love, it seems that no created disposition on the part of this soul is required.
3. Moreover, there is no medium among those things which are the same. But the soul loving God is the same as God, as is said (1 Cor. vi. 17), He who is joined to the Lord, is one in spirit. Therefore no created charity comes as a medium between the soul loving and God being loved.
4. Moreover, the love by which we love our neighbor is charity. But the love by which we love our neighbor is God Himself, for Augustine says in Book VIII of the De Trinitate, He who loves his neighbor loves the same love. But God is love. It follows, therefore, that he especially loves God. Therefore charity is not something created, but is God Himself.
5. But it was said that God, as a cause, is the love by which we love our neighbor. On the contrary, Augustine says in the same place, and he clearly proved it with the testimony of the words of St. John, that that very celestial love by which we love each other is not only from God but also is God. Therefore God is love not only causally, but essentially.
6. Moreover, Augustine says in Book V of the De Trinitate, For we are not going to say that God is called Love because love itself is a substance worthy of the name of God, but because it is a gift of God, as it is said of God, "Thou art my patience," in that He Himself gives it to us. For it is not said, 0 Lord You are my love; but it is said thus, "God is love," as it is said, "God is a Spirit." Therefore it is that God is called charity not only causally, but also essentially.
7. Moreover, when the effect of God is known, He Himself is not known because of this, but He is known through the knowledge of the highest love. For Augustine says in Book VIII of the Dc Trinitate, For he knows the love with which he loves, more than the brother whom he loves. So now he can know God more than he knows his brother. Embrace the love of God, and by love embrace God. Therefore God is called fraternal love not solely as a cause.
8. But it was objected that when fraternal love is recognized, God is recognized as in His own likeness. On the contrary, man is made in the image and likeness of God according to the very substance of his soul. But this likeness is obscured through sin. Therefore, in order that God be able to be recognized in the soul as in His own image, it is only necessary that sin be taken away, and not that some created thing be superadded to the soul.
9. Moreover, everything that is in the soul is either a potency, or a passion, or a habit, as is said in Book III of the Ethic. But charity is not a potency of the soul, because if it were it would be natural. Nor is it a passion, because it is not in a sensitive potency in which are all passions. Nor is it a habit, because a habit is removed with difficulty; charity, however, is easily lost through one act of mortal sin. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul.
10. Moreover, no created thing has infinite power. But charity has infinite power because it joins what is infinitely far apart, viz., the soul to God, and it merits an infinite good. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul.
11. Moreover, every creature is vanity, as is shown (Eccle. i. 2). Vanity, however, does not unite with truth. Therefore, since charity unites us to the First Truth, charity is not something created.
12. Moreover, every created thing is a certain nature since it falls within one of the ten genera. Therefore, if charity is something created in the soul, it is a certain nature. Therefore, since we merit by charity, and if charity is a created thing, it follows that nature is the principle of meriting. This is the erroneous opinion of Pelagius.
13. Moreover, man is closer to God according to his existence in grace than he is according to his existence in nature. But God created man without a medium according to his existence in nature. So, neither in man's existence in grace does God use a medium, viz., a created charity.
14. Moreover, an agent which acts without a medium is more perfect than an agent which acts through a medium. But God is the most perfect agent. Therefore He acts without a medium. He does not, therefore justify the soul through the medium of any created thing.
15. Moreover, a rational creature is more excellent than other creatures But other creatures attain their own end without anything superadded Therefore even more is a rational creature moved by God to its end with out some created thing superadded to it.
16. But it was objected that a rational creature is not, through its own nature, proportionate to its end, and therefore it needs something super added. On the contrary, the end of man is the infinite good. But no created thing is proportionate to an infinite good. Therefore that by which man is ordered to his end is not a good created in the soul.
17. Moreover, as God is the first light, He is also the highest good. But the light which is God is present to the soul, because of which it is said ( Ps. xxxv. 10), In thy light we shall see light. Therefore the highest good, which is God, is also present to the soul. But the good is that by which we love something. Therefore that by which we love is God.
18. But it was objected that the good which is God is present to the soul not formally but efficiently. On the contrary, God is pure form. Therefore He is present formally in those things in which He is present.
19. Moreover, nothing is loved unless it is known, as Augustine say in Book X of the De Trinitate. Therefore according to this, a thing is lovable according as it is knowable. But God is, through Himself, knowable as the first principle of knowledge. Therefore He is lovable throngh Himself and not through any created charity.
20. Moreover, a thing is lovable according as it is good. But God is infinite good. Therefore He is infinitely lovable. But no created love is infinite. Therefore, since some who have charity love God because He is lovable, the love by which we love God is not something created.
21. Moreover, God loves all things which exist, as is said (Wis. xi. 25). But He does not love irrational creatures through something superadded to them; therefore neither does He love rational creatures in this way. Thus the charity and grace according to which man is loved by God is not something created and superadded to the soul.
22. Moreover, if charity is something created, it must be an accident. But charity is not an accident because no accident is more worthy than its subject. Charity, however, is more worthy than nature. Therefore charity is not something created in the soul.
23. Moreover, as Bernard says, we love God and our neighbor by the same law by which the Father and the Son love Themselves. But the Father and the Son love Themselves with an uncreated love. Therefore we love God with an uncreated love.
24. Moreover, that which can raise from death is of infinite power. But charity raises from death, for it is said (1 John iii. 14), We know that we have passed from death to life, because we love the brethren. Therefore charity is of infinite power and is not something created.
On the contrary, everything which is received in a thing is received in it according to the mode of the receiver. If, therefore, charity is received in us from God, it must be received finitely by us, according to our proper mode. However, every finite thing is created. Therefore charity is something created in us.
I answer. It must be said that there are some who have maintained that the charity in us by which we love God and our neighbor is nothing more than the Holy Spirit, as is clear from the Master in the First Book of the Sentences, dist. 17. In order that this opinion might be more clearly understood, it should be known that the Master placed this act of love by which we love God and our neighbor as a created thing in us, like the acts of the other virtues. But he set a difference between the act of charity and the acts of the other virtues. For, the Holy Spirit moves the soul to the acts of the other virtues by means of certain habitual means which are called virtues, but He moves the will immediately to the act of love through Himself without any habit, as is clear in Book I, dist. 17. It was the excellence of charity which moved him to posit this theory, and the words of Augustine and others were used in objections. However, it was ridiculous to say that the very act of love which we express when we love God and our neighbor is the Holy Spirit Itself.
This opinion clearly cannot stand. For, just as natural actions and movements proceed from a certain intrinsic principle which is nature, so also it is necessary that actions of the will proceed from an intrinsic principle. And, just as the natural inclination in natural things is called the natural appetite, so also in rational beings, the inclination which follows the apprehension of the intellect is the act of the will.
It is, however, possible that a natural thing be moved not by an intrinsic principle but by some extrinsic agent, as for instance when a stone thrown into the air. But it is certainly impossible that such a movement or action which does not proceed from an intrinsic principle be called natural, for this would imply a contradiction in itself. Whence, since for contradictories to exist at the same time does not lie within the divine power, it cannot even be effected by God that the upward motion of a stone, which does not proceed from an intrinsic principle, be natural to it. Now it is possible to give a stone that power by which it would naturally move upward as from an intrinsic principle, but that motion would not be natural to the stone unless another nature be given to it. And likewise, it cannot be effected by God that any movement of man, either interior or exterior, which proceeds from an extrinsic principle is voluntary. Whence, all the acts of the will are reduced, as to a pristine root, to that which man naturally wishes, which is the last end; and he wishes the means for the sake of the end.
Therefore an act which exceeds the entire capabilities of human nature cannot be voluntary to man unless there be added to human nature something intrinsic, perfecting the will, so that such an action would proceed from an intrinsic principle. If, therefore, the act of charity in man does not proceed from an interior habit superadded to a natural potency, but proceeds from the movement of the Holy Spirit, then one of these two alternatives follow: either an act of charity is not voluntary, which is impossible because to love something is to will it; or it does not exceed the capability of nature, and this view is heretical.
This difficulty being removed, it will follow, first, that the act of charity is an act of the will. Secondly, if it is granted that the act of the will can be entirely from an extrinsic principle, as acts of the hands or feet, it will also follow that if the act of charity is only from the movement of extrinsic principle, it cannot be meritorious. For, every agent which does not act according to its proper form but only because it is moved by a another, is an agent only instrumentally, as an axe is an agent only inasmuch as it is moved by a woodsman.
Therefore if the soul does not effect an act of charity through some proper form, but only because it is moved by an extrinsic agent, i.e., by the Holy Spirit, then it will follow that it is considered only as an instrument for this act. There would not be, then, in man the power to act or not to act, and he would not be able to gain merit. For, only those things are meritorious which are in us according to a certain manner. Thus human merit is entirely taken away, since love is the basis of meriting.
Thirdly it cannot hold, because it would follow that a man who is in charity would not be inclined to an act of charity, nor would he perform it with any pleasure. For, the acts of virtue are enjoyable to us because we are conformed to them according to a habit, and we are inclined toward them through the manner of a natural inclination. However, the act of charity is especially enjoyable and especially inclines one to remain in charity, and through it everything we do or suffer is rendered pleasing.
The conclusion, therefore, is that there must be a certain habit of charity created in us, which is the formal principle of the act of love. By this opinion it is not denied that the Holy Spirit, Who is Uncreated Charity, exists in man who has created charity, or that He moves man's soul to the act of love, as God moves all things to their own actions to which they are inclined by their own proper forms. And thus it is that He disposes all things sweetly, because to all things He gives forms and powers inclining them to that which He Himself moves them; so that they tend toward it not by force, but as if it were by their own free accord.
To the first, it must be said that God is the life of the soul in the manner of a mover, and not in the manner of a formal principle.
