BOOK X
PLEASURE, HAPPINESS
LECTURE 1
Pleasure
Chapter 1
I. HE SHOWS THAT WE MUST CONSIDER PLEASURE.
A. He proposes his intention. — 1953-1954
After these matters we ought perhaps next to discuss pleasure.
B. Three reasons why we must treat pleasure.
1. FIRST. — 1955
For it seems to be adapted especially to humankind. This is why masters of households teach children by means of pleasure and pain.
2. SECOND. — 1956-1957
Likewise, it seems that a man’s rejoicing in the things he ought and hating the things he ought has great importance for moral virtue; they extend throughout the whole of life, having influence and power for virtue and a happy life, since men choose pleasure and shun pain—motives that should not, it seems, determine our choice.
3. THIRD.
a. He enumerates the diffcrent opinions. — 1958-1959
Moreover, they (pleasure and pain) particularly admit of much uncertainty. Some people say that pleasure is a good, while others, on the contrary, maintain it is something very evil—some of them because they are convinced, and others because they think it better for human living to declare pleasure an evil, though it is not—for most men are disposed to it and are in fact slaves of pleasure. Therefore they are to be induced to the opposite, since in this way they will attain the mean.
b. He rejects a statement contained in the opinions. — 1960-1963
But perhaps this is not a wise attitude, for in questions concerning the passions and actions, arguments are less convincing than facts. Therefore, when arguments are at variance with facts they are spurned and their truth destroyed. If a man who censures b pleasure is seen in his own way to desire it, his inclination to it seems to indicate that all pleasure is desirable. For the majority of people do not draw nice distinctions. Consequently, true arguments are most useful not only for science but also for living, for when they are in accord with the facts they are accepted, and so move those who understand their truth to live by them.
These matters have been discussed sufficiently. Let us pass on to the treatment of pleasure.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
1953.After the Philosopher has finished the consideration of the moral and intellectual virtues-and of continence and friendship which have a relation to virtue-in the tenth book he intends to consider the end of virtue. First, concerning the end of virtue that perfects man in himself; then [Lect. 14], at “Have we sufficiently etc.” (B. 1179 a 33), concerning the end of virtue in relation to the common good, the good of the whole state. He discusses the first point from two aspects. First he defines pleasure which is designated by some as the end of virtue. Next [Lect. 9], at “After the discussion etc.” (B. 1176 a 30), he defines happiness, which in the opinion of everyone is the end of virtue. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [I] by way of introduction he shows we must consider pleasure. Second [Lect. 2; II], after the introduction, at “Eudoxus thought etc.” (B. 1172 b 9), he pursues his proposition. He considers the first point under two headings. First [I, A] he proposes his intention.
1954. He remarks that after the previous treatise (245-1952), it is logical for pleasure to be treated in passing, i.e., briefly. To be sure he had already treated pleasure in the seventh book (1354-1367), inasmuch as it is the object of continence. Hence there his study dwelt chiefly on sensible and bodily pleasures. But here he intends to consider pleasure as an adjunct to happiness. Therefore, he gives special attention to intellectual and spiritual pleasure.
1955. Then [II, B], at “For it seems,” he proves by three reasons why we must treat pleasure. The first [B, 1] is taken from the relation of pleasure to us. For pleasure seems in a marked degree to be naturally adapted to humankind. For this reason orakizontes, i.e., rulers of households, teach children especially by means of pleasure and pain. People who wish to induce children to good or restrain them from evil try to please the well-behaved, e.g., with small presents, and to punish those who misbehave, e.g., by whipping. Since moral philosophy considers human affairs, it is the business of moral science to treat pleasure.
1956. At “Likewise, it seeme’ he presents the second reason [B, 2], which istaken from a comparison with virtue. He says that it seems to be a particular concern of moral virtue that a mat enjoy the things he ought and hate the things he ought and grieve over them. For moral virtue consists principally in the regulation of the appetite; and this is judged by the regulation of pleasure and pain which all the movements of the appetitive part follow, as has been pointed out in the second book (296). And he adds: they, viz., pleasure and pain extend to all phases of human life, exerting great influence on man to be virtuous and live happily. This cannot happen unless his pleasures and pain are properly ordered.
