LECTURE 2

Function Proper to Each Part of the Soul

Chapter 1

B.   He considers the particular intellectual virtues.

      A’ He investigates the ways of understanding the intellectual virtues.

            1.   HE PROPOSES THE COMMON NOTION OF VIRTUE. — 1124-1125

We must, then, ascertain what is the most excellent habit of each of these parts, for this is their virtue.

Chapter 2

But virtue is directed to the work that is proper.

            2.   HE INQUIRES WHAT THE GOOD OF THE RATIONAL SOUL IS IN REGARD TO EACH PART.

                   a.   He shows what the principles of human acts are.

                         i.    He proposes three ingredients that are called principles of human acts. — 1126

Three things in the soul seem to have power over action and truth: the senses, intellect, and appetitive faculty.

                         ii.   He excludes one of them. — 1127

But one of these, viz., the senses is not a principle of any action. This is obvious because dumb animals have senses but do not share in action.

                         iii. He shows how the remaining two can harmonize.

                               x.   HE SHOWS HOW THEIR ACTIONS ARE PROPORTIONABLE. — 1128

Now, affirmation and negation are in the mind, and corresponding to these in the appetitive faculty are pursuit and flight.

                               y.   HE SHOWS HOW THESE ACTIONS... ARE IN AGREEMENT. — 1129

Therefore, since moral virtue is a habit of free choice, and choice is the appetitive faculty deliberating, then reason must be true and the appetitive faculty right if choice is to be good; and the same things that reason affirms, the appetitive faculty pursues. Hence this mind and its truth are practical.

                   b.   He seeks what the proper work of reason is.

                         i.    He shows how each part is related to truth. — 1130-1132

However, it is the function of the speculative mind (but not the practical) as it operates in good or faulty fashion, to express truth and falsity. This belongs to every intellect but the good of the practical intellect is truth conformable to a right appetitive faculty.

                         ii.   He shows how each part is related to action.

                               x.   HE EXPLAINS THAT THE MIND IS A PRINCIPLE OF ACTION. — 1133-1134

Choice, then, is a principle of action, and so of motion but not as a final cause. But, for choice itself the principles are the appetitive faculty and the reason which is terminative. Hence choice does not exist without intellect and mind, nor without moral habit, for good and bad actions cannot exist without the intellect or mind and moral disposition.

                               y.   HE SHOWS OF WHAT MIND HE SPEAKS.

                                     aa.  He explains the proposition. — 1135-1136

Still, mind itself does not move any thing, but the mind that has a purpose and is practical does so, for it governs even the operation which fashions some product. Indeed every worker produces for the sake of something he is not induced to act for an end in general but for a particular thing made for some use; he does not act merely for the sake of acting. The good action itself is an end but the appetitive faculty is for some particular end.

                                     bb. He infers a corollary. — 1137

Therefore, choice is either the appetitive intellect or the intellective faculty of appetition, and man is this kind of principle.

                               z.   HE EXPLAINS ABOUT WHAT KIND OF OBJECTS THE MIND IS A PRINCIPLE OF ACTION. — 1138-1139

What has already taken place is not now an object of choice, e.g., no one now chooses to have captured Ilion. Nor does anyone give advice about something past, but about a future and contingent event. It is not possible that what has taken place did not occur. Therefore Agathon was right, for God lacks only this—to undo things already done.

                   c.   He draws the conclusion he sought to establish. — 1140

In any case the work of each of the intellect’s parts is the knowledge of the truth.

            3.   HE INFERS THE NATURE AND QUALITY OF THE VIRTUES OF EACH PART. — 1141

These habits according to which each part especially manifests the truth are the virtues of both divisions of the intellect.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

1124. After the Philosopher has divided the parts of the rational soul as required for his purpose, he now begins to examine the intellectual virtues themselves by which each part of the rational soul is perfected. First [B] he considers the particular intellectual virtues. Then [Lect. 10, I], at “Someone may raise a doubt etc.” (B. 1143 b 17), he expresses a certain doubt about their utility. On the first point he does two things. First [A’] he investigates the ways of understanding the intellectual virtues. Next [Lect. 3], at “Introducing again the subject etc.” (B. 1139 b 14), he sets himself to examine them. On the initial point he does three things. First [A’, 1 ] he proposes the common notion of virtue as stated in the beginning (65, 81): that which renders the work of a thing good is its virtue. Then [A’, 2], at “Three things in the soul etc.,” he inquires what the good of the rational soul is in regard to each part. Last [A’, 3], at “These habits according to which etc.,” he infers the nature and quality of the virtues of each part.

1125. He says first that, because we have assigned two parts of the rational soul (to which the intellectual virtues are ascribed), we must understand which is the most excellent habit of each of these two parts. The reason is that each habit is necessarily a virtue of each part. It has been noted (308, 536) that the virtue of anything is directed to its characteristic operation, for this is perfected by virtue. Such a habit would be best when it insures that an action is performed in the best way.

1126. Then [A’, 2 ], at “Three things in the soul,” he inquires what the proper good of each of these parts is. On this point he does three things. First [2, a] he shows what the principles of human acts are. Next [2, b], at “However, it is the function etc.,” he seeks what the proper work of reason is. Last [2, c], at “In any case the work etc.,” he draws the conclusion he sought to establish. On the initial point he does three things. First [a, i] he proposes three ingredients that are called principles of human acts. Then [a, ii], at “But one of these etc.,” he excludes one of them. Finally [a, iii], at “Now, affirmation and negation etc.,” he shows how the remaining two can harmonize with each other. In regard to the first we must consider that two works are said to be proper to man, namely, knowledge of truth and action, inasmuch as man assumes mastery of his own action (and as moved or led by something). Over these two, then three things in the soul: senses, intellect, and appetitive faculty, seem to have mastery and power. It is by the same three that animals move themselves, as was noted in the third book De Anima (Ch. 10, 433 a 9 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 15, 818-819).

1127. Next [a, ii], at “But one of these,” he excludes one of them, viz., the senses, from further consideration. It is certainly obvious that truth pertains neither to the senses nor to the appetitive faculty. He adds further that one of the three, the senses, is not a principle of any action, in such a way that mastery of the action can be established. This is clear from the fact that dumb animals have senses but do not have social action because they are not masters of their own action; they do not operate from themselves but are moved by natural instinct.

1128. At “Now, affirmation and negation,” [a, iii], he shows how the work of the remaining two, namely, intellect and appetitive faculty, can harmonize one with the other. First [a, iii, x] he shows how their actions are proportionable. In judging, the intellect has two actions, viz., affirmation by which it assents to what is true, and negation by which it dissents from what is false. To these two correspond proportionately two acts in the appetitive faculty, namely, pursuit by which the appetitive faculty tends and adheres to good, and flight by which it withdraws and dissents from evil. In this manner the intellect and the appetitive faculty can be brought into harmony inasmuch as what the intellect declares good the appetitive faculty pursues, and what the intellect denies to be good the appetitive faculty seeks to avoid.