To the second, it must be said that although it pertains to the effectiveness of a mover that it does not require any disposition in the subject, however, that mover displays its effectiveness if it impresses a strong disposition in that which receives or is moved. For, a great fire causes not only substantial form to appear, but also a strong disposition. That agent which moves to action, and which also impresses a form through that which it moves, is stronger than that mover which so moves to action that it impresses no form. Therefore, because the Holy Spirit is the most powerful mover, He so moves to love that He also causes a habit of charity.
To the third, it must be said that when it is written (1 Cor. vi. 17), He who is foined to the Lord, is one in spirit, this is not meant a unity of substance, but a unity of affection between the lover and the loved. By this union the habit of charity is regarded more as a principle of love than as a medium between the lover and the loved, for the act of love pass immediately to God as to the loved, but not immediately into the habit of charity.
To the fourth, it must be said that although the love by which we love our neighbor is God, it is however not denied that in addition to this created love there is in us a created love by which we love formally, has been said.
To the fifth, it must be said that God is said to be love or charity only causally, as He is said to be hope or patience only causally, but also essentially. This, however, does not deny that besides that love which God is essentially, there is also in us a created love.
The answer to the sixth objection is clear from the above.
To the seventh, it must be said that this text has the same difficulty whether a created habit of charity is posited in us or not. For, when Augustine said that he who loves his neighbor knows the love by which he loves more than he knows the neighbor whom he loves, he seems to understand the very act of love. Now no one holds that this act is something uncreated; therefore it cannot be concluded that the love thus known is God. Therefore when we perceive in ourselves an act of love, we feel a certain participation of God because God Himself is love, not because He is that very act of love which we perceive.
To the eighth, it must be said that a creature, insofar as it is more perfect, approaches more to a likeness to God. Whence, although any creature has a certain likeness to God in this, that it exists and is good, however a rational creature has, in addition, a further cause for similitude in this, that it is intellectual, and another in what it has been made. Thus in the act of charity God is more expressly perceived as in a closer likeness.
To the ninth, it must be answered that charity is a habit and is moved with difficulty. For he who has charity is not easily inclined to sin, even though charity is lost through sin.
To the tenth, it must be said that charity unites one to the infinite good not efficiently but formally, whence infinite power does not strive after charity, but rather the author of charity. However, infinite power would strive after charity if man were infinitely ordered to the infinite good through charity, which is clearly false. For, the manner follows the form of the thing.
To the eleventh, it must be said that a creature is vanity because it is from nothing, not because it is a likeness of God; and it is for this reason that created charity unites to First Truth.
To the twelfth, it must be said that according to the Pelagian heresy, natural principles of man are sufficient for meriting eternal life. It is not, however, heretical that we merit by something which exists as a certain nature in some category. For it is clear that we merit by our acts, and our acts, as created things, exist in some genus and are of a certain nature.
To the thirteenth, it must be said that God created natural being without an efficient medium, but not without a formal medium. For, to each thing He gave the form through which it exists. And likewise He gives existence in grace through some superadded form. But existence in nature and existence in grace are not entirely similar for, as St. Augustine says in Super Joan., He who created thee without thee will not justify thee without thee. Therefore in justification, some operation of justifying is needed and thus it is necessary that there be present an active formal principle which is not present in creation.
To the fourteenth it must be said that an agent acting mediately is less effective if he uses that medium because of its necessity. But God does not use a medium because He is in need of the help of any creature; He acts mediately in order that He might preserve order in things. But if we speak of a formal medium, it is clearthat as the agent is more perfect, so much more will he induce a form. For an imperfect agent does not induce a form but only a disposition to the form, and the less perfect the agent is, the less is his power to induce that disposition.
To the fifteenth, it must be said that man and rational creatures are able to attain a higher end than other creatures. Whence, although they lack more things necessary to attain this end, nevertheless they are more perfect; just as a man who can attain hea1th through the use of several medicines is better disposed than one who is not able to be completely cured, even though he needs only a few prescriptions.
To the sixteenth it must be said that the soul through created charity is raised above the possible limit of nature so that he can be ordered to a more perfect end than the capability of nature would supply. However, it is not so ordered to attain God perfectly, as He enjoys Himself, from the fact that no creature is proportionate to God.
To the seventeenth, it must be said that although the good which is God is through itself present to the soul,nevertheless there is need of a formal medium—on the part of the soul, not however on the part of God—for the soul to be ordered perfectly to Him.
To the eighteenth, it must be replied that God is form subsisting essentially; He is not that which is joined as form to something else.
To the nineteenth, it must be said that, granted that God is known through Himself by the soul—but this introduces another question—He is loved through Himself in the same way as He is known through Himself. When I say through Himself, this is understood on the part of the one loved, not of the one loving. For, God is loved by the soul not because of some other thing, but only because of Himself; and still the soul needs some formal principle in order to love God perfectly.
To the twentieth, it must be said that God cannot be loved by us to the extent that He is lovable, so that it does not follow that the love of charity by which we love God is infinite. This argument applies no less to an act than to a habit; but no one can say that the act of love by which we love God is something uncreated.
To the twenty-first, it must be said that we have need of a habit of charity insofar as we love God; this is not necessary for other creatures, although all creatures are loved by God.
To the twenty-second, it must be answered that no accident is more worthy than its subject as regards its manner of existing, because substance is being through itself, while accident is being existing in another. But when the accident is an act and the form of the substance, there is nothing to prevent the accident from being more worthy than the substance. For in this way the accident is related to the substance as act to potency, as the perfect to the perfectible; and it is thus that charity is more worthy than the soul.
To the twenty-third, it must be said that although the law by which we love God and our neighbor is uncreated, that by which we formally love God and our neighbor is something created. For, the uncreated law is the first measure and rule of our love.
To the twenty-fourth, it must be said that charity revives the dead in a spiritual way, formally, but not as an effective agent. Therefore it is not necessary that it be of infinite power, since neither was the soul of Lazarus which, as a form, revived Lazarus inasmuch as he was revived through a union of his soul with his body.
Article 2: Whether Charity Is a Virtue?
It seems that charity is not a virtue.
1. A virtue concerns what is difficult, according to the Philosopher in Book VI of the Ethics. But charity does not pertain to the difficult; rather, as Augustine says in the De Verbis Domini, Love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and next to nothing. Therefore charity is not a virtue.
2. But it was objected that what is done through virtue is difficult in the beginning but easy in the end. On the contrary, in the beginning there is not yet a virtue. If, therefore, it is difficult only in the beginning, virtue will not pertain to what is difficult.
3. Moreover, the difficulty in virtues arises from contraries, for it becomes difficult to preserve temperance because of the contrary concupiscences. But charity pertains to the highest good for which there is no contrary. Therefore that which pertains to charity is neither difficult in the end nor in the beginning.
4. Moreover, to esteem or to love is to wish a certain thing. But the Apostle says (Rom. vii. 18), To will, is present with me. Therefore to love is present to us. There is, therefore, required for this no other virtue of charity.
5. Moreover, in our mind there is only intellect and appetite. But the intellect is elevated to God by faith; the affective power by hope. It is, therefore, not necessary to posit a third virtue of charity to elevate the mind to God.
6. But it should be objected that hope elevates but does not join together, whence there is need for charity which will unite. On the contrary, hope, because it does not join, always concerns that which is not joined. Hope is not necessary for those who are united to God through the enjoyment of beatitude. If charity unites, by the same reasoning it does not belong to those who are not yet united, i.e., to those living in this life. But virtue perfects us in this life, for it is a disposition of that which is perfect to that which is best. Therefore charity is not a virtue.
7. Moreover, grace adequately joins us to God. Therefore the virtue of charity is needed to unite us to God. 8. Moreover, charity is a certain friendship of man to God. But friendship of man to man is not included by philosophers among the political virtues. Therefore the love of God ought not to be numbered among the theological virtues.
9. Moreover, no passion is a virtue. Love is a passion, therefore it is not a virtue.
10. Moreover, virtue, according to the Philosopher, is a mean. But charity is not a mean because there can be nothing beyond the love of God. Therefore charity is not a virtue.
11. Moreover, the affective power is corrupted more through sin that is the intellect, because sin is in the will, as Augustine says. But our intellect is not able to see God in this state of life immediately as He is in Himself. Neither is our affective power able to love God in this state of life immediately as He is in Himself. But to love God as He is in Himself is attributed to charity. Therefore charity ought not to be numbered among the virtues which perfect us in this life.
12. Moreover, virtue is the ultimate limit of a power, as is said in Book I of the De Caelo. But enjoyment is the ultimate limit which pertains to the affective power. Therefore enjoyment ought to be a greater virtue than love.
13. Moreover, every virtue has its proper measure; whence Augustine says that sin, which is the opposite of virtue, is a privation of mode, species and order. But charity does not have a measure, because as Bernard says, the measure of charity is to love without measure. Therefore charity is not a virtue.
14. Moreover, one virtue is not designated by another, because all the species of the same genus are divided through opposition. But charity is designated by the other virtues, for it is written (1 Cor. xiii. 4), Charity is patient, is kind. Therefore charity is not a virtue.
15. Moreover, according to the Philosopher in Book VIII of the Ethics, friendship consists in a certain equality. But there is the greatest innequality between God and us, as between beings who are infinitely separated. Therefore there can be no friendship of God for us, or of us for God. So charity, which designates friendship of this kind, does not seem to be a virtue. 16. Moreover, love of the highest good is natural to us. But virtue is not natural, because virtues are not in us by nature, as is clear from Book II of the Ethics. Therefore love of the highest good, which is charity, is not a virtue.
17. Moreover, love is more excellent than fear. But fear, because of its own excellence, is not a virtue but a gift, which is more excellent than a virtue. Therefore neither is charity a virtue but a gift.
On the contrary, the precepts of the law are about the acts of the virtues. Now the act of charity is commanded in the law, for it is written (Matt. xii. 37), that the first and greatest commandment is, Love the Lord thy God. Therefore charity is a virtue.
