QUAESTIONES DISPUTATAE DE VIRTUTIBUS
Disputed Questions on the Virtues

It seems that they are not, but are rather acts.

1. For Augustine says in the Retractions that the good use of free will is a virtue. But the use of free will is an act. Therefore, virtue is an act.

2. Moreover, no one is owed a reward except by reason of an act. But a reward is owed to everyone possessing virtue, because whoever dies in charity attains happiness. Therefore, virtue is a merit. But merit is an act. Therefore, virtue is an act.

3. Moreover, the more something in us is like God, the better it is. But we are most like God insofar as we actually are, because he is pure act. Therefore, act is what is best in us. But virtues are what is best in us, as Augustine says in On free will. Therefore, virtues are acts.

4. Moreover, perfection in this life answers to perfection in the next. But the perfection of heaven is an act, namely, happiness, that consists in activity, according to the Philosopher. Therefore, the perfection of this fife, which is virtue, is an act.

5. Moreover, contraries belong to the same genus and mutually exclude one another. But an act of sin expels virtue because of its opposition to it. Therefore, virtue is in the genus of act.

6. Moreover, the Philosopher says in On the heavens 1 that virtue is the utmost of a potency. But the utmost of a potency is act. Therefore, virtue is an act.

7. Moreover, the rational part is more noble and perfect than the sensitive part. But no habit or quality mediates between the sensitive part and its activity. Therefore, in the intellective part, there should not be habits by the mediation of which the intellective part has its perfect operation.

8. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Physics 7 that virtue is the disposition of the perfected to the best. But the best is act, and a disposition is in the same genus as that to which it disposes. Therefore, virtue is an act.

9. Moreover, Augustine says in On the customs of the Church that virtue is the order of love. But order, as he says in The City of God xix, disposes what is equal and unequal in a thing to their places. Therefore, virtue is a disposition and not a habit.

10. Moreover, habit is a quality difficult to change. But virtue is easily removed, because it is taken away by one act of mortal sin. Therefore, virtue is not a habit.

11. Moreover, if we need certain habits, which are virtues, we need them either for natural activities or for meritorious ones, which are supernatural. But not for the natural, because if any nature, sensible or insensible, can perfect its activity without a habit, a fortiori rational nature can do this. Likewise, not for meritorious activities, because God works these in us, Philippians 2:13, “who works in you both the will and the performance.” Therefore, virtues are in no way habits.

12. Moreover, any agent that acts thanks to its form acts according to the demands of that form, as the warm always acts by heating. Therefore, if there were in the mind some habitual form called virtue, the one having virtue would have to act virtuously, which is false, because then anyone having virtue would be confirmed (in the good). Therefore, virtues are not habits.

13. Moreover, habits are in powers that they might have ease of action. But we do not need something facilitating the acts of virtues, as is clear. For they consist chiefly in choice and will. But nothing easier than what is constituted in the will. Therefore, virtues are not habits.

14. Moreover, the effect cannot be nobler than its cause. But if virtue is a habit, it will be the cause of the act, which is nobler than the habit. Therefore, it does not seem fitting that virtue should be a habit.

15. Moreover, the mean and extremes are in the same genus. But moral virtue is a mean between passions; but passions are in the genus of acts; therefore ...

ON THE CONTRARY

1. Virtue, according to Augustine, is a good quality of mind. But it can only be in the first species [of quality], which is habit. Therefore, virtue is a habit.

2. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Ethics 2 that virtue is a habit of choosing in the mind.

3. Moreover, virtues exist in sleepers, because they are only taken away by mortal sin. But there are no virtuous acts of sleepers, since they do not have the use of free will. Therefore, virtues are not acts.

RESPONSE. It should be said that virtue, given its meaning, designates the completion of a power; so strength means that thanks to which a thing, by the complete power it has, can bring about its impetus or motion. Virtue, according to its name, points to the perfection of a power. Hence, the Philosopher said in On the heavens 1 that virtue is the utmost reach of the power of the thing. But because potency is said with reference to act, a potency is fulfilled when it has its complete activity. And because activity is the end of the agent, since any thing is for the sake of its own activity as for its proximate end, as the Philosopher says in On the heavens 1, a thing is good insofar as it has a complete ordering to its end. Hence, virtue makes the one having it good and makes his work good, as is said in Ethics 2, and thus it is evident that it is the disposition of the perfected for the best, as is said in Metaphysics 7.

All of these pertain to the virtue of anything. For the virtue of a horse is what makes him and his activity good; similarly the virtue of a rock or a man or any other thing. But as potencies differ so does the mode of their complexity. For some powers only act, others are only acted upon or moved, yet others are both acted upon and act on others.

The potency which only acts does not require, in order to be a principle of action, that anything be brought to bear on it; hence, the virtue of such a potency is nothing other than the potency itself. Such is the divine power, the agent intellect and natural powers; that is why the virtues of such powers are not habits but the potencies themselves as complete in themselves.

But those powers which both act and are acted upon and which are so moved that they are not determined to a single object, act in a manner that is, in a way, rational. Such powers act insofar as something is added to them, not just in a manner of a passion, but as a form which abides in the subject but which does not determine the subject to a single object - if that were so, the power would not have dominion over its act. Hence, in Ethics 3 it is said that sense is not the principle of any act, and these powers are perfected in their acts only thanks to something superadded, which, however, is not in them in the manner of a form abiding in its subject but only in the manner of passion, as the species (image) in the pupil. Hence, the virtues of these powers are not habits but rather the power themselves, insofar as they are actually acted upon by their agents. Those powers act and are acted upon that are so moved by their agents that they are not determined to one. Action belongs to them as to powers which in a sense are rational, and these powers arc completed in acting by something superadded, which is not in them in the manner of a passion alone but in the manner of an abiding form remaining in the subject, in such a way, however, that by it the power is not necessitated to one, since then the power would not have dominion over its act. The virtues of these powers are not the powers themselves, nor passion, as with sensitive powers, nor qualities acting necessarily, like the qualities of natural things. Rather they are habits thanks to which one can act when he likes, as the Commentator says in On the Soul 3. And Augustine in On the conjugal good says that habit is that whereby one acts when time permits.

Therefore, it is clear that virtues are habits and how habits differ from the second and third species of quality. How do they differ from the fourth species? Figure as such is not ordered to act.

From all of which it can be seen that we need the habit of virtues for three things. First, for uniformity in operation; for what depends solely on operation is easily altered unless it is stabilized by some habitual inclination.

Second, in order that perfect operation be promptly at hand. For unless the rational power is in some way inclined to one [of contraries] by habit, when we act it will always be necessary for the activity to be preceded by inquiry, something obvious in one who does not yet have the habit of science or one wishing to act virtuously who does not have the habit of virtue. Hence, the Philosopher in Ethics 6 says that things done right away are from habit.

Third, in order that perfect activity might be pleasantly accomplished. This results from habit which, since it acts in the manner of a kind of nature, makes the activity proper to it, as it were, natural and, consequently, delightful. For fittingness is a cause of delight. Hence, the Philosopher in Ethics 2 gives as a mark of habit the delight taken in acting.

Ad 1. It should be said that virtue, like power, is understood in two ways. In one way, materially, as when we say that what we can do is our power or strength; and thus Augustine calls the good use of free will a virtue. Second, essentially, and thus neither power nor virtue is an act.

Ad 2. It should be said that to deserve or merit is taken in two ways. First, properly, and thus it is nothing other than the performance of some action by which one justly acquires a reward for himself. Second, improperly, and thus any condition that makes a man in any way worthy is called merit, as when we say that the mien of Priam merits command since it was worthy of command. So a reward ought to follow on merit, and is in a way owed to the habitual quality by which one is made worthy of reward, and thus it is owed to baptized infants. It is also owed to actual merit, and thus it is not owed to virtue but to the act of virtue. Yet even to little ones it is given as by reason of actual merit, insofar as by the merit of Christ the sacrament has the efficacy, by which one is regenerated to life.

Ad 3. It should be said that Augustine says that the virtues are the highest goods, not absolutely, but of their kind, just as fire is said to be the most subtle body. Hence, it does not follow that there is nothing in us better than these virtues but that they are numbered among things that are the highest goods of their kind.

Ad 4. It should be said that just as in life there is a habitual perfection which is a virtue, and the actual perfection which is the act of virtue, so too in heaven happiness is actual perfection, proceeding from some consummate habit. Hence, the Philosopher too in Ethics 1 says that happiness is an activity in accord with perfect virtue.

Ad 5. It should be said that vicious acts directly remove the act of virtue because of contrariety, but they remove the habit of virtue only incidentally insofar as it is separated from the cause of infused virtue, namely, from God. Hence, in Isaiah 59:2: “But your iniquities have divided between you and your God.” That is why acquired virtues are not taken away by one vicious act.

Ad 6. It should be said that that definition of the Philosopher can be understood in two ways. In one way, materially, such that by virtue we understand that of which the virtue is capable, which is the utmost of which the power is capable, as the virtue of one who can carry a hundred pounds is his insofar as he can carry a hundred pounds, not sixty. Second, it can be understood essentially, and thus virtue means the utmost reach of the power because it signifies the completion or fulfillment of the power, whether or not what completes the power is other than it.

Ad 7. It should be said that sensitive and rational powers do not get the same account.

Ad 8. It should be said that a disposition for something is that through which something is moved to achieve something. But motion sometimes has its term in the same genus, as quality in the case of alteration as such; hence the disposition to that term is always of the same genus as the term. Sometimes, however, it has a term in another genus, as when the term of alteration is a substantial form, and thus the disposition is not always of the same genus as that to which it disposes, as heat is a disposition to the substantial form of heat.

Ad 9. It should be said that disposition is said in three ways. First, as heat is the disposition for the form of fire. Second, as that by which an agent is disposed to act, as speed is the disposition to run. Third, disposition means the ordering of things to one another, and Augustine takes disp6sition in this sense. Disposition in the first sense is contrasted with habit, whereas in the second sense, virtue itself is a disposition.

Ad 10. It should be said that nothing is so stable that it is not immediately undone when its cause is removed. It is no wonder then that if union with God is taken away by mortal sin, infused virtue should go. Nor does this impugn its stability, which can only be understood in terms of its cause remaining.

Ad 11. It should be said that we need habit for both operations. For natural operations for the three reasons given above; for meritorious acts too, in order that the natural power can be elevated by the infused habit to that which is above nature. Nor is this affected by the fact that God works in us, because he so acts in us that we too act, hence we need a habit whereby we can act sufficiently.

Ad 12. It should be said that every form is received in its subject in the manner of the one receiving. But it is proper to the rational power that it is capable of opposites and has dominion over its act. Hence, the rational power is not forced to do the same thing by the habitual form acquired, but it can act or not act.

Ad 13. It should be said that what is a matter of choice alone can easily come about in one way or another, but it is no easy matter for it to come about as it should, that is, expeditiously, firmly, pleasantly. For that we need the habits of the virtues.

Ad 14. It should be said that any motion, whether of man or beast, that begins from scratch is produced by some mover, and depends on something that exists prior, and thus a habit does not elicit an act from itself except insofar as it is stirred by some agent.

Ad 15. It should be said that virtue is a mean between passions, not as if it were some middle passion, but as an action that brings about a mean between passions.

Article 2
Is Augustine’s definition of virtue all right?

His definition is: Virtue is a good quality of mind whereby we live rightly, which no one misuses and that God works in us without us.

This does not seem right.

1. Virtue is a good. If it is good, this is either by its own goodness or that of another. If another’s, we have an infinite regress. If by its own, virtue is the first goodness because only the first goodness is good of itself.

2. Moreover, what is common to every being ought not be put in the definition of any one of them, but the good, which is convertible with being, is common to every being and thus ought not be put into the definition of virtue.