1957. Men frequently choose even harmful pleasures and avoid even salutary afflictions. But it seems that the man who wishes to be virtuous and happy ought not to choose pleasure and reject pain as such, that is, commit evil deeds or omit virtuous actions on this account. And, conversely, it can be said that he must not choose to do evil or avoid good for the sake of these, i.e., to obtain pleasure and shun pain. Obviously then it is the function of moral philosophy to treat pleasure, just as it treats moral virtue and happiness.
1958. He offers a third reason [B, 3] at “Moreover, they.” It is taken from the uncertainty prevalent concerning pleasure. He discusses this point from two aspects. First [3, a] he enumerates the different opinions about pleasure, from which the uncertainty arises. Then [3, b], at “But perhaps this etc.,” he rejects a statement contained in the opinions. He says first that we must treat pleasure and pain for another reason: because they admit of much uncertainty. This is obvious from the different views of thinkers who discuss these subjects.
1959. Some say pleasure is a kind of good. Others, on the contrary, maintain that it is something very badand this in different ways. For some hold the opinion because they are convinced that it is so and believe they are speaking the truth. But others, though they may not believe that pleasure is an evil, nevertheless judge it better for human living to declare that pleasure is an evil-although it is not-to withdraw men from pleasure to which the majority are inclined (for people are in fact slaves to pleasure). For this reason men must be induced to the opposite, i.e., to have an aversion to pleasures by declaring them evil. In this way we attain the mean, that is, men use pleasures with moderation.
1960. Then [3, b], at “But perhaps this,” he rejects the last statement. It hardly seems correct for people to say what they do not believe—that pleasures are evil just to withdraw us from them, because in questions of human actions and passions we give less credence to words than to actions. For if a man does what he says is evil, he incites by his example more than he restrains by his word.
1961. The reason for this is that everyone seems to choose what appears to him good in a particular case, the object of human actions and passions. When, therefore, a man’s arguments are at variance with his clearly manifest actions, such arguments are spurned; and consequently the truth enunciated by them is destroyed. Thus it will happen in our proposition.
1962. If someone censuring all pleasure is seen to give way to a pleasure lie might give the impression that all pleasure ought to be chosen. The common people cannot determine by distinguishing this as good and that as evil, but without discrimination they accept as good what appears good in one instance. In this way, then, sound arguments seem to be useful not only for science but also for good living, for they are convincing to the extent they are in accord with actions. For this reason such arguments move those who understand their truth to live by them.
1963. Finally, he concludes in an epilogue that these matters have been discussed sufficiently. Now we must pass on to the observations made by others about pleasure.
LECTURE 2
Opinions on Pleasure as a Good
Chapter 2
II. HE CONTINUES WITH THE OPINIONS OF OTHERS.
A. The opinion of those who set pleasure in the category of good.
1. THE ARGUMENTS EUDOXUS USED TO PROVE THAT PLEASURE IS IN THE CATEGORY OF GOOD.
a. On the part of pleasure itself.
i. The opinion and argument of Eudoxus. — 1964-1965
Eudoxus thought that pleasure is an absolute good because he saw all creatures, both rational and irrational, seeking it. But in every case what is desirable is good, and what is most desirable is the greatest good. Hence the fact that all things are drawn to the same object shows that it is a most excellent good for all, since everything finds its own good just as it finds its own food. Now what is good for all and what all desire is an absolute good.
ii. Why the opinion and argument were accepted. — 1966
But his arguments were accepted because of his excellent character rather than for their merit. For he appeared to be a man moderate in the different pleasures; and consequently did not seem to defend his opinion as a lover of pleasure but because it was really true.
b. On the part of the contrary. — 1967
He also thought that his view was otherwise substantiated by pleasure’s contrary. Since pain in itself is an object to be avoided by all, so its opposite is likewise an object to be chosen.