I answer. It must be said that charity is, without a doubt, a virtue. Now since a virtue is that which makes its possessor good and renders his works good, it is clear that man is ordered to his proper good according to the proper virtue. But the proper good of man must be considerd in various ways, according as man is understood under various aspects. The proper good of man as man is the good of reason, in that to be a man is to be rational. But the good of man considered as an artist is the good of art; so also considered in his political character, his good is the common good of the state. Since virtue operates for good, it is necessary for virtue of any kind that it operate well for the good, i.e., voluntarily, readily, with delight and firmly. These are the conditions of virtuous operation which are not found in any operation unless the agent love the good for which he is working, because love is the principle of all the voluntary affective powers. For, that which is loved is desired when it is not possessed; there is pleasure when it is possessed; and those things which prevent one from having what has been loved cause sadness. Also, those things which are done out of love are done steadily, rapidly and with delight. Therefore love of the good, for which virtue operates, is necessary for virtue.
But that virtue which belongs to man as man operates for a good that is connatural to man. Therefore the love of this good, which is the good of reason, is by nature in his will. But if we accept the virtue of man according to some other consideration that is not natural to man, it will be necessary for virtue of this kind that love of that good to which such a virtue is ordered be something superadded to the nature of the will. For the artist does not operate well unless the love of the good which is intended through the operation of his art be added to him. Whence the Philosopher says in Book VIII of the Politics, for one to be considered politically good, he must love the good of the state. But when man becomes a citizen of a state and is admitted to participating in the good of some state, certain virtues are suitable, necessary even, for doing those things which are a citizen's duty and for loving the good of the state. Therefore man, through grace, becomes as it were a citizen and a sharer in this blessed society which is called the heavenly Jerusalem (Ephes. ii. 19), You are fellow-citizens with the saints, and the domestics of God. And in this way, man is admitted to participating in celestial beatitude which consists in the vision and enjoyment of God. Therefore certain gratuitous virtues, which are infused, are necessary for man when he is enrolled in the heavenly state; for the proper operation of these virtues there is required the love of the common good for the whole society, which is the divine good considered as the object of beatitude.
But to love the good of any society involves a twofold consideration: first, the manner in which it is obtained; secondly, the manner in which it is preserved. But to love the good of any society so that it might be had or possessed, does not constitute the political good. Thus does a tyrant love the good of the state in order to dominate it, which is to love himself more than the state; for he desires this good for himself, not for the state. But to love the good of the state so that it might be preserved and defended, this is indeed to love the state, and this constitutes the political good. So much is this so, that men would expose themselves to dangers of death or neglect their own private good, in order to preserve or increase the good of the state. Therefore, to love the good in which the blessed participate so that it might be had or possessed does not make man well-disposed toward beatitude, because the wicked also desire this good. But to love that good for its own sake in order that it might remain and be made wide-spread, and that nothing might act against that good, this does dispose man well toward that society of the blessed. This is charity, which loves God for His own sake, and loves fellow-men who are capable of attaining beatitude as it loves itself; charity resists every hindrance both in itself and in others; charity can never exist with mortal sin, that obstacle to beatitude. Therefore it is clear that charity is not only a virtue, but even the most powerful of the virtues.
To the first, it must be said that virtue does concern that which is difficult in itself, but it nevertheless becomes easy to one possessing virtue.
The answer to the second objection is clear from the above. But this remains: considered in itself, that with which virtue is concerned is difficult while it is in the process of coming to virtue. When it is virtuous it becomes easy, and this arises from the perfection of virtue.
To the third, it must be said that the difficulty is not only from contranies, but it is also from the excellence of the object. For, a thing is said to be difficult to understand for us because of the excellence of the intelligible, not because of some contrary.
To the fourth, it must be answered that the tendency which is present to us from nature is imperfect and weak as regards its freely obtaining things spiritual and gratuitous. For the Apostle also wrote in the same chapter (Rom. vii. 15), I do not that good which I will. Therefore there is need for the help of a gratuitous gift.
To the fifth, it must be said that hope lifts the affective power of man to the highest good so that it might be attained; but in addition, it is necessary that this good be loved in order for it to be a good of man, as was said above in the body of the Article.
To the sixth, it must be said that, concerning the nature of charity or love, it is that which unites in affection. For example, this union is considered in this respect: that a man consider his friend as another self, and wishes good for him as he does for himself. But to unite in reality, this is not the nature of charity. Therefore there can be a love both of what is possessed and what is not possessed. It makes one desire what is not possessed, and be delighted with what is possessed.
To the seventh, it must be said that grace unites us with God in the manner of assimilation. But it is necessary that we be made one with Him through the operation of the intellect and the will, which is done by charity.
To the eighth, it must be answered that friendship is not posited as a virtue, but as something following virtue. For one who has virtue and loves the good of reason, it follows from the inclination of virtue that he loves what is like himself, i.e., virtuous men in whom the good of reason is strong. But the friendship which is for God, Who is blessed and the author of beatitude, ought to be included among the virtues which order men to beatitude. Therefore, since it is not consequent to the other virtues, but precedes them, as has just been shown, friendship must be in itself a virtue.
To the ninth, it must be said that love, considered in its sensitive part, is a passion; indeed, this is the love of the good through the senses. But such a love is not the love of charity, therefore the argument does not apply.
To the tenth, it must be replied that when the Philosopher said that virtue is a mean between two extremes, he was referring to the moral virtues. This is not true of the theological virtues, among which is included charity, as has been shown in the preceding Question, Article 13.
To the eleventh, it must be answered that something understood as good moves the will; and therefore, although the intellect knows God as the highest good through some medium, from this it moves the will so that He can be loved immediately although He is understood through some medium. For, that by which the knowledge of the intellect is determined, moves the will.
To the twelfth, it must be answered that enjoyment does not express the operation, but something consequent upon the operation. Now, since virtue is the principle of operation, enjoyment is not listed among the virtues, but among the fruits, as is shown (Galat. v. 22), The fruit of the Spirit is, charity, joy, peace, patience.
To the thirteenth, it must be said that the object of charity, viz., God, transcends every human capability. Whence, however the human will tries to love God, it is unable to reach Him so that it might love Him as much as He ought to be loved. Therefore it is said that charity has no measure, because there is no fixed terminus of divine love which, if love would exceed, would go against the nature of the virtue. But this can happen with the moral virtues which are means between extremes. The measure of charity is this, that it has no such measure. It cannot be concluded from this that charity is not a virtue, but only that it does not stand as a mean like the moral virtues.
To the fourteenth, it must be said that charity is called patient and kind, as if named from the other virtues, inasmuch as it produces the acts of all the virtues.
To the fifteenth, it must be said that charity is not a virtue of man considered as man, but of man as considered as becoming, through participation in grace, like to God and the Son of God, according to which it is written (1 John iii. 1), Behold what manner of charity the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called, and should be the sons of God.
To the sixteenth, it must be said that the love of the highest good, considered as the principle of natural being, is in us from nature. However, considered as the object of that beatitude which exceeds the total capacity of created nature, it is not in us from nature but is above nature.
To the seventeenth, it must be answered that the gifts perfect the virtues by raising them above the human way of acting. Thus, the gift of understanding perfects the virtue of faith; and the gift of fear perfects the virtue of temperance from excesses that are beyond the human way of acting. But in the love of God, there is no such imperfection which needs to be perfected by a gift. Therefore charity, which is more excellent than all the gifts, is not considered as the gift of virtue.
Article 3: Whether Charity Is the Form of the Virtues?
It seems that charity is not the form of the virtues.
1. For, the form confers being and species on that of which it is the form. But charity does not give being and species to any virtue. Therefore charity is not the form of the other virtues.
2. Moreover, there is no form of a form. All virtues are forms, for they are certain perfections. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.
3. Moreover, form is included in the definition of that of which it is the form. But charity is not included in the definition of the virtues. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.
4. Moreover, those things which are separated by opposition are not so related that one is the form of the other. But charity is separated by opposition from the other virtues, as is clear (1 Cor. xiii. 13), And now there remain faith, hope, and charity, these three. Therefore charity is not the form of the virtues.
5. But it must be objected that charity is not the intrinsic form of the virtues, but the exemplar. On the contrary, that which is in imitation of something derives its species from the exemplar. Therefore, if charity is the exemplary form of all the virtues, all the virtues derive their species from it. Therefore all the virtues would be of one species, which is false.
6. Moreover, the form of the exemplar is that in imitation of which something is made; therefore it is necessary only in order that a thing be made. If charity is the exemplary form of the virtues, charity itself will be necessary only for the generation of the virtues. Therefore, when the virtues are possessed, it will not be necessary to have charity, which is clearly false.
7. Moreover, the exemplar is necessary to make something, but not to use what has already been made; just as the exemplar is necessary in transcribing a book, but not in using the book after it has been written. Therefore, if charity is the exemplary form of the virtues, it does not belong to us who use these virtues, but to God Who causes the virtues in us.
8. Moreover, the exemplar can exist without what it exemplifies. Therefore if charity is the exemplary form of the virtues, it follows that it could exist without the other virtues, which is false.
9. Moreover, every virtue has its form from its end and object. But what is formed by itself does not need to be formed by another; and so charity is not the form of the virtues.
10. Moreover, nature always does what is best. Therefore God does so all the more. But it is best for something to be formed than unformed. So, since God activates virtues in us, it seems that He makes them formed, and they do not need to be formed by charity.
11. Moreover, faith is a kind of spiritual light. But light is the form of what is seen in light. Therefore, just as physica. light is the form of colors, so faith, and not charity, is the form of charity and of the other virtues.
12. Moreover, the order of perfections corresponds with the order of perfectibles. But virtues are perfections of the powers of the sould. Therefore the order of virtues follows the order of the powers. But among the powers of the soul, the intellect is higher than the will. Therefore faith is higher than charity, and so faith is rather the form of charity than the other way around.