1129. Then [a, iii, y], at “Therefore, since moral virtue,” he shows how these actions of the intellect and appetitive faculty—touching the moral virtues—are in agreement. Moral virtue is a habit of free choice, as was said in the second book (305, 308, 382). Choice is the appetitive faculty deliberating inasmuch as the appetitive faculty takes what was pre-considered, as was stated in the third book (435, 436, 457). But to counsel is an act of one part of the reason, as was previously shown (473, 476, 482, 1118). Since then reason and appetitive faculty concur in choice, if choice ought to be good—this is required for the nature of a moral virtue—the reason must be true and the appetitive faculty right, so that the same thing which reason declares or affirms, the appetitive faculty pursues. In order that there be perfection in action it is necessary that none of its principles be imperfect. But this intellect or reason (which harmonizes in this way with the right appetitive faculty) and its truth are practical.

1130. Next [2, b], at “However, it is the function” he explains what the work of the rational soul is in terms of each part. First [b, i] he shows how each part is related to truth. Then [b, ii], at “Choice, then, is etc.,” he shows how each part is related to action. He says first that the work of a good or faulty mind (i.e., intellect or reason), in the speculative rather than practical order, consists simply in the true and false, in such a way that the absolutely true is its good and the absolutely false is its evil. To express the true and the false is an essential function of every intellect. But the good of the practical intellect is not absolute truth but the “conformable” truth, i.e., corresponding to a right appetitive faculty, as has been shown 022, 326, 548), because on this point the moral virtues are united.

1131. However, there seems to be some difficulty here. If the truth of the practical intellect is determined by comparison with a right appetitive faculty and the rectitude of the appetitive faculty is determined by the fact that it agrees with right reason, as was previously shown, an apparent vicious circle results from these statements. Therefore, we must say that the end and the means pertain to the appetitive faculty, but the end is determined for man by nature, as was shown in the third book (524, 525). On the contrary, the means are not determined for us by nature but are to be investigated by reason. So it is obvious that rectitude of the appetitive faculty in regard to the end is the measure of truth for the practical reason. According to this the truth of the practical reason is determined by agreement with a right appetitive faculty. But the truth of the practical reason itself is the rule for the rectitude of the appetitive faculty in regard to the means. According to this, then, the appetitive faculty is called right inasmuch as it pursues the things that reason calls true.

1132. A further confusion arises here from the manner in which he connects the speculative and practical intellect—as with the two parts given above (1118): the scientific and the estimative—since he stated previously (1123) that the scientific and estimative were different parts, a thing he denies about the speculative and practical intellect in the third book De Anima (Ch. 10, 433 a 15 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 15, 820-821). Therefore, we must say that the practical intellect has a beginning in a universal consideration and, according to this, is the same in subject with the speculative, but its consideration terminates in an individual operable thing. Hence the Philosopher says in the third book De Anima (Ch. 11, 434 a 16 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 16, 845-846) that universal reason does not move without the particular. In this way the estimative is considered a different part from the scientific.

1133. At “Choice, then, is the principle” [b, ii], he shows that each reason has a relation to action. On this point he does three things. First [ii, x] he explains that the mind is a principle

of action. Second [ii, y], at “Still, mind itself etc.,” he shows of what mind he speaks. Third [ii, z], at “What has already taken place,” he explains about what kinds of objects the mind is the active principle. First he concludes from what was just said (1129) that because choice is the appetitive faculty deliberating, consequently it is a principle of action, and so of motion, i.e., in the manner of an efficient cause but not for the sake of something, i.e., in the manner of a final cause. We have already said in the third book De Anima (Ch. 10, 433 b 27-31; St. Th. Lect. 15, 836-837) that the appetitive faculty is a source of movement in animals. But, for choice itself the principles are the appetitive faculty and the reason that is purposive, i.e., which is ordered to a practical thing as to an end, for the choice of the appetitive faculty is concerned with the things that are for the end. Hence reason proposing an end and thereupon proceeding to think discursively about it, and the appetitive faculty tending to the end, are compared to choice as a cause. So it is that choice depends on the intellect (or mind) and on the moral habit that perfects the appetitive power in such a way that it does not exist without either of them.

1134. He gives a sign in proof of this, for the effect of choice is action, as was pointed out. But the action that is good, and its direct opposite in action (i.e., the action that is evil) cannot exist without the mind and disposition or moral condition, i.e., some inclination belonging to the appetitive faculty. Hence neither does choice, good or bad, exist without disposition and mind.

1135- Then [ii, y], at “Still, mind itself,” he shows what mind or reason is the principle of action. First [y, aa] he explains the proposition. Next [y, bb], at “Therefore, choice is either etc.,” he infers a corollary from what has been discussed. He says first that, although the mind is a principle of action, nevertheless the mind simply considered in itself (or the speculative reason) does not move anything because it prescribes nothing about pursuit or flight, as was stated in the third book De Anima (Ch. 9, 432 b 27-33; St. Th. Lect. 14, 812-815), Hence it is not the speculative mind that is a principle of action but the mind having a purpose or ordained to an individual operable thing as an end. This is the practical reason or mind, and it governs not only active operation, which does not pass into external matter but remains in the agent—like desiring and becoming angry—but also “factive” operation which does pass into external matter—burning and cutting for instance.

1136. He proves this by the fact that every worker, say the carpenter or builder, makes his product for the sake of something, i.e., for an end—not an abstract one but with a view to some particular thing that is made or established in external matter, for instance, a knife or a house. Moreover, the end is not something done, i.e., a practicable thing existing in the agent, like rightly desiring or becoming angry. Every worker acts for the sake of something belonging to a thing, i.e., which has some use, as -the use of a house is habitation. This then is the end of the worker, viz., something made and not a thing done, Therefore, it is not something done, since in immanent actions the good action itself is the end, for example, rightly desiring or justly becoming angry. As the practical mind is for the sake of this end, either a thing made or an action, so also the appetitive faculty is for the sake of some particular end.

1137. Next [y, bb], at “Therefore, choice is either,” he draws a corollary from the premises. Because choice is a principle of action, and the principles of choice are the appetitive faculty and reason (i.e., intellect or mind), which by means of choice are principles of action, it follows that choice is of the appetitive intellect (in such a way that choice is essentially an act of the intellect according as it orders the appetitive faculty) or it is of the intellective faculty of appetition (in such a way that choice is essentially an act of the appetitive faculty according as it is directed by the intellect). The latter is nearer the truth, as is clear from the objects. The object of choice, as also of the appetitive faculty, is good and evil but not true and false which pertain to the intellect as such. A principle of this kind is man, viz., an agent choosing by means of intellect and appetitive faculty.

1138. At “What has already taken place” [ii, z] he explains the kinds of objects the mind is concerned with as the principle of action by power of choice. He says that nothing over and done with, i.e., nothing past is an object of choice, for instance, no one chooses Ilion, that is, to have captured Troy. The reason is that choice belongs to the deliberating faculty of appetition, as already noted (1129, 1133). But no one takes counsel about something done, i.e., about a past event but about a future and contingent one. He proves this from the fact that counsel is given only about a contingent event, as shown previously (46o-472). Now what was done is not contingent, since it is not possible that the thing becomes undone, i.e., that it did not take place. Here he introduces the words of Agathon who rightly remarked: God lacks only this power to cause things to be unproduced, i.e., not to be made which are already made. This was well said.

