LECTURE 2

What Voluntary Actions Merit

Chapter 1

            cc. He now clarifies the solution.

                   a’  He discloses in what way these actions merit praise and blame...

                         A.  HE DISTINGUISHES THREE GRADES... FIRST. — 392-393

People doing such actions are at times praised for enduring something dishonorable pain to achieve great and good results. Bit when they do the opposite of this they are blamed, for only a perverse man suffers very dishonorable things in exchange for little or no good.

                         B.  HE SETS DOWN THE SECOND GRADE. — 394

Some actions do not deserve praise but only pardon, for example, if a person does things that are wrong because he fears evils beyond human endurance which no one would undergo in any case.

                         C.  HE TREATS THE THIRD GRADE. — 395

Yet it is probable that there are actions that a man cannot be forced to do and he ought to undergo death of the cruelest kind rather than do them. (The reasons that constrained Euripides’ Alcmaeon to kill his mother seem to be ridiculous.)

                   b’  He makes known the pending difficulties.

                         A.  THE FIRST. — 396

Sometimes it is difficult to judge what is to be chosen for the price and what is to be endured for the gain.

                         B.  THE SECOND DIFFICULTY. — 397

It is still more difficult to abide by our decisions. As often happens, the expected results are painful but the compulsory acts are disgraceful. Hence we receive praise and blame according as we yield or stand firm against the constraint.

      z. HE CONCLUDES WITH A SUMMARY. — 398-399

What sort of actions then are to be called compulsory? Those actions are entirely (simpliciter) compulsory that have their cause from the outside, the person involved contributing nothing. Some actions that in themselves are involuntary become voluntary in particular circumstances. Although of themselves involuntary, if their principle is in the agent who seeks them at this time and in these circumstances, they are voluntary. They are then more like the voluntary because actions take place in particular cases that are voluntary. It is not easy to assign the sort of things we must choose in such circumstances, for particular cases admit of many differences.

ii.   He rejects an error... for five reasons.

      v.   THE FIRST REASON. — 400-401

If someone should say that pleasurable and good things are the cause of violence (they are external to us and influence us), all our actions will then be compulsory because men perform all their actions for the sake of something pleasing and good.

      w.  THE SECOND REASON. — 402

Those who act by violence act involuntarily and with sadness, but those who act to attain something enjoyable act with pleasure.

      x.   THE THIRD REASON. — 403

It is ridiculous that a man blame external goods, and not accuse himself for being snared by such pleasures;

      y.   THE FOURTH REASON. — 404

while he takes to himself the credit for virtuous deeds, and lays the blame for his shameful deeds upon pleasure.

      z.   THE FIFTH REASON. — 405

It seems that the compulsory action is one whose origin is external in such a way that one who suffers violence contributes nothing to the action.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

392. After the Philosopher has solved the doubt raised about the actions done because of fear, showing that such actions are voluntary, he now clarifies the solution [cc] by explaining that praise and blame, honor and punishment are due to voluntary actions of this kind. On this point he does two things. First [a’] he discloses in what way these actions merit praise and blame, honor and punishment. Next [b’], at “Sometimes it is difficult etc.,” he makes known the pending difficulties about this. In regard to the first he distinguishes three grades of these actions performed by reason of fear, as far as they merit praise or blame.

393. Considering now the first grade [a’, A], he shows that regarding such actions, which he says are a mixture of the voluntary and the involuntary, some persons are praised for suffering something dishonorable—not indeed of a sinful nature but a kind of ignominy —or even saddening or grievous in order to persevere in certain great and good things, or example, virtuous actions. When the opposite happens they are blamed since it seems that only a perverse man suffers very dishonorable things, i.e., great disorders in exchange for little or no good. No one suffers any evil to preserve a good unless that good is of greater value in his estimation than the other goods to which the evil he suffers are opposed. It belongs to a disordered desire to prefer small goods to great ones that are destroyed by greater evils. Therefore, he says this pertains to a perverse man, i.e., one who has a disordered desire.

394. At “Some actions” [a’, B], he sets down the second grade, stating that some actions performed because of fear do not deserve praise but only pardon. A person should not be blamed very much for doing certain things he ought not do, such as actions unbefitting his state. These actions should not be considered seriously binding on account of the fear of evils beyond human endurance. No one would undergo such evils especially for the reason alleged, for example, if some one is threatened with punishment by fire unless he tells a jocose lie, or he performs some lowly menial tasks unbecoming his dignity.

395. At “Yet it is probable” [a’, c], he treats the third grade. He states that other actions are so evil that no amount of force can compel them to be done but a man ought to undergo death of the cruelest kind rather than do such things, as St. Lawrence endured the roasting on the gridiron to avoid sacrificing to idols. The Philosopher affirms this either because glory remains after death for one dying for the sake of virtue or because courageous perseverance in virtue is so great a good that continuance of life—which a man loses by death—cannot equal it. He says, therefore, that Alcmaeona or the poems about Alcmaeon written by Euripides seem to be satirical. These poems narrate the story of Alcmaeon who was forced to kill his mother by the command of his father. The father had ordered this when dying in the Theban war to which be had gone by the advice of his wife.

396. Then [b’], at “Sometimes it is,” he brings forward two difficulties which threaten the above-mentioned activities. The first of these pertains to the judgment of reason [b’, A]. Sometimes it is difficult, he says, to judge what is to be chosen so that one may avoid evil and what evil is to be endured so that one may not be lacking in some good.

397. The second difficulty [b, B], which he gives at “It is still more,” pertains to the stability of the affection. He says that it is even more difficult to be steadfast in a reasonable decision that has been made than to make a right judgment. He assigns the reason for the difficulty saying that—as often happens—the things that are expected are painful, i.e., afflicting or sorrowful, but those to which men are forced because of fear are disgraceful. It is difficult, however, for a man’s affections not to be moved by fear of pain. Since those actions to which one is forced by a motive of this kind are disgraceful, it is fitting that for those who are forced to do such things by fear of painful effects, blame should be forthcoming. Put those who cannot be forced to do them are worthy of praise.

398. Next [i], at “What sort of actions then,” he sums up in conclusion the things that have been said and assigns a reason for them. First he reviews the principal question, what sort of actions are to be called compulsory (violenta). Then, he sums up the answer so far as concerns the entirely (absolute) compulsory actions, the cause of which is from the outside so that the person involved contributes nothing because of violence. Third he gives a resumé of mixed actions. He says that those acttions that in themselves, i.e., abstractly (absolute) and universally considered, are involuntary become voluntary at a definite time and by reason of certain events. Although they are involuntary in themselves, their principle is in the agent. Therefore, they should be called voluntary at this time and for these reasons. Thus it is evident that these actions are more like the voluntary than the involuntary because they are voluntary when we consider the particular circumstances in which the actions are performed.

399. Last, he recapitulates what he had stated about the difficulty occurring in things of this kind. He says that it is not easy to assign the sort of thing we must choose in such circumstances. He assigns as the reason that many differences are found in singulars. Hence the judgment of them cannot be comprised under an exact rule but they are to be left to the evaluation of a prudent man.

