BOOK VIII
FRIENDSHIP
LECTURE 1
Friendship, a Subject of Moral Philosophy
Chapter 1
I. IT PERTAINS TO ETHICS TO TREAT FRIENDSHIP—(FOR) SIX REASONS.
a. First. — 1538
After the previous discussions we must pass on to a consideration of friendship, for it is a kind of virtue or at least accompanies virtue.
b. Second. — 1539-1540
Besides, friendship is especially necessary for living, to the extent that no one, even though he had all other goods would choose to live without friends. Indeed the rich, the rulers and the powerful seem to need friends most of all. What purpose do goods of fortune serve if not for the beneficence which is especially and most laudably exercised towards friends? Or how will goods of fortune be preserved and retained without friends? For the greater they are the less secure they become. In poverty and other misfortunes people consider friends their only refuge. Likewise friendship helps young men to guard against wrongdoing; it helps old men to support their deficiencies and faltering movements arising from weakness. Friendship is even useful to people in their prime for the performance of good actions, since two persons working together either in intellectual endeavor or external activity are more effective.
c. Third. — 1541
By nature the parent feels friendship for its offspring not only among men but also among birds and many other animals. There is also friendship among people who are of the same race with one another, and notably among men in general. Hence we have praise for lovers of their fellow men. Even when traveling abroad we see that every man is a familiar and a friend of every other man.
d. Fourth. — 1542
States, it seems, are maintained by friendship; and legislators are more zealous about it than about justice. This is evident from the similarity between friendship and concord; but legislators most of all wish to encourage concord and to expel discord as an enemy of the state.
e. Fifth. — 1543
If people are friends there is no need of justice, but just men do need friendship. Likewise what is just seems to be especially favorable to friendship.
f. Sixth. — 1544
Friendship is not only necessary but also noble. We praise those who love their friends; and a multiplicity of friendships seem to be a good thing. People even identify good men and friends.
2. WHAT MATTERS ARE TO BE TREATED IN THE QUESTION OF FRIENDSHIP.
a. He presents an obvious doubt.
i. Conflicting opinions—on friendship in human affairs. — 1545
On this subject not a few things are uncertain. Some philosophers contend that friendship is a kind of likeness, and that friends are like one another. Hence the saying: “Like seeks like,” “Birds of a feather flock together,” and other proverbs of this sort. Others, on the contrary, hold that all similar individuals are mutually opposed.
ii. (Conflicting opinions) on friendship in things of nature. — 1546-1547
Likewise some seek less superficial reasons, those more rooted in nature. Euripides, for instance, maintained that the parched earth longs for rain and when majestic heaven is filled with rain, it longs to fall on the earth. Heraclitus held that contrary contributes to contrary, that the most excellent harmony results from opposites, and that all things have their origin from strife. But others were of a contrary opinion, especially Empedocles who contended that like desires like.
b. The kind of doubts to be resolved. — 1548
Certainly questions belonging to cosmology should be passed over as not pertinent to our present purpose. But we must give our attention to whatever subjects are human and refer to man’s morals and passions. Thus, whether all men are capable of friendship or whether evil men can be friends, and whether friendship is of one kind or many kinds.
c. He rejects an error. — 1549-1550
In fact some philosophers thought that there was only one kind of friendship because it is susceptible of more and less; they did not accept the sufficient indication that things which differ in species admit of more and less. But we have treated these matters before.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
1538. After the Philosopher has determined the moral and intellectual virtues and continence, which is something imperfect in the genus of virtue, he now turns his attention to friendship which is founded upon virtue as an effect of it. First he explains by way of introduction what he intends to do. Then [Lect. 2], at “Perhaps these questions etc.” (B. 1155 b 17), he begins to treat friendship. He develops the first point in two ways. First [1] he shows that it pertains to ethics to treat friendship. Next [2], at “On this subject etc.,” he shows what matters are to be treated in the question of friendship. In regard to the first item he offers six reasons to explain what we must consider about friendship. He states first what has to be treated, after the previous discussions, in examining the subject of friendship, viz., we must consider the things pertaining to the study of moral philosophy, omitting what belongs to the field of the cosmologist. The first reason [1, a] why we must investigate friendship is that the consideration of virtue is the concern of moral philosophy. Friendship is a kind of virtue inasmuch as it is a habit of free choice—this will be explained later (1559, 1602-1604, 1645, 1831). Also it is reduced to the genus of justice as offering something proportional (a point that will also be discussed later), or at least it accompanies virtue insofar as virtue is the cause of true friendship,
1539. He gives the second reason [1, b] at “Besides, friendship.” Moral philosophy considers all things that are required for human living; and among these friendship is especially necessary, to such an extent that no one in his right mind would choose to live in the possession of great external goods without friends. Indeed friends seem most necessary for the wealthy, the rulers, and the powerful, who have abundant external goods. First, for the enjoyment of these goods; there is no advantage to be derived from goods of fortune if no one can be benefited by them, but a benefit is especially and most laudably done for friends. Second, for the preservation of such goods that cannot be retained without friends. The greater the goods of fortune, the less secure they are because many people secretly covet them. Nor are friends useful only in good fortune but also in adversity.
1540. Therefore, in poverty people look upon friends as the one refuge. So then in any situation friends are needed. Likewise friendship is necessary for young men that the help of friends may restrain them from sin, for they themselves are inclined to desires for pleasures, as has been already remarked in the seventh book (1531). On the other hand, friends are useful to the old for assistance in their bodily infirmities; because they are faltering in their movements from weakness, friends are needed to assist them. But even to those who are at their peak, in the very prime of life, friends are useful for the performance of good actions. When two work together, they are more effective. This is true both in rational investigation where one sees ‘what the other cannot see, and external activity in which one is especially a help to the other. Thus it is evident that we must investigate friendship as a state necessary for all.
1541. He presents his third reason [1, c] at “By nature the parent.” By nature a parent feels friendship for its child. This is true not only of mankind but even of birds who obviously spend a long time training their young. And the same goes for other animals. There is also a natural friendship between people of the same race who have common customs and social life. There is above all that natural friendship of all men for one another by reason of their likeness in specific nature. For this reason we praise philanthropists or friends of mankind as, fulfilling what is natural to man. This: is evident when a man loses his way; for everyone stops even an unknown stranger from taking the wrong road, as if every man is naturally a familiar and a friend of every other man. But those things which are naturally good must be treated by the moralist. Therefore he ought to treat friendship.
1542. At “States, it seems” [1, d] he offers the fourth reason, pointing out that states seem to be preserved by friendship. Hence legislators have greater zeal for maintaining friendship among citizens than even justice itself which is sometimes omitted, for example, in the infliction of punishment, lest dissension be stirred up. This is clear from the fact that concord and friendship are similar. Certainly lawmakers especially want this harmony and eliminate from the citizenry as much as possible contention inimical to the security of the state. Because the whole of ethics seems to be ordered to the good of the state, as was said at the beginning (25), it pertains to ethics to treat friendship.
1543. He states the fifth reason [1, e] at “If people,” saying that if men are friends there should be no need of justice in the strict sense because they should have all things in common; a friend is another self and there is no justice to oneself. But if men are just they nevertheless need friendship for one another. Likewise perfect justice seems to preserve and restore friendship. Therefore it pertains to ethics to treat friendship much more than justice.
1544 . He gives the sixth reason [1, f] at “But friendship” explaining that we must treat friendship not only because it is something necessary for human living but also because it is something good, i.e., laudable and honorable. We praise philophiloi, i.e., those who love their friends; and poliphilia (a multiplicity of friendships) seems to be so good that people identify good men and friends.