1139. Everything that can be contained under the proper object of any cause’s capacity is necessarily subjected to the influence of that cause, for instance, fire can heat anything capable of becoming hot. But the power of God, who is the universal cause of being, extends to the totality of being. Hence that only is withdrawn from the divine power which is inconsistent with the nature of being, as something which implies a contradiction. That a thing done be undone is of this kind, because it involves the same formality I for a thing to be (i.e., will be) while it is, and to have been (i.e., was to have been) while it was; and for what is, not to be-and what was, not to have been.

1140. Next [2, c], at “In any case the work,” he infers from the premises that knowledge of the truth is the work of each part of the intellect, namely, the practical and the speculative or the scientific and the estimative (ratiocinativi).

1141. Then [A’, 31, at “Those habits according to which,” he deduces lastly that those habits by which the truth—the good of the intellective part—is manifested, are virtues of both divisions of the intellect.

LECTURE 3

An Enumeration of the Intellectual Virtues;

Every Science Can Be Taught

Chapter 3

I.    HE DISCUSSES THE PRINCIPAL INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES.

      A.  He enumerates the intellectual virtues. — 1142-1143

Introducing again the subject treated above, let us discuss it further. There are five habits by which the soul expresses the truth by affirming or denying. They are: art, science, prudence, wisdom, and understanding; but not suspicion’ and opinion, which can express falsehood.

      B.  He discusses each of them.

            A’ He discusses ... them.

                   1.   HE DISCUSSES THE INTELLECTUAL VIRTUES PERFECTING THE INTELLECT REGARDING THE THINGS... DERIVED FROM PRINCIPLES.

                         a.   The science which perfects the intellect in regard to necessary things.

                               i.    Science on the part of the matter. — 1144-1146

From this then it can be made clear what science is, if it is proper to science to know with certitude and not follow approximations to the truth. Indeed we all suppose that what we know scientifically cannot be in any other way. But contingent things are not of this kind, for when they pass from observation it is not known whether they exist or not. The object of science then concerns necessity, and therefore is eternal, because everything that is of necessity without qualification is eternal. Eternal things, however, are unproduced and indestructible.

                               ii.   (Science) on the part of the cause. — 1147-1149

Besides, every science can be taught and every object of science can be learned. But all teaching comes about by reason of previous knowledge, as we have indicated in the Analytics; one kind is by induction, the other by syllogism. Induction then gives us a first principle and a universal assent, but the syllogism proceeds from universals. Therefore, there are principles from which the syllogism proceeds principles not derived from the syllogism, and consequently arising from induction. Science then is a demonstrative habit having all the other requirements determined in the Analytics. When a man knows scientifically, he assents to and understands principles in some way; indeed, if he does not know them more than the conclusion, then he has science only incidentally. In this way, therefore, the question of science has been settled.

                         b.  The habits perfecting the intellect in regard to contingent things.

                               i.    He shows that there are two habits concerned with contingent things. — 1150-1152

The contingent is both something to be made and something to be done; and making is one thing and action another. We assent to these things even by proofs outside the science. For this reason the habit that is active under reason’s guidance is different from the habit that is productive through reason. Likewise action and making are not contained under one another, for action is not making, nor is making action.

                              ii.   He defines one of these (habits).

                                     x.    FIRST HE DEFINES ART IN ITSELF.

                                            aa. He shows what art is. — 1153

Chapter 4

However, since architecture is a kind of art and also a kind of habit productive through reason, and no art is found that is not a habit of this sort; and again there is no such habit that is not an art, art then will be the same as a habit concerned with making, under the guidance of true reason.

                                            bb.      He shows what the subject matter of art is.

                                                   a’  He proposes the subject matter of art. — 1154-1155

But every art is concerned with realization, an artifact and observation; it considers particularly how contingent things may be made, and indicates that their principle is in the craftsman but not in the thing made.

                                                   b’. He shows from what things art differs according to its subject matter.

                                                         a.   IN RELATION TO DIVINE SCIENCES. — 1156

Art, however, does not deal with things that exist necessarily or come into being by necessity;

                                                         b.   TO NATURAL SCIENCE. — 1157

nor with things that are according to nature, for they have these principles in themselves.

                                                         c.   (TO) PRUDENCE. — 1158

Since making and action differ from one another, art necessarily directs making and not action.

                                                   c’ He shows with what it agrees in subject matter. — 1159

In some manner art and chance are concerned with the same things, as Agathon remarked: Art highly esteems chance, and chance art.

                                     y.    SECOND (HE DEFINES ART) BY COMPARISON WITH ITS OPPOSITE. — 1160

Art then, as was previously noted, is a kind of habit productive under the guidance of genuine reason On the contrary, however, unskillfulness is a habit productive under the guidance of incorrect reason operating on contingent matter.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

1142. After the Philosopher has investigated the way in which the intellectual virtues are to be understood, he begins now to discuss the intellectual virtues themselves. First [I] he discusses the principal intellectual virtues. Then [Lect. 8], at “Now we must consider etc.” (B.1142 a 32), he defines certain virtues connected with one of them, namely, prudence. On the initial point he does two things. First [A] he enumerates the intellectual virtues.

Next [B], at “From this then it can be made clear etc.,” he discusses each of them. He says first—after the way of understanding the intellectual virtues has been given—we ought to begin again from what has been settled before (1115), so that we may treat the intellectual virtues themselves.

1143. It was previously pointed out (1125) that the intellectual virtues are habits by which the soul expresses the truth. But there are five habits by which the soul always expresses the truth by either affirming or denying, viz., art, science, prudence, wisdom, and understanding. Clearly then these are the five intellectual virtues. He omits suspicion, which is brought about by some conjectures concerning any particular facts, and opinion, which is brought about by some conjectures concerning any general things. Although these two sometimes do express the truth, nevertheless at other times it happens that they express falsehood, which is the evil of the intellect just as truth is the good of the intellect. But it is contrary to the nature of virtue to be the principle of an evil act. Obviously then suspicion and opinion cannot be called intellectual virtues.

1144. Then [B], at “From this then it can be made clear,” he determines the intellectual virtues just enumerated. First [A’] he discusses each of them. Next [Lect. 6], at “As having supremacy” (B. 1141 a 20), he shows which is the principal one among them. On the initial point he proceeds in two ways. First [1] he discusses the intellectual virtues perfecting the intellect regarding the things which are derived from principles. Second [Lect. 5], at “Since science is an evaluation etc.” (B. 1140 b 31), he discusses the intellectual habits perfecting the intellect in regard to first principles. On the first point he does two things. Initially [a] he defines the science which perfects the intellect in regard to necessary things. Then [b], at “The contingent is both etc.,” he defines the habits perfecting the intellect in regard to contingent things. On the initial point he does two things. First [a, i] he explains science on the part of the matter. Next [a, ii], at “Besides, every science can be taught etc.,” he explains it on the part of the cause.