2. THE ARGUMENTS EUDOXUS USED TO PROVE THAT (PLEASURE) IS THE GREATEST GOOD.
a. First. — 1968
Moreover, that is most worthy of choice which we choose not because or for the sake of another. Now, it is admitted that pleasure is such an object. For no one asks to what end a man is pleased, so that pleasure in itself is desirable.
b. Second.
i. The argument. — 1969
Further, pleasure added to any good makes it more desirable. Thus the addition of pleasure to just or temperate action enhances its goodness.
ii. The flaw in this argument. — 1970
But this argument seems to prove only that pleasure is a good and not a greater good than any other. For every good joined to another is more desirable than by itself.
B. The contrary opinion.
1. HOW THEY MEET THE PRECEDING ARGUMENTS.
a. How they used in the opposite way the argument... advanced.
i. How Plato used this argument. — 1971-1972
It is by an argument of this kind that Plato attempts to nullify the previous view, by showing that pleasure is not an absolute good. He argued that the life of pleasure is more desirable with prudence than without it. But if the combination is better, pleasure is not an absolute good; for a good of this type does not become more desirable by any addition.
ii. He rejects Plato’s process of reasoning. — 1973
Obviously nothing else either will be an absolute good if it is made more desirable by the addition of any of the things that are good in themselves. What then is there bf this nature that we can share? This is what we are looking for.
b. How they met the other arguments.
i. On the part of pleasure itself. — 1974-1977
Those who deny that what all beings desire is good are talking nonsense. For that which all men believe to be true, we say is really so; and the man who rejects this belief expresses beliefs hardly more acceptable. If only creatures without understanding desire pleasures, some weight might be conceded in the contention; but if intelligent beings do so too, it does not seem to make sense. Perhaps even in evil men there is some natural good better than themselves which seeks their own proper good.
ii. On the part of the contrary. — 1978-1979
Nor does the argument seem to be correct about the contrary. They say that if pain is evil it does not follow that pleasure is good, for evil is also opposed to evil. And both good and evil are opposed to what is neither the one nor the other. In this they were correct but their statement does not apply to the present question. For, if both were evil, both ought to be avoided; but if neither was evil, neither should be an object of aversion, or both should be equally so. However, as it is, man seems to avoid the one as evil and to seek the other as good. In this way then they are in opposition.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
1964. After the Philosopher has shown that we must treat pleasure, he now begins to treat it. First [II] he continues with the opinions of others. Then [Lect. 5], at “The nature and quality etc.” (B. 1174 a 13), he defines the truth. He discusses the first point under two headings. First [II, A] he proceeds with the opinion of those who set pleasure in the category of good; next [II, B], at “It is by an argument etc.,” with the contrary opinion. He considers his first point from two aspects. First [A, 1] he presents the arguments Eudoxus used to prove that pleasure is in the category of good. Second [A, 2], at “Moreover, that is etc.,” he offers the arguments Eudoxus used to prove that it is the greatest good. He handles the first point in a twofold manner. First [1, a] he shows how Eudoxus proved that pleasure is
in the genus of good on the part of pleasure itself; then [1, b], at “He also thought etc.,” how Eudoxus proved this on the part of the contrary. He treats the first point in two ways. First [a, i] he proposes the opinion and argument of Eudoxus. Next [a, ii], at “But his arguments etc.,” he shows why the opinion and argument were accepted.
1965. He says first that Eudoxus was of the opinion that pleasure comes under the category of good because he saw that all creatures, both rational and irrational, i.e., men and brutes, seek pleasure. But what all choose seems to be proper and good and has great influence in goodness because it can attract every appetite to itself. And so, the fact that all are moved toward the same object, viz., pleasure, indicates that pleasure, is not only a good but a most excellent good. For it is obvious that everything seeks to find what is good. Thus food is good to all animals who commonly desire it. Therefore it is evident that pleasure sought by all is a good.