3. Moreover, the good is in the moral as it is in the natural, but good and evil in natural things do not constitute species. Therefore, good ought not be put into the definition as the specific difference of virtue.

4. Moreover, the difference is not included in the definition of the genus. But good is included in the definition of quality, as is being. Therefore, it ought not be added to the definition of virtue, as when it is said that virtue is a good quality of mind, etc.

5. Moreover, good and evil are opposites. But evil does not constitute any species, since it is a privation. No more then should good. Therefore, it ought not be put into the definition of virtue as a constitutive difference.

6. Moreover, because good is broader than quality, one quality does not differ from another because it is good. Therefore, good ought not be put in the definition of virtue as a difference of quality or virtue.

7. Moreover, nothing comes to be from two acts. But good implies an act and so too does quality. Therefore, it is not wen said that virtue is a good quality.

8. Moreover, what is predicated abstractly is not predicated concretely: Whiteness is a color but it is not colored. But goodness is predicated abstractly of virtue, and thus is not predicated of it concretely. Therefore, it is not right to say that virtue is a good quality.

9. Moreover, no difference is predicated abstractly of species, and that is why Avicenna says that man is not rationality but rational. But virtue is goodness. Therefore, goodness is not a difference of virtue, and it is not right to say that virtue is a good quality.

10. Moreover, evil in the moral order is vice. Therefore, good in the moral order is the same as virtue. But then good ought not be put in the definition of virtue, because then the thing would be defined by itself.

11. Moreover, mind pertains to intellect. But virtue looks rather to appetite. Therefore it is not right to say that virtue is a good quality of mind.

12. Moreover, according to Augustine mind names the higher part of the soul. But some virtues are in the lower powers. Therefore, it is not right to put ‘good quality of mind’ in the definition of virtue.

13. Moreover, a power not the essence is called the subject of virtue. But mind seems to name the essence of soul, because Augustine says that in mind are intelligence, memory, and will. Therefore, mind ought not be put in the definition of virtue.

14. Moreover, that which is proper to species ought not be put in the definition of the genus. But rectitude is proper to justice. Therefore, rectitude ought not be put in the definition of virtue as when it is called a good quality of mind whereby one lives rightly.

15. Moreover, for living things to be is to live. But virtue does not perfect with respect to existence but with respect to acts. Therefore, it is not right that it be called that whereby one lives rightly.

16. Moreover, whoever takes pride in something, uses it badly. But one can be proud of virtues. Therefore, one can use virtue badly.

17. Moreover, in On free will Augustine says that it is only the greatest goods that no one uses badly. But virtue is not among the greatest goods, since the greatest is desired for its own sake, and that is not the case with virtue, which is sought for the sake of something else, namely, happiness. That being so, it is not right to include in the definition, ‘which no one uses badly.’

18. Moreover, a thing is generated, nourished, and grows from the same thing. But virtue is nourished and increased by our acts because a lessening of cupidity is an increase in charity. Therefore, virtue comes about from our own acts, and ‘what God works in us without us’ is wrongly put into its definition.

19. Moreover, the removal of an impediment counts as an efficient cause. But free will is in a way the removal of an impediment to virtue. Therefore, it is in a way its cause, and it is not right to say that God causes virtue in us without us.

20. Moreover, Augustine says: Who created you without your help will not justify you without your help. Therefore...

21. Moreover, that definition seems to belong to grace. But virtue and grace are not one and the same thing. Therefore, this is not a good definition of virtue.

RESPONSE. it should be said that this would be the definition of virtue even if that last clause were omitted, and it fits every human virtue. For, as has been said, virtue perfects a power with respect to perfect act. But perfect act is the end of the power or of the one acting. Hence, virtue makes both the power and the agent good, as was said earlier. Thus, in the definition of virtue there is something that pertains to the perfection of the act and something that pertains to the perfection of the power or agent.

Two things are required for the perfection of the act: first, that the act be right; second, that the habit cannot be the principle of the contrary of the act. That which is the principle of both a good and a bad act cannot as such be the perfect principle of the good act, for habit is the perfection of the power. That is why it must be the principle only of the good act and in no way of a bad. Hence the Philosopher in Ethics 6 says that opinion, which bears on both the true and false, is not a virtue, whereas science, which bears only on the true, is. The first condition is indicated by ‘whereby one lives rightly,’and the second by ‘which no one uses badly.’

In order for virtue to make the subject good, three things must be taken into account. The subject itself, and this is indicated when he says ‘of mind,’ since human virtue can be in man only insofar as he is a man. The perfection of intellect is indicated by the inclusion of ‘good,’because good follows on the ordering to end. The mode of inherence is designated by the mention of ‘quality,’ because virtue cannot inhere in the manner of a passion, but rather in the manner of a habit, as has been said above.

The perfection of intellect is called ‘good’ because good means the order to the end. The mode of inherence is designated by ‘quality’ because virtue does not inhere in the manner of a passion but in the manner of a habit, as was said above. All these things belong to both moral and intellectual virtue, whether theological or acquired or infused. When Augustine adds ‘what God works in us without us,’ this pertains to infused virtue only.

Ad 1. It should be said that just as accidents are called beings, not because they subsist, but because by them something is, so virtue is not called good because it itself is good, but because by it something else is good. That is why virtue need not be good by another goodness, as if it were informed by another goodness.

Ad 2. It should be said that the good that is convertible with being is not put in the definition of virtue, but the good that is specific to the moral act.

Ad 3. It should be said that acts are distinguished according to the form of the agent, as heating and freezing are. But good and evil are, as it were, the form and object of will: The agent always impresses its form on what it acts upon, as does the mover on the moved. Therefore, moral acts, which have will as their principle, are distinguished specifically into the good and bad. But the principle of natural activities is form, not the end, and that is why natural activities are not distinguished into good and bad as species, though that is how it is in moral acts.

Ad 4. It should be said that moral goodness is not included in the understanding of quality, so the argument is not relevant.

Ad 5. It should be said that evil does not constitute a species by reason of privation, but by reason of that which sustains the privation, because it is incompatible with the notion of good, and from this it takes its species.

Ad 6. It should be said that this objection proceeds from the good of nature, not from the good of morals, which is put in the definition of virtue.

Ad 7. It should be said that goodness does not imply another goodness than that of virtue itself, as is clear from the foregoing. In its essence virtue is a quality; hence, it is obvious that good and quality do not indicate different acts, but one.

Ad 8. It should be said that this does not obtain in transcendentals which apply to every being, for essence is being and goodness is good and unity is one, but we cannot say that whiteness is white. The reason is that anything the intellect grasps falls under the notion of being, and consequently under the good and one. Hence, essence and goodness cannot be understood otherwise than under the notes of good and one and being, which is why goodness is said to be good and unity one.

[In the absence of Thomas’s response to the remaining objections, Vincent de Castro Novo, O.P. supplied the following responses.]

Ad 9. It should be said that difference, like genus, is predicated of species essentially, not denominatively. Therefore, if the species is subsistent and compositive, it is not predicated of the difference abstractly, but concretely. The concrete names of composite substances signify the composites, and these are properly put into a category, as species and genera, for example, man and animal. Therefore, if the difference must be predicated of such a species essentially, it should be signified concretely; otherwise it would not be said of the whole species. But if the species is a simple form—think of accidents, the concrete names of which, like ‘white’ and ‘black,’ are not placed in a category as species or genera, save by way of reduction, but only as abstractly signified, e.g., whiteness, music, justice, and, generally, virtue—then either the genus or difference abstractly signified is predicated of them, and that is why, just as virtue is essentially a quality, so it is essentially the goodness of reason or of the moral.

Ad 10. It should be said that the moral good is said of the act, of the habit, and of the object. Similarly, moral evil is said of a bad act which is a sin and of a bad habit which is a vice. Hence, virtue is that which makes the one having it good and makes his act good with moral goodness; similarly vice is what makes the one having it evil and makes his act evil with moral badness. Therefore, moral evil is not the same as vice, since vice names a habit, whereas moral evil is said of habit and act and object. By parity of reasoning the moral good is not identical with virtue, since moral goodness is said of the act as well.

Three things can be considered in virtue.

First, that which the essence of virtue directly implies, and thus virtue implies a certain disposition whereby a thing is well and fittingly disposed given its nature. Hence, the Philosopher says in Physics 7 that “virtue is a disposition that perfects for the best, and I mean the perfected which is disposed according to nature.” In this way, vice is opposed to virtue because it implies a disposition by which a thing is disposed to that which does not befit its nature. Hence, Augustine says in On free will 3: “When you see something that is lacking to the perfection of a nature, call it a vice, because the vice of a thing seems to be that by which it is indisposed to that which befits its nature.”

Second, is that which follows on its essence which virtue signifies by way of consequence; in this way, virtue implies a goodness that makes the one having it good. For a thing’s good consists in this, that it is appropriately disposed with respect to its nature. This is what virtue brings about, as has been said, which is why it is an ordered, that is, a good action. For virtue is ordered by reason to the good or fitting act. Hence, virtue is the perfection of a power with reference to act and not only makes the one having it good but makes his act good as well. In this way, virtue is opposed to sin, which properly signifies an inordinate act.

From this it is clear that the vicious habit, evil, and sin can be called the evil of morals, and every virtue the good of morals, and not the reverse.

Ad 11. It should be said that mind is taken here to stand for the rational powers and thus means both intellect and will: will is essentially a rational power. Virtues are found both in intellect and in the affective part. Intellectual virtues give the capacity of acting well but not the good use of that capacity, whereas moral virtues, which are virtues simply speaking, give to the affective both the capacity of acting well and its good use, bringing it about that one uses the capacity well and rightly. For example, justice not only gives one the capacity to perform just acts but also makes one act justly. Grammar, on the other hand, only gives the capacity to speak correctly and well, but does not bring it about that a man always speaks well. One well versed in grammar can make grammatical mistakes, for example, solecisms. From which it is clear that virtue refers both to the appetitive and the intellective powers, since both are included in mind.

Ad 12. It should be said that mind means a type of power which is the principle of the acts over which man has dominion, and these are properly called human acts. Reason and will are such powers, for they are what first move and command the act over which man has dominion, and they are said to be essentially rational. But the irascible and concupiscible are principles of human acts insofar as they participate in reason, but as moved movers. For they are moved by the higher appetite insofar as they obey it, and thus, insofar as they participate in reason and are so fashioned as to obey this, it is clear that reason and will are the first principle of the human act as moving and commanding, and sensitive appetite is a secondary principle as a moved mover, and such powers are meant by mind and can be the subject of virtue.

Again, mind implies a power that is rational either essentially or by way of participation. The irascible and concupiscible are rational powers by way of participation, and can be the subject of virtue insofar as they participate in mind.

Ad 13. It should be said that mind signifies what is highest in the soul’s power. Hence, since the divine image is found in that which is highest in us, it must be said that image does not pertain to soul in its essence but only according to mind which names its highest power. Thus, insofar as it is image mind names a power of the soul and not its essence; thus mind includes those powers which in their acts recede from matter and the conditions of matter. In mind are included intelligence, will, and memory, not as accidents of a subject, but as parts of a whole.

Ad 14. It should be said that rectitude is of two kinds. There is one which is special and is constitutive with reference to external things which come into man’s use and are the proper matter of justice. There is another that is general and implies an order to the fitting end and to divine law, and this is common to every virtue and enters into the definition of virtue.

Ad 15. It should be said that “to live” is taken in two ways. In one way for the existence of the living thing, and thus it pertains to the essence of the soul which is the principle of being in living things. Hence, the Philosopher in On the Soul 2 says that for living things to exist is for them to live. In that sense, ‘live’ does not enter into the definition of virtue. It is taken in another sense for the activity of the living thing, insofar as understanding and sensing are ways of being alive. Hence, it is that the activity that is most pleasurable and most occupies one is called his life, and the Philosopher says in Metaphysics 1 that the human race lives by art and reasoning, that is, acts. It is in this sense that life is put in the definition of virtue, which by virtue a man rightly acts.