13. Moreover, as moral virtues are related to one another, so are theological virtues. But prudence, which is in the cognitive power, informs the other virtues which are in the appetitive power, such as justice, fortitude, temperance and the like. Theefore faith, which is in the cognitive power, gives form to charity, which is in the appetitive power, and not the other way around.
14. Moreover, the form of a virtue is is mode. But it belongs to reason to impose mode on the appetite, and not the other way around. Therefore, faith, which resides in reason, is the form of charity, which is in the appetitive part, rather than the other way around.
15. Morover, on Matthew 1:2, "Abraham begot Isaac, Isaac begot Jacob", the Gloss says that faith begets hope, and hope charity. But everything generated receives its form from the generator. Therefore charity receives its form from faith and hope, and not the other way around.
16. Moreover, in one and the same thing, potency precedes act in time. Therefore if charity is compared to the other virtues as their act and form, it would follow that the other virtues must exist in man at an earlier time than charity, which is false.
17. Moeover, the designation of form in moral matters comes from the end. But all virtues are ordered, for their ultimate end, to the vision of God, which is the complete reward, as Augustine says, and which follows upon faith. Therefore al the other virtues receive their form from the end of faith. Thus it seems that faith is the form of charity, rather than the other way around.
18. Moreover, the the final, efficient and formal causes do not exist in the same numerical thing, according to the Philosopher in II Physics. But charity is the end and motivator of the virtues. Therefore it is not their form.
19. Moreover, that which is the principle of existence is the form. But the principle of spiritual existence is grace, according to 1 Cor. 15:10: "By the grace of God I am what I am." Therefore the grace of God is the form of the virtues, and not charity.
On the contrary, Ambrose says that charity is the form and mother of the virtues.
I answer. Charity is the form, moving power and root of the virtues. This can be shown by the fact that we must judge habits by their acts. So when what belongs to one habit is formal in the act of another habit, that habit must be related to the other as its form. But in all voluntary acts the end is what gives the form. That is because every act takes its form and species according to the form of the agents, such as heating from heat. But the form of thewill is its object, which is the good and the end, just as the intelligible is the form of the intellect. So that which has relation to the end must be formally in the act of the will. Thus in species, the same act is considered under the form of a virtue if it is ordered to one end, or under the form of a vice if it is ordered to another end. This is clear from the example of one who gives alms either for the sake of God or for the sake of vainglory. For, the act of one vice, according as it is ordered to the end of another vice, receives the form of the second vice; e.g., he who would steal in order to commit adultery is a thief materially, but formally he is considered intemperate. It is clear that the act of all the other virtues is ordered to the proper end of charity, which is its object, viz., the highest good. This is certainly clear regarding the moral virtues, for virtues of this kind are concerned with certain created goods which are ordered to the uncreated good as to their final end. And the same is clearly evident regarding the theological virtues; for uncreated being as true is indeed the object of faith; and insofar as it is desirable, it has the aspect of the good. Thus faith is directed toward that good insofar as it is desirable, since no one believes unless he wishes to believe. Even though the object of this species (i.e., the theological virtues) is uncreated being considered as good, nevertheless the object is still derived from the object of charity; for, the good is the object of hope insofar as it can be desired and obtained, since no one desires to obtain some good unless he loves it.
Therefore it is evident that in the acts of all the virtues there is the formal element which comes from charity; and it is called the form of all the virtues in that every act of all the virtues is ordered to the highest good that is loved, as has just been shown. And because the precepts of the law are concerned with the acts of the virtues, so it is that the Apostle writes (1 Tim. i. 5), The end of the commandment is charity. Thus it is apparent how charity can be the mover of all the virtues; it is the mover because it influences the acts of all the other virtues. For, every higher act or power is said to move a lower act or power, so that the act of the lower is ordered to the end of the higher. For example, a house-builder commands a stone-mason so that the act of the stone-mason is ordered to the form of the house, which is the end of the builder. Since all the other virtues are ordered to the end of charity, charity commands the acts of all the virtues; and for this reason it is called their mover. And because the word "mother" signifies someone who receives and conceives within herself, charity is called the mother of the virtues. For this same reason, charity is called the root of the virtues.
To the first, it must be said that although charity does not give the proper species to any virtue, it gives, however, a common species to each virtue, on account of which we speak of virtue considered as the principle of meriting.
To the second, it must be said that there is no form of a form in the sense that one form is superior to the subject of another. But there is nothing to prevent several forms from existing in the same subject according to a certain order; so that one might be a proper form in respect to another, as color is the proper form in respect to what can be seen. It is in this way that charity can be the form of the other virtues.
To the third, it must be said that charity is included in the definition of a meritorious virtue, as is shown by the definition of Augustine, who says that virtue is a good quality of the mind by which it lives rightly; for it does not live rightly unless it is through that which orders our life to God. This charity does.
To the fourth, it must be said that this argument follows from the form which enters into the constitution of a thing. Charity is not called the form of the virtues in this way but in another way, as has been shown above.
To the fifth, it must be replied that charity, since it is the common form of the virtues, does indeed bring the virtues into one common species, a very special species, but not, however, into a proper species.
To the sixth, it must be said that charity can be called the exemplary form of the virtues; not an exemplar in whose likeness the virtues are generated, but an exemplar according to whose likeness the virtues operate in a certain way. Thus, whenever it is necessary to act according to virtue, charity is necessary.
To the seventh, it must be said that, although to create the virtues belongs only to God, however, to act according to virtue belongs also to a man possessing virtue. Therefore he needs charity.
To the eighth, it must be said that charity, considered as an act, not only is regarded as an exemplar, but also as a virtue which moves and causes. But the exemplar does not cause without producing that which is made in imitation of it, because it produces it in existence. And thus charity does not exist without the other virtues.
To the ninth, it must be said that each virtue has a special form from its proper end and its proper object, by which it becomes this virtue. But it has from charity a certain common form, by which it can merit eternal life.
To the tenth, it must be answered that God makes the virtues in us that are formed with a special form and a general form. The special form is derived from the object and the end, but the general form is derived from charity.
To the eleventh, it must be said that light is the form of colors considered as visible in act through light; likewise, faith is the form of the virtues considered as knowable by us. For, we know by faith what is virtuous and what is not virtuous. But the virtues, insofar as they are operative, are informed by charity.
To the twelfth, it must be said that the intellect, considered in itself, is prior to the will, because the known good is the object of the will. But in its operation and moving, the will is prior. For, the intellect does not understand or move unless the will gives its consent. Thus does the will move the intellect insofar as it is operative; for we use our intellect when we will. Therefore, since to believe is an act of the intellect as moved by the will—for we believe something because we wish to—it follows that charity gives form to faith more so than faith to charity.
To the thirteenth, it must be said that the act of the will is considered according to the one who wills in relation to things as they are in themselves. But the act of the intellect is considered according as things known are in the one who understands. Whence, when things are below the one who understands, then the intellect is higher than the will, because things exist in a higher manner in the intellect than in themselves, since everything which is in another is in it according to the manner of that in which it is. But when the things are above the one who understands, then the will rises higher than the intellect is able to attain. Thus it is that in moral matters, which concern things below man, the cognitive virtue informs the appetitive virtues, just as prudence informs the other moral virtues. But in the theological virtues which concern God, the virtue of the will, viz., charity, informs the virtue of the intellect, viz., faith.
To the fourteenth, it must be said that rational power confers a way of desiring on those things which are below us, but not in those which are above us, as was said in Article I of this Question and in the preceding Question, Articles 10 and 11.
To the fifteenth, it must be answered that faith precedes hope, and hope precedes charity in the order of generation, as the imperfect precedes the perfect. But charity precedes both faith and hope in the order of perfection. For this reason charity is said to be the form of them, as the perfect is the form of the imperfect.
To the sixteenth, it must be said that charity is not that form of the virtues which is a part of the essence of the virtues, so that it must follow the virtues or some matter of the virtues in time, as in the form of things generated. But charity is the form considered as informing; whence it must be, by its nature, prior to the other virtues.
To the seventeenth, it must be said that the vision of God, inasmuch as it is the end considered as a certain good, is the object of charity.
To the eighteenth, it must be said that the intrinsic form cannot be the end of a thing, although it is the end of the generation of a thing. But charity is not the intrinsic form, as has been said; but from the fact that it brings the other virtues to their end, it forms the virtues, as is clear from what has been said.
To the nineteenth, it must be said that the grace of God is called the form of the virtues according as it gives spiritual existence to the soul, so that it is able to receive the virtues. But charity is the form of the virtues according as it forms their operations, as was said in the body of the Article.
Article 4: Whether Charity Is One Virtue?
It seems that charity is not one virtue.
1. Habits are distinguished by their acts; acts by their objects. But charity has two objects; God and neighbor. Therefore charity is not one virtue but two.
2. It has been objected that one of these objects is more primary, viz., God, for charity loves fellow-man only on account of God. On the contrary, the Philosopher says in Book IX of the Ethics, that friendly relations with another come from a man's relations to himself. But that which is a principle and cause is the most powerful in any genus. Therefore through charity man loves himself principally and God secondarily.
3. Moreover, it is written (1 John iv. 20 ), He that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth, how can he love 'God, whom he seeth not? Therefore we ought to love our neighbor more than God. Since our neighbor is to be loved more than God, he is the more primary object of charity.
4. Moreover, nothing is loved unless it is known, as Augustine says in the De Trinitate. But our neighbor is better known than God; therefore he is also loved more than God. Thus it seems that charity is not one virtue.
5. Moreover, every virtue has its own proper mode which it employs in regard to its acts; for a just man not only does just deeds, but also acts justly. Charity uses two modes in its acts; for in charity one loves God with his whole heart, and he loves his neighbor as himself. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
6. Moreover, precepts of the law are ordered to the virtues, for the intention of the law-giver is to make men virtuous, as is seen in Book II of the Ethics. But two precepts are given for charity: Love the Lord thy God, and love your neighbor. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
7. Moreover, as we love God and our neighbor, so ought we to honor them. But we honor God and neighbor with different forms of honor; we honor God with adoration (latria), and our neighbor only with veneration (dulia). Therefore there is one kind of charity by which we love God and another by which we love our fellow-men.
