Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul

ARTICLE II

In the second article we ask:

How does the soul suffer while joined to the body?

[Parallel readings: III Sent., 15, 2, 1 sol. 2; S.T., I-II, 22, 1.]

Difficulties

It seems that it does not suffer indirectly, for

1. As is said in the work Spirit and Soul, because of the friendship of the body and soul, the soul while joined to the body cannot be free; and though the soul cannot be destroyed, it can nevertheless fear destruction. But to fear is a sort of suffering. Therefore the soul while joined to the body suffers in itself, because the inability to be destroyed belongs to it in itself.

2. Whatever gives perfection to another is superior to it. But the body gives perfection to the soul, for the soul is united to the body that it may be perfected there. The body is therefore superior to the soul; and so the soul can suffer directly from the body to which it is united.

3. The soul is moved in place indirectly because it is indirectly in the place in which the body is directly. But a form or quality which is in the body directly is not said to be in the soul indirectly. Now, since a passion or suffering is concerned with a form or quality, being of the type of motion which is alteration, it therefore seems that the soul in the body cannot suffer indirectly.

4. Being moved indirectly is distinguished from being moved in part, as is made clear in the Physics. But the soul is part of a composite which is moved directly, as appears from The Soul. The soul should therefore not be said to be moved indirectly, but as a part with reference to the movement of the whole.

5. The direct is prior to the indirect. But in the passions of the soul the role of the soul is prior to that of the body, because the body is transformed by the apprehension and appetency of the soul, as is evident in anger, fear, and so on. It should therefore not be said that by those passions the soul suffers indirectly and the body directly.

6. Whatever is formal in anything is more important than what is material in it. But in the passions of the soul the role of the soul is formal, and that of the body is material. The formal definition of anger is that it is the desire for revenge; its material definition, that it is the boiling of the blood around the heart. In such passions, then, the role of the soul is more important than that of the body. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

7. Just as joy and sorrow and such passions of the soul do not belong to the soul without the body, neither does sensing. But the soul is not said to sense indirectly. Then neither should it be said to suffer indirectly.

To the Contrary

1. Taken strictly passion is a certain motion in the line of alteration, as has been said. But the soul is not altered except indirectly. Then neither does it suffer except indirectly.

2. The powers of the soul are not more perfect than the substance of the soul itself. But according to the Philosopher’ the powers do not grow old directly but only because of the failure of the body. Then neither does~the soul suffer directly but only indirectly.

3. Whatever is moved directly is divisible, as is proved in the Physics. But the soul is indivisible. It therefore is not moved directly, and so neither does it suffer directly.

REPLY

If passion is taken strictly, it is impossible for anything incorporeal to suffer (pati), as was shown above. Then in a passion properly so called it is the body that suff ers directly. Consequently, if such a passion belongs in any way to the soul, this is only inasmuch as it is united to the body, and therefore indirectly.

Now the soul is united to the body in two respects: (1) as a form, inasmuch as it gives existence to the body, vivifying it; (2) as a mover inasmuch as it exercises its operations through the body. And in both respects the soul suffers indirectly, but differently. For anything that is composed of matter and form suffers by reason of its matter just as it acts by reason of its form. Thus the passion begins with the matter and in a certain sense indirectly belongs to the form. But the passion of the patient is derived from the agent, because passion is the effect of action.

A passion of the body is therefore attributed to the soul indirectly in two ways: (1) In such a way that the passion begins with the body and ends in the soul inasmuch as it is united to the body as its form. This is a bodily passion. Thus, when the body is injured, the union of the body with the soul is weakened; and so the soul, which is united to the body in its act of existing, suffers indirectly. (2) In such a way that the passion begins with the soul inasmuch as it is the mover of the body, and ends in the body. This is called a psychical passion. An example is seen in anger and fear and the like; for passions of this kind are aroused by the apprehension and appetency of the soul, and a bodily transformation follows upon them, just as the transformation of a mobile being follows from the operation of the mover in any one of the ways in which the mobile being is disposed to obey the motion of the mover. Thus, when the body is transformed by an alteration, the soul itself also is said to suffer indirectly.

Answers to Difficulties

1. The soul does not fear destruction as if it would be destroyed in itself, but it fears the destruction of the composite through the separation of itself from the body. And even if it should fear its own destruction, this would be only in so far as there is some doubt whether upon the destruction of the body the soul is corrupted indirectly. Not even destruction, then, is compatible with the soul directly, and even the passion of fear is not attributable to it apart from its union with the body.

2. Even though the soul is perfected in the body, it is not perfected by the body, as Augustine proves.But either it is perfected by God or it perfects itself with the assistance of the body working at its command, just as the possible intellect is perfected by the power of the agent intellect with the help of phantasms which are made actually intelligible by this power.

3. Although a quality of the body by no means belongs to the soul, yet the act of being of the composite is common to soul and body, and likewise the operation. The passion of the body therefore overflows into the soul indirectly.

4. A passion happens to the composite of body and soul only by reason of the body. It therefore happens to the soul only indirectly. The argument proceeds, however, as if the passion belonged to the whole composite by reason of the whole and not by reason of one of the two parts.

5. Anger, and any passion of the soul for that matter, can be viewed in two ways: (1) According to the specific characteristic of anger. From this point of view it is primarily in the soul rather than in the body. (2) Inasmuch as it is a passion. From this point of view it is primarily in the body, for there it first gets the character of a passion. We accordingly do not say that the soul becomes angry indirectly, but that it suffers indirectly.

6. The answer to this difficulty is clear from what has just been said.

7. The soul is not said to sense indirectly any more than to rejoice, though it is said to suffer indirectly.

Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul

ARTICLE III

In the third article we ask:

Is passion only in the sense appetitive power?

[Parallel readings: III Sent., 15, 2, 1 sol. 2; IV Sent., 49, 3, 1 sol. 2 ad 1; In De div. nom., c. 2, lect. 4, n. 191; In II Eth., 5; S.T., I, 20, 1 ad 1 & 2; 81, 1; I-II, 22, 2 & 3.]

Difficulties

It seems not, for

1. Christ suffexed in His whole soul, as appears from the words of the Psalm (87:4): “For my soul is filled with evils,” which are referred to’ the sufferings of His passion in the explanation given in the Gloss) But totality as applied to the soul refers to powers. Consequently there can be passion in any power of the soul, and therefore not only in the sense appetitive power.

2. Every movement or operation which belongs to the soul in itself independently of the body is a function of the intellective, not the sensitive, part. But, as Augustine says, “the soul is not influenced by flesh alone to crave, fear, rejoice, or be distressed; but it can also be stirred up with these movements by itSelf.” Such passions are therefore not only in the sense appetitive part.

3. The will belongs to the intellective part, as is made clear in The Soul. But Augustine says: “There is will in all of these (that is, fear, joy, and the like). They are all, in fact, nothing but acts of the will. For what is craving and joy but the will in its acceptance of the things which we wish? And what is fear and sorrow but the will in its rejection of the things which we do not wish?” Passions of this kind are therefore also in the intellective part.

4. It is not the function of the same power to act and to be acted upon or suffer. But sense seems to be an active power; for the basilisk is said to kill by its gaze, and a menstruating woman ruins a mirror by looking into it, as is explained in the work Sleep and Wakefulness. Hence the passion of the soul is not to be placed in the sensitive part.

5. An active power is nobler than a passive one. But the vegetative powers are active, and the sensitive powers are nobler than they. Therefore the sensitive powers are also active. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

6. The rational powers are capable of opposite determinations according to the Philosopher. But delight is opposed to sadness. Now, since delight is properly in the intellective part, as is made clear in the Ethics, it seems that sadness is also there. And so passions can be in the intellective part.

7. The answer was advanced that the Philosopher’s statement refers to opposite acts.—On the contrary, knowledge and ignorance, which are opposites, are in the intellective part of the soul, and yet they are not acts. The Philosopher’s statement therefore does not refer only to acts.