Ad 16. It should be said that badly using virtue can mean two things. First, when it is taken as an object, and then one can badly use it when he thinks ill of virtue or hates or takes pride in it. Second, as the elicitive principle of bad use, such that a bad act is elicited by virtue, and in this sense one cannot use virtue badly. For virtue is a habit always inclining to the good, since every virtue gives the capacity of acting well and also give good use and not just the capacity and insure that one uses the capacity well. Of this kind are the virtues of the appetitive power, as justice not only makes a man ready to do just things but brings it about that he acts justly.

Ad 17. It should be said that only the greatest goods are such that one cannot use them badly as objects since they are of themselves desirable and can be hated by no one. But virtues, which are not the greatest goods, one can use badly as objects, as was said above; but they cannot be used badly as being the elicitive principle. It is not necessary that what one cannot use badly as an elicitive principle should be the highest good. It can also be said, according to Augustine, that virtue is numbered among the highest goods insofar as through it man is ordered to the highest good, which is God, and for this reason no one uses virtue badly.

Ad 18. It should be said that just as acquired virtues increase and are nourished by the acts that caused them, so infused virtues are increased by the act of God by whom they are caused. Our acts dispose for an increase of charity and the infused virtues, as a man at the outset, by doing what is natural to him, prepares and disposes himself to receive charity from God. Subsequent acts can merit an increase in charity because they presuppose charity, which is the principle of merit. But no one can merit that he might receive charity in the first place, because there can be no merit without charity. From which it is clear that charity and the other infused virtues are not actively increased by acts, but only as disposing and meriting; they are actively increased by the action of God who perfects and conserves the charity that he first infused.

Ad 19. It should be said that sin is what prevents virtue. Free will without the action of God is not of itself sufficient to remove sin, because God alone effectively wipes away iniquity and rids of sin. The Holy Spirit moving the mind of man more or less according to his own will provides any disposition or preparation or effort of free will that precedes charity. For the remission of sin is not without grace, and thus in Romans 3:24, we read, “They are justified freely by his grace.”

Ad 20. It should be said that infused virtue is caused in us by God without our doing anything but not without our consent; thus, God does not justify us unless we are consenting because it is by an act of free will that we consent to God’s justice when we are justified. That movement is not formally the cause of justifying grace, but its effect, such that the whole operation pertains to grace and to God, which effectively justifies by infusing grace. The things done by us of which we are the cause God causes in us but not without our acting, for he acts in every will and nature.

Ad 21. It should be said that the definition of virtue, properly understood, does not apply to grace, for grace is an instance of the first species of quality. It is not a habit like virtue, nor is it immediately ordered to activity; rather, it is like a relation which confers a kind of spiritual and divine existence On the Soul and is presupposed by the infused virtues as their cause and root. Grace is to the essence of soul as health is to the body. That is why Chrysostom in a homily said that grace is the health of mind. It is not counted among the sciences or virtues or the other qualities that philosophers have enumerated because they only knew those accidents of the soul which are ordered to acts proportioned to human nature.

Virtue, therefore, is essentially a habit, but grace is not a habit but rather a supernatural participation in the divine nature according to which we become consorts of the divine nature, as is said in 1 Peter 2, by the reception of which we are said to be reborn as the sons of God. Hence, just as the natural light of reason is root and cause of acquired virtue, so the light of grace, which is the participation in the divine nature in the very essence of the soul by means of a kind of indwelling, is the root and cause of infused virtue.

Again, virtue is a good quality which makes the one having it good: For this goodness which virtue confers on the one having it is the goodness of perfection in relation to activity of which it is the immediate principle. But the goodness that grace confers On the Soul is the goodness of perfection not immediately in relation to activity but to a certain spiritual and divine existence, thanks to which those having grace are said to be made like God and thus sons of God freely by his grace. Hence, the ‘good’ put in the definition of virtue indicates a fittingness to some pre-existent nature, essential or participated. This good is not attributed to grace, save as to the principle and cause of such goodness in man.

Mind as it is put in the definition of virtue means a power of the soul, which is the subject of virtue; but potency in the definition of grace means the essence of the soul, which is the subject of grace.

Again ‘to live’ as put in the definition of virtue means activity of which virtue is the immediate principle, but life as it is attributed to grace means a certain divine existence of which it is the immediate principle, and not activity to which it is only ordered through the mediation of virtue.

Again, virtue is called the disposition of what is best on the part of one already perfected, because it perfects the power with respect to the activity whereby a thing achieves its end. Grace is not the disposition of the perfected to the best in this way, first, because it does not primarily perfect the power but the essence, and also because it does not have activity as its proper effect, but rather something divine. From all of which it is clear that the definition of virtue does not apply to grace.

This is the end of the additions.

Article 3
Can a Power of the soul be the subject of virtue?

It seems that it cannot.

1. According to Augustine, virtue is that whereby we live well. But to live follows on the essence of the soul, not on a power of it. Therefore, there cannot be a virtue of a power of the soul.

2. Moreover, the existence of grace is more perfect than that of nature. The existence of nature is through the essence of soul, which is more noble than the powers, being their principle. Therefore, the existence of grace, which is through the virtues, is not through the powers, so power cannot be the subject of virtue.

3. Moreover, an accident cannot be a subject. But a power of the soul is in the genus of accident, for natural ability and inability belong to the second species of quality. Therefore, a power of the soul cannot be the subject of virtue.

4. Moreover, if one power of the soul could be the subject of virtue, any could, since any power of the sou

I is hostile to vice, against which the virtues are ordered. But not just any power of the soul can be the subject of virtue, as will be clear below. Therefore, the subject of virtue cannot be a power.

5. Moreover, active principles such as heat and cold found in the natures of other agents are not subjects; but the powers of the soul are active principles, for they are the principles of the activities of the soul. Therefore, they cannot be the subjects of other accidents.

6. Moreover, the subject of a power is the soul. Therefore, if a power is the subject of another accident, by parity of reasoning that accident will be the subject of another accident, and so it will go on indefinitely, which is absurd. Therefore, the power of the soul is not the subject of virtue.

7. Moreover, it is said in Posterior Analytics 1 that there is no quality of quality. But the power of the soul belongs to the second species of quality; and virtue is in the first species of quality. Therefore, the power of the soul cannot be the subject of virtue.

ON THE CONTRARY. 1. That whose action it is, is the principle of the action. But the actions of the virtues are of the powers. Therefore, the virtues are as well.

2. Moreover, the Philosopher says in Ethics 1 that the intellectual virtues are essentially rational, but the moral virtues are rational by way of participation. But what is rational either essentially or by participation names a power of the soul. Therefore, the powers of the soul are not subject of virtue.

RESPONSE. It should be said that a subject relates to accident in three ways. In one way, as providing it sustaining power, for the accident does not exist of itself, but is supported by the subject. In another way, as potency to act, for the subject is subject to the accident as to an active power, which is why the accident is called a form. In a third way, as cause to effect, for the subject principles are, per se, principles of the accident.

With respect to the first, one accident cannot be the subject of another accident. For, since no accident exists of itself, it cannot provide sustaining power to another, unless perhaps it were said that it sustains another accident insofar as it itself is sustained by the subject.

With respect to the other two, one accident relates to another in the manner of a subject insofar as it is in potency to the other, as the diaphanous relates to fight and surface to color. One accident can also be the cause of another, as the moist is of taste, and in this way one accident can be the subject of another. It is not that one accident can provide sustainment to the other, but that the subject receives one accident by the mediation of the other. It is in this way that a power of the soul is said to be the subject of a habit. The habit is to the power as act to potency, since potency taken as such is undetermined and is only determined to this or that by a habit. And acquired habits are caused by the principles of the powers. That is why the powers must be called the subjects of virtue, since virtue is in the soul by the mediation of the power.

Ad 1. It should be said that living as it occurs in the definition of virtue pertains to action, as was said earlier.

Ad 2. It Should be said that spiritual existence is from grace, not from virtue, for grace is the principle of existing spiritually, but virtue is the principle of acting spiritually.

Ad 3. It should be said that the power is not of itself a subject, but only insofar as it is sustained by the soul.

Ad 4. It should be noted that we are speaking now of human virtues. Therefore, powers which cannot in any way be human, since the sway of reason does not extend to them, cannot be subjects of virtue, e.g., the vegetative powers. However, whatever resistance arises from such powers is mediated through sense appetite to which the sway of reason extends and which can therefore be called human and be the subject of human virtue.

Ad 5. It should be said that only the agent intellect and the powers of the vegetable soul are active powers of soul, and they are not subjects of any habit. But the passive powers of the soul are the principles of acts only insofar as they are moved by their active causes.

Ad 6. It should be said that it is not necessary to regress infinitely, because we will come to an accident that is not in potency to another accident.

Ad 7. It should be said that there is no quality of quality such that one quality would be the per se subject of another, which is not the case here, as was said above.

Article 4
Whether the irascible and concupiscible can be the subject of virtue

It seems that they cannot.

1. Contraries come to be in the same thing. But mortal sin is contrary to virtue and cannot exist in sensuality, whose parts are the irascible and concupiscible. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible cannot be subjects of virtue.

2. Moreover, habit and act belong to the same power. But the principal act of virtue is choice, according to the Philosopher in the Ethics, but this is not an act of either the concupiscible or the irascible. So there cannot be habits of virtue in the irascible and concupiscible.

3. Moreover, no corruptible thing is the subject of what is perpetual; hence Augustine proves that the soul is perpetual, because it is the subject of truth which is perpetual. But the irascible and concupiscible, like the other powers of the soul, do not survive the body as, or so it has seemed to some, the virtues do. For justice is perpetual and immortal, as is said in Wisdom 1, 15, and for the same reason this could be said of all virtues. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible cannot be the subject of virtues.

4. Moreover, the irascible and concupiscible have bodily organs. Therefore, if there are virtues of the irascible and concupiscible, they are in a bodily organ and can be grasped by the imagination or fancy. But then they are not perceptible by mind alone, as Augustine says of justice, which is a rectitude perceptible only by mind.

5. If it should be said that the irascible and concupiscible can be the subject of virtue insofar as they participate in reason in some way, the response is that they are said to participate in reason insofar as they are ordered by reason. But the ordering of reason cannot provide sustaining power to a virtue, since it is not something subsistent. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible cannot be the subject of virtue because they participate in reason.

6. Moreover, the apprehensive and sensitive powers serve reason as do the irascible and concupiscible, which pertain to sense appetite, do. But there is no virtue in any of the apprehensive powers of sense. Therefore, not in the irascible and concupiscible.

7. Moreover, if the order of reason can be participated in by the irascible and concupiscible, the rebellion of sensuality would be diminished, and these two powers would be contained by reason. But this rebellion is not infinite, since sensuality is a finite power and there cannot be an infinite act of a finite power. Thus, it could completely stamp out this rebellion, since any finite thing is removed if a little bit is taken away again and again, as the Philosopher makes clear in Physics 1. But then sensuality in this life could be totally cured, which is impossible.

8. If it should be said that God, who infuses virtue, could completely remove this rebellion even if it cannot be done by us, the response is that man is what he is insofar as he is rational, since his species is formed from this. To the degree then that anything in man is subject to reason, it belongs to human nature. But the foregoing powers of the soul would be maximally subject to reason if this rebellion were totally quelled. Therefore, this would especially belong to human nature and thus the impediment of this rebellion could be totally removed by us.

9. Moreover, it does not suffice for the notion of virtue that vice be avoided, for the perfection of justice consists in what is said in Psalm 33:15: “Forsake evil and do good.” But it is a note of the irascible that it detests evil, as is said in Of the spirit and soul. Therefore,

virtue can be in the irascible at least.