1966. Then [a, ii], at “But his arguments” he shows why Eudoxus was especially given credence. He observes that Eudoxus’ arguments were accepted because of the moral virtue of the speaker rather than their cogency. He was indeed a man moderate in the different pleasures, being more exemplary than others. For this reason, when he praised pleasure, he did not seem to be speaking as a lover of pleasure but because it was really true.
1967. Next [i, b], at “He also thought,” he presents Eudoxus’ argument that was taken on the part of the contrary. He remarks that Eudoxus thought it no less clear from the contrary (i.e., on the part of pain rather than on the part of pleasure itself) that pleasure belongs to the category of good. For it is obvious that pain in itself ought to be avoided by everyone. Hence the contrary, pleasure, apparently ought to be ch95en by everyone.
1968. At “Moreover, that is” [A, 2] he presents two arguments of Eudoxus to show that pleasure is the greatest good. The first is this [2, a]. That seems most worthy of choice, and consequently the greatest good, which is chosen not because of another incidental to it, or for the sake of something as an end. But all men plainly acknowledge this about pleasure. For no one asks another why he desires pleasure, which would indicate that pleasure is desirable in itself. Therefore pleasure is good in the highest degree.
1969. He offers the second argument [2, b] at “Further, pleasure,” explaining it in a twofold manner. First [b, i] he presents the argument itself. It is evident that pleasure added to any good makes it more desirable. Thus the addition of pleasure to just action and temperate conduct increases their goodness, for a man is better who takes pleasure in a work of justice or temperance. From this he (Eudoxus) wished to conclude that pleasure was best, as enhancing the goodness in all actions.
1970. Next [b, ii], at “But this argument,” he shows the flaw in this argument. He remarks that the reason just given proves that pleasure comes under the category of good, but not that it is a greater good than any other. For it is also true of any good that, when joined to another, it constitutes a greater good than it was by itself.
1971. Then [II, B], at “It is by an argument,” he pursues the opinion of those who maintain that pleasure is not a good. First [B, 1] he explains how they meet the preceding arguments. Second [Lect. 3; B, 2], at “However, it does not follow etc.” (B. 1173 a 14), he gives the arguments they allege to the contrary. He discusses the first point from two aspects. First [B, 1, a] he shows how they used in the opposite way the argument previously advanced to show that pleasure is the highest good. Next [B, i, b], at “Those who deny etc.,” he shows how they met the other arguments. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [B, i, a, i] he explains how Plato used this argument to prove the opposite. Then [B, 1, a, ii], at “Obviously nothing else etc.,” he rejects Plato’s process of reasoning. He observes first that, by the reason just given, Plato, who held the contrary opinion, attempted to nullify what has been asserted (1965-1970), by showing that pleasure is not a good in itself nor in the absolute sense. It is evident that pleasure is more worthy of choice when accompanied by prudence. Since then pleasure combined with something else is better, he concluded that pleasure is not a good in itself. That which is a good in itself does not become more desirable by an addition of something else.
1972. On this point we must understand that Plato named as a good in itself that which is the essence of goodness; for example, man in himself (per se) is the essence of man. But to this essence of goodness nothing can be added that is good in a way other than by participating in the essence of goodness. So, whatever goodness is an addition is derived from the very essence of goodness. Thus the good in itself does not become better by any addition.
1973. At “Obviously nothing else” [B, 1, a, ii] Aristotle rejects Plato’s process of reasoning. According to this argument obviously nothing in human affairs will be good in itself, since every human good added to any good in itself is rendered more desirable. For nothing can be found associated with human life that is of such a nature that it does not become better by the addition of another good. But we are seeking something of this kind associated with human life. People who hold that pleasure is a good mean a human good and not the divine good itself, which is the essence of goodness.