8. According to the Philosopher, the same thing by its absence and by its presence is the cause of contraries, as the pilot is the cause of both the saving and the sinking of the ship. But the intelligible object when present causes delight in the intellective part. When absent, therefore, it causes sadness in the same part. Thus the same is to be concluded as before.

9. Damascene says: “Pain is not a passion but the sensing of a passion.” It is therefore in the sensitive power and not in the appetitive; and, for the same reason, so are pleasure and the other things which are called passions of the soul.

10. According to Damascene and the Philosopher” a passion is that which is followed by joy and sadness. The passions of the soul therefore precede joy and sadness. But joy and sadness are in the appetitive part. Then the passions of the soul are in the part which precedes the appetitive. Since it is the apprehensive part which precedes the appetitive, they are therefore in the apprehensive part.

The body undergoes change in the operations of the sense apprehensive power just as it does in those of the sense appetitive power. Passions are therefore not only in the appetitive but also in the apprehensive.

12. A passion strictly so called is had through the loss of something and the reception of its contrary. But this happens in the intellective part; for guilt is lost and grace is received, and the habit of lust is lost and the habit of chastity is introduced. Passion is therefore properly in the higher part of the soul.

13. The movement of the sense appetitive power follows the apprehension of sense. But sometimes such passions of the soul are aroused in us by objects which cannot be apprehended by sense, such as shame for a disgraceful action or fear for the future. Such passions therefore cannot be in the sense appetitive part, and so we are left with the conclusion that they are in the rational appetitive part, the will.

14. Hope is listed among the passions of the soul. But hope is in the intellective part of the soul, because the holy fathers while in limbo had hope, and the movement of the sensitive part does not remain in the separated soul. Passions are therefore also in the intellective part.

15. The image [of the Trinity] is in the intellective part. But the soul suffers in the powers of the image, since the powers of the image which are now perfected by grace will be perfected by the glory of enjoyment in the state of glory. Consequently passions are not only in the sense appetitive part of the soul.

16. According to Damascene “passion is a movement from one thing to another.” Now the intellect moves from one thing to another by proceeding from principles to conclusions. Therefore passion is in the intellect. And so the same is to be concluded as before.

17. The Philosopher says that “to understand is in a way to be passive (pati). But understanding is in the intellect. Hence there is passion in the intellect.

18. Dionysius says of Hierotheus that “by suffering divine things” he learned divine truths. But he could not undergo or suffer divine things in the sensitive part, which is not proportionate to divine things. Then passion is not only in the sensitive part.

19. No definite power of the soul has to be allotted to that which is in the soul accidentally; for there is neither science of things that exist accidentally nor a definite power for them. But the soul does not suffer except accidentally or indirectly. Passion is therefore not in any definite power of the soul, and so not in the sensitive appetite alone.

To the Contrary

1. Damascene says: “A passion is a movement of the appetitive power in imagining good or evil”; and again: “A passion is a movement of the non-rational soul due to the apprehension of good or evil.” Passion is therefore only in the non-rational appetitive part. In the strict sense passion is taken according to the movement of alteration, as has been said..But there is alteration only in the sensitive part of the soul, as is proved in the Physics. Therefore passion is only in the sensitive part.

REPLY

Strictly speaking, passion is only in the sense appetitive part, as appears from the definitions of passion quoted from Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa. This is shown as follows.

Passion is used in three senses, as was said above. It is taken first in general, in the sense in which all receiving is undergoing or suffering. In this usage passion is in every part of the soul and not only in the sense appetitive part. Understanding passion in this way, the Commentator says that all the powers of the vegetative soul are active; all those of the sensitive soul, passive; and those of the rational soul, partly active (because of the agent intellect) and partly passive (because of the possible intellect). Now, although this sort of passion is compatible with both the apprehensive and the appetitive powers, yet it is more proper to the appetitive. The reason for this is that, since the operation of the apprehensive power is directed to the thing apprehended as it is in the one apprehending, whereas the operation of the appetitive power is directed to the thing as it is in itself, there is less of the individuality of the thing apprehended in what is received into the apprehensive power than there is of the specification of the appetible thing in what is received into the appetitive power. Consequently, truth, which perfects the intellective power, is in the mind, whereas good, which perfects the appetitive, is in things, as is said in the Metaphysics.

In the second sense passion is understood strictly, as consisting in the loss of one contrary and the reception of another by way of a transformation. This sort of passion cannot pertain to the soul except because of the body; and this under two aspects: (1) Inasmuch as it is united to the body as its form. In this respect it suffers along with the body suffering by a bodily passion. (2) Inasmuch as it is united to the body as its mover. In this respect a transformation is produced in the body through the operation of the soul. This latter is called a psychical passion, as was said above.

The bodily passion just mentioned reaches to the powers of the soul as rooted in its essence, by reason of the fact that the soul in its essence is the form of the body; and thus it pertains first to the essence of the soul. This sort of passion can, however, be attributed to a power in three ways: (1) Inasmuch as it is rooted in the essence of the soul. Since all powers are rooted in the soul’s essence, the passion in question pertains to all powers in this way. (2) Inasmuch as the acts of the powers are hindered by an injury to the body. Thtis the passion in question pertains to all powers using bodily organs, since the acts of all of these are hindered when the organs are injured. But indirectly passion in this sense applies also to the powers which do not use bodily organs, the intellective, in so far as they receive something from powers which do use organs. Thus it happens that when the organ of the imaginative power is injured, the operation of the intellect also is hampered because the intellect has need of phantasms in its own operation. (3) It belongs to some power as apprehending it. In this way it properly belongs to the sense of touch; for touch is the sense of the things from which an animal is composed, and likewise of those by which an animal is corrupted.

On the other hand, since by a psychical passion thebody is altered because of an operation of the soul, this kind of passion has to be in a power which is joined to a bodily organ and whose business it is to alter the body. As. a consequence, such a passion is not in the intellective part, which is not the actuality of any bodily organ. Nor again is it in tht sense apprehensive power, because from sense apprehension no movement in the body follows except through the mediation of the appetitive power, which is the immediate mover. According to its manner of operating, then, a bodily organ (the heart) from which motion takes its beginning is at once given a disposition suitable for carrying out that to which the sense appetite inclines. In anger the heart accordingly heats up, and in fear it in a way cools off and tightens up.

Thus psychical passion is properly found only in the sense appetitive faculty. For the powers of the vegetative soul, though using an organ, are clearly not passive but active. Moreover passion more properly attaches to the appetitive power than to the apprehensive, as was said in the beginning of this reply. And this is one reason why the sense appetitive faculty is more properly the subject of passion than the sense apprehensive, just as the higher affective power comes closer to the true character of passion than the intellective.

In the third sense passion was said to be taken more or less figuratively, in so far as a thing is barred in any way whatsoever from what is suited to it. In this sense the powers of the soul suffer in the same way as they are barred from their proper acts. And this occurs in one way or another in all the powers of the soul, as has been said. But we are now speaking of psychical passion properly so called, which is found only in the sense appetitive power, as has been shown.

Answers to Difficulties

1. The whole soul of Christ suffered with a bodily passion; and therefore that passion attached to all the powers, at least inasmuch as they are rooted in the essence of the soul; not, however, in such a way that a psychical passion was in every power of His soul as its proper subject.

2. Augustine is speaking against certain PlatoniStS211 who said that the starting point of all those passions was in the flesh. Augustine shows, however, that even if the flesh were in no respect corrupted, these passions could take their beginning in the soul. He therefore does not say that such passions are brought about apart from the flesh, but that the soul is not moved by these passions because of the flesh alone.

3. Augustine is either taking the term will broadly for any appetite, or he is taking fear and joy and the like as acts of the will similar to passions in the sense appetite. For in some sense joy and sorrow and the like are in the will itself, as was said in the question on sensuality,.but not in the sense that they are passions properly so called.—Or it can be said that Augustine calls these passions acts of the will because man is led into these passions by an act of the will inasmuch as the lower appetite follows the inclination of the higher appetite, as was said in the question on sensuality. Thus Augustine himself afterwards adds: “Just as the will of man is attracted or repelled, so it is changed and turned to these affections or those.”