1145. He affirms first that it can be made clear what science is from what has been said if it is proper to science to know with certitude and not follow approximations to the truth, for in this latter way we are sometimes said to know sensible things about which we are certain. But a well-founded notion of science is taken from the fact that we all agree that what we know cannot be in any other way; otherwise we would have the doubt of the guesser and not the certitude of the knower. However, certitude of this kind, viz., that cannot be in any other way, is not possible about things that can be in some other way, for in that case certitude can be attained about them only when they fall under the senses. But when they pass from observation, that is, cease to be seen or felt, then their existence or non-existence escapes us, as is obvious in the fact that Socrates is sitting. It is evident then that everything known by science is of necessity. From this he infers that it is eternal because everything which is of necessity without qualification is eternal. But things of this kind are neither produced nor destroyed. Therefore, it is about such things that science is concerned.

1146. There can even be a science about producible and perishable things, for example, natural science; yet it cannot be based on particulars that are subject to generation and destruction, but on universal reasons which are necessary and eternal.

1147. Next [a, ii], at “Besides, every science,” he explains science by its cause, saying that every science seems to be teachable. Hence it is stated in the first book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 2, 982 a 14; St. Th. Lect. 2, 39) that a characteristic of the one possessing science is his ability to teach, for a thing is led from potency to actuality by another which is actual. For the same reason every knowable thing can be learned by a man who has the potentiality. But all teaching or science must come about by reason of some previous knowledge, as was indicated in the beginning of the Posterior Analytics (Bk. I, Ch. 1, 71 a; St. Th. Lect. 1, 8). We cannot arrive at the knowledge of an unknown thing except by means of something known.

1148. There is a twofold teaching by means of things known: one by induction and the other by syllogism. Induction leads us to perceive some principle and something universal at which we arrive by experiments with singulars, as is not ed in the first book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 1, 980 b 25-981 a 12; St. Th. Lect. 1, 17-19). But the syllogism proceeds from universal principles previously known in the aforementioned manner. Therefore, it is evident from this that there are certain principles from which the syllogism proceeds and which are not attested as accurate by the syllogism. Otherwise there would be a process to infinity in the principles of syllogisms-which is impossible, as is proved in the first book of the Posterior Analytics (Ch. 3, 72 b 25-73 a 20; St. Th. Lect. 8, 68-75. Ch. 19-22, 81 b 10-84 b 2; St. Th. 31-35, 255-307). So then it remains that the principle of the syllogism is induction. But not every syllogism is productive of knowledge, i.e., causes science, but only the demonstrative, which infers necessary things from the necessary.

1149, So, obviously, science is a demonstrative habit, i.e., produced by demonstration, taking into consideration what has been noted about science in the Posterior Analytics. In order that a man may have science it is necessary that the principles by which he knows be assented to in some way and understood even more than the conclusions which are known. Otherwise he will not have science per se but only incidentally, inasmuch as it can happen that he knows this conclusion through certain other principles and not through these which he does not know better than the conclusion. The cause, certainly, must be more powerful than the effect. Hence that which is the cause of knowing must be more known. In this way then the question of science has been settled.

1150. Next [b], at “The contingent is both” he defines the habits which perfect the intellect in regard to contingent things. On this point he does three things. First [b, i] he shows that there are two habits concerned with contingent things. Second [b, ii], at “However, since architecture etc.,” he defines one of these. Third [Lect. 4], at “Let us now investigate etc.,” he defines the other, viz., prudence. He says first that the contingent is divided into two sections: something to be done, and something to be made. Thus we know that the one is an action and the other a making.

1151. We can assent to these things by external reasons, i.e., by what has been determined outside this science, viz., in the ninth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 8, 1050 a 23-1050 b; St. Th. Lect. 8, 1862-1865). There the difference between action and making has been explained. Action is an operation remaining in the agent, like seeing, understanding, and willing. But making is an operation passing into external matter to fashion something out of it, like constructing and sawing. Since habits are distinguished according to the object, it follows that the habit that is active by means of reason, i.e., prudence, is different from the habit that is productive through reason, i.e., art. It follows also that one of these is not contained under the other, as action and making are not contained under one another, since neither is action making nor is making action. They are distinguished by opposing differences, as is clear from what has just been said.

1152. We must consider that the knowledge of contingent things cannot possess the truth’s certitude rejecting untruth. Therefore, where there is question of knowledge alone, contingent things are passed over by the intellect which is perfected by the knowledge of the truth. But the knowledge of the contingent is useful according as it gives direction to human operation which is concerned with what is contingent. For that reason he makes the division of contingent things—when treating the intellectual virtues—only as they are subject to human operation. Hence, also, only the practical sciences are concerned with contingent things precisely as they are contingent, viz., in the area of the particular. The speculative sciences, on the other hand, do not deal with contingent things except according to universal reasons, as was noted before (1146).

1153. Then [b, ii], at “However, since architecture,” he defines art. First [ii, x] he defines art in itself, and second [ii, y] at “Art then etc.,” by comparison with its opposite. On the initial point he does two things. First [x, aa] he shows what art is. Next [x, bb], at “But every art is concerned etc.,” he shows what the subject matter of art is. He makes the first point by induction. We see architecture as a kind of art, and also as a kind of habit for making something through reason. Likewise, every art is so constituted that it is a habit, concerned with making, under the guidance of reason. Likewise, no productive habit of this kind, i.e., directed by reason, is found which is not an art. Hence it is evident that art is the same as a habit concerned with making under the guidance of true reason.

1154. Next [x, bb], at “But every art,” he considers the subject matter of art. On this point he does three things. First [bb, a’] he proposes the subject matter of art. Second [bb, b’], at “Art, however, does not,” he shows from what things art differs according to its subject matter. Third [bb, c’], at “In some manner etc.,” he shows with what it agrees in subject matter. We should consider two things about the subject matter of art: the very operation of the craftsman which is directed by the art, and the product manufactured. Now, there is a threefold operation of art: the first is to consider how an artifact is to be produced; the second is to operate on the external matter; the third is to accomplish the work itself. For this reason he says that every art is concerned with the creation, or the achievement and completion of the work which he places as the end of art. It is concerned also with the artistic, i.e., with the operation of art that disposes the material, and with observing how a thing may be made by art.

1155. On the part of the work itself we should consider two things. The first of these is that the things that are made by art are contingent-can be or not be. This is evident from the fact that when they are made they begin to be in a new form. The second is that the principle of the creation of artistic works is in the craftsman alone, as it were, in something extrinsic to the artifact but is not in the thing made as something intrinsic to it.

1156. Then [bb, b’], at “Art, however, does not,” he explains what was just said (1154-1155), showing how art differs from three other areas of knowledge. First [b, A] in relation to the divine sciences and mathematics dealing with those things that exist or come into being by necessity; about these subjects there is no art.

1157. Next [b’, B], at “nor with things,” he shows the difference in relation to natural science which treats of those things that are according to nature, and about which there is no art. The things that are according to nature have the principle of motion in themselves, as was stated in the second book of the Physics (Ch. 1, 192 b 15; St. Th. Lect. 1, 142). This does not belong, to the works of art, as we just pointed out (1155).