1545. Then [2], at “On this subject,” he shows what should be considered on friendship. First [2, a] he presents an obvious doubt about friendship. Next [2, b], at “Certainly questions etc.,” he shows the kind of doubts to be resolved about friendship. Last [2, c], at “In fact some etc.,” he rejects an error of certain philosophers. He considers the first point in a twofold manner. First [a, i] he states conflicting opinions of some thinkers on friendship in human affairs; second [a, ii], at “Likewise some etc.,” on friendship in things of nature. He says first that not a few things regarding friendship are uncertain. This is obvious, primarily from the diversity of opinions. Some contend that friendship is a kind of likeness and that like people are friends of one another. In favor of this they quote proverbs: “Like seeks like,” “Birds of a feather flock together.” Certain birds like starlings do flock together. There are other proverbs of this type. But others, on the contrary, hold that all potters are enemies of each other, since one hinders another’s gain. But the truth of the matter is that, essentially speaking, like is lovable; it is, however, hateful incidentally, precisely as an impediment to one’s own good.
1546. At “Likewise some” [a, ii] he states conflicting opinions about the same subject in things of nature. He says that on this very question some seek loftier, i.e., deeper reasons, more in the manner of cosmologists. Thus Euripides maintained that the parched earth desires rain as if loving its contrary; and that when heaven, worthy of honor on account of its excellence, is filled with rain its longs to fall on the earth, i.e., to send down rain to earth, which is the contrary of its loftiness and fullness. Likewise Heraclitus held that contrary contributes to contrary, as cold things to a man suffering from excessive heat, insofar as the most excellent harmony or equilibrium is produced from different and contrary things. But he said that the contrary does this inasmuch as all things had their origin from strife by means of which the elements, mingled in the beginning, are separated. But others like Empedocles were of an opposite opinion: that like desires like.
1547. Our difficulty is answered: essentially speaking, like is desirable naturally; but incidentally like desires the contrary, inasmuch as it is helpful and medicinal. Cf. his previous discussion on bodily pleasures (1525-1517).
1548. Next [2, b], at “Certainly questions,” he shows the kinds of doubts to be resolved about friendship, saying that cosmological questions must be omitted as irrelevant to our present purpose. Attention should be directed to human affairs as connected with morals and man’s passions; for instance, whether all men are capable of friendship, or whether evil men are incapable of it, and whether there is one kind or many kinds of friendship.
1549. Then [2, c], at “In fact some,” he rejects an error of some philosophers who thought there was only one kind of friendship because all species of friendship are to be compared according to more and less. Thus we say that honorable friendship is greater than useful friendship. But Aristotle says that they have not accepted the adequate explanation that even those things that differ specifically receive more and less inasmuch as they agree generically. For example, we may say that white has more color than black, or by analogy that act is more excellent than potency, and substance than accident.
1550- In conclusion he says that the things just treated pertaining to human activities in regard to friendship were discussed previously in a general way.
LECTURE 2
Good, the Object of Friendship
Chapter 2
A. He explains what friendship is.
1. THE FOUR PARTS OF THE DEFINITION OF FRIENDSHIP.
a. The portion dealing with the object.
i. The object of friendship. — 1551-1552
Perhaps these questions will be clarified by some knowledge about what is lovable, for it seems that man does not love everything but only what is lovable; and this is either a good in itself or a good that is pleasurable or useful. But the useful good seems to be a means of attaining the good in itself or the pleasurable good. Therefore, the good in itself and the pleasurable will be things lovable as ends.
ii. He raises a doubt. — 1553
Do men then love the good simply or what is good for them? These two things sometimes differ. Likewise the same doubt exists about the pleasurable good itself.
iii. He gives the answer.
x. HE STATES HIS SOLUTION. — 1554
It seems though that everyone loves what is good for him; and, as the good in itself is lovable, so what is good for each man is lovable for him.
y. HE ARGUES FOR THE CONTRARY. — 1555
However, everyone loves not what is good for him but what appears good.
z. HE GIVES THE ANSWER. — 1556
But this makes no difference, for what is lovable will be what appears good.
b. The second portion—relates to the quality of love. — 1557-1558
While there are three motives prompting love, certainly the love of inanimate objects is not called friendship. In it there is neither a mutual return nor a will for the good of the objects. Indeed it would be absurd to wish good to wine, although a man does want it to remain unspoiled so he can have it. On the other hand, we say that the good of a friend must be wished for his sake.
c. The third portion—refers to change in the one loved. — 1559
But those wishing good to someone in this way are said to have goodwill when the wish is not reciprocal, for friendship is goodwill with reciprocation.
d. The fourth portion is taken from the condition for mutual love. — 1560
Likewise we must add that goodwill may not lie hidden.
Many men in fact are of goodwill towards those they have never seen inasmuch as they think such people virtuous or useful. It is possible too that one of these persons might feel the same way. Consequently men of this kind seem to be benevolent towards one another but they cannot be called friends when unaware of one another’s feelings.
2. HE CONCLUDES WITH THE DEFINITION OF FRIENDSHIP. — 1561
Therefore, it is necessary for friendship that men wish good to one another, that this fact be recognized by each, and that it be for the sake of one of the reasons previously mentioned.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
1551. After the Philosopher has shown in the introduction that it is necessary to clarify friendship and what things are to be determined about it, now he begins to treat friendship. First [A] he explains what friendship is. Then [Lect. 3], at “Since these objects etc.” (1156 a 5), he distinguishes its kinds. Last [Lect. 1, Bk IX], at “In all friendships etc.” (1163 b 32), he states the properties belonging to the different kinds of friendship. He treats
the first point from two aspects. First [A, 1] he investigates the four parts of the definition of friendship. Next [A, 2], at “Therefore it is necessary etc., he concludes with the definition of friendship. First [1, a] he investigates the portion dealing with the object. In regard to this he does three things. First [a, i] he determines the object of friendship. Second [a, ii], at “Do men then love etc.,” he raises a doubt. Third [a, iii], at “it seems though etc.,” he gives the answer. He says first that these questions will perhaps be somewhat clarified if we understand the nature of the thing that is lovable, the object of love from which friendship (or love) receives its name.
1552. Not everything is loved indiscriminately because evil as such is not loved, but man loves what is lovable, and this is either good in itself, i.e., honorable, or it is a pleasurable or useful good. The last or useful good seems to be a means of attaining the honorable and pleasurable goods which are lovable on account of themselves as ends. On the other hand, useful good is lovable on account of another, as a means to an end. But the good and the pleasurable taken in general are not distinguished from one another in substance but only in concept. Something is described as good precisely insofar as it is intrinsically perfect and desirable; and pleasurable inasmuch as the appetite rests in it. However that is not the meaning here: the question here is of man’s genuine good, which belongs to reason; and the pleasurable is taken here as that which appeals to the senses.
1553. Then [a, ii], at “Do men then love, he raises a. doubt on this point: do men love what is the absolute good, or what is good relative to themselves? These sometimes do differ from each other. For instance, to philosophize in itself is good but not in the case of the pauper. The same doubt presents itself in the case of the pleasurable good itself; for an object pleasurable in itself (e.g., a sweet) is not pleasant to one with a sour taste.
1554. At “It seems though” [a, iii] he answers the foregoing question. First [iii, x] he states his solution, saying everyone seems to love what is good for him because every faculty tends to the object proportionate to itself. Thus everyone’s vision sees what is visible to it. As the totally lovable is the totally good, so the lovable for each man is that which is good for him.
1555. Second [iii, y], at “However, everyone,” he argues for the contrary, saying that every man loves not what is really good for him but what seems good for him; for desire tends to an object only as apprehended. Consequently it seems false that what is lovable is what is good for him.
1556. Third [iii, z], at “But this makes,” he gives the answer that this makes no difference to our proposition; for, when some apparent good is loved it is loved as a good for oneself. Hence it can also be said that what is lovable is what appears good.
1557. The second portion which he gives at “While there are” [i, b], relates to the quality of love. He says that while there are three reasons why men love, viz., the good, the pleasurable, and the useful, friendship does not consist in that love which a man is said to have for inanimate things, like wine or gold. He shows this in two ways. First, because in a love of this kind there cannot be the mutual return that is necessary for friendship, for wine does not love man as man loves wine. Second, because we do not love inanimate things in such a way that we will their good. It would be absurd to say that we willed good to wine; but the good which is wine a man wills for himself. Therefore, in loving wine man obviously does not have benevolence towards the wine but towards himself.