1974. Next [ B, 1, b ], at “Those who deny,” he shows how the Platonists met Eudoxus’ arguments proving that pleasure is a good. First [B, 1, b, i], how they met the argument taken on the part of pleasure itself; then [B, 1, b, ii], at “Nor does the argument etc.,” the argument taken on the part of the contrary. They answered the first argument by denying this: that which all desire is good. But Aristotle rejects this, observing that those who oppose the argument of Eudoxus by maintaining that what all desire is not necessarily good seem to talk nonsense.
1975. That which all believe to be true, we say, is really so. And we hold this as a principle, because it is impossible for natural judgment to fail in all cases. But, since the appetite tends only to that which seems good, what is desired by all seems good to all. So, pleasure that all desire is good.
1976. The man who rejects what is accepted by everyone expresses views that are hardly more acceptable. That position might be defended if only those creatures who are without understanding, like dumb animals and evil men, desired pleasures. The reason is that the senses judge good only in its immediacy; and in this way it would not be necessary that pleasure be a good simply but only that it be a good here and now. But since even intelligent creatures desire some pleasure, it does not seem to make any sense.
1977. However, if even all creatures which act without understanding desired pleasure, it might still be probable that pleasure was a good, because even in wicked men there is some natural good that tends to the desire of a suitable good; and this natural good is better than evil men as such. As virtue is a perfection of nature-and for this reason moral virtue is better than natural virtue (we noted this in the sixth book, 1275-1280)—so, since vice is a corruption of nature, the natural good is better: the integral thing is better than the corrupt. But it is clear that evil men are diversified by their connection with vice, for vices are contrary to one another. Therefore, the object on which evil men agree, viz., the desire of pleasure, seems to belong rather to nature than vice.
1978. Then [B, 1, b, ii], at “Nor does the argument,” he shows how they answered the argument taken on the part of pain. They held that, even if pain is an evil, it does not follow that pleasure is good; since we know that evil is opposed not only to good but also to evil, for example, rashness is opposed not only to fortitude but also cowardice. And both good and evil are opposed to that which is neither good nor evil, as the extremes are opposed to the mean; for there is such an act considered according to its species, for instance, to pick up a straw from the ground, or the like.
1979. However, Aristotle in refutation of this process of reasoning remarks that they are correct in reference to this opposition of evil to evil, but their statement does not apply to the present question. For pain is not opposed to pleasure, as evil to evil. If both were evil, both would have to be avoided; just as good as such is to be sought, so evil as such is to be avoided. But if neither of them was evil, neither should be an object of aversion, or they should be viewed in the same light. However, as it is, all men seem to avoid pain as evil and seek pleasure as good. Thus then they are opposed to each other as good and evil.
LECTURE 3
Pleasure Is Not a Good According to Plato
Chapter 3
(B)2. HE PRESENTS (PLATONISTS’) ARGUMENTS AGAINST EUDOXUS’ POSITION.
a. He proposes the arguments.
i. First. — 1980-1981
However it does not follow that if pleasure is not a quality, therefore it is not a good; for neither virtuous activities nor happiness are qualities either.
ii. Second.
x. THE REASON OF THE PLATONISTS. — 1982
But they maintain that good is determinate, and that pleasure is indeterminate, because it admits of more and less.
y. HE REJECTS SUCH AN ARGUMENT. — 1983-1988
Now if they judge in this way about partaking of pleasure, then the same applies to justice and other virtues according to which some are clearly said to be more or less virtuous. For people are in fact just and brave in a greater or less degree, and can act more or less justly and temperately. However if their judgment is based on the nature of the pleasures themselves, perhaps they are not stating the real cause since some pleasures are pure (or unmixed) and others mixed. Why may not pleasure be like health which is determinate and still admits of degrees? Health is not constituted by the same proportion of humors in all men, nor by one proportion always in the same person; but, even when diminished, it remains up to a certain point, and so differs in degree.
iii. Third.
x. HE PROPOSES THE ARGUMENT. — 1989
Again, they postulate that the good in itself (per se) is perfect, while movements and processes of generation are imperfect; and then they try to show that pleasure is a motion or process.