8. Moreover, virtue is that by which we love rightly. But to love God pertains to one life, to love neighbor pertains to another life; for to love God seems to belong to the contemplative life, while loving one's neighbor belongs to the active life. Therefore love of God and of our neighbor is not a single virtue.
9. Moreover, according to the Philosopher in Book I of the Physics, one is considered in three ways: as the continuous, as the indivisible, and as having the same essence. But charity does not have the unity of continuity because it is neither a body nor the form of a body. Nor has it the unity of indivisibility because then it would be neither finite nor infinite. Nor is it one in definition because synonymous things are one in this way, as raiment and dress. Therefore charity is not one.
10. Moreover, what is one by analogy is neither one in species nor in genus nor in number, as is said in Book V of the Metaphysics; even less are those things which are one only by analogy considered in the definition of the one. But charity is directed toward the eternal, viz., God and neighbor, who are not in the same relationship. Therefore in no way is charity considered one virtue.
11. Moreover, according to the Philosopher in Book VIII of the Ethics, perfect friendship cannot be had for many. But charity, by which God and neighbor are loved, is the most perfect friendship. Therefore it is not directed to many. Thus God and neighbor are not loved with the same charity.
12. Moreover, a virtue, by the performance of which it is sufficient that we be not saddened, is different from a vitrue which is performed with pleasure; as fortitude is different from justice. But in the act of charity, it is sufficient that we act without sadness in regard to some objects, as when we love our enemies; but it is necessary that we act with enjoyment in regard to others, as when we love God and our friends. Therefore charity is not one virtue, but different for each object.
On the contrary,
(1) those things are one when they are so regarded that one thing is understood in another. But in loving our neighbor is understood the love of God, and vice versa, as Augusti ne says in Book VII of the De Trinitate. Therefore it is the same charity by which we love God and our neighbor.
(2) Moreover, in any genus, there is one first mover. But charity is the mover of all the virtues. Therefore it is one.
I answer. It must be said that charity is one virtue. To understand this, it must be said that any unity of power or of habit should be considered from the object, and this is because the potency is that which is said to have an order to the possible, which is the object. And thus the formal notion and the species of potency is taken from the object. It is the same for a habit, which is nothing more than a disposition of a perfected potency toward its object.
In the object, however, something is considered as form, and something else as matter. The form in an object is that according to which the object is related to a potency or to a habit; but the matter is that in which the formal notion has its foundation. Thus, if we speak of the object of the power of sight, its formal object is color, or something of this kind, for according as a thing is colored, thus is it visible. Materially, however, it is the body in which the color exists.
From this it is clear that a power or habit is related essentially to the formal notion of the object and only accidentally to the matter of the object. Whatever is accidental does not cause a change in the thing, but only that which is essential; therefore a material diversity in the object does not cause a diversity of power or habit because only a formal diversity causes this. There is one power of sight by which we see stones and men and the sky, because this diversity of objects is material and does not come from the formal notion of the visible. The sense of taste, however, differs from the sense of smell insofar as there is a difference between flavor and odor, which are sensibles in themselves.
Now this consideration is necessary in regard to charity. It is evident that we can love something in a twofold way; in the first, by reason of its very self, and in the second by reason of another. We love someone for himself when we love him because of his proper good, viz., because he is essentially noble or because he is pleasing or useful to us. But we love someone for the sake of another when we love him because he is related to someone else whom we love. If we love someone on his own account, we love his entire family, his relatives, his friends, inasmuch as they are related to him; but in all of these, there is only one formal notion of love, viz., the good of the one whom we love for his own sake. And, in a certain way, we love him in all these others.
Therefore it must be said that charity loves God for His own sake; and because of Him, it loves all others according as they are ordered to God. Thus, in a way, charity loves God in all fellow-men, for our neighbor is loved by charity because God is in him or God might be in him. It is evident that it is the same habit of charity by which we love God and our neighbor.
But if we love our neighbor for his own sake and not for the sake of God, this pertains to some other love, e.g., to a natural love, or a political love, or some other kind which the Philosopher discusses in Book VIII of the Ethics.
To the first, it must be said that our neighbor is not loved except for the sake of God; whence formally considered, both are one object of love, although materially they are two.
To the second, it must be said that since love looks to the good, there is a diversity of love according as there is a diversity of the good. There is, however, a certain good proper to each man considered as one person, and as far as loving this good is concerned, each one is the principal object of his own love. But there is a certain common good which pertains to this man or that man insofar as he is considered as part of a whole; thus there is a certain common good pertaining to a soldier considered as part of the army, or to a citizen as part of the state. As far as loving this common good is concerned, the principal object of love is that in which the good primarily exists; just as the good of the army is in the general, or the good of the state is in the king. Whence, it is the duty of a good soldier that he neglect even his own safety in order to save the good of his general. Thus also does a man naturally endanger his arm in order to save his head. And in this way charity regards the divine good as its principal object, which pertains to every one according as he is able to be a sharer in beatitude; thus we love out of charity only those objects which are able to participate in eternal happiness with us, as Augustine says in the De Doctrina Christiana.
To the third, it must be said that St. John, denying the major premise, argues not that one's fellow-men ought to be loved more, but that they are more accessible to one's love, because men are more inclined to love what can be seen rather than the unseen.
To the fourth, it must be said that although what is known is loved, it does not follow that what is more known is also more loved. For, a thing is not loved because it is known, but because it is good; thus that which is better is more lovable, even though it is not better known. For example, a man loves his servant or even his horse which he has had in constant use less than he loves some good man whom he knows only by reputation.
To the fifth, it must be said that charity regards the divine good as its formal object, as has been said in the previous Article and in the body of this Article. This good is related differently to God and to one's neighbor, therefore it is necessary that charity have a different mode as regards its primary and secondary objects. However, it has only one mode of operation in relation to its primary object.
To the sixth, it must be said that the precepts of the law concern the acts of the virtues and not the habits. Therefore, from a diversity of precepts it does not follow that there is a diversity of habits, but only a diversity of acts. These acts pertain to one habit because of the formal notion.
To the seventh, it must be said that in honoring our neighbor we also honor his proper good; and thus one kind of honor is due to him, another kind to God.
To the eighth, it must be said that the love of neighbor as well as the love of God is included within the contemplative life, as Gregory writes in Super Ezechiel. For prayer to God, which seems especially to pertain to the contemplative life, becomes prayer for fellow-man. So, too, the principle of the active life is, in a special way, the love of God in Himself. It does not follow, then, that if charity is the principle of different actions, it is not one.
To the ninth, it must be said that charity is not one by the unity of continuity, but it can be considered one by the unity of indivisibility inasmuch as it is one simple form. It is not called finite or infinite considered as a quantity with dimensions, but considered as the quantity of virtue. Here we are not treating of charity in this manner, but only insofar as it is considered one in essence; not indeed a numerical unity as is tunic and dress, but a unity of species, as Socrates and Plato are one in their human nature.
To the tenth, it must be answered that this argument would hold if the object of charity be considered in its temporal aspect, not in its eternal aspect, as has been said.
To the eleventh, it must be said that perfect friendship is not directed towards many, so that to each one it would be something proper to himself. But inasmuch as friendship towards one becomes more perfect as regards that one, the more perfect the love we have toward one, the better able are we to love others. Thus charity, because it is the most perfect friendship, extends itself to God and to all who are able to know God; it includes not only those whom we know, but also our enemies.
To the twelfth, it must be said that virtue, which acts for its principal object with enjoyment, is able in the same way to act for some secondary object; not with pleasure, but without sadness. And in this way charity acts with pleasure towards its principal object, although with regard to a secondary object it endures difficulty in such a way that it is able to act without sadness.
Article 5: Whether Charity Is a Special Virtue Distinct From the Other Virtues?
It seems that charity is not a special virtue.
1. That which is put in the definition of any virtue is not a special virtue, because a general virtue is included in the definition of each special virtue. But charity is included in the definition of each virtue, for Jerome says, Let me briefly define all virtue as the charity by which we love God and our neighbor. Therefore charity is not a special virtue distinct from the others.
2. Moreover, charity by which we love our neighbor is not a virtue distinct from charity by which we love God; because charity loves fellow-man because of God. But every virtue loves fellow-man because of God. Therefore no virtue is distinguished from charity.
3. Moreover, the distinctions of habits are marked by the acts of the virtues. But charity carries into effect the acts of all the other virtues, as is said (1 Cor. xiii. 4), Charity is patient, is kind. Therefore charity is not a virtue distinct from the others.
4. Moreover, the good is the general object of all the virtues, for virtue is that which makes its possessor good and renders his works good. But the good is the object of charity. Therefore charity has a general object, and thus it is a general virtue.
5. Moreover, a single perfection is of one perfectible. But charity is the perfection of many perfectibles, i.e., of all the virtues. Therefore charity is not one.
6. Moreover, the same habit cannot be in diverse subjects. But charity is in diverse subjects, for we are commanded to love God with our whole mind, with our whole soul, with our whole heart, and with our whole strength. Therefore charity is not one virtue.
7. Moreover, charity is directed toward the removing of sins. But charity is sufficient to take away all sins, because the least bit of charity can resist any temptation. Therefore charity does that which belongs to all the virtues, and so does not seem to be a special virtue.
8. Moreover, some special sin is opposed to each special virtue. But all sins are contrary to charity, because charity is lost through each mortal sin. Therefore charity is not a special virtue.
9. Moreover, no virtue is necessary except in acting uprightly. But charity alone sufficiently directs us in right acting, for Augustine says, Have charity and do what you wirh. Therefore there is no other virtue outside of charity; and charity is not a special virtue distinct from the others.