1558. If someone says that a man wishes good to the wine because he wishes that it be preserved, we should consider that a man wants the wine to remain unspoiled so he can have it. In this way he does not desire the preservation of the wine for the good of the wine but for his own good. And this is contrary to the notion of friendship, for we say that the good of a friend must be willed for his sake and not for the sake of the one loving.
1559. The third portion [i, c], which he presents at “But those wishing,” refers to change in the one loved. He explains that when people wish good to someone for his sake we call them benevolent but not friends if the wish is not reciprocated so that the loved one wishes good to, and for the sake of, the one loving. The reason is that we say friendship is benevolence with corresponding requital inasmuch as the one loving is loved in return, for friendship has a kind of exchange of love after the manner of commutative justice.
1560. The fourth portion [r, d] is taken from the condition for mutual love; and it is stated at “Likewise we must.” He says that to complete the notion of friendship we must add that it is a mutual benevolence which is recognized. Many men are benevolent towards those they have never seen, for, from reports, they judge these people are just, i.e., virtuous, or useful to themselves. Likewise it is possible that one of them should have the same feeling towards him who is benevolent in this way. Consequently men of this kind seem to be benevolent towards one another but cannot be friends while they are unaware of one another’s feelings.
156z. Then [A, 2], at “Therefore it is necessary,” he concludes with the definition of friendship derived from the premises. He says that it is necessary to the notion of friendship that men wish good to one another, that this fact be recognized by them, and that it be for the sake of one of the things previously mentioned, namely, the good, the pleasurable, or the useful.
LECTURE 3
Kinds of Friendship
Chapter 3
I. HE DISTINGUISHES THE KINDS OF FRIENDSHIP.
A. The distinction. — 1562-1564
Since these objects of love differ from each other in kind, the corresponding love and friendship will also differ in kind. There are then three kinds of friendship corresponding to the objects of love. In each of these a recognized return of love is possible, and those loving can mutually will good according to their love.
B. The particular kinds.
1. FRIENDSHIP BASED ON UTILITY AND THAT BASED ON PLEASURE.
a. He shows just what the different kinds of imperfect ftlendship are.
i. Friendships in an incidental sense. — 1565-1566
Therefore, of those who love one another for utility, one does not love the other for the other’s sake but for the good they mutually gain. The same is true of those who love each other for pleasure, for friends like these do not love witty people because of their character but because they are pleasant companions. Both those who love for utility love for the good they get and those who love for the sake of pleasantness love for the pleasure they enjoy. These do not love a friend because he is a friend but because he is useful or pleasant. Therefore, these friendships are incidental, for a man is loved not for what he is but for some advantage or pleasure.
ii. He shows that they are easily dissolved. — 1567
Since men do not always remain the same, friendships of this kind are easily dissolved; when those who are loved cease to be pleasant or useful, their friends stop loving them. But the useful is not permanent but is one thing now and then another. Consequently if the reason for friendship no longer exists, the friendship itself is dissolved.
b. (He shows) to whom (these friendships) belong.
i. To whom useful friendship belongs.
x. ESPECIALLY AMONG OLD MEN. — 1568
This friendship seems to exist especially among old men who do not seek pleasure but utility.
y. ADOLESCENTS AND YOUTHS WHO SEEK WHAT IS USEFUL. — 1569
It is also suitable for adolescents and youths who seek what is to their advantage. Friends of this kind do not associate much with each other, for sometimes they are not even agreeable to each other. So they do not need such companionship unless it is useful, since they are pleasing to one another only insofar as they hope for some good.
z. THE FRIENDSHIP OF FELLOW TRAVELERS. — 1570
To the same classification some assign the friendship of fellow travelers.
ii. To whom pleasurable friendship (belongs).
x. TO WHOM THIS MAY BE ASSIGNED. — 1571
Young men seem to foster friendship mostly for pleasure because they live according to the passions and follow what is pleasing to them at the moment.
y. THESE FRIENDSHIPS READILY CHANGE.
aa. On the part of the pleasurable objects. — 1572
As they grow older, however, their pleasures undergo change. They quickly make and quickly forsake friends because with the change of pleasure comes at the same time a change of friendship; and youthful pleasure is swift to change.
bb. On the part of those who love. — 1573
Moreover, young people are amorous; they love on account of passion and pleasure, and this is conducive to intense love. For this reason such persons quickly cease to love; oftentimes they fall in and out of love the same day. But they want to remain together all day and live with one another. This is the way their friendship works.
2. HE TREATS FRIENDSHIP BASED... ON GOOD BY ITSELF.
a. This friendship is perfect. — 1574
Perfect friendship, however, is friendship between men who are good and resemble one another according to virtue,
b. He proves his statement.
i. This is friendship essentially.
x. NOT INCIDENTALLY. — 1575
for those who are alike in virtue wish one another good inasmuch as they are virtuous, and they are virtuous in themselves.
y. IS THE BEST. — 1576
But people who wish good to friends for their sake are the truest friends; they do this for the friends themselves and not for something incidental.
z. (THIS) FRIENDSHIP REMAINS. — 1577
Therefore, friendship between such men remains as long as they are virtuous; and virtue is a permanent habit.
ii. He shows that it lacks nothing.
x. (IT) COMPREHENDS ... THINGS... FOUND IN OTHER KINDS. — 1578
Likewise each friend is not only good in himself but also to his friend, for the virtuous are good without qualification, and useful and entirely pleasing to one another. This is so because each man’s own actions and the actions of a like nature are pleasing to him. But actions of virtuous men are of this or a similar kind.
y. SUCH FRIENDSHIP (IS) LONG LASTING. — 1579
It is reasonable for such friendship to be long lasting, because absolutely all the qualities necessary for friends are joined together in it. Every 20 friendship is for the sake of good or pleasure, either absolutely or to the one loving and according to a kind of likeness. But all the preceding qualities are found in this friendship essentially; and those who are alike according to this friendship have the remaining goods too, because what is without qualification good is also unreservedly
pleasurable.
z. HIS THIRD CONCLUSION. — 1580
These things then are most lovable. Hence love of them should be most intense, and such friendship the noblest.
iii. He shows that (this friendship) is rare.
x. HE EXPLAINS HIS INTENTION (BY TWO REASONS).
aa. First. — 1581
Very likely friendships of this kind are rare, since virtuous men are scarce.
bb. He gives the second reason. — 1582
Besides, time and familiarity are needed. This is so because, according to the proverb, people do not know one another until they eat salt together. But men ought neither to take others as friends nor become friends until each appears to the other worthy of love and is trusted by the other.
y. HE EXCLUDES AN OBJECTION. — 1583
However, those who at once offer the services of friendship show that they wish to be friends but in fact are not unless they are lovable to each other and know it. So then the wish for friendship is quickly made but not friendship itself.
z. HE GIVES A SUMMARY. — 1584
Chapter 4
A friendship of this kind is perfect both in regard to duration and the remaining conditions; and in all respects each receives from each the same benefit-as is proper between friends.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
1562. After the Philosopher has shown the nature of friendship, he now distinguishes the kinds of friendship. On this point he does two things. First he makes his distinction. Then [Lect. 13], at “There are three etc.” (B.1162 a 34), he shows which kinds of friendship give rise to complaints or grumblings. He treats his first point from two aspects. First he distinguishes the kinds of friendship which exist between persons of equal rank. Next [Lect. 7], at “There is another etc.” (B. 1158 b 11), he distinguishes the kinds of friendship that exist between persons of unequal rank. On the first point he does two things. First he distinguishes the kinds of friendship. Second [Lect. 6], at “Consequently, the friendships etc.” (B 1158 b), he shows, that these consist in equality. He -discusses the first point from three aspects. First [I] he distinguishes the kinds of friendship. Then [Lect. 5; II], at “Just as in the case etc.” (B.1157 b 5), he treats them in relation to their acts. Last [Lect. 6; III], at “But friendship etc.” (B. 1158 a 3), he treats them in relation to their subjects. On the first point [I, A] he gives the distinction of the kinds. Next [I, B], at “Therefore of those etc.,” he treats the particular kinds.