400. At “If someone” [ii], he rejects an error of certain philosophers concerning actions done as a result of violence. Because man is what he is by reason, it seemed to some that man of himself, and as it were voluntarily, does only that which he performs according to reason. But when it happens that man acts contrary to reason either on account of the desire of some pleasure or greed for some external good, he acts in a violent manner. They say, therefore, that pleasurable and external goods like riches cause forced actions inasmuch as being external things they force man to act against his reason. Aristotle shows this to be false for five reasons.

401. The first reason is this [ii, v]. If external things, precisely as they are pleasurable and seemingly good, cause violence, it would follow that all actions we perform in human affairs are forced actions and none is voluntary. (All men do what they do for the sake of these things, i.e., for something that is pleasurable or good under a certain aspect.) But this is unreasonable. Therefore, the first (that these external things cause violence) is also untenable.

402. He sets down the second reason at “Those who act” [ii, w]. All who act as a result of violence, act involuntarily and with sadness. Hence in the fifth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 5,1015 a 26 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 6, 829-831), it is well said that necessitation is saddening because it is opposed to the will. But those who act to acquire something enjoyable act with pleasure. They do not then act by violence and involuntarily.

403. He gives the third reason at “It is ridiculous” [ii, x]. He says it is ridiculous that a man plead as an excuse or blame external goods and not accuse himself that he was spared, i.e., permitted himself to be overcome by such pleasures. Our will is not of necessity moved by these desirable things but it can cling to them or desert them. None possesses the nature of a universal and perfect good, as happiness (which everyone necessarily wishes) does.

404. He assigns the fourth reason at “while he takes” [ii, y]. It is ridiculous, he says, that a person should call himself the cause of his good and virtuous works, and pleasurable things the cause of his shameful deeds inasmuch as they induce desire. Aristotle says it is ridiculous because directly opposed operations are referred back to the same power as a cause. Consequently it is necessary that as reason operating according to itself is the cause of virtuous action so also in following the passions it should be the cause of vicious action.

405. He gives the fifth reason at “It seems that” [ii, z], saying that the forced action is one whose source is from the outside in such a way that he who suffers by reason of it contributes nothing to the action. But the man who acts on account of external goods does contribute something to the action. Accordingly, although the principle inclining his will is from outside, his action is forced neither wholly (simpliciter) because he contributes something to the action, nor by some mixture because in mixed actions a thing is not rendered simply voluntary, as happens here. Therefore, a man acts in that case with sadness but not with pleasure, as has been stated (402).

LECTURE 3

The Involuntary Resulting from Ignorance

Chapter 1

c.    He now turns his attention to the involuntary resulting from ignorance.

      i.    He shows how there is an involuntary resulting from ignorance.

            x.   HE SETS DOWN THREE DIFFERENCES CONCERNING IGNORANCE. THE FIRST. — 406-408

Every action done because of ignorance is not voluntary; it is involuntary if sorrow and repentance follow. One who does something on account of ignorance and is not sorry about what he did, cannot be said to have acted voluntarily, for he was unaware of his action. But neither can he be said to have acted involuntarily if he is not sorry. A man who has acted from ignorance and regrets his action seems to have acted involuntarily. But if he does not regret it, his case is different; let us call him non-voluntary. Because of his differ, it is better that he have a distinctive name.

            y.   HE SETS DOWN THE SECOND DIFFERENCE. — 409-410

There seems to be a difference between acting on account of and acting in ignorance. A drunken or angry person does not act because of ignorance but because of one of the things mentioned (drunkenness or anger). Such a one however does not act knowingly but in ignorance. Therefore, every wicked person acts in ignorance of the things he ought to do and avoid. Men acting on account of an error of this kind become unjust and wicked generally.

            x.   HE ASSIGNS THE THIRD DIFFERENCE. — 411-413

When we speak of an action as involuntary we do not mean that a man is ignorant of what he ought to do. The ignorance that accompanies choice is not the cause of an involuntary but of sin. The same may be said of ignorance that is of a general nature because a person is blamed for such ignorance. But a person who is ignorant of particular conditions about which and on which human activity is exercised deserves mercy and pardon because he who is ignorant of any of these circumstances acts involuntarily.

      ii.   He explains some of his statements. (Circumstances the ignorance of which is a cause of an involuntary.)

            x.   HE POINTS OUT WHAT THESE CIRCUMSTANCES ARE. — 414-416

Perhaps it is not out of place to determine the nature and number of these circumstances: who, what, concerning what or in what one operates; sometimes, too, by what, for example, a tool; for the sake of which, for instance, safety; and in what manner, for example, quietly or violently.

            y.   IN WHAT WAY IGNORANCE OF THEM MAY BE PRESENT. — 417-421

No one but a madman will be ignorant of all these circumstances. It is obvious that no one can be ignorant of the agent. How can he be ignorant about himself? But someone can be ignorant of what he does, for instance, those speaking out of turn say it escaped them unawares or they did not know that certain things were not to be disclosed, like Aeschylus when he revealed the sacred mysteries; or someone wishing to show the working of a weapon discharges an arrow; or a man mistakes his son for an assailant, as Merope did; or he thinks a piked lance blunted, or a rock merely pumice; or he may kill someone by a blow meant to save him; or a trainer sparring with a boxer to teach him takes his life.

            z.   HE EXPLAINS HOW IGNORANCE OF THESE CIRCUMSTANCES IS THE CAUSE OF AN INVOLUNTARY.

                   aa. First... man seems to act unwillingly... who is ignorant of one (circumstance). — 422

Since ignorance can be concerned with every one of the circumstances occurring with the action, that man seems to act involuntarily who is ignorant of one of them. This applies especially to ignorance of the most important circumstances.

                   bb.      The most important circumstances. — 423

These seem to be the circumstances of the action and its motives.

                   cc. Ignorance of these very things is not enough for an involuntary. — 424

For an action to be called involuntary in respect of such ignorance it must be painful to the agent and cause repentance.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

406. After the Philosopher has determined the involuntary resulting from violence, he now turns his attention to the involuntary resulting from ignorance [c]. Concerning it he does two things. First [i] he shows how’ there is an involuntary resulting from ignorance. Second [ii], at “Perhaps it is etc.,” he explains some of his statements. In regard to the initial point he sets down three differences concerning ignorance. The first of these [i, x] is considered insofar as what is done on account of ignorance is rclated to the will in different ways. Sometimes it is opposed to the will, and then it is properly called an involuntary. But other times it is not opposed to the will but is over and above the will precisely as it is unknown. In this sense it is not called involuntary but non-voluntary.