1158. Third [b’, c], at “Since making,” he shows how art differs from prudence. He says that since action and making differ from one another, art is restricted to giving directions to making and not to action that prudence directs.

1159. At “In some manner” [bb, c’], he shows that with which art is in material agreement. He says that chance and art have to do with those things that are done by intellect: art in company with reason, and chance without reason. Agathon indicated this agreement when he said that art values chance and chance art, inasmuch as they agree in matter.

1160. Then [ii, y], at “Art then,” he considers art by comparison with its opposite. He says that as art—this was previously noted (1153)—is a certain habit concerned with making under the guidance of true reason, so atechnia or unskillfulness, on the contrary, is a habit concerned with making directed by incorrect reason regarding what is contingent.

LECTURE 4

Prudence

Chapter 5

I.    HE SHOWS WHAT PRUDENCE IS.

      A.  He shows the nature of prudence.

            A’ He shows who is prudent.

                   1.   HE DETERMINES THE METHOD OF PROCEDURE. — 1161

Let us now investigate prudence in this way, considering who are called prudent.

                   2.   HE SHOWS WHO ARE PRUDENT. — 1162

It seems to pertain to the prudent man that he can give good advice about proper goods useful not for one aspect of life—as an example, what are useful for health or bodily strength—but for the benefit of the total life of man.

                   3.   HE MAKES KNOWN WHAT HE SAID, BY A SIGN. — 1163

A sign of this is that we call men prudent in a particular matter when they can rightly conclude what is useful for a determined good end in things that do not belong to art. Therefore, a man will be absolutely prudent who gives advice about the whole of life.

            B’ He shows what prudence is.

                   1.   HE GIVES THE DEFINITION.

                         a.   He shows... the difference between prudence and other habits given above. — 1164-1165

But no one takes counsel about things that either are incapable of being in any other way or are not within his power. Therefore, let us consider that science comes about by demonstration, and a demonstration is not possible in things whose principles can be in some other way--otherwise all the conclusions could be different; also, that b counsel is not about matters which are necessarily so. Prudence then will be neither a science nor an art. It is not a science because the thing to be done is contingent; it is not an art because the genus of action and making differ.

                         b.  He infers the definition of prudence. — 1166

It remains, therefore, that prudence is a genuine habit concerned with action under the guidance of reason, dealing with things good and bad for man.

                         c.   He assigns the reason for a statement he has made. — 1167

Indeed the end of making is something other than itself. This is not always true in regard to action, for sometimes a good operation is its own end.

                   2.   HE MAKES... KNOWN (THE DEFINITION OF PRUDENCE) BY SIGNS.

                         a.   The first of these. — 1168

For this reason we think Pericles and others like him are prudent, because they can reckon what things are good both for themselves and others. We look upon stewards or dispensers of goods and statesmen or rulers of cities as men of this kind.

                         b.   He presents the second sign.

Hence we call temperance by the name sophrosyne, as it were, a thing preserving prudence. Prudence does preserve an estimation of the kind mentioned, for while pleasure and pain do not distort or pervert all judgments (for example, that a triangle has or has not three angles equal to two right angles), they do affect those dealing with the practicable. The principles of practicable things are the ends for which they are done. But the principle is not clear to a man corrupted by pleasure or pain, nor does he see the obligation to choose and do everything for the sake of it and on account of it, for vice is corruptive of principle. Consequently, prudence is of necessity a habit concerned with action, under the direction of correct reason, regard-

      B.  He shows how it (prudence) differs from art.

            A’ First... in art, a moral virtue regulating its use is required. — 1172

Nevertheless, virtue is required for art but not for prudence.

            B’ He presents the second difference. — 1173

Likewise in art a man who makes a deliberate mistake is the more acceptable, but in prudence, as in the virtues, it is the reverse. It is clear, therefore, that prudence is a particular kind of virtue and not an art.

II.  HE SHOWS WHAT ITS OBJECT IS. — 1174

But since there are two parts of the reasoning soul, prudence will be a virtue of the second part, viz., the estimative (opinativae), for opinion deals with the contingent as prudence does. Nevertheless, prudence is not a habit connected with reason alone, and a sign of this is that such a habit can be forgotten. But this is not true of prudence.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

1161. After the Philosopher has finished his investigation of art, he begins now to investigate prudence. First [I] he shows what prudence is. Then [II], at “But since there are two parts etc.,” he shows what its object is. On the first point he does two things. First [A] he shows the nature of prudence. Next [B], at “Nevertheless, virtue etc,” he shows how it differs from art. On the initial point he does two things. First [A’] he shows who is prudent. Second [B’], at “But no one takes counsel etc.,” he shows what prudence is. On the first point he does three things. Initially [A’, 1] he determines the method of procedure, Saying that we must accept what prudence is from a consideration of people classed as prudent.

1162. Second [A’, 2 ], at “It seems to pertain,” he shows who are prudent. He says that it seems to pertain to the prudent man that he can, by the power of habit, give good advice about proper and useful goods, not only in some particular matter—for example, what things are useful for health or bodily strength—but also about things good and useful for the benefit of the total life of man.

1163. Last [A’, 3], at “A sign of this is etc.,” he gives a probative sign for his assertion. People are called prudent not absolutely but in a particular matter who can infer correctly what things are good or useful for some determined end. We suppose the end is good because to make deductions about things in reference to an evil end is contrary to prudence. We suppose likewise that there is question of things to which art does not apply because to conclude rightly in such matters (which are the concern of art) belongs not to prudence but to art. Therefore, if a man who is capable of giving good advice for a particular incident is presumed prudent in some matter, it follows that he will be absolutely prudent who gives good counsel about things touching the whole of life.

1164. Then [A, B’], at “But no one takes counsel” he shows what prudence is. First [B’, i] he gives the definition. Next [B’, 2], at “For this reason we think etc.,” he makes it known by signs. on the initial point he does three things. First [1, a] he shows in this context the difference between prudence and other habits given above (1142-1160), viz., science and art. Second [1, b], at “It remains etc.,” he infers the definition of prudence. Third [1, c], at “Indeed the end of making etc.,” he assigns the reason for a statement he has made. He remarks first that no one deliberates either about things that absolutely cannot be in any other way, or about things not within his power. Let us then take the things stated above (11148-1149), viz., that science comes about by demonstration, and again that a demonstration is not possible in matter whose principles can be in some other way, otherwise all the conclusions from those principles could be different. it is not possible that principles should be weaker than the inferences drawn from the principles. But let us now join to these observations what has just been said, viz., that counsel is not about matters that are necessarily so, and that prudence is concerned with things worthy of deliberation, since it was previously stated (1162, 1163) that the prudent man’s special function is to give good counsel. From all this it follows that prudence is neither a science nor an art.

1165. That it is not a science is evident from the fact that things to be done, about which counsel is given and prudence is concerned, are contingent; and there is no science about matters of this kind. But that it is not an art is evident because the genus of action and making are different. Consequently, prudence, which deals with action, differs from art, which deals with making.