y. HE REJECTS THIS ARGUMENT.
aa. First... that pleasure is a motion. — 1990-1992
But they do not seem to be correct. In fact pleasure is not a motion, for swiftness and slowness are proper to all movement, if not absolutely like the motion of the earth, then relative to another moving body. But neither of these is true of pleasure. A man can become pleased quickly just as he can get angry quickly; but he cannot be pleased quickly, not even in relation b to somebody else, as he can walk, grow, and so on quickly. Therefore someone can change into a pleasurable state quickly or slowly, but he cannot function or be pleased in that state quickly.
bb. Next ... that pleasure is a process of generation.
a’. First. — 1993-1994
And how can it be a process of generation? It does not seem that any chance thing can be generated from any other chance thing, but everything is dissolved into that from which it came; and pain would be the destruction of that which pleasure generates. Further, they affirm that pain is a deficiency of the natural state and pleasure a replenishment. But these experiences are bodily passions. If then pleasure is a replenishment of the natural state, the part replenished will feel the pleasure. Consequently the body can feel pleasure. However, this does not seem to be the case. Therefore, pleasure is not replenishment; but after replenishment takes place, a man will feel pleasure just as after a surgical operation he will feel pain.
b’. The origin of this opinion. — 1995-1996
This opinion seems to arise from pains and pleasures associated with food. Certainly people who are distressed beforehand by lack of food receive pleasure by replenishment. However, this is not the case with all pleasures. For pleasures of (mathematical) knowledge are not preceded by pain, nor are the pleasures of sense-for example, smell-and sounds and sights; and the same is true of memories and hopes. If these are the result of generation, by what are they generated? No lack of anything has occurred to be replenished.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
1980. After the Philosopher has dismissed the Platonists’ opposition to the arguments of Eudoxus, he now [B, 2] presents their arguments against Eudoxus’ position. He treats this point in a twofold manner. First [2, a] he proposes the arguments designed to show that pleasure does not belong to the category of good. Then [Lect. 4; 2, b], at “The distinction between etc.” (B. 1173 b 33), he offers the arguments to show that pleasure i t an absolute and universal good. Sit the first set of arguments conclude falsely, therefore Aristotle presents and disproves them at the same time. He gives four arguments on the first point. The first [a, i] is this. Good seems to come under the genus of quality; for, to a person asking what the quality of a thing is we answer that it is good. But pleasure is not a quality. Therefore it is not a good.
1981. But Aristotle rejects this, observing that even if pleasure does not come under the genus of quality, it does not follow that pleasure is not a good. For good is predicated not only of quality but also of every genus, as was indicated in the first book (81).
1982. He presents the second argument [a, ii] at “But they maintain.” First [ii, x] he offers the reason of the Platonists themselves. They hold that good is determinate, as is evident from the discussion in the ninth book (1887)Now pleasure is indeterminate according to them-a statement they proved from the fact that it admits of degrees. Thus they concluded that pleasure did not come under the genus of good.
1983. Next [ii, y], at “Now if they etc.,” he rejects such an argument. On this point we must remember that a thing admits of degrees in two ways: one, in the concrete; the other, in the abstract. Something is called more and and less by reason of nearness to an object or remoteness from it. When, therefore, a thing that exists in a subject has oneness and simplicity, it does not admit of more and less in itself. Hence it is not said to admit of degrees in the abstract. But it can be predicated according to more and less in the concrete because the subject partakes more and less of such a form, as is evident in the case of light which is an undivided and simple form. Consequently, light itself is not predicated according to more and less. However, a body is termed more or less luminous from this that it partakes of light more or less perfectly.
1984. On the other hand, when there exists a form that in its nature indicates a proportion between many individuals referred to one principle, that form admits of degrees even according to its own nature. This is evident of health and beauty: each implies a proportion appropriate to the nature of an object designated as beautiful or healthy. And since a proportion of this kind can be more or less appropriate, consequently beauty and health considered in themselves are predicated according to more and less. It is obvious from this that unity, by which something is determinate, is the reason why a thing may not admit of degrees. Since then pleasure does admit of degrees, it seemed not to be something determinate and consequently not to belong to the genus of good.