10. Moreover, in the same book it is said that in reason there is a desire for virtues, but in the irascible a hatred of vice. But the desire for virtue and virtue are in the same power, since a thing desires its own perfection. Therefore, every virtue is in reason and not in the irascible and concupiscible.

11. Moreover, no potency which is only acted upon and does not act can have a habit, since a habit is that whereby one acts when he wishes, as the Commentator says in On the Soul 3. But the irascible and concupiscible do not act, but are acted upon, because as is said in Ethics 3, sense is not the master of any act. Therefore, there cannot be a habit of virtue in the irascible and concupiscible.

12. Moreover, the proper subject is commensurate with the proper passion. But virtue is commensurate with reason and not with the irascible and concupiscible, which are common to the brutes and us. That is why virtue like reason is found only in men. Therefore, every virtue is in reason and none in the irascible and concupiscible.

13. Moreover, the gloss on Romans 7: “The law is good which while it prohibits concupiscence, prohibits every evil.” Therefore, all vices pertain to the concupiscible appetite where concupiscence lies. But virtues and vices are in the same subject. Therefore, if not in the irascible, virtues are in the concupiscible at least.

ON THE CONTRARY. 1. There is what the Philosopher says of temperance and fortitude, that they are in irrational parts. But the parts of the irrational, that is, of sense appetite, are the irascible and concupiscible, as is said in On the Soul. Therefore, there can be virtues in the irascible and concupiscible.

2. Moreover, venial sin is a disposition to mortal sin. But completion and disposition pertain to the same thing. Therefore, since venial sin is in the irascible and concupiscible (for the first movement is the act of sensuality, as is said in the gloss on Romans 8), mortal sin too can be there, and thus virtue too, which is the contrary of mortal sin.

3. Moreover, the middle and extremes belong to the same thing. But virtue is a kind of mean between contrary passions, as courage between fear and boldness, and temperance between too much and too little in things desired. Therefore, since passions of this kind are in the irascible and concupiscible, it seems that virtue too is in them.

RESPONSE. It should be said that everyone is agreed on this question, at least in part, though in part there are conflicting opinions as well. It is conceded by all that there are some virtues in the irascible and concupiscible, such as temperance in the concupiscible and courage in the irascible, but there is this difference. Some distinguish two kinds of irascible and concupiscible, one in the superior, the other in the inferior pari of the soul. For they say that the irascible and concupiscible which are in the superior part of the soul, since they pertain to rational nature can be the subject of virtue, but not those which are in the inferior part and pertain to sensual and brute nature. But this has been discussed in another question, namely, whether in the superior part of the soul two powers can be distinguished, one irascible and the other concupiscible, properly speaking.

But whatever be said of that, so far as the irascible and concupiscible in the inferior appetite are concerned, there must be virtues in them as well, as Aristotle says in Ethics 3, and others agree. This is obvious from the following consideration. It has been pointed out that virtue names the fulfillment of a power, and a power looks to act, so virtue is found in a power which is a principle of human action. It is not just any activity found in man or engaged in by a man that is called human, since there are many activities shared by plants, animals, and men, but only that which is proper to him. Unlike these other things, it is proper to man that he have dominion over his acts. Any act over which a man has dominion is properly called a human act, but not those over which he does not have dominion, even though they occur in him, e.g., digesting and growing and the like. Therefore, there can be virtue in that which is a principle of an act over which man has dominion.

Therefore, any act of which man is master is properly a human act, but not those of which he is not, even though they occur in a man, such as digesting, growing, and the like. Therefore, there can be human virtue in that thanks to which man has domain over his acts. But it should be noted that acts of this kind have a threefold principle. One that is the first and commanding mover, thanks to which man has dominion over his acts, and this is reason or will. The other is a moved mover, namely, sense appetite, which is moved by the higher appetite insofar as it obeys it and then by its command moves the external members. Third, there is that which is only moved, namely, the external members.

However, although both the external members and the inferior appetite are moved by the higher part of the soul, this does not happen in the same way. For, in the nature of things, such external members as the hand or foot obey the command of the higher straightaway without any resistance, un1css there be some impediment. But the lower appetite has an inclination of its own following on its nature and does not automatically obey the higher appetite. Hence, Aristotle says in the Politics that the soul rules the body as a despot would, as a master rules a slave who does not have the capacity to resist the master’s command. But reason rules the inferior parts of the soul with a royal and political governance, that is, as kings and princes rule free men who have the right and capacity to resist to some degree the commands of king or prince.

Therefore, there is no need in the external member for anything perfective of the human act, save its natural disposition by which it is fashioned to be moved by reason. But in the inferior appetite, which can resist reason, there is need for something whereby the activity that reason commands be accomplished without resistance. For if the immediate principle of operation is imperfect, the operation must be imperfect, however much perfection is found in the higher principle. Therefore, if the lower appetite is not perfected by a disposition to follow the command of reason, the operation, which is from the lower appetite as from its proper principle, would not be of perfect goodness. For there would be some resistance of sense appetite, and a sadness would result in sense appetite, since it would be moved as it were violently by the higher. This happens in those who have strong desires which they do not, however, follow because of reason’s prohibition.

Therefore, when human action must deal with the objects of sense appetite-, the good of the operation requires that there be a disposition or perfection in sense appetite by which it easily obeys reason. This is what we call virtue. Therefore, when there is a virtue with respect to that which pertains to the irascible power, such as courage with respect to fear and boldness, or magnanimity with respect to difficult things hoped for, and patience with respect to anger, such virtues are said to be in the irascible as in their subject. But when it is a matter of things which properly pertain to the concupiscible, they are said to be in the concupiscible as in their subject, such as chastity, which is concerned with venereal pleasure, and sobriety and abstinence, which are concerned with the pleasures of food and drink.

Ad 1. It should be said that virtue and mortal sin can be considered as acts or as habits. For the acts of the concupiscible and irascible, considered in themselves, are not mortal sins, but turn into mortal sin when, with reason consenting or moving, they tend to what is contrary to divine law. Some of these acts then, taken as such, cannot be acts of virtue, but only when they concur in following the command of reason. Thus the act of mortal sin and of virtue pertain in a way to the irascible and concupiscible, and that is why the habit of either can be in the irascible and concupiscible. And so in the case in point: just as the act of virtue consists in this that the irascible and concupiscible follow reason, so the act of sin consists in this, that reason is drawn to follow the inclination of the irascible and concupiscible. That is why sin and the virtues of the irascible and concupiscible are often attributed to reason as to their proximate cause.

Ad 2. It should be said that, as has been pointed out already, the act of virtue cannot be of the irascible and concupiscible alone, apart from reason. Choice, the chief thing in the act of virtue, comes from reason, and, as in any activity, the action of the agent is prior to the passion of the patient. But reason commands the irascible and concupiscible. Therefore, virtue is not said to be in the irascible or concupiscible as if the whole act of virtue or even its chief part were accomplished by them, but insofar as, by the habit of virtue, the ultimate fulfillment of goodness is conferred on the act of virtue, such that the irascible and concupiscible follow the command of reason without difficulty.

Ad 3. It should be said that, supposing that the irascible and concupiscible do not actually remain in the separated soul, they would still remain in it as in their root, for the essence of the soul is the root of the powers. Similarly, virtues which are ascribed to the irascible and concupiscible remain in reason as in their root, for reason is the root of all the virtues, as will be shown later.

Ad 4. It should be said that a certain hierarchy is found in forms. For some forms and powers are totally immersed in matter and their activities are wholly material, as is evident of the forms of elements. But the intellect is wholly free from matter, so its operation does not involve any sharing in matter. The irascible and concupiscible are in a midway condition. For the bodily change conjoined to their acts shows that they use a bodily organ, but that they are in some way lifted above matter is shown by this, that they are moved on command and obey reason. So there is virtue in them insofar as they are lifted above matter and obey reason.

Ad 5. It should be said that although the order of reason in which the irascible and concupiscible participate is not something subsistent and cannot be a subject as such, yet it can be the reason why something is a subject.

Ad 6. It should be said that the powers of sense knowledge are naturally prior to reason since reason receives from them, but the appetitive naturally follow the order of reason since the lower appetite naturally obeys the higher, and so it is not similar.

Ad 7. It should be said that the rebellion against reason by the irascible and concupiscible cannot be wholly removed by virtue; since of their very nature the irascible and concupiscible tend to that which is good according to sense, they sometimes resist reason. But this can be brought about by the divine power which is even capable of changing natures. Nevertheless, this rebellion is diminished by virtue insofar as these powers become accustomed to being subject to reason, and thus, they have what pertains to virtue from outside, namely, from the dominion of reason over them. Of themselves they retain something of the movements proper to them which are sometimes contrary to reason.

Ad 8. It should be said that although there is in man the principle of reason, the integrity of human nature requires not only reason, but also the lower powers, and the body too. So it is that left to itself the condition of human nature is such that there is resistance to reason on the part of the lower powers, something which follows on the fact that these lower powers of the soul have their own activities. It is otherwise in the state of innocence and of glory, since reason thanks to its union with God draws strength to contain entirely the lower powers.

Ad 9. It should be said insofar as the detestation of evil is said to pertain to the irascible, it not only implies a turning away from evil but a move by the irascible to destroy evil, much like one who not only flees evil but is moved by anger to extirpate evil. But this is to do something good. Although evil thus detested, it is not only this that pertains to the irascible and concupiscible, for to pursue an arduous good pertains to the irascible, in which there is not only the motion of wrath and boldness but of hope.

Ad 10. It should be said that those words must be understood by way of adaption and not properly, for in every power of the soul there is a desire for a proper good, so the irascible desires victory as the concupiscible desires pleasure. But because the concupiscible is drawn to something simply or absolutely good for the whole animal, every desire of the good is attributed to it.

Ad 11. It should be said that, although the irascible and concupiscible, considered as such, are acted upon and do not act, however, insofar as in man they participate somewhat in reason they also in a way act and are not wholly acted upon. Hence, in the Politics the Philosopher says the reason’s dominion over these powers is pofitical, because such powers retain their own activities and do not obey reason completely. The soul’s dominion over body is not royal but despotic, because the members of the body instantly obey the soul so far as their activities go.

Ad 12. It should be said that although these powers are found in brutes, in them they do not participate in reason and thus they cannot have moral virtues.

Ad 13. It should be said all evil can be laid to concuptscence as to its ultimate, but not to its proximate, root. All passions take their rise from the concupiscible and irascible, as was shown when we dealt with the emotions. Indeed, the perversity of reason and will most often come about because of the emotions. Or we could say that we understand by concupiscence not only the concupiscible power itself but what is common to all appetitive powers, in each species of which there is to be found something of concupiscence, because of which sin occurs. One cannot otherwise sin than by desiring and seeking.

Article 5
Whether will is the subject of virtue

And it seems that it is.

1. A greater perfection is needed in the commander if he is to command perfectly than in the executor if he is to execute well, because the order to execute comes from the commander. But the will commands the act of virtue, and the irascible and concupiscible obey and execute. Therefore, since virtue exists in the irascible and concupiscible as in a subject, it seems that it should even more so be in the will.

2. lt will be said that the will’s natural inclination to the good suffices for its rectitude, since we naturally desire the end, so it does not need to be rectified by a superadded habit of virtue. On the contrary: Will does not bear on the ultimate end alone, but also on other ends. But with respect to the desire for other ends the will can act rightly or not rightly. For the good propose for themselves good ends, and the evil evil, as is said in Ethics 3: As a person is, so does the end appear to him. Therefore, for rectitude of will there is required that there be in it some habit of virtue that perfects it.

3. Moreover, the soul’s knowing power has some natural knowledge, namely, of first principles, yet we have an intellectual virtue with respect to such knowledge, namely, insight (intellectus), which is the habit of first principles. So there should be in will a virtue with respect to that to which it is naturally inclined.