1166. Next [i, b], at “It remains then,” he infers the definition of prudence from the premises. He says that, inasmuch as prudence is not a science (a habit of demonstration concerning necessary things) nor an art (a habit concerned with making under the guidance of reason), it follows that it is a habit dealing with action directed by genuine reason and is concerned not about things to be made—which are outside man—but about things good and bad for man himself.

1167. At “Indeed the end of making” [1, c] he assigns the reason for his statement (1166), that prudence is a habit dealing with action and concerned with things good and bad for man. Obviously the end of making is always something other than the making itself, as the end of building is a constructed edifice. Consequently, the good of making is not in the maker but in the thing made. So then art, which deals with making, is not concerned with the good and bad of man but with the good and bad of things wrought by art. But the end of action is not always something other than the action because sometimes eupraxia or good operation is its own end, i e., for itself, or even for the agent; this, however, is not always so. Nothing prevents one action from being ordered to another as an end, for example, the consideration of effects is ordered to a consideration of the cause, but the end of each is a good. Clearly then the good of action is in the agent himself. Hence prudence, which deals with action, is said to be concerned with the goods of man.

1168. Then [B’, 2], at “For this reason,” he gives two signs indicating the validity of the proposed definition. The first [2, a] of these is that, since prudence is concerned with things good and bad for man, therefore Pericles and others like him are thought to be prudent because they can consider what are the good things not only for themselves but also for others. Likewise, we think of stewards or dispensers of goods and of statesmen or governors of cities as men of this kind, viz., who can reckon good things for themselves and others.

1169. At “Hence we call” [ 2, b ] he presents the second sign. He says that because prudence is concerned with good and bad things to be done, for this reason temperance is called in Greek sophrosyne (as it were, a thing preserving the reason) from which prudence gets the name phronesis. But temperance, precisely as it moderates the pleasures and pains of touch, preserves an estimation of this kind, namely, concerned with things to be done that are good or bad for man. Likewise this is made clear from the converse, since pleasure and pain—which temperance moderates—do not altogether distort (nor pervert by bringing about the exact opposite) every estimation, for example, the speculative judgment whether a triangle has or has not three angles equal to two right angles. But pleasure and pain do distort and pervert estimations that have to do with the practicable.

1170, Subsequently, he shows how this distortion comes about. It is evident that the principles of practicable things are the ends for the sake of which the practicable are done; these are in practicable matters like principles in demonstrations, as is stated in the second book of the Physics (Ch. 9, 200 a 15b 10; St. Th. Lect. 15, 273-274). But to a man experiencing intense pleasure or pain that thing appears best by which he attains pleasure and avoids pain. So, when the judgment of his reason is distorted, a man does not see clearly the end which is the principle of prudence regarding the practicable, nor does he desire the end; likewise it does not seem to him necessary to choose and do everything on account of the true end but rather on account of pleasure. Every vice or bad habit distorts the principle inasmuch as it distorts the correct estimation of the end. However, this distortion is prevented to a great degree by temperance.

1171. Thus he comes to the conclusion from the foregoing signs that prudence is necessarily a habit of action with correct reason regarding the good of man.

1172. Next [B], at “Nevertheless, virtue,” he shows a twofold difference between art and prudence from the nature of virtue. The first [B, A’] is that in the art a moral virtue regulating its use is required, for it is possible for a man to have the use of art enabling him to build a good building but not will it because of some other vice. But moral virtue, for instance, justice, causes a craftsman rightly to use his art. On the other hand, in the use of prudence an additional moral virtue is not required, for it was said (1170) that the principles of prudence are ends in regard to which rectitude of judgment is preserved by the moral virtues. Hence prudence, which is concerned with things good for man, necessarily has joined with it the moral virtues preserving its principles. This is not true of art, which deals with external goods, but, after art is acquired, moral virtue is still necessary to regulate its use.

1173. He presents the second difference at “Likewise in art” [B, B’]. Obviously if a man deliberately makes a mistake in art, he is considered a better artist than if he does not do this of his own will, because then he would seem to act out of ignorance of his art. This is evident, in those who deliberately make grammatical errors in their speech. But in the case of prudence a man who willingly sins is less commended than one who sins against his will; the same is true of the moral virtues. This is true because for prudence there is required a rectitude of the appetitive faculty concerning the ends, in order that its principles be preserved. Thus it is clear that prudence is not an art consisting, as it were, only in the truth of reason, but a virtue requiring rectitude of the appetitive faculty after the manner of the moral virtues.

1174. Then [II], at “But since there are two parts,” he shows what the subject of prudence is. He says that since there are two parts of the rational soul—one of which is called scientific and the other estimative or conjectural (opinativum)—it is clear that prudence is a virtue of the second of these, viz., the conjectural. Opinion indeed deals with contingent things, as prudence does. Nevertheless, although prudence resides in this part of the reason as in a subject—because of this it is called an intellectual virtue—it is not connected with reason alone, as art or science, but it requires rectitude of the appetitive faculty. A sign of this is that a habit in the reason alone can be forgotten (for example, art and science), unless the habit is a natural one like understanding. Prudence, however, is not forgotten by disuse, but it is destroyed by the cessation of right desire which, while remaining, is continually engaged with the things belonging to prudence, so that oblivion cannot come along unawares.

LECTURE 5

Understanding, the Habit of First Principles; Wisdom

Chapter 6

1.   HE DISCUSSES UNDERSTANDING WHICH DEALS WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF DEMONSTRATION. — 1175-1179

Since science is an evaluation of universal and necessary truths, and since there are principles of demonstrable things and of every science (science is accompanied by demonstrative reason), the principle of the knowable is neither a science nor an art nor prudence. What is knowable is demonstrable, but these, viz., art and prudence, deal with contingent things. Likewise, wisdom does not treat these principles because it is the business of the man of wisdom to furnish demonstrations about some things. If intellectual habits are science, prudence, wisdom, and understanding—by which we have the truth and are never deceived about contingent or necessary things—and none of the three (viz., prudence, science, and wisdom) is concerned with those principles, it remains then that understanding treats them.

2.   HE CONSIDERS WISDOM WHICH DEALS WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF BEING.

      a.   He shows what wisdom is.

            i.    He shows what wisdom, understood in a special sense, is called. — 1180

Chapter 7

We attribute “wisdom” to the most certain arts; accordingly we call Phidias a wise sculptor, and Polycletus a wise statuary. Here then by wisdom we mean nothing more than the excellence of the art.

            ii.   He shows what wisdom in the unqualified sense is. — 1181

But we consider some men wise in an unqualified sense and not just in a particular area or in some other way, as Homer says in his Margites: “The gods made this man neither a miner nor a farmer, nor wise in any other particular way.” It is clear then that wisdom is the most perfect of the modes of knowledge.

      b.   He infers a corollary from what was said. — 1182-1183

Therefore, the wise man must not only know the conclusions drawn from the principles but he must declare the truth about the principles. Hence wisdom will be a combination of understanding and science.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

1175. After the Philosopher has treated the intellectual virtues that perfect the intellect in respect to the things derived from principles, he will now consider the intellectual virtues perfecting the intellect in relation to the principles themselves. He does two things. First [i] he discusses understanding which deals with the principles of demonstration. Second [2], at “We attribute wisdom etc.,” he considers wisdom which deals with the principles of being. He shows first that, over and above the other intellectual virtues, there must be understanding concerning the principles of demonstration. Science is a certain evaluation of universals and things existing of necessity, for particulars and contingents cannot attain the certitude of science since they are only known insofar as they fall under the senses.