407. He says then that what is done on account of ignorance in such a way that ignorance is the cause, is not voluntary in any case because the act of the will is not moved to it. The act of the will cannot be moved to what is entirely unknown since the will’s object is the known good. But only then is that which is done out of ignorance called involuntary—as it were opposed to the will—when on becoming known, sorrow and repentance (which is sorrow over one’s past actions) follow. A thing is sorrowful because it is opposed to the will, as is stated in the fifth book of the Metaphysics (Ch. 5, 1015 a 26 sq.; St. Th. Lect. 6, 829-830).

408. One who does something on account of ignorance and is not sorry about what he did after he knows it, for instance, if he takes silver thinking he took tin, cannot be said to have voluntarily (willingly) taken silver since he did not know that it was silver. It cannot be said that he involuntarily (unwillingly), i.e., against his will, took silver since he is not sorry that he did take silver by reason of ignorance. He seems to have acted involuntarily who has sorrow or repents for the fact that he took silver by reason of ignorance, just as if someone had, on the contrary, taken in thinking he has taken silver. But because he who does not repent is different from the man who does repent (he is said to be unwilling) let the first be called non-willing. Since he really differs from the one who is unwilling, it is better that he have a proper and separate name.

409. He sets down the second difference at “There seems to be” [i, y]. This is taken according to the difference of what is done in ignorance; for ignorance sometimes is the cause of an action, but sometimes the act proceeds from another cause. He says that a person acting on account of ignorance seems to be different from a person acting in ignorance. Sometimes one acts in ignorance but not on account of ignorance. A drunken or angry person does not act on account of ignorance but on account of drunkenness or anger. Neither of these, however, acts knowingly because ignorance is caused at the same time as the action by drunkenness and anger. Thus ignorance is concomitant with the action and is not its cause.

410. From this he concludes that as an angry person acts in ignorance and not on account of ignorance but on account of anger, so every wicked person acts not indeed on account of ignorance but partly in ignorance of the good he ought to do and of the evil he ought to avoid, inasmuch as he thinks that at this moment he should do this evil and refrain from this good. For this reason he sins because he does what he ought not to do. Men who act in ignorance universally become unjust with respect to others and wicked with respect to themselves. From this it is evident that when someone acts in ignorance, and not on account of ignorance, he does not cause an involuntary. The reason is that no one, by reason of what he does involuntarily, is unjust or wicked.

411. He assigns the third difference at “When we speak” [i, z]. This is taken from the object of the person’s ignorance. Here we must consider that ignorance can be of two kinds. According to one, a person is ignorant of what he ought to do or avoid. He says this is ignorance of what is fitting—of what he ought to be doing. This ignorance does not cause an involuntary because ignorance of this kind cannot happen to a man with the use of reason except from negligence. The reason is that everyone is bound to be solicitous about knowing what he is obliged to do and to avoid. Hence if a man does not wish to avoid (as he is bound) ignorance that is considered voluntary, it follows that what is done through this ignorance should not be judged involuntary. This is the meaning of the saying that one does not wish an involuntary (i.e., what is by nature an involuntary) if he is ignorant of what he does, that is, of what is suitable under the circumstances. Of this someone can be ignorant in two ways:

412. One is in a particular choice. For instance, because of sensual desire a person thinks he should commit fornication at this time. The other way is in general, as is evident in one who is of the opinion that fornication is always lawful. Both kinds of ignorance concern what is done. Hence neither causes an involuntary. This is what is meant by saying that that ignorance accompanying choice (by which a person thinks he should do this evil at this time) is not the cause of an involuntary but is rather the cause of vice or sin. Neither is the ignorance that is of a general nature the cause of an involuntary since a person is blamed on account of ignorance of this kind. But no one is censured because of an involuntary, as was said previously (410).

413. The other ignorance (the first is in 411) is of singular conditions, for instance, that this woman is married, that this man is a parent, that this place is holy. It is about these conditions and on them that human activity is exercised; by reason of a justifiable ignorance of such conditions that a person deserves mercy and pardon because he who is ignorant of one of these conditions acts involuntarily. Therefore, it is obvious that ignorance of particular circumstances of this kind—not however ignorance of what one should do—is the cause of an involuntary.

414. Then [ii], at “Perhaps it is not,” he explains what he had referred to: those circumstances the ignorance of which is a cause of an involuntary. In regard to this he does three things. First [ii, x] he points out what these circumstances are. Next [ii, y], at “No one but etc.,” he shows in what way ignorance of them may be present. Last [ii, z], at “Since ignorance can be etc.,” he explains how ignorance of these circumstances is the cause of an involuntary. On the first point we must consider that circumstances are nothing else but certain particular conditions of a human act. These can be taken either on the part of the causes of the act or on the part of the act itself. The cause of the act is efficient or final. The efficient cause is either the principal or the instrumental agent. On the part of the act three things can be understood: the genus of the act, the matter or the object itself, and the mode of acting. In agreement with this the Philosopher here places six circumstances. He says that it is not out of place-indeed it is very appropriate-to determine what and how many are these particular circumstances, the ignorance of which is the cause of an involuntary. He uses an adverb (forsitan) indicating doubt, as in many other places of this book because of the uncertainty in moral matters.

415. Enumerating then these particular things he names “who,” which refers to the person of the principal agent; “what is done,” which refers to the genus of the act; and “concerning what,” which refers to the matter or the object. But he adds also “concerning this”—which refers to the measure of the act—as belonging to the agent, i.e., place or time, since he says “or in what he operates.” The reason is that all external things seem to have relation to the human act. Cicero includes what we call “concerning what” under “what.” What is here called “in what” he divides into two circumstances: time and place.

416. So far as concerns the instrumental agent Aristotle adds: sometimes also “by what” (quo), for instance an instrument, since not every action is performed through an instrument, for example, understanding and willing. In place of this some put “by what means” (helps), for one to whom help is given uses help as an instrument. Referring to the end he says “for the sake of which,” for instance, a doctor cuts for the sake of health. Referring to the mode of acting he says “and in what manner,” for example, quietly, or violently, that is, strongly.

417. Next [ii, y], at “No one but,” he shows in what way there may be ignorance about the preceding circumstances. He says that only a totally insane person is ignorant of all these circumstances. Among the other circumstances it is obvious that a man cannot be ignorant of what is meant by the one acting, because in this case he would be ignorant about himself (which is impossible). But someone can be ignorant of what he does, as those who disclose things that should not be disclosed say in excusing themselves that it slipped their mind or they never knew that such things were secret, i.e., were not to be spoken. Thus were revealed the sacred mysteries or secrets by Aeschylus, a certain poet. He who speaks such things is ignorant of what he does because he does not know this is a revelation of secrets.

418. He gives another example so far as concerns what is done, for instance, an archer wishing to teach a pupil how archery is practised shoots an arrow into something. Such a one does not know what he does because he does not know he is shooting an arrow. Then he exemplifies ignorance “concerning what” (circa quid), thus if a man should mistake his son for an enemy besieging his home, and kill him, just as a certain woman named Merope killed her son. So it is obvious that in a case of this kind a man knows what he does because he knows he kills, but he does not know the “concerning what” of his act because he does not know he kills his son.