1563. He says first that there are three kinds of lovable objects, is indicated (1552, 1557), namely, the good as such, the pleasurable, and the useful; these do not differ in kind as three equal species of a genus but are classified by priority and posteriority. Since acts are diversified according to the difference of objects, the types of love will differ in kind according to these three: thus there is one type of love by which a thing is loved for the good, another for the pleasurable, and a third for the useful. Likewise, because love is an act of friendship, there will be three kinds of friendship equal to the three objects of love. One is friendship for the honorable good or the good as such, another for the pleasurable, and a third for the useful.
1564. In each of these the definition of friendship just given is fulfilled, because in each of the three a recognized return of love by someone is possible. Likewise in these three, people can will good to one another according to their love. For example, if men love for the sake of virtue, they wish one another the virtuous good; but if for a good based on utility, they wish one another useful goods; if for a good based on pleasure they wish pleasurable goods.
1565. Next [l, B], at “Therefore of those,” he treats the kinds of friendship just mentioned which are contained under friendship not according to equality but according to priority and posteriority. So he does three things. First [B, i] he treats friendship based on utility and that based on pleasure which share the nature of friendship by posteriority. Then [B, 2], at “Perfect friendship, however etc.,” he treats friendship based on the honorable, i.e., good by itself to which the notion of friendship primarily and essentially pertains. Last [B, 3; Lect. 4], at “But that etc.” (B. 1157), he compares the other kinds of friendship with this kind. He discusses the first point from two aspects. First [i, a] he shows just what the different kinds of imperfect friendship are; then [i, b], at “This friendship,” to whom they belong. On the first point he does two things. First [a, i] he shows that useful and pleasurable friendships are friendships in an incidental sense. Second [a, ii], at “Since men etc.,” he shows that they are easily dissolved.
1566. He says first that of those who love one another for the sake of utility, one does not love the other for the sake of the other but inasmuch as he receives from the other some good for himself. The same is true of those who love each other on account of pleasantness, for the one does not love the other precisely as witty or virtuous in merriment but merely as pleasant to himself. So it is obvious that those who love for the sake of utility love for the good they get, and those who love for the sake of pleasantness love for the pleasure they enjoy. Thus they do not love their friend for what he is in himself but for what is incidental to him, his utility or pleasantness. Therefore, friendships of this sort plainly are not friendships essentially but incidentally, because a person is not loved for what he is but for utility or pleasure.
1567. Then [a, ii], at “Since men,” he shows that friendships of this kind are easily dissolved. They are for the sake of something that is incidental to the persons loved and in this men do not always remain the same. The same man, for instance, is not always pleasant or useful. Therefore, when those who are loved cease to be pleasant or useful, their friends stop loving them. This is very obvious in friendship based on utility, for the same thing is not always useful to a man. it is one thing now, and then another in different times and places. So a doctor is useful for sickness, a sailor for navigation and so on. Since then friendship was cultivated not for the man himself but for the utility he afforded, when the cause of the friendship vanishes the friendship too is consequently dissolved.
1568. At “This friendship” [1, b] he shows to whom these friendships may be attributed. First [1, b, i] he shows to whom useful friendships belong; then [1, b, ii], at “Young men seem etc.,” to whom pleasurable friendship. He notes three classes of men who avail themselves of useful friendship. First [i, x] he says that this friendship seems to exist especially among old men who are not looking for what is pleasurable for the delight of body and sensitive nature, but rather what is useful for help needed for their natural deficiency.
1569. Second [i, y], at “It is also,” he says that is the kind of friendship pursued by adolescents and youths who seek what is useful. They seem quite incapable of possessing mutual love or even of remaining constant companions because sometimes they are not agreeable to one another; neither does one need the companionship of another except for utility. Their association with one another is pleasurable to them inasmuch as it holds some hope of good for which this association is useful.
157o. Third [i, z], at “To the same,” he says that to friendships based on utility some reduce even the friendship of fellow travelers who seem to love one another for the advantage that one derives from another on his journey.
1571. Next [1, b, ii], at “Young men seem,” he shows to whom pleasurable friendship may be attributed. On this point he does two things. First [ii, x] he explains to whom this friendship may be assigned, saying that friendship based on pleasure belongs most of all to youths. This is so because they live according to the impulses of passion since they have not been strengthened in rational judgment by which the passions are regulated. Because all passions terminate at pleasure and pain, as we stated in the second book (296, 441), youths principally seek what is pleasurable at the present moment. The passions belong to the sensitive part of man which is chiefly concerned with the present. But to love a present thing because it is productive of future pleasure coincides with the notion of the useful.
1572. Then [ii, y], at “As they grow older,” he shows that these friendships readily change in two ways: first [y, aa], on the part of the pleasurable objects, because other things become pleasing to them with the passing of time. It is not in the same thing that children, adolescents, and youths alike find pleasure; and so they easily make friends and easily forsake them because with the change of pleasure comes a change of friendship. But youthful pleasure is characteristically swift to change since the nature of youth consists wholly in a state of change.
1573. At “Moreover, young people” [y, bb] he shows the same thing on the part of those who love. He says that young people are volatile, i.e., quick and vehement in their love because they love not from rational choice but from passion and inasmuch as they are very desirous of pleasure. Therefore they love passionately and intensely. Since passion vanishes as quickly as it appears, such persons as easily fall in love as they cease to love; many times they even fall in and out of love the same day. But as long as the friendship endures these people want to remain together all day long and live in the other’s presence inasmuch as they enjoy the company of each other. This is the way their friendship works.
1574. Next [B, 2], at “Perfect friendship, however,” he treats the principal kind of friendship which is for the good of virtue. First [2, a] he points out that this friendship is perfect. He says that the friendship between good men and those alike in virtue is perfect friendship.
1575. Then [2, b], at “for those who,” he proves his statement by~ explaining the qualities of this friendship. First [2, b, i] he shows that this is friendship essentially and not incidentally. Second [2, b, ii], at “Likewise each,” he shows that it lacks nothing. Third [2, b, iii], at “Very likely etc.,” he shows that it is rare. He handles the first point in a threefold manner. First [2, b, i, x] he shows that the friendship just referred to is friendship essentially and not incidentally. Those who are alike in virtue wish one another good inasmuch as they are virtuous. But they are good in themselves, for virtue is a kind of perfection making man good and his work good. It is clear then that such men wish good to one’ another in themselves. Therefore they have friendship essentially.
1576. Second [2, b, i, y], at “But people who,” he concludes from this that friendship of this type is the best friendship; that which is essential is always better than that which is incidental. Since this is friendship essentially and the others incidentally, the virtuous who wish good to friends for their sake and not for the sake of something that may come from them are the highest type of friends.
1577. Third [2, b, i, z], at “Therefore friendship,” he infers further: from the fact that men of this kind love one another by reason of their goodness, their friendship consequently remains as long as they are good in virtue. But virtue is a permanent habit and does not change easily, as is clear from discussions in the second book (305). Therefore this friendship is lasting.
1578. At “Likewise each” [2, b, ii] he shows that this friendship lacks nothing that belongs to the notion of what is perfect, as is evident in the third book of the Physics (Ch. 6, 207 a 10; St. Th. Lect. 11, 385). On the first point he does three things. First [2, b, ii, x] he shows that this friendship comprehends those things that are found in other kinds of friendship. He explains that each friend is good not only simply or in himself but also in relation to his friend, because those who are virtuous are also good without qualification and useful to one another and completely pleasing. This is so because each man takes pleasure in his own actions and in actions similar to his own. Likewise the actions of virtuous men are those belonging to one man as proper to him and to another as similar to these; for operations that are according to virtue are not contrary to each other but all are according to right reason. So then it is obvious that the friendship of virtuous men comprehends not only good in an unqualified sense but also pleasure and utility.