4. Sense is not an active but a passive power. Not every power that has an act which is an operation is called active, for then every faculty of the soul would be active; but a faculty that is related to its object as an agent to a patient is called active, and that which is related to its object as a patient to an agent is called passive. Now sense is related to the sensible thing as a patient to an agent, because the sensible thing alters the sense; and if the sensible object is sometimes altered by the sense, this is incidental, inasmuch as the organ of sense has some quality by which it is naturally capable of changing another body. Consequently the ruination in question (by which a menstruating woman damages a mirror or a basilisk kills a man by a look) does not contribute anything to the act of seeing; but the seeing is accomplished by the fact that the visible species is received in sight; and this is a sort of passivity or suffering. Sense is therefore a passive power. And even if it were granted that sense acted upon something actively, it would not follow from this that there is no passivity in sense; for nothing prevents the same thing from being active and passive in differcnt respects. And again if it were granted that sense, which designates an apprehensive power, were incapable of any passion, this would not exclude the possibility of passion being in the sensitive appetite.

5. Although what is active is simply and from the same point of view nobler than what is passive, still nothing prevents something passive from being nobler than something active inasmuch as the passive thing suffers by a passion that is nobler than the action by which the active being acts, as is the case with regard to the passion by which the possible intellect is called a passive power. And even sense by receiving something iminaterially is nobler than the action by which the vegetative power acts materially, that is, by means of the qualities of the elements.

6. There is nothing in contrary opposition to that delight which is in the intellective part by reason of its union with a suitable intelligible object, since to have a cause of the contrary passion we should need to have something contrary to that suitable intelligible object. But this is impossible, because nothing is contrary to an intelligible species; for the species of contraries are not contrary in the soul, as is said in the Metaphysics. Man accordingly takes delight not only in understanding good but also in understanding evil, as far as understanding is concerned; for the understanding of evil is a good for the intellect. And so intellectual delight has no contrary. Sadness or pain are nevertheless said to be in the intellective part, broadly speaking, inasmuch as the intellect understands something as harmful to man, to which the will is averse. Because that harmful thing, however, is not harmful to the intellect as understanding it, sadness or pain is not contrarily opposed to the delight of the intellect, which comes from understanding something suitable to the intellect in so far as it understands.

7. The rational power is capable of contrary determinations in its own way and also in a way common to itself and all other powers. To be the subject of contrary accidents is common to the rational and the other powers, because all contraries have the same subject. But to be capable of contrary actions is proper to it alone, for natural powers are determined to one course of action. It is in this sense that the Philosopher is speaking when he says that the rational powers are open to opposites.

8. The absence of the pilot is not the cause of the sinking of the ship except indirectly, inasmuch as it takes away the supervision exercised by the pilot which up to then prevented the sinking of the ship. In the same way the removal or absence of the intelligible object is not the cause of sadness but merely of not being delighted. Effects are proportioned to their causes. Then understanding and not understanding, which are contradictorily opposed, are the cause of being delighted and of not being so, which are likewise contradictories; not of being delighted and of being sad, which are contraries. Furthermore, if we take the contrary of the understanding of truth, namely, error, this cannot be the cause of sadness; for either error is deemed to be truth, in which case it causes delight just as truth does; or it is recognized as error (which can be done only by coming to know the truth), in which case again error causes delight in understanding.

9. Sadness and pain differ in that sadness is a psychical passion, beginning with the apprehension of a source of harm and ending in an operation of the appetite and even further in an alteration of the body, whereas pain is dependent upon a bodily passion. Thus Augustine says that “pain is more commonly said of bodies.” It begins, then, with an injury to the body and ends in an apprehension by the sense of touch, and on this account pain is in the sense of touch as apprehending it, as has been said.

10. That joy and sadness follow upon a passion is said by both Damascene and the Philosopher, but by each with a different meaning. Damascene, as also Gregory of Nyssa, who makes the same statement, is speaking of a bodily passion, which causes joy and sadness when apprehended and pain when experienced by sense. But the Philosopher is without any doubt here speaking of psychical passions, maintaining that joy and sadness follow upon all the passions of the soul. The reason for this is that among all the passions of the concupiscible power joy and sadness, which are caused by the attaining of the agreeable or the harmful, hold the last place; and all the passions of the irascible power terminate in passions of the concupiscible, as was said in the question on sensuality. It remains, then, that all the passions of the soul terminate in joy and sadness. In neither meaning of the words quoted, however, does it follow that passions are in the apprehensive power, because bodily passion is in the very nature of the body, and the other psychical passions are in the same appetitive part in which joy and sadness are found, but only with reference to its previous acts. If, on the other hand, there were no order in the acts of the appetitive part, it would follow from the words of the Philosopher that psychical passions are not in the appetitive part, where joy and sadness are found, but in the apprehensive.

11. Neither sense nor any other apprehensive power moves immediately, but only mediately through the appetitive. Consequently, upon the operation of the sense apprehensive power, the body is changed in its material dispositions only if the movement of the appetitive power supervenes. For the alteration of the body disposing itself to obey follows immediately upon this movement. Accordingly, although the sense apprehensive power is changed together with the bodily organ, passion strictly so called is still not in it, because in the operation of sense the bodily organ undergoes, properly speaking, only a spiritual change, inasmuch as the species of the sensible objects are received into the sense organs “without matter,” as is said in The Soul.

12. Even though something is lost and something else is received in the intellective part, this does not take place by way of a transformation so that reception and loss occur in a continuous succession. In the case of infused habits it comes about through a simple influx; for in an instant grace is infused and by it guilt is instantly expelled. And even an alteration from vice to virtue or from ignorance to knowledge affects theAintellective part only indirectly, while the transformation is directly in the sensitive part, as is made clear in the Ethics. For upon the occurrence of a transformation in the sensitive part there straightway results a perfection in the intellective part, so that the result in the intellective part is the term of the transformation in the sensitive part, just as illumination may be the term of a local motion and generation in an unqualified sense may be the term of an alteration. This is the explanation with regard to acquired habits.

13. From the apprehension of something by the intellect there can follow a passion in the lower appetite in two ways: (1) In so far as that which is understood by the intellect in a universal way is represented in the imagination in particular, thus moving the lower appetite. When, for example, the intellect of a believer assents intelIcctually to future punishment and forms phantasms of the pains, imagining the fire burning and worm gnawing and the like, the passion of fear follows in the sensitive appetite. (2) In so far as the higher appetite is moved by the intellectual apprehension, with the result that the lower appetite also is stirred up by the higher through a kind of overflow or through a command.

14. The hope which remains in the separated soul is not a passion but either a habit or an act of the will, as is clear from what was said previously.

15. From the bestowal of beatitude or the perfecting of the image nothing can be concluded other than that there is passion in the intellective part in the sense in which every reception is called a passion.

16. Passion is said to be a movement from one thing received to another thing received, not from one thing produced to another thing produced. In the former sense there is movement in the intellect from one thing to another.

17.Understanding is said to be passive in the broad use of the term according to which all reception is passivity or passion.

18. The passion of which Dionysius is speaking is nothing but affection for the things of God, which has more of the character of a passion than mere apprehension, as is clear from what has been said above. Por from affection for divine things comes their manifestation, as is written in John (14:21): “And he that loveth me, shall be loved by my Father; and I will love him and will manifest myself to him.”

Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul

ARTICLE IV

In the fourth article we ask:

On what grounds are the contrariety and diversity among the passions of the soul based?

[Parallel readings: III Sent., 26, 1, 3; In II Eth., 5, nn. 291-96; S.T., I-II, q. 23; 46, 1 ad 2.]