10. Moreover, the habits of the virtues are necessary in order that a man might act promptly and with enjoyment, for no one is just who does not rejoice in just works, as is said in Book I of the Ethics. But charity is sufficient for the prompt and enjoyable operation of all works, for Augustine writes in the De Verbis Domini, Love makes all hard and repulsive tasks easy and next to nothing. Therefore there is no need for any virtue outside of charity.
11. Moreover, those things which are distinct from each other have a distinct generation and a distinct corruption. But charity and the other virtues do not have distinct generations and corruptions because all the other virtues are communicated along with charity and they are lost when charity is lost. Therefore charity is not a special virtue.
On the contrary, opposed to this is the fact that the Apostle (1 Cor. xiii. 13) divides charity from the other virtues saying, Now there remain faith, hope and charity, these three.
I answer. It must be said that charity is a special virtue, distinct from the other virtues. To understand this, it must be considered that whenever any act depends upon several principles that are constituted according to a certain order, it is necessary for the perfection of this act that each of the principles be perfect. For, if there be an imperfection in the beginning, or in the middle, or in the end, an imperfect act follows; just as if knowledge of art is lacking in the artist, Or a right disposition be lacking in the instrument, an imperfect work will follow. And this can also be considered in the very powers of the soul. For, if right reason, which is the mover of the inferior powers, be correct, and the concupiscible attitude is disordered, one will indeed act according to reason, but the operation will be imperfect, for he will have hindrance from the ill-disposed concupiscence tending toward its contrary. This is clear in the example of the continent man. Therefore in addition to prudence, which perfects reason, it is necessary in order that man be rightly constituted with regard to the objects of the concupiscible appetite, that he possess temperance in order that he might act readily and without hindmance.
Just as among diverse powers, one of which moves the other, so one may consider diverse objects, one of which is ordered to the other as to an end. For, one and the same power, insofar as it is an end, not only moves another power, but even moves itself regarding the means to the end. Therefore, for right operation it is necessary that something not only be well-disposed toward the end, but also that it be well-disposed toward the means to the end. Otherwise, an impeded operation follows, as is clear in the case of one who is well-disposed toward attaining good health, but is ill-disposed toward undertaking the means which bring about health. Thus it is clear that, since man is disposed through charity to be well-ordered toward his final end, it is necessary to have other virtues by which he will be well-disposed toward the means which pertain to the end.
Charity, therefore, is different from the virtues which are ordered to the means to the end; even though that virtue which is ordered to the end is more primary and architectonic with respect to the other virtues, which are ordered to the means to the end. In this way, medical knowledge is related to the art of applying unguents, or the military art is related to horsemanship.
It becomes clear, therefore, that it is necessary for charity to be a special virtue, distinct from the other virtues, but yet the most important virtue and the mover of the other virtues.
To the first, it must be said that this is a causal definition inasmuch as charity is the cause of the other virtues.
To the second, it must be answered that charity in loving fellow-man has God as the formal notion of the object, and not only as the final end, as it clear from the preceding Article. The other virtues have God, not as the formal notion of the object, but as their final end.
Thus, when it is said that charity loves neighbor on account of God, the on account of denotes not only the material cause, but in a way the formal cause. But when it is said of the other virtues that they operate on account of God, the on account of denotes only the final cause.
To the third, it must be said that charity does not produce the acts of the other virtues by eliciting them, but only by commanding them. For, the virtue draws out only those acts which are according to the notion of proper form, as justice acts rightly or temperance acts temperately. But virtue is said to command all the acts which it summons up to its end.
To the fourth, it must be said that the good in general is not the object of charity, but the highest good. Therefore it does not follow that charity is a general virtue, but that it is the highest virtue.
To the fifth, it must be said that charity is not the intrinsic perfection of the other virtues, but the extrinsic perfection, as was said in Article III of this Question. Therefore the objection does not follow.
To the sixth, it must be said that charity exists as in a subject in only one power, viz., the will which, through its command, moves the other powers. According to this, we are commanded to love God with our whole mind and our whole soul in order that all the powers of our soul might be summoned in submission to divine love.
To the seventh, it must be said that, just as charity commands the acts of the other virtues, so through this manner of commanding does it exclude the sins which are contrary to these virtues; and in this way charity resists temptations. However, it is necessary that there be other virtues which directly and in an elicited way drive out sins.
To the eighth, it must be said that, just as the acts of the other virtues are ordered to the end which is the object of charity, so also do sins, which are contrary to those virtues, oppose the end which is the object of charity. From this it happens that the contraries of the other virtues, viz., sins, drive out charity.
To the ninth, it must be said that, although charity adequately directs us through its manner of commanding in all things which pertain to a righteous life, nevertheless other virtues are required which, by eliciting their acts, carry out the command of charity so that man will act readily and without impediment.To the tenth, it must be said that it sometimes happens that a thing which in itself is difficult and causes sadness may exist for the sake of an end; as one freely takes a bitter medicine for the sake of health, although he is much afflicted by its consumption. Charity, therefore, makes all things pleasing in respect to the end, but the other virtues are needed which make those things which are good in themselves more enjoyable, in order that we may more easily do them.
To the eleventh, it must be said that charity is generated at the same time as the other virtues, not because it is not distinct from the others, but because the works of God are perfect. Whence, when charity is communicated, all the virtues which are necessary for salvation are communicated at the same time. However, charity is corrupted at the same time as the virtues because whatever is opposed to the other virtues is opposed to charity, as has been said.
Article 6: Whether There Can Be Charity With Mortal Sin?
It seems that charity can exist with mortal sin.
1. Origen says in 1 Periarchon, 2: I do not think that anyone who has continually stayed in the highest and perfect state would suddenly fall from that height, but he must needs fall away little by little. But one commits mortal sin suddenly, through his consent alone. Therefore he who is in a perfect state through charity cannot fall away from charity through one act of mortal sin. Thus charity can exist along with mortal sin.
2. Moreover, Bernard says that the charity in Peter when he denied Christ was not wiped out, but only rendered inactive. But Peter, by denying Christ, sinned mortally. Therefore charity can remain with mortal sin.
3. Moreover, charity is stronger than the habit of a moral virtue. But the habit of virtue is not taken away through one act of vice, since it is not generated through one act; for virtue is generated and corrupted by doing the same things in a contrary manner, as is said in Book II of the Ethics. Therefore much less is the habit of charity taken away through a single mortal sin.
4. Moreover, to each thing there is one thing in opposition. But charity is a special virtue, as has been shown. Therefore there is opposed to it one special vice. Thus charity is not taken away by other mortal sins, and so it seems that it is possible for mortal sin to exist along with charity.
5. Moreover, things in opposition cannot be in the same subject, for one drives out the other. But some sins are not in the same subject with charity, for charity is in the higher reason which is turned to God; but mortal sin can exist in the lower reason, as Augustine says in the De Trinitate 7 Therefore not every mortal sin drives out charity.
6. Moreover, that which is the strongest is not able to be driven out by what is the weakest. But charity is the strongest, for it is said (Cantic. viii. 6), Love is strong as death. But sin is the weakest because evil is infirm and powerless, as Dionysius says. Therefore mortal sin does not drive out charity, and so it can exist along with it.
7. Moreover, habits are known through their acts. But the act of charity is able to exist with mortal sin, for a man sinning loves God and his neighbor. Therefore charity can exist with mortal sin.
8. Moreover, charity especially causes one to take delight in the contemplation of God. But there is no contrary to that delight which comes from speculative knowledge, as the Philosopher says in Book I of the Topics. Therefore there is no contrary to charity, and so it is not able to be driven out by mortal sin.
9. Moreover, a universal mover can be hindered in regard to one object that is potentially movable, and not in regard to another. But charity is the universal mover of all the virtues, as was said above in Article III. Therefore it is not necessary that its operation towards one virtue be hindered insofar as it moves the others. Thus charity is able to exist with the sin which is opposed to temperance, according as it is the mover of the other virtues.
10. Moreover, just as charity has God as its object, so too do faith and hope. But faith and hope are able to exist without form; so too, therefore, is charity. Thus it is able to exist with mortal sin.
11. Moreover, everything which does not have the perfection it was meant to have by nature is without form. But charity does not have here in this life the perfection that it is destined to have in heaven. Therefore it is without form, and thus it seems that it can exist with mortal sin.
12. Moreover, habits are known through acts. But some acts of those who have charity can be imperfect; for oftentimes those who have charity are moved by another movement to impatience, or to vainglory. Therefore it may happen that the habit of charity is imperfect and without form, and thus it seems that mortal sin can exist with charity.
13. Moreover, just as sin is opposed to virtue, so is ignorance opposed to science. But not every ignorance takes away complete science. Therefore not every mortal sin takes away all virtue. Whence, since charity is the root of the virtues, it does not seem that every mortal sin takes away charity.
14. Moreover, charity is the love of God. But a person who keeps his love towards a thing can act against it through incontinence; just as one loving himself acts against his good through incontinence; and another loving his community acts against it through incontinence, as the Philosopher says in Book V of the Politics. Therefore one can act against God by sinning and still remain in charity.
15. Moreover, one can be well-disposed toward the universal, and yet fail in the particular. For example, the incontinent man has right reason toward the universal, viz., that it is wrong to commit fornication; but yet in regard to the particular, he chooses here and now to commit fornication as a good, as is explained by the Philosopher in Book VI of the Ethics. But charity causes man to keep himself well-disposed toward the universal end. Therefore, remaining in charity, one can sin in regard to some particular act, and thus charity can exist with mortal sin.
16. Moreover, contraries are in the same genus. But sin is in the genus of act because sin is something said, done, or desired contrary to the law of God. But charity is in the genus of habit. Therefore sin is not contrary to charity, and so does not drive out charity. It is, therefore, able to exist with charity.
On the contrary,
(1) it is said (Wis. i. 5), For the Holy Spirit of discipline will flee from the deceitful, and will withdraw himself from thoughts that are without understanding, he shall not abide when iniquity cometh in. But the Holy Spirit is in man as long as he has charity, because the Spirit of God dwells in us through charity. Therefore charity is driven out when sin enters, and thus it is not able to exist along with mortal sin.