1579. Then [2, b, ii, y], at “It is reasonable,” he concludes further that it is reasonable for such friendship to be long lasting and not readily transient, because it contains absolutely everything necessary for friends. Every friendship is for the sake of good or pleasure: either in itself (for example, when what is loved is in itself good and pleasurable) or in relation to the one loving which is to be good and pleasurable not in itself and properly but according to a kind of likeness to what is really and properly good and pleasurable. in fact all the preceding things are found in this friendship not incidentally but essentially; and those who are alike according to this friendship have the remaining goods too, because what is simply good is also pleasing. Since this friendship has all the requisites of friendship, it is not easily broken up, for a defective thing is usually set aside.
i58o. His third conclusion [2, b, ii, z], at “These things then,” observes that this friendship is the noblest kind because the state in which all the reasons for loving are united is most lovable. Objects of this kind are honorable goods because they are good without qualification and at the same time pleasurable and useful. Hence love in these cases should be most complete, and such friendship the noblest.
1581. Next [2, b, iii], at “Very likely,” he shows that this friendship is rare-an indication of its perfection, for perfection in any class is rather unusual. On this point he does three things. First [iii, x] he explains his intention. Then [iii, y], at “However, those who etc.,” he excludes an objection. Last [iii, z], at “A friendship of this kind then etc.,” he gives a summary. He explains his intention by two reasons. The first [x, aa] is that this friendship exists between virtuous men. But such men are scarce because of the difficulty of attaining the mean, as was pointed out in the second book (370). Consequently it is very likely that such friendships are rare.
1582. Then [x, bb], at “Besides, time,” be gives the second reason. Friendship between men of this kind requires a long time and mutual association so that they can decide among themselves who are virtuous and their friends. This is so because, according to the proverb, people do not come to know one another before they eat a peck of salt together. But one man ought not to take another as his friend until he appears to the other worthy of being loved and is believed to be so. This rarely occurs. Consequently such friendships are uncommon.
1583. Next [iii, y], at “However, those who,” he excludes an objection concerning those who seem to become friends at once. He says that people who quickly offer the services of friendship show that they want to be friends; nevertheless they are not yet friends until they know that they are lovable to one another. Thus it is clear that a man quickly acquires a wish for friendship but not friendship itself.
1584. Last [iii, z], at “A friendship of this kind,” he concludes with a summary that this friendship is perfect both in regard to duration because it is lasting, and in regard to the other conditions. It contains everything found in the other kinds of friendship; and friends perform like services for each other—a thing that is necessary for friendship because friends are alike in virtue.
LECTURE 4
Useful and Pleasurable Friendships Compared
Chapter 4
(B) 3. HE NOW COMPARES THEM.
a. The other kinds ... are like perfect friendship.
i. In regard to the reason for loving. — 1585
But the friendship for pleasure has a likeness to this friendship, for virtuous men are pleasing to one another. The same can be said about utilitarian friendship since virtuous men are also useful to one another.
ii. In regard to the duration of friendship.
x. HOW ENDURING (THESE) FRIENDSHIPS ARE.
aa. Two reasons why these... are lasting.
a’ The first reason. — 1586-1587
But here again friendships are to a great extent lasting when an equal return, of pleasure for instance, is made by each friend; and not only by a return of pleasure, but also by a return of the same pleasurable object, as happens among the witty. This does not occur between a lover and his beloved, however, for they do not take pleasure in the same things: one in seeing the beloved, the other in receiving the attention of the lover. But when beauty fades, the friendship sometimes breaks up, because the lover is no longer attracted by the beloved and the other no longer receives the adulation of the lover.
b’ The second reason.
Again, many persons remain friends when they become accustomed to each other’s natural dispositions, these being similar. 1588
bb. Why they lack permanency. — 1589
Where people do not exchange pleasure but profit in matters of love, their friendship is less intense and also less enduring.
y. WHICH OF THESE IS MORE ENDURING. — 1590
Likewise, people who are friends by reason of utility break up their friendship when utility ends because they were not lovers of one another but only of profit.
b. How they differ.
i. Any type of men can become friends. — 1591
Therefore, for the sake of pleasure and utility bad people may be friends to one another, or good men may be friends to bad men; and those who are neither good nor bad may be friends with any sort of person. But it is plain that only virtuous men love each other because of themselves, for vicious men do not find pleasure in one another unless some advantage is forthcoming.
ii. The second difference. — 1592-1593
Only the friendship between virtuous men is unchangeable. For it is not easy to believe some evil about a person who often has been proved and never found acting unjustly, and in whom we have discovered whatever is considered worthy of true friendship. But in other types of friendship there is nothing to prevent all such kinds of suspicions from occurring. Indeed men designate as friends both those who love for utility, like alliances between states which seem to be contracted with a view to advantage, and those who love for pleasure, like children. Consequently we too should call men of this sort friends.
c. He summarizes what has been discussed. — 1594-1595
There are then many kinds of friendship. First and principally is the friendship between good men qua good. The remaining types are called friendship by analogy, for some men are friends in virtue of something good or something akin to good; even what is pleasurable seems to be good to those who are fond of pleasures. But these friendships do not combine very well nor do the same persons become friends from motives of utility.
Things that are incidental are not bound together in all respects. But friendship is divided into these species: evil men can be friends for pleasure or utility, this being their point of resemblance. On the other hand, good men are friends for one another’s sake, i.e., in virtue of their goodness. The good then are friends in an absolute sense, but the others only incidentally and because of their resemblance to the good.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
1585. After the Philosopher has treated the three kinds of friendship, he now [B, 3] compares them. On this point he does three things. First [3, a] he shows in what respect the other kinds of friendship are like perfect friendship. Then [3, b], at “Therefore, for the sake etc.,” he shows how they differ. Last [3, c], at “There are then etc.,” he summarizes what has been discussed. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [a, i] he shows the likeness of the other kinds of friendship with perfect friendship in regard to the reason for loving. He explains that friendship for pleasure has a likeness to perfect friendship to the extent that virtuous men are pleasing to one another. Similarly, utilitarian friendship is like perfect friendship in this that virtuous men are useful to one another.
1586. Second [a, ii], at “But here again,” he shows the likeness in regard to the duration of friendship. On this point he does two things. First [ii, x] he shows how useful and pleasurable friendships endure. Next [ii, y], at “Likewise, people who etc.,” he shows which of these is more enduring. He discusses the first point from a double aspect. First [x, aa] he proposes two reasons why these two kinds of friendship are lasting; and in this they resemble perfect friendship. Then [x, bb], at “Where people etc.,” he states the reasons why they lack permanency. Initially [aa, a] he says that friendships even among those who are friends for utility and pleasure endure for the most part, since such persons make the same and an equal return to one another, for example, pleasure for pleasure. Because there is a variety of pleasures differing in kind and number according to the variety of pleasurable objects, the durability of friendship requires not only a return of pleasure but a return by the same kind of pleasurable object; this occurs among the witty, when one delights in the banter of the other. But this does not necessarily happen among persons who love one another sexually, since sometimes they do not take pleasure in the same things.
1587. But the lover takes pleasure in seeing the beauty of the beloved; and the beloved in receiving favors from the lover. On the termination of these circumstances, pleasurable friendship sometimes breaks up when the attractiveness of the one and the favor of the other cease.
1588. At “Again, many persons etc.” [aa, b’] he gives tile second reason for durability. . fie explains that even in friendship based on utility and pleasure many remain friends when one loves the ways of the other, like one lustful person loves the ways of another, or one miser loves the ways of another; not that such ways are attractive of themselves but by reason of habit inasmuch as both persons have like habits. But likeness is essentially a cause of friendship unless it incidentally hinders the good of the individual, as we stated previously (1566). Since evil habits acquired from custom are enduring, such a friendship is lasting.
1589. Then [x, bb], at “Where people,” he states the reason why friendship is deficient in durability. He says that people who do not make a return of one pleasurable object for another but of a useful object for a pleasurable one are less friends because of slighter likeness to one another. Hence their friendship is less enduring.