4. Moreover, just as there is moral virtue governing the emotions, namely temperance and courage, so there is a virtue governing actions, namely justice. But will acts without emotion while the irascible and concupiscible are with emotion. Therefore, just as there is moral virtue in the irascible and concupiscible, so too is there in the will.

5. Morever, the Philosopher says in Ethics 4 that love or friendship involves emotion. But friendship is a matter of choice, and the love that is without passion is an act of will. Therefore, since friendship is a virtue, or not without virtue, as is said in Ethics 8, it seems that there is also virtue in will as in a subject.

6. Moreover, charity is the most powerful of the virtues, as the Apostle proves in 1 Corinthians 13. But only will can be the subject of charity; the concupiscible, which is lower, cannot be its subject since it bears only on sensible goods. Therefore, will is the subject of virtue.

7. Moreover, according to Augustine we are conjoined to God most immediately through will. But that which conjoins us to God is virtue. Therefore, it seems that virtue is in will as in a subject.

8. Moreover, happiness according to Hugh of St. Victor is in the will. But virtues are dispositions to happiness. Therefore, since disposition and perfection are in the same thing, it seems that virtue is in will as in a subject.

9. Moreover, according to Augustine, will is that whereby we either live rightly or sin. But rectitude of fife pertains to virtue. Hence, Augustine says that virtue is a good quality of mind, whereby we live rightly. Therefore, virtue is in the will.

10. Moreover, contraries are such as to be in the same subject; but sin is contrary to virtue. Therefore, just as every sin is in the will, as Augustine says, so it seems that every virtue too must be in the will.

11. Moreover, human virtue ought to be in the part of the soul that it proper to man. But will is proper to man, just as reason is, as being closer to reason than are the irascible and concupiscible. Therefore, since the irascible and concupiscible are subject of virtue, it seems that the will should be a fortiori.

ON THE CONTRARY

1. Every virtue is either intellectual or moral, as is clear from what the Philosopher says at the end of Ethics 1. But moral virtue has as its subject that which is rational by participation, not essentially. But intellectual virtue has for subject that which is rational essentially. Therefore, since the will can be counted in neither part, since it is not a knowing power, which pertains to the essentially rational, nor does it pertain to the rational by way of participation, it seems that the will can in no way be the subject of virtue.

2. Moreover, several virtues ought not pertain to the same act, but that is what would happen if the will were the subject of virtue because, as has been shown, there are virtues in the irascible and concupiscible, and since will is related in some way to the acts of those virtues, there would have to be virtues in the will related to those acts. Therefore, it should not be said that the will is the subject of virtue.

RESPONSE. It should be said that a power acquires a complement to its act from the habit of virtue to which it is subject. Hence, a habit of virtue is not needed in order for a power to extend to its proper objects. Virtue orders the power to the good, since virtue is what makes the one having it good and renders his act good. But will has by reason of itself that which other powers have as a result of virtue, since its object is the good. Hence, for the will to tend to the good is like the concupiscible tending to the pleasurable and hearing to sound. Hence, the will is in no need of a habit of virtue in order to be inclined to the good proportioned to it, to which it tends because of what it is, but with respect to the good which transcends what is proportioned to the power, it needs a habit of virtue. Since it is the nature of any appetite to tend to the proper good of the desirer, a good can exceed the proportion of will in two ways.

In one way by reason of the species, in another by reason of the individual. By reason of the species, as when the will is elevated to a good that exceeds the limits of the human good, and by human I mean what a man can do with his own powers. But the divine good is above the human good, and charity raises man’s will to that, and so does hope.

By reason of the individual, as when someone seeks the good of another, although the will is not borne beyond the limits of the human good, and thus justice perfects will as do all the virtues which relate to the other, such as liberality and the like. For justice is the good of the other, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 5. Thus, there are two virtues in will as in a subject, namely, charity and justice. A sign of this is that these virtues, although they pertain to appetite, are not about emotions, as temperance and courage are, and thus, it is clear that they are not in sense appetite in which the emotions are found, but in rational appetite, that is, will, in which there are no emotions. For every emotion is in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in Physics 8. But those virtues which concern the emotions, as courage concerns fear and boldness, and temperance desire, must for this reason be in sense appetite. Nor need there be any virtue in the will because of such emotions, because the good of such emofions is according to reason. To which, since it is its proper object, the will is naturally disposed by reason of what it is.

Ad 1. It should be said that the judgment of reason suffices for the will to command, since will naturally seeks the good according to reason, as the concupiscible seeks what is pleasurable to the sense.

Ad 2. It should be said that the natural inclination of will is not only to the ultimate end, but to the good shown to it by reason. For the good as understood is the object of will and to it the will is naturally ordered, as any power is ordered to its own object, so long as it is its proper good, as was said earlier. But one can sin in this regard insofar as the judgment of reason is intercepted by emotion.

Ad 3. It should be said that knowledge comes about through some likeness (species), nor does the power of intellect suffice of itself for knowing unless it receives an intelligible species. That is why in things that we know naturally there must be some habit which also takes its rise from the senses, as is said at the end of the PosteriorAnalytics. But will does not need any species in order to will, so the case is not similar.

Ad 4. It should be said that the virtues which concern emotions are in the lower appetite, nor is any virtue of the higher appetite required for them, for the reason already given.

Ad 5. It should be said that friendship is not a virtue properly speaking, but something following on virtue. For because one is virtuous it follows that he will love those like himself It is otherwise with charity, which is a friendship with God that lifts man up to that which exceeds the limits of his nature. Hence, charity is in the will, as we said.

Ad 6 & 7. From this the reply to six and seven are obvious, for the virtue joining the will to God is charity.

Ad 8. It should be said that certain dispositions are prerequisites to happiness, such as the acts of the moral virtues by which impediments to happiness are removed, such as disturbance of the mind by passions and external distractions. But there is an act of virtue which when it is complete is essentially happiness, namely, the act of reason or intellect. For contemplative happiness is nothing else than the perfect contemplation of the highest truth; but active happiness is the act of prudence by which a man governs himself and others. But there is something perfective of happiness, namely, pleasure which completes happiness as comeliness does youth, as is said in Ethics 10. This pertains to will, and if we are speaking of celestial happiness which is promised to the saints, the will is ordered to it by charity, but if we are speaking of contemplative happiness, the will is ordered to it by a natural desire. Thus, it is clear that not all virtues need be in the will.

Ad 9. It should be said that one lives rightly or sinfully by will which commands all the acts of virtues and vices, although not as eliciting, so it is not necessary that the will be the proximate subject of every virtue.

Ad 10. It should be said that every sin is in the will as in its cause insofar as every sin comes about by consent of the will, but it is not necessary that every sin be in the will as in its subject: Gluttony and dissipation are in the concupiscible, and pride is in the irascible.

Ad 11. It should be said that from will’s closeness to reason it happens that will is in harmony with reason just because of what it is, and therefore, there is no need of any habit of virtue besides, as there is with the lower powers, namely, the irascible and concupiscible.

REPLIES TO ARGUMENTS ON THE CONTRARY

Ad 1. It should be said that charity and hope which are in the will are not included in this division of philosophy, for they are another kind of virtue called theological. justice is included among the moral virtues, for the will like other appetites participates in reason in the sense that it is directed by reason. For although will belongs by nature to the same intellectual part as reason, it is not the same power as reason.

Ad 2. It should be said that with respect to the things to which a virtue of the irascible or concupiscible relates, there need be no virtue in will, for the reason already given.

Article 6
Whether practical intellect is the subject of virtue

It seems that it is not.

1. The Philosopher says in Ethics 2 that knowing is of little or no avail for virtue, and he is speaking there of practical knowledge, as is clear from what he adds, that many do not do the things of which they have knowledge: It is the knowledge of practical reason that is ordered to action. Therefore, practical intellect cannot be the subject of virtue.

2. Moreover, without virtue no one can act rightly. But without the perfection of practical intellect, a person can act rightly, since he can be instructed by someone else concerning things to be done. Therefore-, the perfection of practical intellect is not a virtue.

3. Moreover, the more one sins, the more he recedes from virtue. But departure from the perfection of practical intellect lessens sin, for ignorance excuses either in part or in full. Therefore, the perfection of practical intellect cannot be a virtue.

4. Moreover, according to Cicero, virtue acts as nature does, but nature’s manner of acting is opposed to that of reason, that is, of practical intellect, something clear from Physics 2, where the natural is distinguished from the way in which one acts knowingly. Therefore, it would seem that there is no virtue in the practical intellect.

5. Moreover, the good and the true are formally different in their proper notions, but the formal difference of objects diversifies habits. Therefore, since the object of virtue is the good, whereas the perfection of practical intellect is the true, although ordered to action, it seems that the perfection of practical intellect is not virtue.

6. Moreover, according to Aristotle in Ethics 2, virtue is a voluntary habit, but the habits of practical intellect differ from those of will or the appetitive part. Therefore, the habits which are in practical intellect are not virtues. Consequently, the practical intellect is not the subject of virtue.

ON THE CONTRARY

1. Prudence is one of the four principal virtues, but its subject is practical intellect. Therefore practical intellect can be the subject of virtue.

2. Moreover, human virtue has a human power for its subject. But intellect is more of a human power than are the irascible and concupiscible, since that which is something essentially is greater than that which is such only by participation. Therefore, the practical intellect is the subject of human virtue.

3. Moreover, that for the sake of which something is takes precedence, but in the affective part virtue is for the sake of reason, since in order that the affective power might obey reason a virtue is established in it. All the more reason, then, why there should be a virtue in practical reason.

RESPONSE. It should be said that there is this difference between natural and rational virtue that the former is determined to one, whereas the latter is ordered to many things. Both animal and rational appetites are inclined to what they desire by means of a preexisting cognition. As for natural appetite, it tends to its end without any pre-existent knowledge, as the heavy inclines to the center. Because the known good is the object of animal and rational appetites, where this good is always the same, there can be a natural inclination in appetite and a natural judgment in the cognitive power, as happens in beasts which have few activities because of the weakness of the active power which extends to few. In all things of the same species there is the same unchanging good. Hence, they have a natural inclination to it and a natural judgment in the cognitive power with respect to that uniform good. From this natural judgment and desire it comes about that all swallows builds their nests in the same way and all spiders spin a web the same way, and so it is with all beasts. But man has many and different activities because of the nobility of his active principle, the soul, whose power extends in a way to an infinity of things. Therefore, the natural desire of the good does not suffice for man, or the natural judgment for acting well, unless they be further determined and perfected.

A man is inclined by natural appetite to seek his proper good, but since this varies in many ways and because man’s good consists of many things, there could not be a natural appetite for this determinate good given all the conditions needed if it is to be good for him, since this varies widely according to the condition of persons, times, and places and the like. For the same reason the natural judgment, which is uniform, does not suffice for the pursuit of a good of this kind. So it is that a man must by reason, which compares different things, discover and discern his proper good, determined with respect to all its conditions insofar as it sought here and now.

With respect to doing, reason without a perfecting habit is like speculative reason without the habit of science when it judges the conclusion of some science, something it can do only imperfectly and with difficulty. Thus it is that speculative reason needs to be perfected by the habit of science in order to judge the objects pertaining to that science; so too practical reason is perfected by a habit in order that it might rightly judge the human good with respect to all the things that must be done. This virtue is called prudence and its subject is practical reason; it is perfective of the moral virtues in the appetitive part, all of which incline appetite to some type of human good, as justice gives an inclination to the good of equality in things pertaining to common life, temperance to the good which is the restraint of desire, and so with the other virtues, every one of which is exercised in many ways and not uniformly in every case. That is why prudence of judgment is needed in order that the right mode be established.