(2) Moreover, whoever has charity is worthy of eternal life, according to the Apostle (1I Tim. iv. 8), There is laid up for me a crown of justice, which the Lord the /ust judge will render to me in that day: and not only to me, but to them also that love his coming. However, whoever sins mortally is worthy of eternal punishment, according to what is written (Rom. vi. 23) , The wages of sin is death. But no one can at the same time be worthy of eternal life and of eternal punishment. Therefore charity cannot be retained with mortal sin.
I answer. It must be said that charity can, in no way, exist along with mortal sin. To prove this, it must be considered, first, that every mortal sin is directly opposed to charity. Whoever chooses something in preference to something else, loves better that which he first chooses. Whence, because man loves his own life itnd his own continuance more than pleasure, however great that pleasure may be, he is drawn away from pleasure if he thinks that it is infallibly destructive of his own life. This is explained by Augustine when he writes in the LXXXIII Quaestionum, that there is no one who fears pain more than he who seeks pleasure. Sometimes we even see that the most savage of beasts will avoid the greatest pleasures because of the fear of pain. However, one sins mortally in this, that he prefers something other than to live according to God and to cling to God. Thus it is clear that whoever sins mortally, by this fact he loves some other good more than he loves God; for if he would love God, he would choose to live according to God more than to obtain some temporal good. However, it is of the very essence of charity that God be loved above all things, as is clear from what is said above. Therefore every mortal sin is contrary to charity.
Charity is founded in man by God. But those things which are caused by divine infusion are in need of divine action not only in the beginning so that they might begin to exist, but also in their entire duration so that they might be preserved in existence. For example, the illumination of the air needs the presence of the sun not only when the air is first lighted, but as long as it remains lighted. And for this reason, if any intervening obstacle prevents the direct rays of the sun, the light in the air fails. Likewise, when mortal sin enters, which obstructs the soul's direct sight of God—and through this something else is preferred to God—the flow of charity is stopped, and charity is then lacking in man, as is said (Isaiah. lix. 2), Your iniquities have divided between you and your God.
But when the mind of man again returns to God by regarding Him rightly and by loving Him above all things—which, however, cannot be done without divine grace—man immediately returns again to charity.
To the first, it must be said that the words of Origen should not be understood to mean that a man sinning mortally, howsoever perfect he was, does not suddenly lose charity. The words are to be interpreted to mean that it does not easily happen that a perfect man would suddenly commit a mortal sin at once, but through negligence; and many venial sins would be disposed finally to fall into mortal sin.
To the second, it must be answered that the text of Bernard does not seem to hold unless it be understood that charity was not extinct in Peter, only because it was soon resurrected; for those things which are not very far apart seem as if they are not separated at all, as is said in Book II of the Physics.
To the third, it must be said that a moral virtue which is acquired by acts consists in an inclination of power to act; and that inclination is not entirely taken away by one act. But by one act, the influence that God exerts in the operation of charity is taken away; therefore one act of sin takes away charity.
To the fourth, it must be said that, in general, the opposite of charity is hate; but indirectly all sins are opposed to charity insofar as they pertain to the contempt of God Who ought to be loved above all things.
To the fifth, it must be said that the higher reason, in which charity exists, moves the lower reason. Therefore sin, inasmuch as it is opposed to the movement of charity in the lower part of the soul, drives out charity. Or, it can be answered that mortal sin does not exist without consent, which is attributed to the higher faculty of reason in which charity exists.
To the sixth, it must be said that sin does not drive out charity by its own power, but only in virtue of the fact that man voluntarily subjects himself to sin.
To the seventh, it must be said that a man who sins mortally does not love God above all things, as He ought to be loved in charity; but there is something else that he prefers to the love of God, and on account of this thing, he despises the law of God.
To the eighth, it must be said that delight, which comes from speculative knowledge, does not have a contrary in the same genus so that the consideration of some other thing would be contrary to it. This is because the species of contraries are not contrary in the understanding; whence, the delight which comes from a consideration of white is not contrary to the delight which comes from a consideration of black. Since the act of the will consists in the movement of the soul toward the thing willed, and just as things in themselves are contraries, so the movements of the will towards these contraries are contraries. For, the desire of sweetness is contrary to the desire of the bitter. According to this, the love of God is contrary to the love of sin which excludes one from God. However, speculative knowledge, insofar as there is no contrary, is not a proper act of charity which is elicited by it, but charity is only commanded by it as its effect.
To the ninth, it must be said that charity which is the universal mover of the virtues, when it is impeded through mortal sin in regard to those things which pertain to one virtue, is impeded in regard to its own universal object; and because of this it is universally impeded in regard to all. However, this is not true when the object that is potentially movable is so hindered in regard to its particular effect, so that it is not hindered in regard to those things which pertain to universal virtue.
To the tenth, it must be said that although hope and faith have God as their object, they are not the form of the other virtues; as is true of charity and as was proved above in Article III. Therefore, although charity is not without form, hope and faith can exist without form.
To the eleventh, it must be said that a defect of any perfection doesnot render virtue without form, but only that defect which removes the order to the final end. Indeed, there is an order in the charity of this life, although the charity of this life does not have the perfection of the charity of heaven which is in accord with its proper and perfect enjoyment of God.
To the twelfth, it must be said that imperfect acts can be performed by one possessing charity, but they do not follow from charity. For, not every act of the agent is the act of each form in the agent, and this is especially true in a rational nature which possesses freedom to exercise those habits in it.
To the thirteenth, it must be said that although not every ignorance of proper principles excludes science, however the ignorance of common principles does take away science, and when these principles are unknown, it follows that there is an ignorance of art, as is said in Book I of the Elench. However, the final end is regarded as the most common principle to all. Therefore, a de-ordination from the final end through mortal sin completely removes charity. But every de-ordination of particular principles does not remove charity, as is clear with venial sins.
To the fourteenth, it must be said that whoever acts incontinently against a good which he loves, thinks that the good is not completely lost through that incontinent act which he is doing. For, if anyone who loves a certain state, or the health of his own body, would think that he would lose either of these through what he is doing, he would either abstain totally from those acts, or he would love that which he did more than his health or the good of the state. Whence, although one knows that he loses God through mortal sin—which is to know that he has sinned mortally—and nevertheless is doing that incontinent act, he clearly loves what he is doing more than he loves God.
To the fifteenth, it must be said that charity requires not only that there be a disposition to the universal, that God be loved above all things, but also that the act of choice and of the will be so disposed toward any particular that is chosen. And this particular choice is excluded through the choice of the contrary, viz., sin, which excludes one from God.
To the sixteenth, it must be answered that although acts are directly contrary to acts, and habits to habits, acts are also indirectly contrary to habits according as they conform to contrary habits. For, similar acts are generated from similar habits, and similar acts cause similar habits; although not all habits are caused by acts.
Article 7: Whether the Object to Be Loved Out of Charity Is a Rational Nature?
It seems that the object to be loved out of charity is not a rational nature.
1. That because of which a thing is so is itself more so. But man is loved in charity because of his virtue and blessedness. Therefore virtue and blessedness, which are not rational creatures, are more to be loved in charity; and thus a rational creature is not the proper object of charity.
2. Moreover, through charity we are made especially like to God in our loving. But God loves all things that are, as is said (Wis. xi. 25), by loving Himself, Who is Love, in charity. Therefore not only a rational nature, but all things are to be loved in charity.
3. Moreover, Origen says in Super Cantica, that it is one thing to love God and every other good. But God is loved in charity. Therefore, since all creatures are good, not only the rational nature but all creatures are to be loved in charity.
4. Moreover, only the love of charity is meritorious. But we can merit in the love of any thing. Therefore we can love any thing out of charity.
5. Moreover, God is loved out of charity. Therefore that ought to be more loved out of charity which is especially loved by Him. But among all created things, the good of the universe, in which all things are included, is especially loved by God. Therefore all things are to be loved in charity.
6. Moreover, to love more pertains to charity than does to believe. But charity believes all things, as is said (1 Cor. xiii. 7). Therefore much more should charity love all things.
7. Moreover, rational nature is found most perfectly in God. If, therefore, a rational nature is the object of charity, it would be necessary that we love God in charity. But this seems impossible, since the love of charity is a perfect love. We cannot love God perfectly in this life because we do not know Him perfectly in this life; and we do not know what God is but only what He is not. But love presupposes knowledge, since nothing is loved unless it is known. Therefore a rational or intellectual nature is not the proper object of charity.
8. Moreover, God is farther from man than is any creature other than man. If, then, we do not love other creatures in charity, much less are we able to love God out of charity.
9. Moreover, intellectual nature is also found in angels. But it seems that angels do not have to be loved out of charity. Therefore intellectual nature is not the proper object of charity. The proof of the minor is given: friendship consists in a sharing of life, for, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, to live together is proper to friends. But there does not seem to be any sharing of life between the angels and us, because we do not share with the angels in the life of nature, for they are more excellent in nature than man. Nor, again, do we share with them in the life of glory, for the gifts of grace and of glory are given by God according to the active capacity of the one receiving, as is said (Matt. xxv. 15), To every one He gave according to his proper ability. But the capacity for action of the angel is much greater than that of man. Therefore the angels do not share with men in any life.
10. Moreover, rational nature is also found in the same man loving out of charity. But it seems that man ought not to love himself out of charity. Therefore the object of charity is not a rational nature. The proof of the minor: the precepts of the law are given concerning the acts of the virtues. But there is no precept given that one should love himself. Therefore to love is not an act of charity.
11. Moreover, Gregory says in one of his Homilies, it is not possible that there be charity between less than two. Therefore it is not possible for a person to love himself out of charity.
12. Moreover, just as justice consists in a sharing, so does friendship, according to the Philosopher in Book VI of the Ethics. But justice, properly speaking, is not of a man toward himself, as is said in Book V of the Ethics. Therefore neither is friendship, and neither is charity.