419. Then he gives an example of ignorance of the instrument, thus if a lancer should use a piked lance that he thought was blunted or if a thrower of rocks thinks what he throws are pumice stones.

420. Farther on he gives an example of ignorance of the end. He says that a doctor or a blood-letter lancing a patient to make him better, or a teacher striking a pupil to correct him, may take a life. These have ignorance of the end, not indeed of what they intended but of what followed from their action. They were ignorant that their action would lead to such an end.

421. Last, he illustrates ignorance of the manner of the action, for instance, a man thinks he is tapping with his fist to show how to hit like boxers do but he strikes with force. Such a man strikes with force in ignorance or unknowingly.

422. At “Since ignorance can be” [ii, z], he shows how ignorance of the previously named things is a cause of the voluntary. First [aa] he says that since ignorance can be concerned with any one of the five afore-mentioned that concur with the action, that man seems to act unwillingly or involuntarily who is ignorant of one of the preceding. This does not apply in equal measure to all but it does apply especially if the ignorance concerns the most important circumstances.

423. Next [bb], at “These seem to be,” he shows what he considers the most important circumstances. He says that the principal circumstances seem to be those on which the act takes place, i.e., the object or the matter of the act, and that “for the sake of which” or the end, because acts are specified by their objects. just as the matter is the object of the external act so the end is the object of the internal act of the will.

424. Last [cc], at “For an action,” he says that ignorance of these very things is not enough for an involuntary. He states that although an action may be called involuntary according to the preceding ignorance, a further requirement is that the action be connected with sadness and repentance, as was pointed out before (408).

LECTURE 4

Definition of the Voluntary

Chapter 1

I.    HE SHOWS WHAT THE VOLUNTARY IS. — 425

Since the involuntary comes about on account of force and ignorance, the voluntary seems to originate within the agent who has knowledge of the circumstances of the action.

II.  HE DISMISSES AN ERRONEOUS VIEW OF IT.

      A.  First he explains (the error). — 426

Perhaps it is not accurate to call involuntary the things that are done on account of anger or sensual desire.

      B.  Second he rejects this opinion for five reasons.

            a.   The first. — 427

(1) The main reason is that neither animals nor children would then act voluntarily.

            b.  The second. — 428

(2) Are none of the things done by reason of sensual desire or anger done voluntarily? Are the noble actions done voluntarily but the evil involuntarily? The latter views seems ridiculous since there is one cause of all our actions. Likewise it seems unreasonable to call involuntary the things we ought to seek. We ought to be angry under certain circumstances, and we ought to desire certain things, for example, health and learning.

            c.   The third reason. — 429

(3) Involuntary things seemingly are accompanied by sadness. But what is done in agreement with sensual desire seems to be done with pleasure.

            d.  The fourth reason. — 430

(4) Further what difference is there from the viewpoint of involuntariness between sins committed after reflection and sins committed on account b of anger? It is our duty to avoid both.

            e.   The fifth reason. — 431

(5) The irrational passions seem to be truly human. So too then are the actions of man proceeding from anger and sensual desire. It is unreasonable, therefore, to regard these as involuntary.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

425. After the Philosopher has considered the involuntary, he next turns his attention to the voluntary. First [I] he shows what the voluntary is. Then [II], at “Perhaps it is not accurate etc.,” he dismisses an erroneous view of it. On the first point we must consider that although the term involuntary seems to indicate the removal of the voluntary, nevertheless the causes lead us to understand that a thing is called voluntary by reason of the removal of the things causing an involuntary, such as violence and ignorance. Because every single thing is known through its cause, he gives the definition of the voluntary by taking away the cause of the involuntary. He says that since the involuntary comes about through physical compulsion and ignorance, as has been determined previously (386), the voluntary seems to be: that which the agent himself originates (thus violence is excluded) in such a way that the agent knows the individual circumstances that concur with the action. Thus ignorance as the cause of the involuntary is excluded.

426. Then [II], at “Perhaps it is,” he rejects an error. First [A] he explains it. Certain people were of the opinion that not everything, which the agent originates through a knowledge of circumstances, is a voluntary. It can happen that that principle which is from within is not the rational appetitive faculty called the will (voluntas), whence the voluntary receives its name, but a passion of the sensitive appetitive faculty, for instance, anger, sensual desire, or something else of this kind. This, the Philosopher says, is not an accurate statement. It should be noted that because the passions of the sensitive appetitive faculty are aroused by external things grasped by means of an external sense, this error seems to be of the same nature as the one he discarded previously (400-405), according to which it was indicated that external things bring about violence. It was imperative to state that in that context it was a question of violence, whose origin is external. But this must be treated here where it is a question of the voluntary, the principle of which is intrinsic, for the passions are within us.

427. Second [B], at “The main reason is,” he rejects this opinion for five reasons. Here is his primary reason [a]. Whatever irrational animals and children do, they do in conformity with the affections of the sensitive faculty, and not in conformity with the rational faculty because they lack the use of reason. If then the things that are done through anger, sensual desire, and the other affections of the sensitive faculty were involuntary it would follow that neither animals nor children would act voluntarily. But agents are said to act voluntarily, not because they operate under the impulse of the will, but because they operate of their own accord by their proper movement in such a way that they are not moved by any external thing. It follows then that things done by reason of anger or sensual desire are voluntary.

428. He gives the second reason at “Are none” [b]. If the things that are done because of anger or sensual desire are not voluntary, either this is universally true or it is true of evil actions, not of good actions, so that the good actions that a person does by reason of passion he does voluntarily but the evil actions involuntarily. The proponents of this view were probably influenced by the fact that good actions conform to and evil actions are opposed to reason. But this second supposition seems unacceptable since the one cause of all human actions, both good and bad, is the will. A man does not rush to do whatsoever is rendered desirable by anger or sensual desire without the consent of the rational appetitive faculty. Likewise, the first supposition seems unreasonable, namely, that someone should call not-voluntary the good things that he ought to seek even according to passion, for the reason by means of the will incites to the things we ought to seek. We ought to be angry under certain conditions, for instance, to curb sin. Likewise we ought to desire certain things, for example, health and learning. It remains false then to hold that the things done on account of passion are not voluntary.

429. He assigns the third reason at “Involuntary things” [c]. It is this. Actions resulting from violence are accompanied by sadness, but those which are done in agreement with sensual desire are done with pleasure. Consequently they are not involuntary.

430. The fourth reason given at “Further, what” [d], is this. As has been pointed out before (383, 393), voluntary faults are to be censured and avoided. This cannot be said of the involuntary because a man is neither able to avoid these nor is he censured on account of them. But as sins that are committed after reflection, that is, with deliberation, are to be avoided and are blameworthy so also sins that are committed on account of anger or another passion. A man can, by means of his will, resist passion. Hence if he does a disgraceful act because of passion he is blamed. Therefore, they do not differ from things done by deliberation so far as they are voluntary.