From this the rectitude and completion of goodness in all other virtues comes; hence, the Philosopher says that the mean in moral virtue is determined by right reason. Because all the habits of the appetitive part take the note of virtue from this rectitude and completion of goodness, virtue is the cause of all the virtues of the appetitive part, which are called moral insofar as they are virtues. Moreover, Gregory in the Morals on Job 22 says that the other virtues can be virtues only insofar as they do prudently what they seek.

Ad 1. It should be said that the Philosopher is speaking there of practical science, and prudence implies more than practical science. Practical science makes a universal judgment of things to be done, for example, fornication is evil, theft ought not he committed, and the like. This knowledge can be present yet reason’s judgment concerning the particular act be intercepted with the result that one does not judge correctly. That is why moral science is said to avail little for the acquisition of virtue, because even when it is had a man can sin against virtue. It is the task of prudence to judge correctly concerning singular things to be done, to be done now, a judgment that is indeed corrupted by any sin. Therefore, while prudence remains, a man does not sin. Hence, it avails not a little but much for virtue, indeed it causes virtue, as has been said.

Ad 2. It should be said that a man can take general advice from another concerning what is to be done, but that he rightly follow it in action against all passions can only result from the rectitude of prudence without which virtue simply would not be.

Ad 3. It should be said that the ignorance which is the opposite of prudence is ignorance of choice according to which every evil is due to the ignorance which follows on the interception of reason’s judgment by the inclination of appetite. And this is no excuse for sin, since it constitutes it, but the ignorance which is opposed to practical science excuses or diminishes sin.

Ad 4. It should be said that Cicero’s remark is to be understood as applying to the inclination of appetite tending to some general good, such as acting courageously and the like. But if this inclination is not directed by the judgment of reason, it is frequently led astray and so much the more as it is more vehement, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 6 of the blind man who is the more injured by hitting the wall the faster he runs.

Ad 5. It should be said that the good and true are objects of different parts of the soul, namely, of the intellective and the appetitive, which two are so related that both act on the act of the other, as win wishes the intellect to understand and intellect understands the will to will. Therefore, these two, good and true, include one another, since the good is a kind of truth, insofar as it is grasped by intellect when intellect understands the will to be willing the good or even insofar as it understands that something is good. So too the true is a good of intellect which thus falls to the will insofar as a man wills to understand the true. Nevertheless, the truth of the practical intellect is the good, which is the end of action, for good does not move appetite save insofar as it is understood. Therefore, nothing prevents there being a virtue in practical intellect.

Ad 6. It should be said that the Philosopher defines moral virtue in Ethics 2 and intellectual virtue in Ethics 6. The virtue that is in practical intellect is not moral but intellectual, since the Philosopher numbers prudence among the intellectual virtues, as is evident in Ethics 2.

Article 7
Are there virtues of the speculative intellect?

It seems that there are not.

1. Every virtue is ordered to action, since virtue is what renders action good. But the speculative intellect is not ordered to action, for it says nothing of imitating or fleeing, as is clear from On the Soul 3. Therefore, there can be no virtue of the speculative intellect.

2. Moreover, virtue is what makes the one having it good, as is said in Ethics 2. But a habit of speculative intellect does not make the one having it good; one is not called a good man because he possesses science. Therefore, the habits which are found in the speculative intellect are not virtues.

3. Moreover, the speculative intellect is chiefly perfected by the habit of science, but science is not a virtue, as is clear from the fact that it is distinguished from the virtues. For a habit or disposition is said to be in the first species of quality, and habit is predicated of science and virtue. Therefore, there is no virtue of the speculative intellect.

4. Moreover, every virtue is ordered to something, namely, happiness which is the end of virtue. But the speculative intellect is not ordered to anything; speculative sciences are not sought for the sake of utility, but for themselves, as is said in Metaphysics 1. Therefore, there cannot be a virtue in the speculative intellect.

5. Moreover, the act of virtue is meritorious. But understanding does not suffice for merit, indeed one who knows the good and does not do it sins, as is said in James 4:17. Therefore, there is no virtue of speculative intellect.

ON THE CONTRARY

1. Faith is in the speculative intellect, since its object is the First Truth. But faith is a virtue. Therefore, the speculative intellect can be the subject of virtue.

2. Moreover, the true and good are equally noble, for they include one another, for the true is a kind of good and the good is a kind of truth, and both are common to every being. Therefore, if there can be virtue in the will, whose object is the good, there can be virtue in speculative intellect, whose object is the true.

RESPONSE. It should be said that virtue in anything is said with respect to the good, because, as the Philosopher says, any virtue makes the one having it good and renders his action good. For example, the virtue of the horse makes the horse good and makes him run well and sit a rider well, and these are the functions of a horse. To the degree then that a habit has the note of virtue, it is ordered to the good. But this occurs in two ways, formally and materially.

Formally, when a habit is ordered to the good as good; materially when it is ordered to something that is good but not under the note of goodness. Good under the note of goodness is the object of the appetitive part alone, for good is that which all things seek. Therefore, those habits which are either in the appetitive part or depend upon it are formally ordered to the good and are called virtues in the strongest sense. Habits which are not in the appetitive part nor depend upon it can be materially ordered to that which is good although not formally under the note of goodness, hence they can in some way be called virtues, though not so properly as the first habits. But it should be noted that the intellect, both speculative and practical, can be perfected by a habit in two ways.

In one way absolutely and as such, insofar as it precedes win as moving it; in another way insofar as it follows will which elicits its act on command, because, as has been said, these two powers, intellect and will, involve one another. Therefore, the habits which are in practical or speculative intellect in the first way can be called virtues in a way, though not according to the full sense of the term, and so it is with understanding, science, and wisdom in the speculative intellect, and art in the practical intellect. For one is said to be knowing or understanding insofar as his intellect is perfected with respect to knowing the truth, which indeed is the good of intellect. And although the true can be willed, insofar as a man wishes to understand the truth, it is not in this respect that the foregoing habits perfect.

For a man is not made willing to consider the truth by the fact that he has science: He is only capable of it. Hence, the very consideration of the true is not science as it is willed, but insofar as it tends directly to its object. And similarly in the case of art in the practical intellect, which is why art does not perfect a man in such a way that he wills to act according to the art, but only that he should know and be capable. But habits which are in speculative or practical intellect insofar as intellect follows will more truly have the note of virtue, since by them a man is made not only capable or cognizant of acting well, but willing. This can be seen in the case of faith and prudence, though differently. Faith perfects the speculative intellect insofar as it is commanded by will, which is clear from its act, for a man does not give intellectual assent to what is above human reason unless he wills to; as Augustine says: “No man can believe unless he is willing.”

just as faith is in the speculative intellect following the command of will, so temperance is in the concupiscible insofar as it is subject to the command of reason. Hence, in believing will commands intellect, not only with respect to bringing off the act, but also with respect to the determination of its object, since intellect assents to a definite belief on the will’s command, just as in the determination of the mean by reason the concupiscible tends because of temperance. But prudence is in practical intellect or reason, as has been said, and will determines only the end of prudence, not its object: For prudence seeks its object presupposing the will for the good end, inquiring into ways whereby this good can be achieved and retained.

Thus it is clear that habits of intellect are related to win in different ways, for some depend on will only for their use, and this is incidental to them. Use depends on will in one way and on such habits as science and wisdom and art in another. These habits do not perfect a man in such a way that he chooses to use them well, but give him only the capacity. But there is an intellectual habit which receives its principle or starting point from will, for in action the end is the starting point. This is how it is with prudence. There is another intellectual habit which receives its determinate object from the will, and this is faith.

Now all these habits can be called virtues but not in the same sense. These last two more perfectly and properly fulfill the definition of virtue, although from this it does not follow that they are more noble or more perfect habits.

Ad 1. It should be said that a habit of speculative intellect is ordered to its proper act which makes it perfect, that is, to the consideration of truth, but it is not ordered to some external action as to an end: Its end lies in its proper act. But practical intellect is ordered to an external action as to its end, for the consideration of what ought to be done or made pertains to practical intellect for the sake of acting or doing. Thus, the habit of speculative intellect makes its act good in a more noble way than does the habit of practical intellect, the former as an end, the latter as for an end, even though the habit of practical intellect, insofar as it orders to the good as good, and presupposes the will, is more properly called virtue.

Ad 2. It should be said that a man is not said to be simply good when he is only partially good but only when he is good as a whole, which comes about by the goodness of will. The will commands the acts of all human powers, because every act is the good of its power. Thus, a man will be called simply good when he has a good will. But he who has goodness with respect to some power, not presupposing a good will, is called good insofar as he has good sight or hearing or is said to see and hear well. It is clear from this that a man is not said to be absolutely good just because he knows; he is only said to think well, and the same is true with respect to art and other like habits.

Ad 3. It should be said that science is distinguished from moral virtue yet is an intellectual virtue; it is also distinguished from virtue in the most proper sense, for it is not that kind of virtue, as has been said.

Ad 4. It should be said that the speculative intellect is not ordered to something outside itself, but it is ordered to its own act as to an end. Ultimate, that is, contemplative, happiness consists in its activity. Hence, the acts of speculative intellect are closer to ultimate happiness by way of similarity than the habits of practical intellect, though the habits of practical intellect are perhaps closer by way of preparation or merit.

Ad 5. It should be said that by the act of such a habit as science a man can merit insofar as it is commanded by will without which there is no merit. However, science does not perfect intellect in that way, as has been said. A man is not made willing to use it from the fact that he has knowledge, but only capablc.Thcrcf0rc, a bad will Is not opposed to science or art as It is to prudence, faith, or temperance. Hence, the Philosopher says that he who sins voluntarily in things to be done is less prudent, though it is the opposite in science and art: The grammarian who deliberately commits a solecism is no less a grammarian.

Article 8
Do we have any natural virtues

Il seems that we do.

1. St. John Damascene said in Book Three, Chapter 14, “Virtues are natural and are in us naturally and equally.”

2. Moreover, the gloss on Matthew 4:23, says: He teaches natural justice, namely, chastity, justice, humility, virtues a man has naturally.

3. Moreover, it is said in Romans 2:14, that men who have not the law naturally do what is of the law. But law commands the act of virtue. Therefore, men naturally perform the acts of virtue, and so it seems that virtue is from nature.

4. Moreover, Anthony says in a sermon to monks, “If will changed nature, it would be perversity; if the condition is preserved, it is virtue.” And in the same sermon he says that natural adornment suffices for a man. But this would not be if the virtues were not natural. Therefore, the virtues are natural.

5. Moreover, Cicero says that elevation of soul is ours by nature, but this seems to refer to magnanimity. Therefore, magnanimity is in us naturally and for the same reason the other virtues.

6. Moreover, to do the work of virtue nothing is needed but being capable of the good, to will it and to know it. But the notion of good is in us naturally, as Augustine says in On free will 2. But to will the good is natural to man, as Augustine says when commenting literally on Genesis. “To be capable of the good is in man naturally, since the will has dominion over his acts. Therefore, nature suffices for the work of virtue. Therefore, virtue is natural to man, with respect to its beginning over his acts.

7. But it might be said that virtue is natural to man as to its beginning, but its perfection is not from nature. On the contrary, there is what Damascene says in Book Three, Chapter 14: “Remaining in that which is according to nature, we are in virtue; but falling away from that which is according to nature, from virtue, we arrive at that which is against nature and we are in evil.” From which it is clear that to turn away from evil is according to nature, but this is the mark of perfect virtue. There the perfection of virtue too is from nature.

8. Moreover, virtue, since it is a form, is something simple, lacking parts. Therefore, if it is according to nature in some part, it is totally from nature.

9. Moreover, man is more worthy and perfect that irrational creatures, but in what pertains to their perfection nature is sufficient for such creatures. Therefore, since the virtues are perfections of man, it seems that they are in man by nature.