Difficulties

It seems that it is not on the grounds of good and evil, for

1. Boldness is opposed to fear. But both of these passions regard evil, because boldness tackles the same thing that fear runs away from. The contrariety of the soul’s passions is therefore not based on good and evil.

2. Hope is opposed to despair. But both regard good, which hope expects to attain and despair has no confidence of attaining. The contrariety of the soul’s passions is therefore not based on good and evil. Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa distinguish the passions of the soul on the basis of the present and the future and on that of good and evil. Thus hope and desire have to do with a future good; pleasure, delight, and gladness, with a present good; fear.has to do with a future evil; sadness, with a present one. But the present and the future are accidental as regards good and evil. Consequently the difference in the soul’s passions is not of itself based on good and evil.

4. Augustine distinguishes3 between sadness and pain in that sadness refers to the soul, pain to the body. But again this distinction is not made on the basis of good and evil. The conclusion is therefore the same as before.

5. Exultation, joy, gladness and pleasure, good humor and mirth are somehow different; otherwise it would be useless to couple two of them as is done for example, in Isaiah (35: 10): “They shall obtain joy and gladness.” Now since all of those terms are used with reference to good, it seems that good and evil do not differentiate the passions of the soul.

6. Damascene distinguishes four kinds of sadness: “boredom, distress, envy, and pity,” in addition to which there is also repentance. All of these are used with reference to evil. The same is therefore to be concluded as before.

7. He also distinguishes six species of fear: laziness, bashfulness, shame, awe, astonishment, and anxiety. These again do not involve the difference in question. The conclusion is therefore the same as before.

8. Dionysius ranks jealousy with love, but both of these are passions regarding good. Thus the conclusion is the same as before.

To the Contrary

l. Acts are distinguished by their objects. But the passions of the soul are acts of the appetitive power, whose object is good and evil. The passions of the soul are therefore distinguished by good and evil.

2. According to the PhilosopherT the passions of the soul are changes from which joy and sadness result. But joy and sadness are distinguished on the basis of good and evil. Good and evil therefore distinguish the passions of the soul.

REPLY

In the passions of the soul a threefold distinction is found. The first is that by which they differ generically, as belonging to distinct powers of the soul. It is in this way that the passions of the concupiscible power are distinguished from those of the irascible. Now the basis of this distinction is taken from the basis for distinguishing the powers. For since the object of the concupiscible power is something sensuously pleasurable and that of the irascible something arduous or lofty, as was said above in the question on sensuality, those passions belong to the concupiscible power in which there is implied a reference to the sensuously pleasurable in an unqualified sense or to its contrary; whereas those belong to the irascible which are referred to something arduous concerning such an object. Thus the difference between desire and hope becomes evident; for desire denotes that the appetite is attracted to something pleasurable, whereas hope expresses a certain raising of the appetite to some good which is deemed arduous or difficult. And the same is to be said of the other passions.

The second distinction of the passions of the soul is that by which they are distinguished in species within the same power. In regard to the passions of the concupiscible power this distinction is made on two different grounds: (1) According to the contrariety of objects. In this way joy, which regards good, is distinguished from sadness, which regards evil. (2) According as the concupiscible power is referred in different ways to the same object, or in other words according to the different stages that can be considered in the course of an appetitive movement. For the pleasurable object is first united psychically with the man who seeks it, by being apprehended as like bini or agreeable to him. From this there follows the passion of love, which is nothing but the specification of the appetite by the form of the appetible object. For that reason love is said to be a sort of union of the lover with the beloved. But what has thus been united psychically is sought further with a view to its being united really, so that the lover enjoys the possession of the beloved. Thus is born the passion of desire, which, when the object has been obtained in reality, begets joy. The first stage, then, in the movement of the concupiscible power is love; the second, desire; and the last, joy. And through the contrary to these the passions bearing upon evil are to be distinguished, with hate opposed to love, aversion to desire, sadness to joy.

The passions of the irascible power, as was said in another question, arise from the passions of the concupiscible and end in them. There is accordingly found in them a distinction conformable to that in the concupiscible power; and there is in them furthermore a distinction proper to them based upon the specific character of their proper object. Deriving from the concupiscible there is the distinction of the passions on the basis of good and evil and on that of the oleasurable and its contrary, and again on that of what is really pbssessed and what is not really possessed. But propep to the irascible t)ower is the distinction of its passions on the basis of what exceeds the capacity of the one who has the appetite and of what does not exceed it, and this according to his evaluation of the matter. For these grounds seem to distinguish the arduous as essential differences.

A passion in the irascible power can therefore regard either good or evil. If it regards good, this can be a good possessed or one not possessed. Regarding a good possessed there can be no passion in the irascible power, because once a good is possessed it causes no diffi culty to the possessor. Consequently the notion of the arduous is not verified in it. But regarding a good not yet possessed, in which the notion of the arduous can be verified because of the difficulty of obtaining it, if that good is judged to exceed the capacity of the one seeking it, despair ensues; but if it is judged not to exceed that capacity, hope arises.

If, on the other hand, the excitation of the irascible power with reference to evil is considered, this will be of two kinds: either with reference to an evil not yet possessed which is regarded as arduous inasmuch as it is difficult to avoid, or with reference to an evil already possessed or joined to oneself, and this again has the character of the arduous inasmuch as it is deemed difficult to get rid of. Now if it is with reference to an evil not yet present, if that evil is regarded as exceeding one’s capacity, then it causes the passion of fear; but if it is regarded as not exceeding one’s capacity, then it causes the passion of boldness. If, however, the evil is present, either it is regarded as not exceeding one’s capacity, and then it arouses the passion of anger; or it is regarded as exceeding that capacity, and then it does not arouse any passion in the irascible power, but in the concupiscible power alone there remains the passion of sadness.

The distinction which is based upon the different stages in the appetitive movement is not the cause of any contrariety, because such passions differ as perfect and imperfect, as is seen, for example, in desire and joy. But the distinction which is based on the contrariety of the object properly effects a contrariety in the passions. In the concupiscible power, accordingly, passions are regarded as contrary on the basis of good and evil, as joy and sadness or love and hate. In the irascible power a twofold contrariety can be considered: (1) According to the distinction of the proper object, as exceeding one’s capacity or not. From this point of view hope and despair, boldness and fear are contrary; and this contrariety is the more proper one. (2) According to the difference in the object of the concupiscible power, i.e., according to good and evil. From this point of view hope and fear seem to be contrarily opposed. From neither point of view, however, can anger have a passion contrary to it—not on the basis of the contrariety of good and evil, because there is no passion in the irascible power regarding a present good; and likewise not on the basis of the contrariety of what exceeds one’s capacity and what does not, because an evil which exceeds one’s capacity does not cause any passion in the irascible, as has been said. Hence among the passions anger has as, proper to itself that nothing is contrary to it.

There is a third difference of the passions of the soul which is, so to speak, accidental. This can come about in two ways: (1) According to the intensity or mildness of the passion, as jealousy implies an intensity of love, and rage an intensity of anger. (2) According to the material differences of good or evil, like the difference of pity and envy, which are both species of sadness; for envy is sadness about the prosperity of someone else in so far as it is regarded as an evil for oneself, whereas pity is sadness about the adversity of someone else in so far as it is regarded as one’s own evil. Certain other passions also can be considered in the same way.

Answers to Difficulties

1. The object of the irascible power is good and evil, not in an unqualified sense, but with the added circumstance of arduousness. There is therefore contrariety in its passions not merely on the basis of good and evil but also on that of the differences which distinguish the arduous both in good and in evil.

2. The answer is clear from what has just been said.

3. Present and future are regarded as differences to distinguish the powers of the soul inasmuch as what is future is not yet really united to the soul and what is present is already united, and the movement of the appetite to what is really united is more perfect than to what is really at a distance. Consequently, although future and present account for some distinction in the passions, like the perfect and the imperfect they cause no contrariety.