431. He assigns the fifth reason at “The irrational passions” [e]. Irrational passions, i.e., of the sensitive appetitive faculty, seem to be human insofar as the sensitive appetitive faculty can obey reason, as was stated before (272). Therefore, the actions proceeding from anger, sensual desire, and the other passions are human. But no involuntary operation is human, for neither praise nor blame are imputed to a man who acts involuntarily. Therefore, it is unreasonable to say that things done out of passion are involuntary.

LECTURE 5

Choice

Chapter 2

I.    HE GIVES AN EXPLANATION OF CHOICE ITSELF.

      A.  He shows that it belongs, to our present study to consider choice. — 432-433

After the treatise on the voluntary and the involuntary, we naturally proceed to a consideration of choice. Such a study is especially proper to virtue, for moral practices are judged by choice rather than by actions.

      B.  He investigates the nature of choice.

            A’ He investigates its genus. — 434-436

Choice certainly is something voluntary, but choice and voluntary are not identical, for the voluntary is more extensive in range. Children and all the brutes participate in voluntariety but not in choice. Then too the things done on the spur of the moment are called voluntary but they are not said to be done by choice.

            B’ (He investigates) its different aspects.

                   1.   HE EXPLAINS HIS INTENT. — 437

Those who say that choice is sensual desire, or anger, or wish, or opinion of some sort do not speak accurately.

                   2.   HE PROVES IT.

                         a.   He shows first that choice is not sensual desire.

                               i.    He gives four reasons. The first. — 438

Choice does not belong to the brutes while sensual desire and anger are common both to men and brutes.

                                ii.   Second reason. — 439

The incontinent man acts in conformity with sensual desire but not in conformity with choice. But the continent man on the contrary acts from choice and not from sensual desire.

                               iii. Third reason. — 440

Sensual desire is opposed to choice, but one desire is not contrary to an other.

                               iv.  Fourth reason. — 441

Sensual desire is accompanied by pleasure or sorrow, but choice is not necessarily associated with sorrow or pleasure.

                         b.  (He shows) that... (choice) is not anger. — 442

There is less argument in favor of choice being anger, for the things done on account of anger do not seem to be done by choice.

                         c.   (He shows) that... (choice) is not wishing.

                               i.    First he sets forth his proposition. — 443

Choice is not identical with wishing although it is closely connected with it.

                               ii.   Then he proves it.

                                     x.    BY THREE REASONS, OF WHICH THE FIRST IS THIS. — 444

Choice is not concerned with impossibles, and if a person should say that he does choose the impossible, he will appear foolish. Wishing on the other hand can be directed to the impossible, for instance, to live forever.

                                     y.    SECOND REASON. — 445

Wishing can be concerned with things not done by oneself, for instance, that a man pretending to be an athlete may win, or even that a man who is really an athlete may win. No one, however, chooses these things but only those that he thinks he can do himself.

                                     z.    THIRD REASON. — 446

Moreover, wishing is directed rather to the end, and choice to the means. Thus we wish health but we choose the remedies that restore us to health. Likewise, we wish to be happy and we do say this. Yet it is not suitable to say that we elect or choose to be happy.

                               iii. He deduces the origin of the difference between choice and wishing. — 447

In general, choice seems to be directed to the things which are within our power.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

432. After the Philosopher has treated the voluntary and the involuntary, he here makes a study of choice. First he gives an explanation of choice itself [I], and then [Lect. 7, II] of counsel (which is placed in the definition of choice) at “Should men take counsel about all things etc.” (B. 1112 a 19). Regarding the initial point he does two things. First [A] he shows that it belongs to our present study to consider choice. Next [B], at “Choice certainly is something,” he investigates the nature of choice. He says first that, after the treatise (382-431) on the voluntary and the involuntary, he will undertake a passing consideration of choice. Here then he proposes briefly the things necessary to study choice. He proves here that it belongs to our science to consider choice because choice seems especially proper to virtue, which is our principal concern at present.

433. Its appropriateness is clearly shown by the fact that although both inner choice and outward action flow from the habit of virtue, virtuous or vicious practices are judged rather by choice than by outward works. Every virtuous man chooses good but sometimes he does not do it because of some external hindrances. On the other hand the vicious man sometimes performs a virtuous deed not out of virtuous choice but out of fear or for some unbecoming motive, for instance, vainglory or something else of this kind. Hence it obviously pertains to our present purpose to consider choice.

434. Then [B], at “Choice certainly” he shows what choice is. First [A’] he investigates its genus, and next [B’] its different aspects, at “Those who say that choice etc.” Last [Lect. 6, C’], at “What, then, is its genus etc.” (B. 1112 a 13), he concludes the definition. The voluntary is the genus of choice because it is universally predicated of choice and of other things besides. Hence first he says that every choice is voluntary, but choice and the voluntary are not identical, for the voluntary is more extensive. He proves this in twofold fashion:

435. The first proof he gives by the words “... participate in voluntariety etc.” It is this. Children and the various brutes participate in voluntariety inasmuch as of their own accord they do things by their own movement, as has been noted above (427). But they do not communicate in choice because they do not act with deliberation, which is required for choice. Therefore, the voluntary is more extensive than choice.

436. He assigns a second reason by the words “Then too the things done on the spur of the moment etc.” It is this. The things we do on the spur of the moment are called voluntary because their origin is within us. However, they are not said to be according to choice because they are not done with deliberation. Therefore, the voluntary is more extensive than choice.

437. Next [B’], at “Those who say,” he investigates the different aspects of choice, proving that choice differs from things with which it appears to agree. On this question he does two things. First [1] he explains his intent. Then [2], at “Choice does not belong etc.,” he proves it. He says first that some philosophers have held that choice is sensual desire because both imply a movement of the appetitive faculty toward good. Others maintained that choice is anger, perhaps because in both there is a certain use of reason. The angry person uses reason inasmuch as he judges that an injury received deserves punishment. Still others who consider that choice is without passion ascribe choice to the rational part, either so far as concerns the appetitive faculty (saying it is wishing) or so far as it concerns perception (saying it is opinion). In these four states all the principles of human actions are included in a simple way: reason to which opinion belongs; the rational appetitive faculty that is the will; the sensitive appetitive faculty divided into irascible to which belong anger, and concupiscible to which belong sensual desire. The Philosopher says, however, that those who hold that choice is one of these do not speak accurately.

438. At “Choice does not” [2], he proves his proposition. He shows first [a] that choice is not sensual desire; next [b], at “There is less argument etc.,” that it is not anger; third [c], at “Choice is not identical etc.,” that it is not wishing; last [Lect. 6, d], that it is not opinion, at “Choice is not opinion etc.” (B. 1111 b 31). Regarding the first he gives four reasons. The first of these [a, i], common to sensual desire and anger, is this. Sensual desire and anger are found both among men and brutes. But choice is not met with among the brutes as has been said (435). Therefore, choice is neither sensual desire nor anger.