10. But it will be said that this cannot be because man’s perfection lies in many and diverse things whereas nature is ordered to one. On the contrary. The inclination of virtue like that of nature is to one. For Cicero says that virtue is a habit after the manner of nature, in agreement with reason. Therefore nothing prevents virtues from being in man from nature.

11. Moreover, virtue consists in the mean, but the mean is determined to one. Therefore, nothing prevents nature from inclining to the same thing as virtue.

12. Moreover, sin is the privation of mode, species, and order. But sin is the privation of virtue. Therefore, virtue consists in mode species, and order. But these three are natural to man. Therefore, virtue is natural to man.

13. Moreover, the appetitive part of the soul follows the cognitive part, but in the cognitive part there is a certain natural habit, namely, the understanding of principles. Therefore, there must be a natural habit in the appetitive and affective part of the soul which is the subject of virtue. Therefore, there seems to be some virtue that is natural.

14. Moreover, the natural is that whose principle is within, as to be borne upward is natural to fire, because the principle of this motion is in that which is moved. But the principle of virtue is in man. Therefore, virtue is natural to man.

15. Moreover, that whose seed is natural is itself natural, but the seed of virtue is natural, for a gloss on Hebrews 1 says that God willed to sow in every soul the beginnings of wisdom and understanding. It seems, therefore, that the virtues are natural.

16. Moreover, contraries are of the same genus, but virtue is contrary to evil. But evil is natural, for it is said in Wisdom 12:10, “and their malice natural” and Ephesians 2:3, “and were by nature childrcn of the wrath.” Therefore, it seems that virtue is natural.

17. Moreover, it is natural for the lower powers to be subject to reason, for the Philosopher says in On the Soul 3 that the appetite of the higher part, which is reason, moves the lower, which is of the sensitive part, as the higher sphere moves the lower. But moral virtue consists in this, that the lower powers are subject to reason. Therefore, such virtues are natural.

18. Moreover, in order for a motion to be natural it suffices that there be a natural aptitude of the inner passive principle. This is how the generation of simple bodies is said to be natural; the active power of the celestial bodies is not nature, but intellect, so that the principle of generation of simple bodies is extrinsic to them. But in man there is a natural aptitude for virtue. Aristotle says in Ethics 2: We receive the innate from nature but the perfected from practice. It seems, then, that virtue is natural.

19. Moreover, that which is in a man from birth is natural, but according to the Philosopher in Ethics 6 some seem from birth to be courageous and temperate and disposed to other virtues. And job 31, 18, says, “For from my infancy mercy grew up with me and it came out with me from my mother’s womb.” Therefore, virtues are natural to man.

20. Moreover, nature does not fail in what is necessary, but virtues are necessary for a man given the end to which he is ordered, namely, happiness, which is the act of perfect virtue. Therefore, a man has virtues from nature.

ON THE CONTRARY

1. The natural is not removed by sin. Hence Dionysius says that what was given by nature survives even in the devils. But virtues are taken away by sin. Therefore, they are not natural.

2. Moreover, we neither acquire nor lose that which is in us naturally and is from nature. But we can acquire and lose what pertains to virtue. Therefore, the virtues are not natural.

3. Moreover, what is naturally in us is in everyone. But the virtues are not commn to all, because in some are found to virtue.

4. Moreover, we neither gain nor lose merit because of what is natural in us. But we merit by the virtues as we lost merit by vices. Therefore, the virtues and vices are not natural.

RESPONSE. It should be said that there is a division of opinion concerning the acquisition of sciences and virtues like that concerning the production of natural forms.

For there were those who held that forms actually pre-exist in matter, though latently, and then are brought from a hidden to a manifest state by the natural agent. This was the view of Anaxagoras, who held that everything is in everything, with the result that anything can be generated from anything.

Others said that forms are totally from without, whether by participation in Ideas, as Plato held, or from the agent intellect, as Avicenna thought, and that natural agents only dispose matter for form.

A third and middle way is that of Aristotle who held that forms pre-exist potentially in matter and are brought to act by an externl natural agent.

Similarly, in the case of sciences and virtues, some held that sciences and virtues are in us by nature and that by effort it is only impediments to science and virtue that are removed. Plato seems to have held this when he said that sciences and virtues are caused in us by participation in separated forms, but the soul was impeded from using them because of its union with the body, an impediment that must be removed by pursuit of the sciences and the exercise of the virtues. But others said that the sciences and virtues are in us by the influence of the agent intellect, to whose influence a man is disposed by study and exercise. Third is the middle opinion, that sciences and virtues are in us as an aptitude from nature, but their perfection is not in us from nature.

This view is best because just as with natural forms it does not take away the power of natural agents, so it preserves their efficacy with respect to the acqwisition of science and virtue by study and exercise. However, it should be noted that the aptitude for perfection and for form can be in a subject in two ways. In one way according to passive potency alone, as in the matter of air there is an aptitude for the form of fire; in another way, according to both active and passive potency, as in the curable body there is an aptitude for health because the body is susceptible of health. It is in this way that there is in man a natural aptitude for virtue, partly indeed due to the nature of species, insofar as the aptitude for virtue is common to all men, and partly due to the nature of the individual, insofar as some are more apt than others for virtue.

For evidence of this, notice that there are three ways in which a man can be a subject of virtue, as is clear from what has already been said; namely, intellect, will, and the lower appetite, which is divided into the concupiscible and irascible. In each of them the manner of susceptibility to virtue and the active principle of virtue must be considered. For it is obvious that in the intellective part there is the possible intellect, which is in potency to all intelligIbles, in the knowledge of which intellectual virtue consists, and the agent intellect, in whose light things come to be actually intelligible, some of which a man naturally knows from the outset without study and inquiry, first principles, that is, not only speculative, such as every whole is greater than its part and the like, but also in the practical order, such as evil is to be avoided and the like. These naturally known things are the principles of all subsequent speculative or practical knowledge which is acquired by study.

So too with will it is obvious that there is a natural active principle, for the will is naturally inclined to the ultimate end, and where it is a matter of action the end has the note of a natural principle. Therefore, the inclination of will is an active natural principle with respect to every disposition acquired by the affective part through exercise. But it is clear that the will itself, insofar as it is a power related to many, is susceptible of an habitual inclination to this or that with regard to the means to the end. The concupiscible and irascible naturally heed reason and hence have a natural receptivity to virtue, which is brought to perfection in them insofar as they are disposed to follow the good of reason.

All the foregoing beginnings of virtue follow on the nature of the human species and hence are common to all. But there is another beginning of virtue which follows on individual nature, insofar as a man, by natural makeup or celestial influence, is inclined to the act of a given virtue. This inclination is a kind of beginning of virtue but is not perfected virtue, because for perfected virtue the governance of reason is needed, which is why the definition of virtue states that it is elective of the mean according to right reason. For if someone should follow such an inclination without the discernment of reason, he would frequently sin. just as this beginning of virtue without the work of reason cannot have the perfect note of virtue, no more can any of the other beginnings of virtue mentioned. For one moves to the specific from universal principles by rational inquiry, and it is by the office of reason too that a man is led from desire of the ultimate end to the things which are appropriate to that end. In commanding the irascible and concupiscible, reason causes them to be subject to itself. So it is clear that for the consummation of virtue the work of reason is required, whether the virtue be in intellect or will or in the irascible or concupiscible. This is the consummation, that the beginning of virtue in the higher part is ordered to the virtue of the lower part, just as a man is made apt for the virtue that is in the will by the beginning of virtue that is in the will, and by that which is in intellect. But the virtue which is in the irascible and concupiscible [is brought to consummation] by the beginnings of virtue in them, and by that which is in the higher, but not vice versa.

Hence, it is manifest that reason, which is higher, works for the completion of every virtue. Both reason and nature are operative principles but they differ, as is clear in Physics 2, because the rational power relates to opposites whereas nature is ordered to one. Obviously then the perfection of virtue is from reason, not nature.

Ad 1. It should be said that virtues are called natural because of the natural beginnings of virtue in a man, not because of their perfection.

Ad 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. The same answer applies to all these.

Ad 6. It should be said that the ability to be good is in us from nature simply speaking in that the powers are natural; but to will and to know arc in us by nature in a manner of speaking, namely, according to some general beginning, but this does not suffice for virtue. For good action, which is the effect of virtue, requires that a man promptly and for the most part infallibly attain the good, which no one can do without the habit of virtue. Clearly someone may know generally how to make a work of art, for example to argue, to saw, or to make something, but to do so readily and without error, he has need of art, and it is the same with virtue.

Ad 7. It should be said that for man to turn away from evil is in a way natural, but to do this promptly and infallibly the habit of virtue is needed.

Ad 8. It should be said that virtue is not said to be partly from nature because some part of it is from nature and another not, but because it is from nature according to an imperfect way of being, namely, according to potency and aptitude.

Ad 9. It should be said that God is of himself perfected in goodness; hence, there is no way in which he needs to pursue goodness. The higher substances close to him need little from him in order to achieve the perfection of goodness. But man, who is more remote, needs many things for the pursuit of perfect goodness, because he is capable of happiness. Creatures who are not capable of happiness need fewer things than a man does. Hence, man is more worthy than they, even though he needs more things, just as one who can acquire perfect health by much exercise is better disposed than another who can achieve only a little even though by slight exercise.

Ad 10. It should be said that there can be a natural inclination with respect to the object of one virtue but not with respect to all because the natural disposition which inclines to one virtue inclines to the opposite of another virtue. For example, one naturally disposed to courage, which is the pursuit of the arduous, is less disposed to patience, which consists in restraining the passions of the irascible. Thus we see that animals naturally inclined to the act of one virtue are inclined to a vice contrary to another virtue, as the Eon who is bold is also naturally cruel. Such natural inclinations to this or that virtue suffice for animals who are incapable of achieving the perfect good according to virtue but pursue some limited good. But men are made to achieve the perfect good according to virtue and must therefore have an inclination to all the acts of virtue, which, since it cannot be from nature, must come from reason, in which are found the seeds of all the virtues.

Ad 11. It should be said that the mean of virtue is not determined by nature as is the middle of the earth toward which heavy things tend. The mean of virtue must be determined by right reason, as is said in Ethics 2, because what is enough for one is too little or too much for another.

Ad 12. It should be said that mode, species, and order constitute any good, as Augustine says in On the nature ofgood 2. Hence, mode, species, and order, in which the good of nature consists, are naturally present in man nor are they taken away by sin. Sin can be called the deprivation of mode, species, and order insofar as the good of virtue consists of these.

Ad 13. It should be said that the will does not produce its act through some species informing it, as the possible intellect does. Therefore, no natural habit for a natural desire is needed in the will, and all the less so because the will is moved by the natural habit of intellect insofar as the known good is the object of will.

Ad 14. It should be said that although the principle of virtue, namely, reason, is within man, this principle does not work in the mode of nature, and that is why what comes from it is not called natural.

Ad 15. The same response suffices for 15.

Ad 16. It should be said that their malice was natural insofar as it was due to custom, since custom is a second nature. But we were by nature the sons of wrath because of original sin, which is a sin of nature.

Ad 17. It should be said that it is natural that the lower powers be subject to reason, but not that they be subject to it according to a habit.

Ad 18. It should be said that motion is said to be natural because of the natural aptitude of the moveable when the mover moves to one determinate thing in the manner of nature, as do the generator of the elements and the mover of the heavenly bodies. But that is not how it is in the case in point, so the argument does not work.

Ad 19. It should be said that the natural inclination to virtue, thanks to which some almost from birth are brave and temperate, does not suffice for perfect virtue, as has been said.

Ad 20. It should be said that nature does not fail man in necessary things, for although it does not provide everything that is necessary for him, it enables him to acquire all necessary things by means of reason and the powers that obey it.

Article 9
Are virtues acquired by acts?

And it seems that they are not.