4. In its strict sense pain should not be numbered among the passions of the soul, because it involves nothing on the part of the soul bcyond inere apprehension; for pain is the feeling of an injury, but t lie injury itself is in the body. For this reason even Augustine adds in the saine place that he has preferred to use the term sadness rather than pain; for sadness is completed in the appetitive power itself, as appears from what has been said.

5. Pleasure and joy differ in the same way as sadness and pain; for sensible pleasure involves on the part of the body union with something agreeable, and on the part of the soul the feeling of this agreeableness. Similarly spiritual pleasure involves a certain real union of two things that agree with each other, and the perception of this union. Thus in defining sensible pleasure Plato said that pleasure is a sensible process toward a natural state. Aristotle, defining pleasure in general, said that pleasure is the unhampered operation of a habit conformable to nature.” For an agreeable operation is that united agreeable thing which causes pleasure, especially spiritual pleasure. Thus pleasure of either kind begins with a real union and is completed in its apprehension. Joy, however, begins with apprehension and ends in the affections. Thus pleasure is sometimes the cause of joy, just as pain is sometimes the cause of sadness. Joy, on the other hand, differs accidentally from gladness and the rest of the passions mentioned —on the basis of intensity or slackness. For the others express a certain intensity of joy. Either this intensity is considered from the viewpoint of one’s interior disposition; and then it is gladness, which implies an interior expansion or dilation of heart; for gladness (laetitia) is spoken of as a sort of expansiveness (latitia). Or the intensity of inner joy is considered from the viewpoint of its bursting forth into certain outward signs, and then it is exultation; for exultation is so named from the fact that inner joy in a way outwardly leaps (exilit). This leaping is noted either in.a change of countenance, in which the evidences of emotion first appear because of its nearness to the imaginative power; and then the passion is mirth; or it is noted inasmuch as one’s words and deeds are influenced by the intensity of the inner joy; and then it is good humor.

6. The various species of sadness which Damascene lays down are types of sadness which add to it certain accidental differences. These may be regarded from the viewpoint of the intensity of the movement. In that case in so far as the intensity consists in an interior disposition, it is called boredom, which is sadness weighing a man down (that is, his heart) so that he does not care to do anything; or, in so far as the bile proceeds to an external disposition, the passion is distress, which is sadness that takes the voice away. The differences may, on the other hand, be regarded from the viewpoint of the object inasmuch as what is in another is looked upon as one’s own evil. Then if another’s good is considered one’s own evil, the passion will be envy; but if another’s evil is considered one’s own evil, it will be pity. Repentance, however, does not add to sadness in general any specific note, since it concerns one’s own evil taken absolutely. For this reason it is omitted by Damascene. Yet many different types of sadness can be listed if everything that has any accidental bearing upon the evil which causes sadness is taken into account.

7. Since fear is a passion coming from something harmful apprehended as exceeding one’s capacity, the types of fear will be differentiated according to the difference in such harmful things. Now what is harmful can be referred to the one affected in three different respects: (1) With regard to one’s own operation. In this case inasmuch as one’s own operation is feared as laborious, the passion is laziness; and inasmuch as it is feared as disgraceful, the passion is shame, which is fear in a disgraceful action. (2)With regard to knowledge, according as some object of knowledge is apprehended as altogether exceeding cognition. In that case the study of it is looked upon as fruitless and so as harmful. Now its exceeding cognition either is due to its greatness, and then the passion is awe, which is fear from the imagining of something great; or it is due to its unusualness, and then the passion is astonishment, which is “fear from the imagining of something unusual,” as Damascene defines it. (3) With regard to suffering that comes from another. That suffering can be feared either under the aspect of disgrace, and then the passion is bashfulness, which is fear in anticipation of ridicule; or under the aspect of injury, and then the passion is anxiety, by which a man is afraid that some misfortune will befall him.

8. Jealousy adds to love a certain intensity, for it is a vehement love that brooks no sharing of one’s beloved.

Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul

ARTICLE V

In the fifth article we ask:

Are hope, fear, joy, and sadness the four principal passions of the soul?

[Parallel readings: III Sent., 26, 1, 4; S.T., I-II, 25, 4 (cf. aa. 1-3); 84, 4 ad 2; II-II, 141, 7 ad 3.]

Difficulties

It seems that they are not, for

1. In enumerating the four principal passions, Augustine puts cupidity in place of hope. And the same, it seems, can be gathered from the words of Vergil in which he designates the main passions: “Hence men crave and fear, rejoice and sorrow.”

2. The more perfect a thing is, the more important it seems to be. But the movement of boldness is more perfect than that of hope, since it tends to its object with greater intensity. Boldness is therefore a more important passion than hope.

3. Everything takes its name from the most important in its line. But the irascible power gets its name from anger. Anger should therefore be numbered among the principal passions.

4. There is a passion that looks to the future not only in the irascible power but also in the concupiscible. But the passion looking to the future which is in the concupiscible power, desire, is not included as one of the principal passions. Then neither are fear and hope, which in the irascible similarly look to the future.

5. Principal means coming before the rest; for according to Gregory “to be prince (principiari) means to come before the others.” But love comes before the rest of the passions; for from love all the other passions are born. Love should therefore be placed as one of the principal passions.

6. Those passions seem to be the principal ones upon which the others depend. But all the others seem to depend upon joy and sadness; for a passion of the soul is that from which joy or sadness follows, according to the Philosopher.These two passions, joy and sadness, then, are the only principal passions.

7. It was said in answer that joy and sadness are the principal ones in the concupiscible power, but that hope and fear are the principal ones in the irascible.—On the contrary, it is said in Spirit and Soul: “From concupiscibility joy and hope arise; from irascibility, pain and dread.”

8. In accord with the special character of the irascible power hope is opposed to despair, fear to boldness. But on the part of the concupiscible power are listed two chief passions which are contrary on the basis of the special character of the concupiscible power, namely, joy and sadness. Then on the part of the irascible there should be listed as principal passions either hope and despair or fear and boldness.

To the Contrary

11. In Spirit and Soul it is said: “Emotion is distinguished into four kinds, since we already take joy in what we love, or we hope for it as something that will be enjoyed; and we already grieve over what we hate or we dread it as something to make us grieve.” Consequently these four are the principal passions: joy, pain or sadness, hope, and fear.

2. Enumerating the main passions, Boethius says:

          Drive away joy, and drive away fear.

          Hope put to flight; let grief not stay near.

And so the conclusion is the same as above.

REPLY

There are four principal passions of the soul: sadness, joy, hope, and fear. The reason for this is that passions which come before the others and are their source are called the principal ones. Now, since the passions of the soul are in the sense appetitive part, those passions will come first which arise immediately from the object of the appetitive part; that is, from good and evil. Those which arise through the intermediary of others will be in a sense secondary.

For a passion to arise immediately from good or evil two conditions are required. The first is that it arise from good and evil essentially or directly, because what is accidental or indirect cannot be first. The second is that it arise without presupposing any other. A passion is accordingly said to be a principal one for these two. reasons: it does not conit accidentally from the object, which has the role of an active principle, nor does it come subsequently. Now a passion which proceeds from a good inasmuch as it is good, comes from good essentially; but one which proceeds from a good inasmuch as it is evil, comes from good accidentally. And the inverse is to be understood of evil. Good as such attracts and draws to itself. Hence any passion of an appetite tending to good will be a passion essentially and directly dependent upon good. But it is proper to evil as such to repel the appetite. Hence if there is any passion regarding good by which the good is shunned, that passion will not be from good essentially but in so far as it is apprehended as somehow evil. And the contrary is to be understood of evil: a passion which consists in flight from evil comes from evil essentially or directly, whereas one which consists in an approach to evil comes from evil accidentally. It is therefore clear how a passion arises from good or from evil essentially.