439. He gives the second reason at “The incontinent man” [a, ii]. It is this. If choice were sensual desire, whoever acts with choice would act with sensual desire. This, however, is false because the incontinent man acts in conformity with sensual desire but not in conformity with choice, for he does not reasonably direct his choice because of his sensual desire. But the continent man on the contrary acts from choice and not from sensual desire, which he resists by choice, as will be made evident in the seventh book (1143)Therefore, choice is not the same as sensual desire.

440. He assigns the third reason at “Sensual desire is opposed” [a, iii]. It is this. Sensual desire is opposed to choice in one who is continent or incontinent. One chooses according to reason the opposite of that which the other desires according to the sensitive appetitive faculty. But the sensual desire in the one is not opposed to the sensual desire in the other, because the whole sensual desire of each one tends to the same thing, the pleasure of the senses. But this must not be understood in the sense that one desire may not be opposed to another. We do find desires of contraries, for instance, one man desires to move and another to remain in repose. Therefore it is evident that choice is not identical with sensual desire.

441. The fourth reason, given at “Sensual desire is accompanied” [a, iv], is this. Sensual desire is always accompanied by pleasure because of the presence of the thing desired, or by sorrow because of the absence of that thing. Every passion is followed by pleasure or sorrow, as has been pointed out in the second book (296). But choice is not necessarily associated with pleasure or sorrow, for it can occur without any passion by the judgment of reason alone. Therefore, choice is not sensual desire.

442. Then [b], at “There is less argument,” he shows that choice is not the same as anger. As to this, he says that there is less argument in favor of choice being anger than sensual desire. The reason is that even according to appearances the things done from anger do not seem to be done by choice because, by reason of the swiftness of the movement of wrath, the actions done through anger are very sudden. Although in anger there is some use of reason, insofar as the angry person begins to attend to his reason as it judges that an injury ought to be avenged, nevertheless he does not perfectly heed reason in determining the manner and the order of the vengeance. Hence anger especially excludes deliberation, which is necessary for choice. But sensual desire does not act so suddenly. Hence things done in conformity with sensual desire do not seem to be remote from choice as the things done out of anger.

443. Next [c], at “Choice is not identical,” he explains the difference between choice and wish. First [c’ I] he sets forth his proposition. Then [c, ii], at “Choice is not concerned etc.,” he proves it. Last [c, iii], at “In general, choice,” he deduces the origin of the difference between choice and wishing. He says first that choice is not even wishing although it seems to be closely connected with wishing. Both belong to the one power, the rational appetitive faculty or the will. Wishing designates an act of this power related to good absolutely. But choice designates an act of the same power related to good according as it belongs to an act by which we are ordered to some good.

444. At “Choice is not concerned” [c, ii], he proves the statement by three reasons, of which the first is this [x]. Because choice refers to our activity, it is said that choice is not concerned with impossible things. If a person should say that he chooses something impossible he will appear foolish. But wishing can be directed to any good even the impossible because it regards good absolutely. Thus a man can wish to be immortal, an impossible thing according to the condition of this perishable life. Therefore, choice and wish are not the same.

445. He gives the second reason at “Wishing can be” [y]. The wishing of someone can be concerned with things not done by himself. Thus he who is a spectator at a duel can wish that a pretender playing an assumed role may win (for example, a man who comes into the ring as a boxer when he is not a boxer) or even that one who is really an athlete may win. No one, however, chooses these things that are done by another but only those that he thinks he can do himself. Therefore, choice differs from wishing.

446. He assigns the third reason at “Moreover, wishing.” He says that wishing is directed rather to the end than to the means because we wish the means on account of the end. But that for the sake of which something exists is itself greater. But choice concerns only the means and not the end itself because the end as already predetermined is presupposed. The means, however, are sought by us as things to be ordered to the end. Thus we wish health principally since it is the end of healing. But we choose the remedies by which we are restored to health. Likewise we wish to be happy—happiness is our ultimate end—and we say we wish this. Yet it is not suitable to say that we elect or choose to be happy. Therefore, choice is not the same as wish.

447. Then [c, iii], at “In general, choice,” he gives the root of the whole difference to which all the previous differences in general are referred. He says that choice seems to be directed to the things that are within our power. This is the reason why it does not concern impossibles, things done by others, nor the end that, for the most part, is prearranged for us by nature.

LECTURE 6

Choice and Opinion

Chapter 2

      d.   He shows that choice is not the same as opinion.

            i.    Choice is not the same as opinion in general.

                   y.   HE PROVES THE STATEMENT BY TWO REASONS.... FIRST. — 448

Choice is not opinion, for opinion can concern everything—no less eternal and impossible things than things lying within our power.

                   z.   SECOND REASON. — 449

Then, too, opinion is divided into false and true but not into good and bad, as is the case with choice. Perhaps there is no one who maintains that choice is generally identical with opinion.

            ii.   Choice is not the same as... particular opinion.

                   v.   HE PROVES THIS BY (FIVE) REASONS. THE FIRST. — — 450-451

Nor is choice identical with a particular opinion. In choosing good or bad things we are said to be good or bad but this is not the case in forming opinions about them.

                   w.  SECOND REASON. — 452

We choose to accept or reject this or anything pertaining to our actions. But we have an opinion as to what a thing is or what effect it has or how it is to be used. However, accepting or rejecting something is hardly a matter of opinion.

                   x.   THIRD REASON. — 453

Choice is rather praised because it chooses what it ought—as it were—in the right way, while opinion is praised because it has the truth about something.

                   y.   FOURTH REASON. — 454

We choose those things that we especially know are good. But we have an opinion about things we are not sure of.

                   z.   FIFTH REASON. — 455

And it is not necessarily the same people who make the best choices and form true opinions. Some men form a true opinion of what is better but on account of bad will they do not make the right choice.

            iii. He raises a doubt. — 456

Whether opinion should be said to precede choice or follow it, does not matter, for we do not intend to determine this but whether choice is identical with a particular opinion.

C’  He concludes the definition. — 457

What then is its genus, what its specific difference, since it is none of the things previously mentioned? Seemingly it is a voluntary. However, not every voluntary—but certainly the deliberately intentional voluntary—is a thing chosen, for choice must be accompanied by reason and intellect. Even the name seems to imply that one thing be preferred to others.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

448. After the Philosopher has shown that choice is not the same as sensual desire; nor anger, which belongs to the sensitive appetitive faculty; nor wishing, which belongs to the rational appetitive faculty, he here shows [d] that choice is not the same as opinion, which pertains to reason itself. He illustrates this point by a threefold consideration. First [i] he shows that choice is not the same as opinion in general. Next [ii], at “Nor is choice etc.,” he shows that choice is not the same as that particular opinion that concerns itself with the things we do. Last [iii], at “Whether opinion should be,” he raises a doubt (which he leaves unsolved). He says first—this is apparent from the premises—that choice is not the same as opinion in general. He proves the statement by two reasons, the first of which is this [i, y]. Opinion can concern everything—no less eternal and impossible things than things lying within our power. But choice concerns these things only within our capacity, as was just noted (447). Therefore, choice is not the same as opinion.