1590. Next [ii, y], at “Likewise, People who,” he compares the durability of the two kinds of friendship. He says that men who are friends by reason of utility break up their friendship when utility ceases, because they were friends, not of one another, but of the utility they seek. But pleasure comes more from the beloved in himself, than does utility which sometimes is in an external object.
1591. At “Therefore, for the sake” [3, b] he states two differences by which the two kinds of friendship deviate from perfect friendship. First [b, i] he infers from the discussions that for the sake of pleasure and utility any type of men can become friends with one another, for example, the good with the good, the bad with the bad, and even those who are neither virtuous nor vicious with both (i.e., the good and the bad), and with each other. But only good men make friends in that perfect friendship by which men are loved for their own sakes; evil men do not provide anything except utility by reason of which they can love one another or find mutual pleasure.
1592. He gives the second difference at “Only the friendship” [b, ii], saying that only friendship between virtuous men, which is the perfect kind, is of itself unchangeable. Friendship is destroyed especially when one friend finds in the other something opposed to their friendship. But this is impossible in friendship between the virtuous. A man does not readily believe some evil about one whom he has often proved and never found doing any wrong and in whom he has discovered whatever is considered worthy of true friendship. Consequently, such a friendship does not break up because it is friendship essentially and not incidentally, and because it is perfect containing in itself everything requisite for friendship—the reasons have been given before (1578-1582); and also because it does not admit as an obstacle to friendship what is now offered as a reason.
1593. But in other kinds of friendship nothing hinders one from believing evil of another and acting unjustly to another. Therefore, some would not be termed friends according to these types of friendship. But people have usually designated as friends of this kind both those who love for the sake of utility (friendship is said to exist among states because of the advantage of mutually fighting against their common enemies) and those who love one another for the sake of pleasure, as is evident among children. So we should follow the customary way of speaking and call such men friends.
1594. Last [3, c], at “There are then,” he summarizes what has been said about the kinds of friendship, stating that there are many kinds of friendship. That between good men, as good, being friendship in the primary and proper sense, while the remaining kinds are called friendship from a likeness to this. Some men are called friends according to these types of friendship to the extent that there is present a likeness to true friendship. It is clear that what is pleasurable seems to be a kind of good to those who love pleasures. So this friendship has a likeness to that which is an unqualified good; and the same argument prevails in the case of useful friendship.
1595. However, these two kinds of friendship are not so combined that friends for utility and friends for pleasure are identical, for things that are incidental are not united in all cases, for instance, what is musical and white.The kinds of friendship just treated are friendships incidentally, as we have pointed out (1566), hence they are not always combined. If then, according to the division of friendship into the foregoing species, the evil can be friends among themselves, to that extent they are like one another in one or other of these aspects. But only the good are friends essentially; others are friends by way of resemblance, to the extent that they resemble the good.
LECTURE 5
The Act and Habit of Friendship
Chapter 5
II. HE NOW TREATS (THE KINDS OF FRIENDSHIP) IN RELATION TO (ITS) PROPER ACT.
A. He distinguishes friendship by reason of habit and act.
1. HE DISTINGUISHES THE KINDS OF FRIENDSHIP BY WAY OF HABIT AND ACT. — 1596
Just as in the case of the virtues, some men are called good by reason of habit and others by reason of performance; so in friendship, some actually live together pleasantly and do good for one another, others who are asleep or separated by place do not actually perform the works of friend ship although they have its habit. Distance indeed, does not sever friendship itself but only prevents the acts of friendship.
2. HE SHOWS THAT SOME LOSE FRIENDSHIP BY LACK OF FRIENDLY ACTS.
a. He explains his proposition.
i. First, about those... separated... for a long time. — 1597
However, if the absence is prolonged, it apparently makes people forget friendship. So goes the proverb: “Out of sight, out of mind.”
ii. He shows the same thing about the old and the morose. — 1598
Neither old men nor morose men seem inclined to friendship because there is very little that is pleasant in them. No one can continually live with a gloomy person or with one who is unpleasant, for nature avoids the painful and seeks the pleasant.
iii. About a third class of men. — 1599
But those who get along with one another and yet do not live together are more like well-wishers than friends.
b. He proves what he had assumed. — 1600
Nothing is so characteristic of friends as living together; the needy desire assistance but even the happy (who especially do not like to be alone) wish to spend their time with their friends. Men, however, cannot associate with one another unless they are pleasant and rejoice in the same things; this is found in the friendship of those who are comrades.
3. HE SHOWS THAT FRIENDSHIP ESPECIALLY BETWEEN VIRTUOUS MEN ARISES FROM... THE VERY ACT OF FRIENDSHIP. — 1601
Friendship, then, between the virtuous is friendship in the best sense, as we have noted many times. The reason is that what is wholly good and pleasurable seems to be lovable and worthy of choice; and a thing of this nature is lovable and worthy of choice by everyone. But it is for these two reasons that one virtuous man is good in the eyes of another virtuous man.
B. He proves what he had assumed.
1. HE STATES HIS PROPOSAL. — 1602
Affection resembles an emotion but friendship itself is similar to a habit.
2. HE PROVES HIS PROPOSITION.
a. First (reason). — 1603
Affection, however, may be bestowed even on lifeless objects. But a return of love for love is accompanied by deliberate choice, and what is done by choice is from habit.
b. Second reason. — 1604
Men wish good to friends for their sake, not from passion but from habit.
3. HE ANSWERS AN IMPLIED OBJECTION. — 1605-1606
Likewise, those who love a friend love their own good; for when a good man becomes a friend he also becomes a good to his friend. So each loves what is good for himself and repays equally both in goodwill and in pleasantness. The reason is that friendship is a kind of equality. What has been said applies especially to the friendship which exists between virtuous men.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
1596. After the Philosopher has distinguished the kinds of friendship, he now [II] treats them in relation to the proper act of friendship. On this point he does two things. First [II, A] he distinguishes friendship by reason of habit and act. Second [II, B], at “Affection resembles etc.,” he proves what he had assumed. He discusses the first point from three aspects. First [A, 1] he distinguishes the kinds of friendship by way of habit and act. Then [A, 2], at “However, if etc.,” he shows that some lose friendship by lack of friendly acts. Last [A, 3], at “Friendship then etc.,” he shows that friendship especially between virtuous men arises from the nature of the very act of friendship. He says first that, as in other virtues some men are called good or virtuous by reason of habit (for example, the brave or the generous) even when they are not performing the act of virtue, but others are called virtuous for actually performing a virtuous action; so too in friendship some are friends actually inasmuch as they live together pleasantly and do good for one another—two things that seem to belong to the act of friendship. But others are not actually performing the works of friendship, although they are so disposed by habit that they are inclined to perform such works—this is obvious of friends who are asleep or locally separated from one another. Indeed, separation does not sever friendship itself but only friendship’s activity. Thus it is evident that the habit of friendship remains even when its expression ceases.
1597. Then [A, 2], at “However, if the absence,” he shows how in some cases friendship ceases from a lack of friendly acts. First [2, a] he explains his proposition. Second [2, b], at “Nothing is so etc.,” he proves what he had assumed. He explains his proposition in regard to three classes of men. First [a, i], about those who are separated from one another for a long time. He says that if the absence of friends from one another is prolonged, it seems to cause forgetfulness of a previous friendship. In this way other habits are also weakened and finally disappear from lack of use. As habits are acquired by practice, they must be preserved by practice, for everything is preserved by its cause. For that reason it has become proverbial that many friendships are destroyed through a man’s neglect to call upon his friend, to converse and associate with him.
1598. Second [a, ii], at “Neither old men,” he shows the same thing about the old and the morose. He says that neither the old nor the morose, i.e., people severe in word and social intercourse, seem to be friendly or disposed for friendship because they are not inclined to the activity of friendship, namely, association. Very little that is pleasant is found in them. For this reason they are not easy to live with, for no one can spend his days (i.e., a long time) with a man who is gloomy or with one who is unpleasant. Men and other animals find it natural to avoid pain and seek pleasure which appears to be simply repose of the appetite in a desired good.