1985. Therefore, Aristotle in opposing this observes that, if the Platonists hold that pleasure is something indeterminate because it admits of degrees in the concrete—by reason of the fact that someone can be pleased more and less—they will have to admit the same about justice and other virtues according to which people are designated such more and less. Certainly some men are just and brave in a greater or less degree. The same is true concerning actions, for someone can act more and less justly and temperately. Thus, either virtues will not belong to the genus of good, or the reason offered does not remove pleasure from the genus of good.
1986. However, if they maintain that pleasure admits of degrees on the part of the pleasures themselves, we must consider that perhaps their argument may not apply to all pleasures; but they are indicating the reason why some pleasures are pure and unmixed, for example, the pleasure following the contemplation of truth, and other pleasures are mixed like those following a pleasing combination of some kinds of sensibles, for instance, pleasures resulting from musical harmony or the blending of tastes or colors. Obviously, pure pleasure of itself does not admit of degrees but only mixed pleasure, inasmuch as a pleasing combination of sensibles causing pleasure can be more or less agreeable to the nature of the person enjoying it.
1987. Nevertheless, neither is it necessary that pleasures, which in themselves admit of degrees by reason of their admixture, are not determinate or good. Nothing prevents pleasure, which allows of more or less, from being determinate-as health is in fact. Qualities of this kind may be called determinate inasmuch as they reach in some way that to which they are ordered although they might come closer. Thus a’ mixture of humors contains the reason for health from the fact that it attains a harmony in human nature; and by reason of this it is called determinate attaining its proper end, so to speak.
1988. But a temperament that in no way attains this is not determinate but is far from the notion of health. For that reason health of itself admits of more and less because the same proportion of humors is not found in all men, nor is it always the same in one and the same person. But, even when diminished, health remains up to a certain point. Hence health differs according to degrees; and the same is true of pleasure.
1989. At “Again, they postulate” he offers the third argument [a, iii] and discusses it in a twofold manner. First [iii, x] he proposes the argument. The Platonists held that what is good in itself (per se) is something perfect. But motion and processes of generation are imperfect, for motion is an act of an imperfect thing, as stated in the third book of the Physics (Ch. 2, 201 b 27-202 a 2; St. Th. Lect. 3, 296). Consequently they maintain that no motion or process of generation belongs to the genus of good. And they try to establish that pleasure is a motion or a process of generation. Hence they conclude that pleasure is not a good in itself (per se).
1990. Then [iii, y], at “But they do not seem,” he rejects this argument under two aspects. First [y, aa], as to their assertion that pleasure is a mo. tion. He states that they are apparently not correct when they maintain that pleasure is a motion, for every motion seems to be swift or slow. But swiftness and slowness are not proper to motion considered absolutely and in itself but in relation to something else. For example, the motion of the earth, i.e., the daily motion, in which the whole heavens revolve, is called swift in comparison with other motions.
1991. The reason for this—as is pointed out in the sixth book of the Physics (Ch. 2, 232 a 25-232 b 20; St. Th. Lect. 3, 766-773)—is that a thing is called “swift” which moves a great distance in a short time and “slow” a little distance in a long time. Now “great” and “little” are predicated relatively, as indicated in the Categories (Ch. 6, 5 b 15-30). But neither swiftness nor slowness are attributable to pleasure. To be sure a man can become pleased quickly, just as he can become angry quickly. But we do not say that a man can be pleased quickly or slowly, not even in comparison with someone else, as we do say that a man can walk quickly or slowly, can grow quickly or slowly, and so on. So then obviously someone can be changed into a state of pleasure, i.e., can arrive at it quickly or slowly.
1992. This is so because we can attain pleasure by a kind of motion. But we cannot function quickly in the state of pleasure so that we are quickly pleased. The reason is that the act of being pleased consists in something done (in facto) rather than in something taking place (in fieri).