13. Moreover, nothing which is reckoned among the vices is an act of charity. But to love self is considered a vice in man, as is said (2 Tim. iii. 1), In the last days, shall come dangerous times. Men shall be lovers of themselves. Therefore to love self is not an act of charity, and so rational nature is not the proper object of love.
14. Moreover, the human body is a part of rational nature, viz., human nature. But it does not seem that the human body ought to be loved out of charity, since according to the Philosopher in Book IX of the Ethics., those who love themselves for what is exterior to their nature ought to be censured. Therefore rational nature is not the object of love.
15. Moreover, no one who has charity flees from that which he loves out of charity. But the saints having charity flee the body, as is said (Rom. vii. 24), Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? Thus the body is not to be loved out of charity, and the same argument follows as in the previous objection.
16. Moreover, no one is bound to fulfill that of which he is not capable. But no one can know that he has charity. Therefore no one is bound to love rational creatures out of charity.
17. Moreover, when it is said that a rational creature is loved out of charity, this preposition out of designates the relation of a cause of some sort. But it cannot indicate the relation of a material cause, since charity is not something material, but is spiritual. Again, it does not indicate the relation of a final cause, because the end of the one loving out of charity is not charity, but rather it is God. Likewise, neither does it indicate the relation of an efficient cause, because it is the Holy Spirit Who moves us to love, as is said (Rom. v. 5), The charity of God is poured forth in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost, who is given to us. And again, it does not indicate the relation of a formal cause, because charity is not an intrinsic form since it does not come from the essence of a thing; nor is it the extrinsic exemplary form, for then all things which are loved out of charity would be located in the species of charity, just as imitations are located in the species of the exemplar. Therefore rational creatures are not to be loved out of charity.
18. Moreover, Augustine says in I De Doctrina Christiana, that our neighbor is he from whom some favor is received. But we receive favors from God. Therefore God is our neighbor. Thus it was not correctly posited by Augustine that God is one object of love out of charity, neighbor another.
19. Moreover, since Christ is the Mediator between God and man, it seems that He ought to be posited as another object of love, in addition to God and neighbor. There are, therefore, five objects to be loved in charity, and not just four, as Augustine says.
On the contrary, it is said (Levit. xix. 18), Love your neighbor as yourself. The Gloss is: Your neighbor is such not only by closeness of blood-relationship, but also by way of the fellowship of reason. Therefore, according as anything shares with us in the society of rational natures, so it is lovable out of charity. Therefore rational nature is the object of charity.
I answer. It must be said that when there is question of those things which come under the act of any power or habit, the formal notion of the object of that power or habit must be considered. For, it is in terms of their relation to that notion that things come under that power or habit; just as in the case of things visible, it is in terms of their relationship to one and the same notion of being able to be seen, that they are either essentially or accidentally visible.
However, since the object of love taken universally is the good taken commonly, it is necessary that there be some special good as the object of each special love. For example, the proper object of natural friendship, which is friendship toward blood-relatives, is a natural good considered as something produced from parents; in a political friendship, however; the object is the good of the state. Charity, therefore, has a certain special good as its proper object, viz., the good of divine beatitude, as was said above in Article IV of this Question. Thus, according as things are related to this good, so also are they lovable out of charity. But it should be considered that, since to love is to wish the good of someone, that which is said to be loved has a twofold consideration: it is considered either as one for whom we wish the good; or as the good which we wish for someone.
Therefore, in this first way, only those things can be loved out of charity for which we are able to wish the good of eternal beatitude, for they are the things which were begotten to enjoy a good of this kind. Whence, since only intellectual nature was begotten to enjoy the good of eternal beatitude, then only intellectual nature is to be loved out of charity, according as those things for which we wish this good are said to be loved.
And for this reason, Augustine distinguishes four objects to be loved out of charity according as various things can have eternal beatitude in various ways.
For, there is that which has eternal beatitude through its own essence, and this is God; and that which has it through participation, and this is the rational creature; both that one that loves, as well as other creatures which can be associated with it in the sharing in beatitude. However, there is something else to which it pertains to have an eternal beatitude, but only through a certain return, viz., our body which is glorified through a redundance of glory from the soul to itself. Therefore God ought to be loved out of charity as the root of beatitude; however each man ought to love himself in charity in order that he may share in beatitude. He should also love his neighbor as his associate in the participation of beatitude, and his own body according as beatitude redounds to it.
But in the second way, i.e., considered as those goods which we wish for others are said to be loved, everything can be loved out of charity insofar as these are goods of those who are able to enjoy beatitude. For, all creatures are a means for man to tend towards his beatitude, and, further, all creatures are ordered to the glory of God inasmuch as the divine goodness is manifested in them. At this time, therefore, we can love all things out of charity, but only by ordering them to those beings which have, or can have, beatitude.
Now it must also be considered that loves are related to one another in accord with the relation among goods which are their objects. Accordingly, since all human goods are ordered to eternal beatitude as the ultimate end, the love of charity includes within itself all human loves, with the exception of those which are based on sin, which cannot be ordered to beatitude. Whence, that some who are relatives, or fellow-citizens, or fellow pilgrims, or any such, should love (diligant) one another, can be meritorious and out of charity; but that some be bound together (ament se invicem) for the sake of sharing in robbery or adultery, this cannot be meritorious nor out of charity.
To the first, it must be said that we love virtue and beatitude out of charity inasmuch as we wish them for those for whom it is possible to have beatitude.
To the second, it must be said that God loves all things out of charity, not because He wishes beatitude for them, but He orders these things to Himself and to the other creatures which are able to enjoy beatitude.
To the third, it must be said that all goods are in God as in a first principle. In this way, Origen meant that it is one thing to love God and every other good.
To the fourth, it must be said that all things can be loved meritoriously by ordering them to those which have a capacity for beatitude, not by wishing beatitude for them.
To the fifth, it must be said that there is contained, as a principle, in the good of the universe, rational nature which is capable of beatitude, and to which all other creatures are ordered. According to this, it is fitting both for God and for us to especially love the good of the universe out of charity.
To the sixth, it must be said that, just as charity believes all things that are worthy of belief, so does it love all things according as they are lovable out of charity. To the seventh, it must be said that we are not able to love God here with that perfection with which we will love Him in our home-land, seeing Him through His essence.
To the eighth, it must be said that the distance separating other creatures is not the reason why they are not loved in charity, but it is because they are not capable of beatitude.
To the ninth, it must be said that angels do not share with us in the life of nature as regards our species, but only as regards the genus of rational nature; but we are able to share with them in the life of glory. As to that which is said (Matt. xxv. 15), To every one He gave according to his proper ability, this must not be referred only to natural ability, for it is erroneous to say that the gifts of grace and glory are given according to natural measure, but rather here [in this text] must be understood also that ability which is by way of grace, through which it is granted to men that they can merit glory equal to that of the angels.
To the tenth, it must be said that the written law has been given as an aid to the law of nature, which had been obscured by sin. But the law was not rendered so obscure that it would not move one to love, so that man would not love himself or his body; but it was obscured to this extent that it was not moving man to love God and his neighbor. Therefore, in the written law, there had to be given precepts about loving God and neighbor, in which is, nevertheless, also included the precept that each one love himself. The reason for this is that as we are induced to love God, we are induced to desire Him, by which we especially love ourselves and wish for ourselves the highest good. But in the precept of loving neighbor, it is said, Love your neighbor as yourself. In this is included the love of self.
To the eleventh, it must be said that although, properly speaking, friendship cannot be had for self, on the other hand love is had for self. For, it is written in Book IX of the Ethics, that the feelings that constitute friendship for others are an extension of regard for self. But as charity signifies love, thus is one able to love himself in charity. But Gregory speaks of charity considered as it includes the aspect of friendship.
To the twelfth, it must be said that although friendship consists in a sharing with another, just as does justice; love, however, does not necessarily relate to another, which is sufficient for the notion of charity.
To the thirteenth, it must be said that those who love self are censured inasmuch as they love themselves more than they ought. Reproach, indeed, does not pertain to spiritual goods because no one is able to love virtue too much. But one can love himself to excess inasmuch as he loves external and corporeal goods.
To the fourteenth, it must be said that not everyone who loves himself in terms of his exterior nature is at fault, but rather he who seeks exterior goods beyond the measure of virtue. Thus we are able to love our body in charity.
To the fifteenth, it must be said that charity does not flee the body but the corruption of the body, inasmuch as it is said (Wis. ix. 15), For the corruptible body is a load upon the soul. Because of this the Apostle clearly has said the body of this death (Rom. vii. 24).
To the sixteenth, it must be said that it does not follow from the fact that man does not know for certain whether he has chariy that he is not able to love out of charity, but it does follow that he is not able to judge whether he loves out of charity. Thus, it can be required of us that we love out of charity, but not that we judge that we are loving out of charity. Whence the Apostle says (1 Cor. iv. 3), Neither do I judge my own self... but he that judgeth me, is the Lord.
To the seventeenth, it must be said that when one is said to love his neighbor out of charity, this preposition out of can designate a relation of final, efficient and formal causes; the final cause inasmuch as the love of neighbor is ordered to the love of God as to an end, whence it is written (1 Tim. i. 5), The end of the commandment is charity, because the love of God is the goal in observing the precepts. In the relationship of efficient cause, however, inasmuch as charity is a habit tending toward loving, being related to the act of loving as heat is to heating. In the reationship of formal cause, however, inasmuch as the act receives its species from the habit, as heating does from heat.
To the eighteenth, it must be said that the notion of being a neighbor is preserved both in him who gives favors and in him who receives, but not that whoever gives favors is a neighbor since it is required among neighbors that there be a sharing in some order. Therefore God, although He gives favors, cannot be said to be our neighbor; but Christ, inasmuch as He is man, is called our neighbor according as He gives favors to us.
From this the answer to the last objection is clear.