1599. Third [a, iii], at “But those who,” he shows the same thing about a third class of men, viz., those who are acceptable to one another in this, that one approves the ways and conduct of the other although for some reason the two never live together. Such persons, he says, are more like well-wishers than friends because friendship requires living together for some time.
1600. Next [2, b], at “Nothing is so, “ he proves what he had assumed, namely, that living together is required for friendship as its proper act. He says nothing is so characteristic of friends as living together. Previously (1595) he stated that two works belong to the act of friendship: living together and bestowing favors on one another—this is to bring a friend some benefit, a thing that not all but only the needy seek from friends. Even happy people, i.e., those with abundance (who do not like to be alone) desire to spend their days (i.e., a long time) with friends. Nor can men associate with one another if they are not mutually pleasant and do not rejoice in the same things—two qualities found in the friendship of those who are brought up together. So then it is evident that the principal act of friendship is to live with one’s friends.
1601. At “Friendship then” [A, 3] he concludes from the premises that friendship between virtuous., men is friendship in the best sense, as we have frequently noted (1574-1579, 1592). That seems to be lovable and absolutely worthy of choice in itself which is wholly good and pleasurable. But something of this nature, i.e., good or pleasurable in itself is lovable and worthy of choice for everyone. But one virtuous man is lovable to another and worthy of choice for these two reasons: each is good and pleasant without qualification, and each is good and pleasant to the other. Consequently, virtuous men especially can live pleasantly with one another.
1602. Then [II, B], at “Affection resembles,” he proves what he had previously assumed: that friendship may be predicated not only according to act but also according to habit. On this point he does three things. First [B, 1] he states his proposal, saying that affection seems to indicate passion. But friendship seems to indicate habit and to be like other habits.
1603. Second [B, 2], at “Affection, however,” he proves his proposition by two reasons. The first [2, a] is that one-sided love can be bestowed even on lifeless objects, as we are said to love wine or gold. But mutual love—which belongs to the notion of friendship, as we have indicated (1557)—is accompanied by deliberate choice, for this is found only among rational beings. But what is done by choice is not done from passion but rather from habit. Therefore friendship is a habit.
1604. He gives the second reason at “Men wish” [2, b], saying that by friendship men wish good to friends for their friends’ sake. If men wished good for their own sake they would love themselves rather than others. But to love others for their sake is not from passion because passion, since it belongs to the sensitive’ appetite, does not go beyond the particular good of the one loving. Consequently, it remains that this is from habit; and so friendship is a habit.
1605. Third [B, 3], at “Likewise, those who love,” he answers an implied objection. It has just been said (1601) that what is good to anyone is lovable to him. It seems contrary to this, that a man loves his friend for the friend’s sake. But he answers that those who love a friend love what is good to themselves. When a person, who is a good in himself ‘ becomes a friend to someone, he also becomes a good to his friend. So each, in loving his friend, loves what is good for himself; and each makes an equal return to his friend both in the fact of willing —as he wishes good to his friend—and in the kind of willing. He wishes good to his friend not for his own but for the friend’s sake. The reason is that friendship is a kind of equality precisely as it requires mutual love. This seems to be an addition above the mode of virtue, for in any virtue the act of the virtuous man is enough. But in friendship the act of one is not sufficient but the acts of two mutually loving one another must concur. For that reason the Philosopher did not state absolutely that it is a virtue but added “or at least accompanies virtue,” because it seems to add something above the notion of virtue.
1606. The observations that have been made about friendship seem to be especially applicable to friendship between virtuous men.
LECTURE 6
Friendship in Relation to Its Subject
Chapter 6
III. HE NOW DISCUSSES (FRIENDSHIP) IN RELATION... TO FRIENDS THEMSELVES.
A. He treats the aptitude and ineptitude of some... for friendship. — 1607-1608
But friendship among morose and elderly people occurs less frequently inasmuch as they are more peevish and have little taste for conversations that especially seem to be the marks and cause of friendship. For this reason youths make friends quickly but not old people, for they cannot become friends of those whose company they do not enjoy. The same reason holds for austere persons who, nevertheless, entertain kindly feelings toward one another; for they wish each other well and assist one another in their needs. However, they do not really become friends because they do not live together nor take pleasure in one another’s company-activities that are especially characteristic of friendship.
B. (He treats) the number of friends.
1. HE SHOWS THAT IT IS NOT POSSIBLE TO BE A FRIEND TO MANY BY... PERFECT FRIENDSHIP.
a. First (reason). — 1609
It is not possible to be a friend of many people by perfect friendship, as neither is it possible to be in love with many persons at the same time. Perfect friendship has a likeness to excess, but it is designed by nature for one object only.
b. Second reason. — 1610
Then too it is difficult for many to be exceedingly pleasing at the same time to the same person. But perhaps this would not be expedient.
c. Third reason. — 1611
Besides, friendship implies familiarity and experience which are very difficult.
2. HE SHOWS THAT THIS HAPPENS IN TWO OTHER KINDS OF FRIENDSHIP. — 1612
In friendships for the sake of utility and pleasure many may be pleasing to one. The reason is that many can be useful and pleasant, and their services can be rendered in a short time.
3. HE COMPARES THE TWO KINDS OF FRIENDS.
a. He states his proposition. — 1613
Friendship between such persons, however, seems rather to be for the sake of pleasure since the same activities may be performed by both: they may find delight in one another and in the same things. The friendships of the young are like this.
b. He proves his proposition by two reasons.
i. First. — 1614
Their friendship seems more generous than friendship for utility, which is for gain.
ii. Second. — 1615
But fortunate people have no need of useful friends, although they do need pleasant friends for they must live with others. People can bear unpleasantness for a time but no one can continuously endure something unpleasant—not even good itself if it were displeasing.
c. He infers a corollary. — 1616
For this reason people look for pleasant friends; even those who are friends for virtue’s sake must also be pleasant and good to one another. Thus they will have all the requisites for friendship.
C. (He treats) the differentiation of friends.
1. HE STATES HIS PROPOSITION. — 1617
Men in power seem to have different classes of friends, some of whom are useful and others pleasant to them; for the same persons are not likely to be friends in both ways.
2. HE PROVES (IT). — 1618
Nor do the powerful seek pleasant friends who are also virtuous nor friends useful for honorable projects But to provide amusement they desire some who are witty, and others who are industrious in doing whatever they are commanded. Such qualities, however, are rarely found in the same person.
3. HE ANSWERS AN OBJECTION. — 1619-1620
It has been said, though, that a man can be a pleasant and useful friend at the same time, as in the case of the virtuous person. But a virtuous man does not become a friend of one who is eminent unless the latter is surpassed by the former in virtue. If this does not happen, there is no proportionate equality. But such people (who excel the good man in virtue) are not easy to find.
D. He shows that the kinds of friendship discussed consist in equality.
1. HE EXPLAINS HIS PROPOSITION. — 1621
Consequently, the friendships discussed consist in equality, for friends both do and wish the same things for one another; or they exchange one thing for another, for instance, pleasure for utility.
2. HE SHOWS HOW THE TWO KINDS (OF FRIENDSHIP) COMPARE WITH THE DEFINITION OF FRIENDSHIP. — 1622-1623
We have explained that these are less perfect and also less enduring friendships. Indeed according to their similarity or dissimilarity to the same thing they seem to be or not to be friendships. Inasmuch as they have a likeness to friendship based on virtue they seem to be friendships; for one kind has pleasure and the other utility. But perfect friendship has both. They differ, however, for perfect friendship is unchanging and permanent while the others quickly change; on account of this dissimilarity the latter do not seem to be genuine friendships.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
1607. After the Philosopher has distinguished the different kinds of friendship, he now [III] discusses these friendships in relation to their subject, that is, to friends themselves. This aspect he treats from three angles. First [III, A] he treats the aptitude and ineptitude of some persons for friendship; then [III, B], at “It is not possible etc.,” the number of friends; last [III, C], at “Men in power etc.,” the differentiation of friends. He says first that the more peevish they are, the fewer friendships morose and elderly people form because, presuming on themselves, they follow their own way, For that reason they cannot agree with others: they have little taste for conversation with others both because they are intent on themselves and because they are suspicious of others. But concord and conversation with friends seem especially to be the works of friendship and its cause.