1176. In regard to the science of the things that are demonstrated, we must consider that there are some principles of the science itself necessarily dealing with demonstrable things. This is clear from the fact that science is founded on demonstrative reason proceeding from principles to conclusions. Since this is the casc with science, the principle of the science necessarily is neither a science, nor an art, nor prudence—which we have just discussed (1142-1174).

1177. Obviously it is not a science because the subject matter of science is demonstrable. But the first principles of demonstrations are indemonstrable, otherwise we would proceed to infinity. That art and prudence have nothing to do with these principles is evident from the fact that these two virtues deal with contingent things. This cannot be said of the principles of demonstration, for principles must be more certain than necessary conclusions. Likewise it is clear that wisdom, another intellectual virtue which we will discuss subsequently (1180-1181), does not treat these principles. The reason is that it pertains to the wise man to frame a demonstration about some things, viz., the ultimate causes of being. But principles are indemonstrable, as has been said (1148).

1178. If then the intellectual virtues—about which we so truly say that falsehood never underlies them whether concerned with necessary or contingent things—are these habits: science, prudence (under which he includes art which also has to do with what is contingent), and besides, wisdom and understanding, it remains that understanding treats these principles since none of the three, prudence, wisdom, or science, can be concerned with indemonstrable principles, as is clear from the foregoing.

1179. Understanding is not taken here for the intellect itself but for a particular habit by which a man, in virtue of the light of the active intellect, naturally knows indemonstrable principles. The name is suitable enough, for principles of this kind are immediately understood from a knowledge of their terms. Once we know what a whole and what a part is, we grasp immediately that every whole is greater than its part. It is called understanding (intellectus) because it reads (legit) within, observing the essence of a thing. Hence his third book De Anima (Ch. 4, 429 b 5-23; St. Th, Lect. 8, 700-719) says that the proper object of the intellect is the essence of a thing. So the knowledge of principles, which immediately become known when the essence of the thing is understood, is suitably called “intellect” or understanding (intellectus).

1180. Next [2], at “We attribute wisdom,” he considers wisdom. First [a] he shows what wisdom is. Then [b], at “Therefore, the wise man etc.,” he infers a corollary from what was said. On the initial point he does two things. First. [i] he shows what wisdom, understood in a special sense, is called. Second [ii], at “But we consider some etc.,” he shows what wisdom in the unqualified sense is. He says first that in the arts we attribute the name wisdom to the most certain ones—those which, knowing the ultimate causes in some category of handicraft, direct other arts concerned with the same category, for example, an architectonic art directs technical workers. In this way we say Phidias was a wise sculptor and Polycletus a wise statuary, i.e., a carver of statues. Here we call wisdom nothing other than the excellence of the art (i.e., its ultimate perfection) by which a man attains what is ultimate and most perfect in the art. In this the excellence of each thing consists, as was pointed out in the first book De Coelo (Ch. 11, 281 a 7-15; St. Th. Lect. 25, 248-249).

1181. Then [ii], at “But we consider,” he shows what wisdom in the unqualified sense is. He says that, as we consider some men wise in a particular handicraft, so too we consider others completely wise, i.e., with regard to the whole category of beings and not just a part of them, even though they are not wise in a particular handicraft. Thus Homer remarks that the gods did not make a certain man a miner or a farmer, nor make him gifted in any craft but simply made him wise. Hence it is clear that, as the man who is wise in some handicraft is most sure in that art, so that knowledge which is wisdom in an unqualified sense is the most certain of all modes of knowledge inasmuch as it treats first principles of being—in themselves most known, although some of them, the immaterial, are less known in regard to us. But the most universal principles are also more known in regard to us, for example, those belonging to being as being—the knowledge of which pertains to wisdom taken in this sense, as is evident in the fourth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 1, 1003 a 21-22; St. Th. Lect. 1, 529-530).

1182. At “Therefore, the wise man” [b] he infers a corollary from this: because wisdom is most certain and the principles of demonstrations more certain than the conclusions, the wise man should not only know the things inferred in the matter that he is considering but he should also declare the truth about first principles themselves not to prove them but to explain common notions, e.g., whole and part, equal and unequal, and suchlike-a function proper to a philosopher. When these common notions are known, the principles of demonstrations are clear. Hence the concern of such a man is to argue against those denying principles, as is evident in the fourth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 3, 1005 a 19-b 8; St. Th. Lect. 5, 588-595).

1183. Finally, he draws a further conclusion that wisdom, in declaring the truth about principles, is understanding; but in knowing the things inferred from the principles, it is science. However, wisdom is distinguished from science, taken in the usual sense, by reason of the eminence which it has among other sciences; it is a kind of perfection of all sciences.

LECTURE 6

Wisdom, the Principal Intellectual Virtue

Chapter 7

I.    HE SHOWS WHICH (VIRTUE) IS ABSOLUTELY PRINCIPAL.

      A.  He shows that wisdom is principal among all...

            A’ He proposes what he intends. — 1184

As having supremacy it is the science of the most honorable things,

            B’ He rejects the opposite error.

                   1.   HE REJECTS THIS ERROR (FOR... TWO REASONS).

                         a.   It is unreasonable... to consider political science or prudence... the best of the sciences. — 1185-1186

for it is unreasonable to consider political science or prudence the best of the sciences if man is not the most excellent thing in the world.

                         b.  He gives the second reason. — 1187-1188

What is healthful and what is good for men and fishes are different, but white and straight are always the same; and everyone would say that in godlike things what is wise is always the same. However, what is prudent may be different, for the man who can properly consider individual things pertaining to himself is called prudent and we entrust such matters to him. For this reason people call prudent all dumb animals who seem to have the ability to care for themselves. It will certainly be evident then that wisdom is not 30 the same as political science. If people call wisdom that science dealing with things useful to themselves, there will be many kinds of wisdom, for there is not one consideration regarding the good of all animals but there is a different consideration for individual animals. Likewise there is not one medicine for all beings.

                   2.   HE DISMISSES A CERTAIN OBJECTION. — 1189

That man is the most excellent of all animals makes no difference, because there are other creatures more divine by their nature, for instance, the very evident things that constitute the universe.

            C’ He infers the truth. — 1190

From what has been said it is obvious that wisdom is both science and understanding about the things most honorable by their nature.

      B.  He infers a corollary from the premises.

            A’ He introduces the corollary. — 1191-1193

For this reason people say Anaxagoras and Thales, and others like them, are wise but not prudent: men, seeing them ignorant of what is useful to themselves, assert they know superfluous and wonderful things both difficult and divine, but that this knowledge is useless because they do, not seek human goods.