Because, however, to the extent to which a thing is last in the attainment of the end it is first in intention and in desire, those passions which consist in the attainment of the end therefore arise from good or evil without presupposing), any others, and with these presupposed others arise. Now joy and sadness come from the attainment of good or evil, and that essentially; for joy comes from a good inasmuch as it is good, and sadness comes from an evil inasmuch as it is evil. And all other passions of the concupiscible power likewise come from good or evil essentially. This is so because the object of the concupiscible power is good or evil in an absolute sense. Yet the other passions of the concupiscible power presuppose joy and sadness as their cause; for a good becomes loved and desired by the concupiscible by reason of its being apprehended as pleasurable, and an evil becomes hateful and repulsive by being apprehended as saddening. Thus in the order of appetency joy and sadness are prior,.though in the order of execution and attainment they are posterior.

In the irascible power not all the passions follow from good or evil essentially, but some essentially and others accidentally. This is so because good and evil are not the object of the irascible power in their absolute sense, but as they are modified by the condition of arduousness. Under this condition a good is repudiated as being beyond one’s capabilities, and an evil is tended to as able to be driven away or mastered. But in the irascible power there cannot be any passion which follows from good or evil without any other being presupposed; for after the good is possessed, it does not arouse any passion in the irascible power, as was said above.An evil that is present, on the other hand, does arouse a passion in the irascible power not essentially but accidentally, inasmuch as the person tends to something evil that is present as something to be driven away or mastered. This is evident in the case of anger.

It is clear, then, from what has been said that there are some passions which first and essentially arise from good and evil, as joy and sadness, and some others that essentially but not first so arise, as the other passions of the concupiscible power and two of those of the irascible, fear and hope, one of which expresses a flight from evil, the other an approach to good. And there are some other passions which neither essentially nor first arise from good and evil, as the others in the irascible power, such as despair, boldness, and anger, which express an approach to evil or a withdrawal from good.

The most important passions, therefore, are joy and sadness. But fear and hope are the principal ones in their own class, because they do not presuppose any other passions in the power in which they are found, the irascible. Although the other passions of the concupiscible power, such as love and desire, hate and aversion, are from good or evil essentially, they are nevertheless not the first in their class, since they presuppose others in the same power. Thus they cannot be called the principal passions either simply or in their genus. It remains, then, that there are only four principal passions: joy and sadness, hope and fear.

Answers to Difficulties

1. Cupidity or desire is preceded by another passion in the same power, joy, which is the reason for desiring. Desire therefore cannot be a principal passion. Even though hope presupposes another passion, it does not presuppose one in the same power but in the concupiscible. All of the passions of the irascible power, in fact, arise from the passions of the concupiscible, as was said in another question. For this reason it can be one of the principal passions. Augustine, however, lists desire or cupidity in place of hope on account of a certain resemblance between them, because both look to a good not yet possessed.

2. Boldness cannot be one of the principal passions, for it arises from evil accidentally, since it looks to evil with a view to attacking it For a bold man attacks evil inasmuch as he judges victory over evil and its repulse to be a good, and from the hope of such a good boldness arises. When carefully considered in this way, hope is found to be prior to boldness; for the hope of victory or at least of escape causes boldness.

3. Anger too arises from evil accidentally, inasmuch as an angry person considers revenge for an evil done to him a good and seeks it. Thus the hope of revenge to be obtained is the cause of anger. Therefore, when a person is injured by someone upon whom he does not hope to be able to get revenge, he does not become angry, but he merely grows sad or he fears, as Avicenna points out,—if a country bumpkin is injured by a king, for instance. Consequently anger cannot be a principal passion; for it presupposes not only sadness, which is in the concupiscible power, but also hope, which is in the irascible. The irascible power gets its name from anger, however, because it is the last of the passions which are in the irascible.

4. The passions regarding the future which are in the concupiscible power arise in some sense from the passions in the same power regarding the present. But the passions regarding the future in the irascible do not arise from any passions regarding the present in the same power but rather from such passions in another power, that is, from joy and sadness. Hence there is no parallel.

5. In the line of execution and attainment love is the first passion, but in the line of intention joy is prior to love and is the reason for loving, especially in the sense in which love is a passion of the concupiscible power.

6. Joy and sadness are the most Important among the passions, as has been said. Nonetheless hope and fear are the principal ones in their own class, as is clear from what has been said.

7. Since that work is not by Augustine, it does not impose upon us any necessity of accepting its dicta as authoritative. Here especially it is seen to contain a patent error. For hope is not in the concupiscible but in the irascible power; and sadness is not in the irascible but in the concupiscible. Yet if we must uphold its authority, we can say that it is speaking of those powers according to the meaning of their names: concupiscence is concerned with good, and on this basis all passions directed to good can be attributed to the concupiscible power; and because anger is concerned with an evil inflicted, all the passions which regard evil can be attributed to the irascible power. On this basis sadness is attributed to the irascible power and hope to the concupiscible.

8. The contrariety which is proper to the passions of the irascible power, namely, exceeding one’s capacity or not, makes the second passion arise from good or evil accidentally. For something which exceeds one’s capacity leads to withdrawal, whereas something which does not exceed it leads to approach. If these differences are taken with reference to good, then, a passion which follows from something which exceeds one’s capacity will come from good accidentally. If, on the other hand, they are taken with reference to evil, then a passion which follows from something that does not exceed one’s capacity will be accidental. Consequently in the irascible power there cannot be two principal passions which are directly contrary (e.g., hope and despair, or boldness and fear), as are joy and sadness inn the concupiscible.

Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul

ARTICLE VI

In the sixth article we ask:

Do we merit by our passions?

[Parallel readings: De malo, 12, 1; S.T., I-II, 24, 1; 3 ad 1; II-II, 158.]

Difficulties

It seems that we do, for

1. We merit by fulfilling commands. But by divine commandments we are induced to rejoice, to fear, to grieve, and to have other such passions, as Augustine says. We therefore merit by our passions.

2. According to Augustine such passions of the soul are not had without the will. In fact they are nothing but acts of will. But by our acts of will we can merit not only materially but also formally. Then so can we by such passions.

3. Psychical passions come closer to being voluntary than do bodily passions, because the psychical passions are to some extent within our power in so far as the concupiscible and the irascible powers obey reason, whereas bodily passions are not. But bodily passions or sufferings are meritorious, as is evident in the case of martyrs, who merit the aureola of martyrs by their bodily passions. With all the more reason, then, are psychical passions meritorious.

4. The answer was given that bodily passions or sufferings are meritorious in so far as they are willed.—On the contrary, the will to suffer for Christ can also be in one who will never suffer, and yet he will not get the aureola. A bodily passion therefore merits the aureola not only by reason of being willed but by being actually undergone.

5. If from the intensification of a given thing there follows the intensification of reward, that thing is essentially and not just materially meritorious. But from the intensification of bodily passion or suffering there follows the intensification of reward, because the more a person suffers, the more gloriously he will be crowned, as is said. We consequently merit by our passions or sufferings essentially and not just materially.

6. Hugh of St. Victor says: “After the act of will there follows the deed, so that the will is increased in its own work. Thus the external deed contributes something to merit. But the will can similarly be increased in passion. Passion therefore contributes something to merit; and so the conclusion is the same as before.

7. Since merit is situated in the will, that in which the will terminates as formally completing it must pertain to merit as formally completing it. But in so far as a passion is willed, it is the object of the will; and so it determines the will more or less formally. The passion itself therefore pertains formally to merit.

8. Some of the confessors endured more grievous trials than some of the martyrs. It is accordingly said of them that they underwent a protracted martyrdom, though the passion of certain martyrs was finished in a short space of time. Yet the aureola is not due to the confessors. It accordingly seems that the bodily passion of the martyrs in itself directly merits the aureola.

9. Commenting on the words of the Epistle of St. James (1:12: “My brethren, count it all joy...” the Gloss says: “Tribulation increases justice in the present life and the crown in the future.” But it increases these only by meriting. Since tribulation is suffering or passion, passion is meritorious.