1608. Consequently youths, who find much pleasure in conversation and readily agree with others, quickly make friends. This does not happen with old people, for they cannot become friends of those whose company and conversation they do not enjoy. The same reason holds for morose persons who are quarrelsome and critical of what others do. But such people, i.e., the elderly and the severe, can be benevolent inasmuch as they affectively wish good to others and even effectively assist them in their needs. However they do not really become friends because they do not live with nor take pleasure in the company of their friends-activities that seem to be the special works of friendship.
1609. Then [III, B], at “It is not possible,” he treats the number of friends. He explains this point in a threefold manner. First [ B, 1 ] he shows that it is not possible to be a friend to many people by the perfect friendship that exists between virtuous persons. Second [B, 2], at “In friendships etc.,” he shows that this happens in two other kinds of friendship: those for utility and pleasure. Third [B, 3], at “Friendship between etc.,” he compares the two kinds of friends with one another. He shows first, by three reasons, that it is not possible for a person to be a friend of many people by perfect friendship built on the good of virtue. The first [1, a] is that, since this friendship is perfect and best, it has a likeness to excess in loving-if the extent of love be considered. But if we consider the notion of loving there cannot be an excess. It is not possible for virtue and a virtuous person to be loved excessively by another virtuous person who regulates his affections by reason. Superabundant love is not designed by nature for many but for one only. This is evident in sexual love according to which one man cannot at the same time love many women in an excessive manner. Therefore, the perfect friendship of the virtuous cannot extend to many persons.
1610. He gives the second reason [I, b] at “Then too it is difficult.” It is this. In perfect friendship friends are exceedingly pleasing to one another. But it is not easy for many to be exceedingly pleasing at the same time to the same individual, because few are to be found who do not have something displeasing to a person affected in some way by man’s many defects and conflicting dispositions. Thus it happens that, while one is very pleasing, another may not be. Perhaps it is fortunate and desirable that many cannot be exceedingly pleasing to one man who, while associating with many, would not be able to care for himself. Therefore, one cannot be a friend to many by perfect friendship.
1611. He gives the third reason [i, c] at “Besides, friendship etc.” It is this. In perfect friendship we must become acquainted with a friend by habitual association. But this is very hard and cannot happen with many people. Therefore, one does not have many friends by perfect friendship.
1612. Next [B, 2], at “In friendships,” he shows that in the other two kinds of friendship, which are based on utility and pleasure, it is possible for a man to have many friends who are pleasing to him; and this for two reasons. First, because many can be useful and pleasant. Second, because a long period of trial is not required, it suffices that for a short time people provide one another with pleasure, for example, or even some utility.
1613. Then [B, 3], at “Friendship between such,” he compares the two kinds of friends. First [3, a] he states his proposition: with those just mentioned, among whom one can have many friends, friendship for pleasure’s sake seems to be more like true friendship; on condition, though that the same thing is done by both, namely, each affords pleasure to the other, for in this way they rejoice in the same things—a characteristic of friendship. In fact, this is an indication that there is one pleasure for those who delight in the same things. But the case is different when pleasure is occasioned on the part of one and utility on the part of the other. However, such are the friendships among youths that on either side they love each other for the sake of pleasure.
1614. Second [3, b], at “Their friendship,” he proves his proposition by two reasons. The first [b, il] is that in pleasurable friendship friends love one another more generously than in useful friendship in which a profitable return is sought—this friendship seems to be a kind of business affair. Hence friendship for the sake of pleasure is more powerful, as more resembling perfect friendship, which is most generous inasmuch as by it friends are loved for their own sakes.
1615. He gives the second reason [b, ii] at “But fortunate people.” It is this. Fortunate men, i.e., the rich, have no need of useful friends since they are sufficient unto themselves, but they do have need of pleasant friends, for they must live with others; and this is impossible without pleasantness. People can bear unpleasantness for a time. But no man can continuously endure something unpleasant; he could not even stand good itself if it were displeasing. Consequently men who do not find pleasure in virtuous activities cannot persevere in them, So then it is evident that pleasurable friendship is more effectual than useful friendship, as being necessary to a great number and to more generous people.
T616. Third [3, c], at “For this reason,” he infers a corollary from the discussions. Since even an honorable good would be intolerable if it were distasteful, it follows that friends for virtue’s sake must be pleasant to one another. They must be not only good in themselves, but also good to one another. Thus they will have the requisites for friendship.
1617. Next [III, C], at “Men in power,” he treats the distinction of friends. On this point he does three things. First [C, 1] he states his proposition, that men situated in positions of power are accustomed to different kinds of friends in such a way that some are useful to them and others pleasant. It is not usual for the same men to be their friends in both ways.
1618. Second [C, 2], at “Nor do the powerful,” he proves his proposition from the fact that these powerful men do not seek the pleasures of virtue—this type of pleasure has utility connected with it. Nor do they seek friends useful in the attainment of honorable good—this utility has a pleasure attached to it. For amusement they seek witty or entertaining people, like comedians. But for utility they desire other friends (dinos) i.e., shrewd in executing whatever is commanded, either good or bad. These two qualities, viz., shrewdness and jocularity, are not found in the same person because skillful people are not given to jesting but to serious matters. Hence it is evident that the powerful have different kinds of friends.
1619. Third [C, 3], at “It has been said, though,” he answers an objection. Someone can object that friends of the powerful are at the same time pleasant and useful because, as was explained previously (1585), a good or virtuous person is at the same time pleasant and useful. But Aristotle answers that the virtuous man does not become a friend of one eminent in power or riches unless the virtuous person is surpassed in virtue by the powerful. If this is not the case, the more powerful one who is surpassed in virtue does not make himself proportionately equal, i.e., does not give proportionate compensation to the virtuous man; that is to say, as the virtuous person defers to him as the more powerful so he should defer to the virtuous man as the better.
1620. Usually, to the extent that men excel in power and riches they think themselves better; and we are not accustomed to find men in power who also excel in virtue or defer to the virtuous as the better.
1621. Then [III, D], at “Consequently, the friendships,” he shows that the kinds of friendship discussed consist in equality. He treats this point in a twofold manner. First [D, 1] he explains his proposition, concluding from the premises that the kinds of friendship just treated consist in equality. Since this is obvious about friendship for the sake of virtue, he proves the proposition in regard to friendship based on utility and pleasure: either men wish and do the same things for one another, i.e., return pleasure for pleasure or utility for utility, or they exchange one for the other, i.e., utility for pleasure or vice versa.
1622. Next [D, 2], at “We have explained,” he shows how the two kinds compare with the definition of friendship. He says that from the discussions obviously the kinds of friendship which are less proper are less lasting than the perfect friendship of the virtuous, according to whose likeness or unlikeness friendships seem to be or not to be denominated. Inasmuch as they resemble perfect friendship they seem to be friendship according as one of them has pleasure and another utility. Perfect friendship has both.
1623. But in respect to other qualities they are dissimilar according as perfect friendship is unchanging and lasting. The remaining kinds, however, quickly change; they also differ in many other particulars, as is evident from the previous discussions (1594-1595). On account of this dissimilarity they do not seem to be species of true friendship.
LECTURE 7
Friendship Between Unequals
Chapter 7
I. HE DISCUSSES THE FRIENDSHIPS OF A SUPERIOR FOR A SUBORDINATE.
A. He distinguishes the classification of this friendship from the previous kinds. — 1624-1625
There is another kind of friendship that consists in an inequality, as the friendship of a father with a son, or—in general—of an older with a younger person, of a husband with a wife, and of a ruler with his subject.
B. He distinguishes friendships of this type from one another.