449. He gives the second reason at “Then, too, opinion is divided etc.” [i, z]. It is this. The things that are distinguished by various reasons are said to differ and not to be the same. Opinion, however, is divided into true and false since it pertains to the faculty of knowledge, the object of which is the truth. Opinion is not divided into good and bad as is the case with choice which belongs to the appetitive faculty, the object of which is the good. He concludes from this that choice is not the same as opinion in general. This is so obvious that no one affirms the contrary.

450. Then [ii], at “Nor is choice,” he shows that choice is not identical with that opinion which deals with the things we do. He proves this by (five) reasons, the first of which is this [ii, v]. From the fact that we choose good or bad things we are said to be such, that is, good or bad. But from the fact that we have an opinion about good or bad things, or about true or false things, we are not said to be good or bad. Therefore choice is not identical with opinion, which refers to eligible things.

451. The reason for this difference is that a man is not called good or bad on account of his capabilities but on account of his actions (as noted in the ninth book of the Metaphysics: Ch. 9, 1051 a 4-15; St. Th. Lect. 10, 1883-1885), that is, not because he is able to act well but because he does in fact act well. When a man understands perfectly he becomes able to act well but he does not yet act well. Thus one who has the habit of grammar is able by that very fact to speak correctly, but that he actually speak correctly he must will it. The reason is that a habit is that quality by which a person acts when he wishes, as the Commentator says on the third book De Anima. It is obvious then that good will makes a man act well according to every capability or habit obedient to reason. Therefore a man is called good simply because he has a good will. However, from the fact that he has a good intellect he is not called good simply but relatively good, for example, a good grammarian or a good musician. Therefore, since choice pertains to the will but opinion to the intellect, we are called good or bad by reason of choice but not by reason of opinion.

452. He gives the second reason at “We choose to accept” [ii, w]. Choice has to do especially with our actions. We choose to accept or reject this thing, or whatever else there is that pertains to our actions. But opinion principally refers to things. We have an opinion as to what this thing is (for instance, what bread is) or what effect it has or how one must use it. Opinion, however, does not principally concern our actions, for example, that we are of an opinion about accepting or rejecting something. The reason is that our actions are particular contingent things and quickly passing. Hence a knowledge or opinion of them is not often sought for the sake of the truth in them but only because of something done. Therefore choice is not identical with opinion.

453. He assigns a third reason at “Choice is” [ii, x]. It is this. The good of choice consists in a kind of rectitude, that is, the appetitive faculty rightly orders something to an end. This is what he means saying that choice is rather praised because it chooses what it ought, as it were in the right way, while opinion is praised because it has the truth about something. Thus the good and perfection of choice is rectitude but the perfection of opinion consists in truth. Things which have different perfections are themselves different. Therefore choice is not opinion.

454. The fourth reason, given at “We choose those things” [ii, y], is this. Choice is accompanied by certitude, for we choose those things which we especially know are good. But opinion lacks certitude, for we have an opinion about the things we are not sure are true. Therefore choice and opinion are not identical.

455. He assigns the fifth reason at “And it is not necessarily” [ii, z]. if opinion and choice were identical, those who make the best choices and those who have true opinions about them would necessarily be identified. This is obviously false, however, for some men form a true opinion in general of what is better but on account of bad will they do not choose what is better but what is worse. Therefore choice and opinion are not identical.

456. At “Whether opinion” [iii] he raises a doubt whether opinion should be said to precede choice or follow it. He states that it does not matter for the present because we do not intend to determine the order of these things but only whether choice is identical with a particular opinion. Nevertheless, we must know that opinion, since it pertains to the faculty of knowledge, strictly speaking, precedes choice pertaining to the appetitive faculty, which is moved by the cognoscitive power. However, it sometimes happens accidentally that opinion follows choice, for instance, when a person on account of the affection for things he loves changes the opinion he formerly held.

457. Then [C’], at “What then,” he shows what choice is. He says that, since it is none of the four things previously mentioned, we must consider what it is according to its genus and what according to its specific difference. As to its genus, seemingly it is a voluntary. However, not every voluntary is a thing chosen (as has been pointed out before, 434-436), but only the deliberately intentional voluntary. That this difference should be given attention is clear from the fact that counsel is an act of the reason, and choice itself must be accompanied by an act of reason and intellect. The very name—meaning that one be accepted rather than another—seems to imply or signify this in a hidden way. It pertains to deliberative reason to prefer one to others.

LECTURE 7

Counsel

Chapter 3

II.  HE TAKES UP THE QUESTION OF COUNSEL.

      A.  He treats counsel in itself.

            A’.      He shows the things about which counsel ought to be taken.

                   1.   HE PUTS FORWARD HIS PROPOSITION.

                         a.   He proposes the question he intends to treat. — 458

Do men take counsel about all things in such a way that everything is worthy of deliberation, or are some things not objects of counsel?

                         b.  He explains the proposed question. — 459

A thing must not be called worthy of deliberation because some foolish or insane person takes counsel about it but because men of good sense do so.

                   2.   HE EXECUTES IT.

                         a.   He shows where counsel should function, first by distinguishing things according to their own causes.

                               i.    He shows where counsel is unnecessary.

                                     v.    HE SAYS THAT NO ONE SHOULD TAKE COUNSEL ABOUT ETERNAL THINGS. — 460

No one takes counsel about: (1) eternal things, for instance, about the whole universe or the incommensurability of the diagonal and the side of a square;

                                     w.   NO ONE TAKES COUNSEL ABOUT THINGS IN MOTION... UNIFORM. — 461

(2) things that are in motion provided their motion is always uniform either by necessity or from nature or on account of some other cause, for instance, the solstices and the risings of the sun;

                                     x.    DELIBERATION IS UNNECESSARY ABOUT THINGS IN MOTION FOLLOWING THE SAME PATTERN. — 462

(3) things that sometimes happen otherwise, for instance, droughts and rains;

                                     y.    COUNSEL IS NOT TAKEN ABOUT THINGS THAT HAPPEN BY CHANCE. — 463

(4) things that happen by chance, for example, the finding of a treasure;

                                     Z.   MEN DO NOT TAKE COUNSEL... ABOUT ALL HUMAN THINGS.464

(5) all human things, for instance, the Spartans do not take counsel about how the Scythians ought best to live their lives. None of these things will take place by our efforts.

                               ii.   He infers the areas with which counsel does deal. — 465

We do take counsel about practicable things within our power.

                               iii. He shows that the conclusion follows from the premises. — 466

There is actually no other class of things left. Seemingly the causes are nature, necessity, and chance, to which must be added the intellect and anything else causing what is done by man. Each man takes counsel about those practicable matters which can be done by him.

                         b.  (He shows where counsel should function) by distinguishing things according to every cause.

                               i.    He shows in the arts where counsel is taken. — 467

About certain self-sufficient branches of instruction counsel is not taken, for instance, about writing the letters of the alphabet, for there is no doubt about how the letters must be formed. But counsel is taken about whatever is determined by us.