10. The same appears from what is said in the Psalm (115:15): “Precious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his saints.” But precious means worthy of a price. Now the price of our labors is the reward which we merit by our labors. We can therefore merit by our passions. assions or sufferings

11. It was said in answer that we merit by our passions or sufferings in so far as they are willed.—On the contrary, there is the truth which St. Lucy expressed: “If you cause me to be violated against my will, my chastity will be doubled in value for my crown. Even the undergoing of rape, then, which she would have suffered in this life, would have been meritorious for a crown. Thus passion or suffering does not merit merely because it is voluntary.

12. Difficulty is a necessary condition for merit. This is clear from what the Master says: in the state of innocence man did not merit, because nothing urged him to evil or drew him away from good. Now since passions or sufferings occasion difficulty, they therefore seem to have a direct influence upon merit.

13. Fear is a type of passion. Now we can merit by it even formally, since it is in the intellective part, as is clear when we fear things that we know only by the intellect, as eternal punishment. We can therefore merit by our passions.

14. Reward corresponds to merit. But the reward of glory will be not only in the soul but also in the body. Then merit too consists not only in the action of the soul but also in the passion of the body.

15. Where there is greater difficulty there is a greater score of merit. But there is greater difficulty regarding sufferings and passions than regarding the operations of the will. Sufferings and passions are therefore more meritorious than the acts of the will, which are, however, formally meritorious.

16. We formally merit by virtues. But certain passions are listed by the saints9 as virtues—pity and repentance, for example. And certain ones are set down by the philosophers as laudable and the mean between extreme vices, as shame and indignation are instanced by the Philosopher. But all this refers to virtue. We therefore merit formally by passions.

17. Merit and demerit, being contraries, are in the same genus. But demerit is found in the genus of passions; for the first movements, which are sins, are passions. Anger and sloth also are passions, and yet they are listed as capital sins. The Apostle (Romans 1:26) calls sins against nature “shameful passions.” Then we also merit by passions.

To the Contrary

1. Nothing can be meritorious unless it is within our power, because according to Augustine “it is by the will that one sins or lives rightly.” But passions are not in our power, because, as Augustine says, “we yield to passions unwilfingly.”We therefore do not merit by passions.

2. Whatever is a preamble to willing cannot be meritorious, since merit depends upon the will. But the passions of the soul precede the act of the will, since they are in the sensitive part, whereas the act of the will is in the intellective part; but the intellective part receives its object from the sensitive. The passions of the soul therefore cannot be meritorious.

3. Every meritorious deed is praiseworthy. But according to the Philosopher “we are neither praised nor blamed for passions.” We therefore do not merit by our passions.

4. The ability to merit was greater in Christ than it is in us. But Christ did not merit by His passion. Then neither do we merit by our passions.—Proof of the minor: To merit is to make one’s own something which is not one’s own or at least to make more one’s own what is less one’s own. But Christ was not able to make His own what was not His own or to make more His own what was less so, because from the first instant of His conception everything that comes under the heading of merit was most completely due to Him. Christ therefore merited nothing by His passion.

5. It was answered that He merited by making what was His in one way His in more ways.—On the contrary, a double bond makes the obligation greater. In like fashion a double reason for indebtedness makes a greater debt. Therefore, if Christ was not able to cause something to be more due to Him, neither was He able to make something due to Him in more ways.

6. Difficulty diminishes voluntariness. Since merit must be voluntary, difficulty therefore seems to diminish merit. But passions cause difficulty. They therefore diminish merit rather than contribute to it.

REPLY

If meriting is taken in the strict sense, we do not merit by our passions directly but, so to speak, indirectly. Since we speak of meriting in connection with recompense, to merit in the proper sense is to acquire something for oneself as a recompense. Now this is not done unless we give something that is equal in value to that which we are said to merit. We cannot give anything, however, unless it is ours and we have dominion over it. But we have dominion over our acts through our will—not only over those which are immediately elicited by the will, such as loving or willing, but also over those which are elicited by other powers at the command of the will, such as walking, speaking, and the like. These actions, however, are not equal to eternal life in value as if they were a price paid for it, except in so far as they are informed by grace and charity. Consequently, in order that an act may be directly meritorious, it must be an act either commanded or elicited by the will, and must moreover be informed by charity.

Because the principle of an act consists in the habit and the power and even the object, we are on this account said to merit secondarily, as it were, by our habits and powers and objects. But what is primarily and directly meritorious is a voluntary act informed by grace. Passions, however, do not belong to the will either as commanding or as eliciting them; for the principle of passions as such is not in our power, whereas things are said to be voluntary from the fact that they are in our power. Passions accordingly sometimes even anticipate the act of the will. Directly, then, we do not merit by passions. Yet, in so far as they in some way accompany the will, they somehow have a bearing upon merit so that they can be called meritorious indirectly.

Now a passion has a bearing upon the will in three ways: (1) As the object of the will. In this sense passions are said to be meritorious inasmuch as they are willed or loved. That by which we essentially merit in this case will not be the passion itself but the willing of the passion. (2) As arousing or intensifying the act of the will. This can come about in two ways, either directly or indirectly—directly when the passion arouses the will to something like itself, as when the will is inclined by concupiscence to consent to the thing coveted or by anger to will revenge; or indirectly when by furnishing the occasion a passion arouses the will to its contrary, as in the case of a chaste person, when the passion of concupiscence wells up, the will resists with a greater effort; for we try harder in regard to difficult things. Thus passions are said to be meritorious inasmuch as the act of the will aroused by the passion is meritorious. (3) Conversely, when a passion is aroused by the will because the movement of the higher appetite overflows into the lower. For example, when by his will a person detests the filth of sin, the lower appetite is by that very fact moved to shame. In this sense shame is said to be either praiseworthy or meritorious by reason of the act of will which caused it.

In the first way, then, passion has a bearing upon the will as its object, in the second as its principle, and in the third as its effect. Thus the first way is more remote from meritoriousness; for with equal reason gold or silver could be called meritorious or demeritorious on the grounds that by willing these we merit or incur demerit. The last way is closer to merit, since the effect receives something from the cause and not the other way about. Thus if merit is taken in its strict sense, we do not merit by our passions except indirectly.

Merit, however, can be taken broadly in the sense in which any disposition that confers a fitness to receive something is said to merit it; for example, if we should say that by reason of her beauty a woman merits marriage to a king. In this sense even bodily passions are said to merit inasmuch as those passions make us in some sense fit to receive some glory.

Answers must therefore be given to each set of difficulties.

Answers to Difficulties

1. By God’s commandments we are admonished to rejoice or to fear in so far as joy and fear and the like consist in acts of the will and are not passions, as is clear from what was said previously, or also in so far as such passions follow from the will.

2. Augustine says that these passions are acts of will because they come about in us from our will. Thus he adds: “In general depending upon the various things sought or shunned, not only is a man’s will attracted or repelled, but it is also changed and turned into these different affections.” Or else he is speaking of these passions in the sense in which the terms designate acts of the will, as has been said.

3. The bodily passion of a martyr has nothing to do with the meriting of the essential reward except in so far as it is willed, but it has bearing upon an accidental reward, the aureola of martyrs, through the kind of merit which confers a certain fitness for the aureola; for it is fitting that one who is conformed to Christ in His passion should be conformed to Him in His glory, as we gather from the Epistle to the Romans (8:17): “Yet so, if we suffer with him, that we may be also glorified with him.” We should bear in mind, however, that the will cannot have the same attitude toward bodily sufferings when a man is not suffering them as it has because of their keenness while he is actually suffering them. In such matters, then, according to the Philosopher it suffices for a brave man not to be saddened. Consequently the bodily passion actually being experienced is both the sign of a firm and constant will and also that which evokes it, because a man makes an effort regarding difficult things. And so the aureola is not due to the confessor, though it is due to the martyr.

4. The answer is clear from what has just been said.

5. An increase in the rewards follows from an intensification of the suffering either because of a certain fittingness or because of the intensity of the will.

6. Even though the will is increased in both a passion and an exernal act, the case is not the same for both; for the act is commanded by the will, but the passion is not. They therefore do not have the same bearing upon merit.