Prudence has to do with human goods about which we deliberate, for skillful deliberation seems to be the special work of the prudent man. But no one deliberates about things that cannot be in any other way, nor about whatsoever is not ordered to some end -and this a practicable good. Moreover, that man is a good counsellor absolutely speaking who can conjecture, by reasoning what is best for man to do.

            B’ He manifests one aspect of it (the corollary). — 1194

Prudence not only considers universals but must also know singulars, for it is active, and action is concerned with singulars. Hence some men not informed scientifically but expert in different particulars are more effective than other men with scientific knowledge. Certainly, if a doctor knows that light meats are easily digestible and healthful but does not know what meats are light, lie will not make people the flesh well. But if he knows that the flesh of fowls is light and healthful he will be better able to effect a cure. Since prudence is concerned with action, therefore, it must have both kinds (of knowledge) but especially the latter (of particulars).

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

1184. After the Philosopher has defined the individual intellectual virtues, he now explains the principal one among them. First [I] he shows which is absolutely principal. Then [Lect. 7], at “But there will be etc.” (B. 1141 b 22), he shows which is principal in the, genus of the practicable in reference to man. On the first point he does two things. First [A] he shows that wisdom is principal among all without qualification. Next [B], at “For this reason etc.,” he infers a corollary from the premises, clarifying what has been said, by a sign. On the initial point he does three things. First [A, A’] he proposes what he intends. Then [A, B’], at “for it is unreasonable etc.,” he rejects the opposite error. Last [A, C’], at “From what has been said etc.,” he infers the truth. He says first that wisdom is not science of any sort whatever but the science of the most honorable and divine things, inasmuch as it has the essential elements to be head of all sciences. As the senses located in the head direct the movements and operations of all the other members, so wisdom directs all the other sciences since they take their principles from it.

1185. Then [A, B’], at “for it is unreasonable,” he rejects the error of certain philosophers who, considering usefulness rather than the dignity of science, assign primacy of the sciences to political science by which the multitude is governed, or to prudence by which a man governs himself. As was pointed out in the beginning of the Metaphysics (Bk. 1, Ch. 1, 981 b 13-25; St. Th. Lect. 1, 31-33), the speculative sciences are not sought as useful for some further end but simply as honorable in themselves. Hence he does two things on this point. First [1] he rejects this error. Next [2], at “That man etc.,” he dismisses an objection raised. For the first statement he gives two reasons.

1186. Concerning the first of these he says that [a] it is unreasonable for a man to consider political science or prudence the most desirable science, i.e., the best of the sciences. This could not be unless man were the most excellent of all things in the world, for one science is better and more honorable than another because it deals with better and more honorable subjects-as is said in the first book De Anima (Ch. 1, 402 a 1-5; St. Th. Lect. 1, 4-5). But it is false to say that man is the most excellent thing in the world. Consequently, neither political science nor prudence—both dealing with human affairs—are the best among the sciences.

1187. At “What is healthful etc.” [b] he gives the second reason. It arises from this, that there are certain things whose prime characteristic consists in a proportion and relation to another. For this reason such things cannot be the same in reference to all objects. Thus it is clear that what is healthful and what is good are not identical for men and fishes. But other things are predicated without limitation, for example, white of colors and straight of figures. Because wisdom is one of the things which are such simply and in themselves (it is numbered among the primary entities), everyone must say that what is wise is the same in all things and that wisdom is the same without qualification in relation to everything. But what is prudent must be a thing that may be different in different subjects, because prudence is predicated according to a proportion and a relation to something. The man who can properly consider each thing pertaining to him is said to be prudent and to such a one we grant or attribute prudence. Hence by a kind of analogy men say that certain dumb animals are prudent, viz., those that seem to be able to care for themselves, not however by means of reason which properly belongs to prudence. So then it is evident that wisdom, which is a particular virtue, is not the same as political science.

1188. If we would hold that a science such as politics, which deals with useful things, was wisdom—the chief of all the sciences—it would follow that there would be many kinds of wisdom. Certainly there cannot be one identical formality in the things which are good for all animals, but a different consideration must be accorded to individual animals, taking into account what is good for each. A similar reason holds for medicine that cannot be the same for all. It was just said (1187) that what is healthful and what is good differ for men and fishes. But there must be only one wisdom because its function is to consider things which are common to all entities. So it remains that political science, which governs a human multitude, cannot be wisdom without qualification; much less can ordinary prudence which governs one man.

1189. Then [2], at “That man’ “ he answers a certain objection. Someone could say that political science or (practical) prudence, treating as it does of human affairs, is the principal science because man is more excellent than other animals. But this has no relevance to our proposition because certain other things are by their nature more divine than man by reason of their excellence. And—as we may not treat of God and separated substances, for they do not come under the senses—even the objects most evident to the senses and constituting the universe, namely, the heavenly bodies, are better than men. This is so whether we compare body to body, or the moving substances to the human soul.

1190. Next [A, C’], at “From what has been said,” he infers the truth, viz., that wisdom is science and understanding—as was previously pointed out [1183)—not of all possible things but of the most honorable. This is evident from the preceding, because if any science was more honorable it would be especially political science or prudence, and this view has just been rejected (1186-1188).

1191. At “For this reason” [B] he infers from the premises a corollary by which some things previously discussed are clarified. On this point he does two things. First [B, A’] he introduces the corollary. Then [B, B’], at “Prudence not only considers etc.,” he manifests one aspect of it. He says first that, because prudence deals with the goods of man, but wisdom with the things that are better than man, accordingly people call Anaxagoras and Thales the philosopher—and others like them—wise but not prudent. This is because men see these philosophers ignorant of things useful to themselves, but admit they know useless truths that are wonderful (is it were exceeding the common knowledge of mortals), difficult (needing careful investigation), and divine by reason of their exalted character.

1192. He gives in particular the example of Thales and Anaxagoras because they are especially censured on this point. When Thales was leaving his house to look at the stars he fell into a ditch; while he was bewailing the fact an old woman remarked to him: “You, O Thales, cannot see what is at your feet and you expect to see what is in the heavens?” And Anaxagoras, though noble and wealthy, left his family possessions to his relatives and devoted himself to the investigation of natural phenomena; taking no interest in civic affairs, he was consequently blamed for his negligence. When someone asked him: “Do you not care about your country?” He answered: “I will have great concern for my country after I have explained the heavens.”

1193. Therefore people say they know useless things, since they do not seek human goods; on this account, too, they are not called prudent, for prudence deals with human goods about which we deliberate. Now, to deliberate well seems to be the special work of the prudent man. But no one deliberates about necessary things which cannot possibly be in any other way; and the divine things, which these wise men consider, are necessary. Likewise deliberation is not possible about things in general that are not ordered to some end, i.e., to a practicable good—things that the speculative sciences consider, even when they treat what is corruptible. That man is a good counsellor without qualification, and consequently prudent, who can conjecture by reasoning what is best for man to do.

1194. Then [B, B’], at “Prudence not only considers,” he makes clear something he had said, assigning the reason why the prudent man is concerned about practicable things. Prudence not only considers universals, in which action does not occur, but must know singulars because it is active, i.e., a principle of doing. But action has to do with singulars. Hence it is that certain people not possessing th