                               ii.   In these matters counsel is not taken in the same way. — 468

In these matters counsel is not always taken in the same way, for instance, in regard to things pertaining to the art of medicine, to business and to navigation. In all these—inasmuch as they are less certain—we take more counsel than in gymnastics. The same is to be understood of other arts.

                               iii. He shows the difference relative to the necessity of counsel. — 469

It is more necessary to take counsel in the arts than in the sciences, for more doubts arise in the arts.

                         c.   (He shows where counsel should function) by distinguishing things according to the qualities of the things themselves.

                               i.    Counsel has to do with things that occur more frequently. — 470

Counsel has to concern things occurring more frequently.

                               ii.   Counsel must attend to those situations in which no determination has been made. — 471

It must concern uncertain things where it has not been determined in what way they will come to pass.

                               iii. We take others into our confidence for advice in things of importance. — 472

We invite counsellors in matters of importance not trusting ourselves as capable of coining to a decision.

COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS

458. After the Philosopher has finished the treatise on choice, he here [II] takes up the question of counsel. First [A] he treats counsel in itself; and then [Lect. 9; B], at “The objects of counsel etc.” (B. 1113 a 3), he treats it in comparison with choice. On the initial point he does two things. First [A’] he shows the things about which counsel ought to be taken. Next [Lect. 8; B’], at “We do not take counsel about ends etc.” (B.1112 b 13), he treats the method and order of taking counsel. He handles the first consideration in two steps. First [1] he puts forward his proposition; and then [2], he executes it at “... about: (1) eternal things etc.” In regard to this first he also does two things. Initially [1, a] he proposes the question he intends to treat. The question is: should men take counsel about all things in such a way that everything is worthy of deliberation, or are some things not objects of counsel?

459. Next [1, b], at “A thing must not,” he explains the proposed question with the observation that a thing is not said to be worthy of deliberation from the fact that sometimes counsel is taken in the matter by some foolish person who perversely uses his reason, or by an insane person entirely lacking the use of reason. But something is deemed worthy of deliberation inasmuch as men with good sense do deliberate about it. Men of this type take counsel only about things that of their nature require careful consideration and that are properly said to be worthy of deliberation. Foolish people sometimes deliberate even about things wherein no counsel is required.

460. Then [2], at “... about: (1) eternal things,” he shows where counsel should function, first [2, a] by distinguishing things according to their own causes; next [2, b], at “About certain etc.,” by distinguishing things according to every cause; and last [2, c], at “Counsel has to concern etc.,” by distinguishing things according to the qualities of the things themselves. On the first point he does (three) things. First [a, i] he shows where counsel is unnecessary. Then [a, ii], at “But we do take counsel etc.,” he infers the areas with which counsel does deal. Last [a, iii], at “There is actually etc.,” he shows that the conclusion follows from the premises. In regard to the first, five considerations require his attention. First [i, v] he says that no one takes counsel about eternal things, that is, about things existing always and without motion. Examples of this sort are either those, the substances of which are not subject to motion (as separated substances and the whole universe itself), or those which, even though they exist in movable matter, nevertheless according to reason are separated from such matter, as mathematical entities. Hence he gives the example of the diagonal of a square and its rib or side—no one takes counsel about the commensurability of such things.

461. Next [i, w], at “things that are in motion,” he says that no one takes counsel even about things that are in action provided their motion is always uniform. This uniformity of motion may be either of necessity and not by reason of any other cause (as are those things which are of themselves necessary) or from the nature of movable bodies or through the agency of some separated cause as immaterial substances, movers of the heavenly bodies, about which he speaks here. Hence he takes an example from the revolutions or circular motions of the sun and its risings, and so forth.

462. Third [i, x], at “things that sometimes,” he says that deliberation is unnecessary about things in motion and usually following the same pattern, even though sometimes in a minor number of cases they happen otherwise. Such are the droughts that generally occur in summer and the rains that commonly fall in, winter; although this may at times vary.

463. Fourth [i, y], at “things that happen,” he says that counsel is not taken about things that happen by chance as the finding of a treasure. just as the things spoken of above (461-462) do not depend on our action, so things happening by chance cannot depend upon our forethought because they are unforeseen and beyond our control.

464. Fifth [i, z], at “all human things,” he says, as men do not take counsel about necessary, natural, and fortuitous things, so neither do they take counsel about all human things. Thus the Spartans do not take counsel about how the Scythians—who dwell a long way from them—ought best to live their lives. He then subjoins a common reason valid in all the afore-mentioned cases when he says “None of these things will take place etc.,” because none of these things that are necessary or natural or fortuitous or done by other men take place by reason of our efforts.

465. Then [a, ii], at “But we do take counsel,” he concludes as it were from the premises about the Proper field for counsel. He says that men take counsel about practicable things within us, that is, in our power. Counsel is ordered to action.

466. Next [a, iii], at “There is actually,” he shows that this follows from the premises because, besides the things just mentioned about which it has been indicated that counsel does not apply, there remain these situations within us on whose behalf counsel is required. He proves his contention by separating the causes. Seemingly there are four causes of things: nature, which is the principle of motion either in the case of things always moved in the same way or of things for the most part preserving uniform motion; necessity, which is the cause of things existing always in the same way without motion; fortune, an accidental cause outside the intention of the agent, under which is also included chance. Besides these causes there is the intellect and whatever else is man’s agent, as the will, the senses, and other principles of this kind. This cause is different in different men so that each takes counsel about those practicable matters which can be done by him. From this it follows that counsel is not taken about things done by other causes, as already noted (464).

467. At “About certain” [2, b] he shows about what subjects counsel can be taken in the creative arts according to which we do what is within our power. On this point he does (three) things. First [b, i] he shows in the arts where counsel is taken and where it is unnecessary. He says that those creative arts which have a fixed mode of procedure and are self-sufficient to the extent that what is done rests on nothing, extrinsic do not require counsel, as writing the letters of the alphabet. The reason for this is that we deliberate only about doubtful matters. And there is no doubt about how a letter should be formed because there is a fixed method of writing which is not doubtful and the written work depends only on the art and hand of the scribe. But counsel is taken about those situations in which we must fix for ourselves in advance how to proceed since they are not certain and determined in themselves.

468. Next [b, ii], at “In these matters,” he shows that in these matters counsel is not taken in the same way but that some cases require more deliberation and others less. First he explains this difference among the creative arts themselves. He states that in those cases in which we have the final say, we do not always take counsel in the same way, that is, with equal deliberation. We deliberate more about some things which are less certain and in which we must take into consideration more external things: in the art of medicine we must be mindful of the natural strength of the sick person; in business we must assess the needs of men and the supply of goods; and in navigation we must take into account the winds. In all these, we take more counsel than in gymnastics, i.e., the arts of wrestling and exercising that have more fixed and determined methods. According as the previously mentioned arts are less settled, by so much must we take more counsel in th