7. The object determines the will as to the species of the act. Strictly speaking, however, merit consists in the act, not from the viewpoint of the species of the act, but from that of its root, which is charity. Thus it is not necessary that we formally merit by a passion even though it does stand as the object.

8. All the toil which a confessor endures over a long, period of time cannot, under the aspect of the genus of the deed, equal the death which a martyr undergoes even in a moment. For by death one is deprived of what is most valued, life and being; and for this reason it is the ultimate among things that strike terror, according to the Philosopher, and in its regard the virtue of bravery is exercised most of all. This appears very clearly from the fact that men worn out with long-continued afflictions shrink away from death, choosing in effect to undergo further afflictions rather than death. The Philosopher accordingly says that a man of virtue exposes himself to death, choosing rather “ one good and great deed than many small ones,” as if that act of bravery in facing death outweighed many other virtuous deeds. Consequently, from the standpoint of the genus of his deed, the least martyr merits more than any confessor whatever. From that of the root of his deed, however, the confessor can merit more to the extent that he acts from greater charity, because the essential reward corresponds to the root, charity, whereas the accidental reward corresponds to the genus of the act. Hence it is that a confessor can surpass a martyr in the essential reward, but the martyr surpasses him in the accidental reward.

9. That comment in the Gloss is speaking of tribulation in so far as it is willed or excites the will.

10. The same is to be said of this difficulty.

11. For a virgin who would be violated for the sake of Christ, that very violation would be meritorious, just like the other sufferings of the martyrs, not because the violation itself would be voluntary, but because its antecedents, her remaining constant in the confession of Christ, from which the violation followed as a consequence, would be voluntary. Thus that violation would be voluntary, not with an absolute will but with a will in some sense conditioned, seeing that the virgin chooses to suffer this disgrace rather than deny Christ.

12. There are two kinds of difficulty: one which comes from the magnitude and excellence of the task, and this kind is required for virtue; another which is from the agent himself to the extent that he is deficient or hampered in his correct operations, and this kind is removed or diminished by virtue. It is in the latter sense that passions cause difficulty. The first kind of difficulty, on the part of the task, has a direct bearing upon merit in the same way as the excellence of the act; whereas the second, from the weakness of the agent, has no bearing upon merit unless perhaps as an occasion, inasmuch as it supplies the occasion for a greater effort. It is not true, however, that in his first state Adam would not have been able to merit—if we grant that he had grace, even though there were nothing drawing him away from good or urging him to evil—because, if he had stood fast, he would have arrived eventually at glory; and it is clear that this would not have been without merit. Nor does the Master say that he would not have been able to merit in the first state, but he does say that he would have been able to avoid sin without meriting; for he could avoid sin without grace because nothing was pushing him to evil, and without grace nothing can be meritorious.

13. That fear of eternal punishment which is directly meritorious is in the will and is not a passion strictly speaking, as is clear from what has alrcady been said. A passion of fear can, however, be aroused in the lower appetite by reason of eternal punishment either because of an overflow from the higher appetite into the lower or because the intellect’s conception of eternal punishment is represented in the imagination, with the consequence that the lower appetite is moved through the passion of fear. But such fear does not have anything to do with merit except indirectly, as has been said.

14. [This answer is missing.]

15. If we are speaking of difficulty on our part, then passions and sufferings involve more difficulty than acts of the will. But in that case the difficulty does not contribute anything to merit except indirectly, as has been said; and similarly neither do passions and sufferings. But if we are speaking of the difficulty which comes from the excellence or goodness of the task, which does contribute to merit directly, then there is greater difficulty in acts of the will.

16. Some passions are called laudable by the philosophers because they are the effects and signs of a good will, as is evident in the example of shame, which shows that the man’s will is averse to the filth of sin, and in that of pity, which is a sign of love. On this account the names of these passions are sometimes used by the saints for the habits which elicit the act of will which is the source of these passions.

17. First movements do not have the complete nature of sin or demerit but are in a way dispositions for demerit just as venial sin is a disposition for mortal sin. The movements of sensuality themselves, then, do not have to be directly meritorious, because what is meritorious cannot be anything but a voluntary act, as has been said. But those passions are sometimes called vices or sins inasmuch as acts of the will or even habits are designated by the names of passions. Moreover, vices against nature are called passions even though they are voluntary acts, inasmuch as by such vices nature is disturbed from its proper order.

Answers to Contrary Difficulties

l. We yield to passions unwillingly, not as regards consent, since we do not consent to them except by our will, but as regards some bodily alteration such as laughter and weeping and the like. Consequently, in so far as by our will we consent or refuse consent to them, they are meritorious or demeritorious.

2. Though the passions of the lower appetite sometimes anticipate the act of the will, they do not always; for the appetitive powers do not stand in the same relationship as the apprehensive. Our intellect receives its object from sense; consequently there cannot be an operation of the intellect unless there is some previous operation of sense. The will, however, does not receive anything from the lower appetite, but rather moves it; and so it is not necessary that a passion of the lower appetite precede the act of the will.

3. Even though passions are not directly praiseworthy, they can nevertheless be praiseworthy indirectly, as has been said.

4. By His passion Christ merited for Himself and for us. For Himself He merited the glory of His body; for although He merited this through His other merits which preceded it, yet the splendor of the resurrection is by a certain fittingness properly a reward of the passion, because exaltation is the proper reward of humility. He merited for us, moreover, inasmuch as in His passion He gave satisfaction for the sin of the whole human race, but not by His preceding works, though He did merit for us by them. Retribution by way of suffering is required for satisfaction as a sort of compensation for the pleasure of sin.

5. By His passion Christ did not make the glory of His body due after it was not due, nor did He make it more due after it was less due. He did, however, make it due in another way than that in which it was due before. But it does not follow that He made it more due. This would follow if the cause for which it was due were either increased or multiplied, as happens when an obligation is increased by a two-fold promise. But that did not occur in the case of the merit of Christ, because His grace was not augmented.

6. Directly difficulty hampers voluntariness, but indirectly it increases it in so far as a person makes an effort against the difficulty. But the difficulty itself contributes to satisfaction by reason of its penal character.

Q. 26: The Passions of the Soul

ARTICLE VII

In the seventh article we ask:

Does a passion accompanying a meritorious act detract from its merit?

[Parallel readings: De malo, 3, 11; 12, 1; S.T., I-II, 24, 3; 77, 6 ad 2.]

That is to say, who merits the more, he who helps a poor man with a certain compassion of pity, or he who does it without any passion solely because of a judgment of reason?

Difficulties

It seems that he who does it solely because of a judgment of reason merits the more, for

1. Merit is opposed to sin. But a man who commits a sin solely by choice sins more than one who sins under the urging of passion; for the first is said to sin out of definite malice., the second out of weakness. Then a man who does a good deed solely because of a judgment of reason also merits more than one who does it with a passion of pity.

2. The answer was given that for something to be meritorious or to be an act of virtue there is required not only a good which is done but also a good manner of doing it, which in this case cannot be had without the emotion of pity.—On the contrary, for an act to be done in a good manner there are three requisites according to the Philosopher: the will choosing the act, reason establishing the mean in the act, and the relation of the act to the due end. Now these requisites can all be met without the passion of pity in one who gives an alms. Without it, then, there can be not only the good which is done but also the good manner of doing it.—Proof of the Minor: All three requisites mentioned are fulfilled by an act of the will and of reason. But an act of the will and of reason does not depend upon a passion, because reason and the will move the lower powers in which the passions are found, and the motion of the mover does not depend upon the motion of the thing moved. The three requisites mentioned can therefore be fulfilled without any passion.

3. For an act ofyirtue the discernment of reason is needed. Thus Gregory says that unless the other virtues do with prudence the things to which they tend, they cannot be virtues at all. All passions, however, hinder the judgment or discernment of reason. Hence Sallust says: “All men who deliberate about doubtful matters ought fittingly to be free of an