1. Augustine calls virtue a good quality of mind whereby one acts rightly, which one never uses badly, and which God brings about in us without us. But that which comes about by our acts is not brought about in us by God. Therefore, virtue is not caused by our acts.

2. Moreover, Augustine says that the life of all infidels is sin and that there is no good apart from the supreme good; where knowledge of the truth is lacking, the virtue of even the best is false. From which it follows that virtue cannot be without faith. But faith is not from our doing, but from grace, as is clear in Ephesians 2:18, “For by grace you have been saved through faith; and that not from yourselves, for it is the gift of God, not as the outcome of works, lest anyone may boast.” Therefore ‘ virtue cannot be caused by our acts.

3. Moreover, Bernard says that he labors in vain for virtue who does not know he must hope for it from the Lord. But what one hopes to obtain from God is not caused by our acts. Therefore, virtue is not caused by our acts.

4. Moreover, continence is less than virtue, as is clear from the Philosopher in Ethics 7. But we only have continence as a divine gift, for it is said in Wisdom 8:21, “I know that I cannot be continent unless God grants it.” So much the less are we capable of acquiring virtue by our acts, but it must come solely as the gift of God.

5. Moreover, Augustine says that man cannot avoid sin without grace. But sin is avoided by virtue, since a man cannot simultaneously be vicious and virtuous. Therefore, virtue cannot be without grace and thus is not acquired by acts.

6. Moreover, it is through virtue that we come to happiness, for happiness is the reward of virtue, as the Philosopher says in Ethics 1. Therefore, if virtue were acquired by our acts, by our acts without grace we could attain life eternal, which is man’s ultimate happiness, but that goes against the Apostle in Romans 6:23, “The gift of God is life everlasting.”

7. Moreover, Augustine in Onfree will counts virtue among the greatest goods because no one uses virtue badly. But the greatest goods are from God, according to James 1:17, “Every good gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights.” Therefore, it seems that virtue is only in us as a gift of God.

8. Moreover, as Augustine says in On free will 3, nothing can form tsclf. But virtue is a kind of form of the soul. Therefore, a man cannot cause virtue in himself by his acts.

9. Moreover, just as from the outset intellect is in essential potency to knowledge, so the affective power is to virtue. But the intellect existing in a state of essential potency needs an external mover, namely, a teacher in order that it might actually know. Similarly therefore, in order for a man to acquire virtue he needs an external agent, and thus his own acts do not suffice.

10. Moreover, acquisition comes about by receiving. But action does nox come about by receiving but rather by a sending forth or emergence of action from the agent. Therefore, we do not acquire virtues by the fact that we do things.

11. Moreover, If virtue were acquired by us by our acts, it would be acquired by either one or many. But not by one, since no one is made learned by one act, as is said in Ethics 2. Similarly too not by many, because many acts, since they are not simultaneous, cannot together bring about a single effect. Therefore, it seems that there is no way in which virtue could be caused in us by our acts.

12. Moreover, Avicenna says that virtue is the power essentially attributed to things for performing their works. But that which is essentially attributed to a thing is not caused by its act. Therefore, virtue is not caused by the act of the one having virtue.

13. Moreover, if virtue were caused by our acts, this would be either by virtuous or by vicious acts. But not by vicious acts, since they destroy virtue; similarly not by virtuous acts, because they presuppose virtue. Therefore, there is no way that virtue is caused in us by our acts.

14. If it should be said that virtue is caused by imperfect virtuous acts, on the contrary: Nothing acts beyond its species. Therefore, if the acts preceding virtue are imperfect, it seems that they cannot cause perfect virtue.

15. Moreover, virtue is the utmost of a power, as is said in On the heavens 1. But a power is natural. Therefore, virtue is natural and not acquired by works.

16. Moreover, virtue is that which makes the one having it good, as is said in Ethics 2. But a man is good according to his nature. Therefore, a man’s virtue is his from nature and is not acquired by acts.

17. Moreover, a new habit is not acquired by the frequency of a natural act.

18. Moreover, a thing has existence through its form, but grace is the form of the virtues, for without grace the virtues are said to be unformed. Therefore, virtues are from grace and not from acts.

19. Moreover, according to the Apostle [in] 2 Corinthians 12:9 “strength is made perfect in weakness.” But weakness is more of a passion than an act. Therefore, virtue is caused from passion rather than by acts.

20. Moreover, since virtue is a quality, the change brought about by virtue seems to be an alteration, for alteration is change of quality. But alteration is only a passion in the sensitive part of the soul, as is evident from the Philosopher in Physics 7. Therefore, if virtue were acquired by our acts by way of some passion and alteration, it would follow that virtue is in the sensitive part. Which conflicts with Augustine who calls it a good quality of mind.

 21. Moreover, a person chooses correctly concerning the end

thanks to virtue, as is said in Ethics 10, but to do this does not seem to

be in our power because as one is, so does the end appear to him, as

is said in Etbi . cs 3, and this is due to natural make-up or the influence

of the heavenly bodies. Therefore, it is not in our power to acquire

virtues, and they cannot accordingly be caused by our acts.

22. Moreover, we do not become accustomed or unaccustomed with regard to natural things. But in some men there are natural dispositions to some vices, as in others to virtue. Therefore, such inclinations to virtue cannot be wholly taken away by the accustoming due to acts. Thus, while they remain, virtue cannot be in us. Therefore, the virtues cannot be acquired by us through acting.

ON THE CONTRARY. 1. Dionysius says the good is more virtuous than evil, but habits of vice are caused in us by bad acts. Therefore, the habit of virtue is caused in us by good acts.

2. Moreover, according to the Philosopher in Ethics 2, activities cause us to be skilled. But this is through virtue. Therefore, virtue is caused in us by acts.

3. Moreover, generation and corruption take place between contraries. But virtue is corrupted by bad acts. Therefore, it is generated by good acts.

RESPONSE. It should be said that since virtue is the utmost of a power, that toward which any power tends in acting, which is that the activity be good, it is manifest that the virtue of anything is that by which it produces its good activity, since anything is for the sake of its activity. A thing is good insofar as it is well related to its end. Thus, a thing must be good and act well because of its own virtue. But the proper good of a thing differs from the proper good of another, different perfections relating to different perfectible things, which is why the good of man is different from the good of a horse or the good of a rock.

But the good of man varies according to different ways of considering him. For there is not the same good of a man as such and as citizen, for the former is the perfection of reason in the knowledge of truth and that the lower powers be regulated by the rule of reason: A man is a man because he is rational. But a man’s good insofar as he is a citizen is that he be ordered in all things according to the city, which is why the Philosopher says in Politics 3 that the virtue of man as a good man is not the same as the virtue of man as good citizen. But man is not only a citizen of the earthly city, but is also a participant in the heavenly city of Jerusalem whose ruler is the Lord and whose citizens are the angels and all the saints, whether they reign in glory and are at rest in the heaven or are still pilgrims on earth, according to what the Apostle says Ephesians 2:19, “You are citizens with the saints and members of God’s household.”

A man’s nature does not suffice for him to be a participant of this city; he must be elevated by the grace of God. For it is manifest that the virtues that are man’s as a participant in this city cannot be acquired by him through his natural powers; hence they are not caused by our acts but are infused in us as a divine gift. But the virtues of a man as man, insofar as he is a citizen of the earthly city, do not exceed the capacity of human nature; hence, a man can acquire them through his natural capacities, by his own acts. This is clear from the fact that everyone has a natural aptitude to some perfection, and if this aptitude is only due to a passive principle, he can acquire it, not by his own act but rather by the act of some external agent, as air receives light from the sun. But if he has a natural aptitude to a perfection due to both an active and passive principle, then he can arrive at it by his own act, as the body of a sick man has a natural aptitude for health. The subject is naturally receptive to health on account of the natural power in him to heal, so even without the action of an external agent, the sick are sometimes made well. But it was shown in the preceding article that man’s natural aptitude for virtue is due to active and passive principles, which is clear from the very order of the powers. For in the intellective part there is the quasi-passive power of the possible intellect which is brought to perfection by the agent intellect. But the actualized intellect moves the will, for the known good is the end that moves appetite. But will as moved by reason is so fashioned that it moves the sensitive appetite, namely, the irascible and concupiscible, which are so fashioned as to obey reason. Hence, it is also manifest that any virtue causing good operation in a man has its proper act in man, who by his own action can actualize it, whether it be in intellect, in will or in the irascible and concupiscible.

The virtue of the part does not become actual in the same way as does the virtue of the appetitive part. The action of intellect, or of any other cognitive power, assimilates it to what is known: Intellectual virtue is generated in the intellect when the understood species comes to be in it either actually or habitually thanks to the agent intellect. But the action of the appetitive power inclines us toward the desirable. Hence, in order for virtue to come to be in the appetitive part, it must acquire an inclination to something determinate.

Notice should be taken of the fact that the inclinations of natural things follow their forms, which is why they are ordered to one thing following the demands of the form, and as long as it remains, this inclination cannot be taken from them nor can they be urged toward the opposite. For this reason natural things do not become accustomed or unaccustomed. No matter how often a stone is tossed in the air it will never grow accustomed to height but will always fall. But that which is indifferent in object has no form thanks to which it is inclined determinately; only by its proper mover is it determined to some one thing. Moreover, its being so determined in a way disposes it to the same thing, such that when it is often inclined it is determined to the same effect by its proper agent and a definite inclination is strengthened in it. This superimposed disposition is like a form tending to one in the manner of nature. That is why it is said that custom is a second nature.

It is because the appetitive power is indifferent that it does not tend to one object unless it is determined to do so by reason. When reason repeatedly inclines the apperitive power to some one thing, a disposition is implanted in it by which it is inclined to the thing to which it has become accustomed. It is this implanted disposition that is the habit of virtue. Rightly considered, therefore, the virtue of the appetitive part is nothing other than a disposition or form which is sealed and impressed on it by reason. Because of this, no matter how strong a disposition to something there may be in the appetitive power, it win only be a virtue if it is the result of reason. That is why reason is put into the definition of virtue. Aristotle says in Ethics 2 virtue is a habit of choice in the mind determined in the way that the wise man would determine it.

Ad 1. It should be said that Augustine is speaking of the virtues ordered to eternal happiness.

Ad 2, 3, 4. The same remark applies to these.

Ad 5. It should be said that acquired virtue does not cause us always to turn from sin, but only for the most part, just as things that come about naturally are only for the most part. But it does not follow from this that anyone is simultaneously vicious and virtuous, because one act of a power does not remove the acquired habit of vice or virtue, and one cannot by acquired virtue avoid every sin. Through acquired virtue, the sin of infidelity is not avoided, nor the other sins opposed to the infused virtues.

Ad 6. It should be said that we do not arrive at heavenly bliss by means of the acquired virtues, but at a certain happiness that a man has been fashioned to achieve in this life by what is naturally proper to him according to the act of perfect virtue of which Aristotle treats in Ethics 10.

Ad 7. It should be said that acquired virtue is not the greatest good simply speaking, but the greatest among human goods; infused virtue is the greatest good simply speaking, since by it a man is ordered to the highest good, which is God.

Ad 8. It should be said that a thing considered in the same way cannot form itself, but when there is in a thing one principle that is active and another that is passive, it can form itself partly, namely, such that one of its parts forms and another is formed, just as something moves itself insofar as one of its parts is mover and another moved, as is said in Physics 8. So it is in the generation of virtue, as has been shown.

Ad 9. It should be said that science is acquired by intellect not only by discovery but also by teaching, which is from another; so too in the acquisition of virtue, a man is helped by correction and discipline, which are from another. The less one needs these, the more disposed to virtue he is, just as the more one is ingenious of mind, the less need he has of external doctrine.

Ad 10. It should be said that active and passive powers come together in man’s action, and something comes forth from the powers insofar as they are active and nothing is received by them; to the passive as passive it falls to acquire something by way of receiving. Hence, in a power which is act