1993. Next [y, bb], at “And how can it be,” he rejects the Platonists’ argument to uphold their opinion that pleasure is a process of generation. He discusses this point in a twofold manner. First [bb, a’] he shows that pleasure is not a process of generation. Then [bb, b’], at “This opinion seems etc.,” he shows the origin of this opinion. He remarks first that pleasure does not appear to be a process of generation, for it does not seem that any chance thing is generated from any other chance thing. But everything is dissolved into that from which it is generated. If pleasure is a generation, pain must be the destruction of the same thing which pleasure generates. This is affirmed by the Platonists who hold that pain is a deficiency in what is according to nature, for we see that pain follows a person’s privation of those things to which he is naturally united. Likewise they maintain that pleasure is a replenishment because pleasure follows when something naturally belonging to a man is added to him.
1994. But Aristotle rejects this argument because privation and replenishment are bodily passions. If then pleasure is a replenishment of what is according to nature, the part replenished will feel pleasure. Consequently the body can feel pleasure. But this does not seem to be the case because pleasure is a passion of the soul. Therefore it is clear that pleasure is not a replenishment or a process of generation but a consequence of it. A man feels pleasure after replenishment just as he feels pain and distress after a surgical operation.
1995. Then [bb, b], at “This opinion seems,” he shows its origin. He observes that the view that sees pleasure as a replenishment and pain as a privation seems to arise from pains and pleasures concerned with food. People who beforehand are distressed by the lack of food, afterwards are pleased by replenishment. But this does not occur in connection with all pleasures where replenishment of a deficiency does not take place. For pleasures resulting from mathematical studies do not have an opposite pain, which they say consists in a deficiency. Thus pleasures of this sort do not exist for a replenishment of a need. It is evidently the same with some pleasures of sense such as smell, sound and the sight of physical objects.
1996. Besides, many delightful hopes and memories exist; and no cause can be assigned whose generations are pleasures of this sort, because there are no preceding defects which are replenished by means of these pleasures. But it was pointed out (1993) that if pleasure is the generation of a thing, pain is its destruction. Therefore, if any pleasure is found without the defect of pain, it follows that a pain is not the correlative of every pleasure.
LECTURE 4
A Fourth Argument that Pleasure Is Not a Good
Chapter 3
(a) iv. He refutes a fourth (argument).
x. FIRST (REPUTATION) — 1997-1998
In answer to those who bring forward very disgraceful pleasures it can be said that these are not pleasant; for even if they are pleasing to the ill-disposed, we must not assume that they are really pleasant—except to such people—any more than what is wholesome or sweet or bitter to the sick is so in fact, or any more than objects which seem white to persons with diseased eyes are actually white.
y. SECOND. — 1999
Or we may concede that pleasures are desirable but not from these sources. Thus wealth is desirable but not as the price of betrayal, so too is health but not as a result of eating things indifferently.
z. THIRD. — 2000
Again, we may say that pleasures differ in kind: some are derived from honorable sources and others from base sources. Now it is impossible to enjoy the pleasure proper to the just man without being just, to enjoy the pleasure proper to a musician without being musical. And this applies to other pleasures.
b. Pleasure is not a good in itself for three reasons.
i. First. — 2001
The distinction between a friend and a flatterer seems to show that pleasure is not a good or that pleasures differ in kind. For a friend is thought to intend good in his association but the flatterer, pleasure; the latter is blamed with reproach but the former praised, for no other reason than the ends they pursue.
ii. Second. — 2002
And certainly no one would choose to retain the mind of a child throughout life in order to have the pleasures that children are thought especially to enjoy. Nor would anyone choose to find pleasure in doing an extremely shameful act even though he might never have to suffer pain as a result.
iii. Third. — 2003-2004
Likewise, there are many things we should be eager about even though they do not produce pleasure, for example, sight, memory, knowledge, possession of virtues. It makes no difference whether pleasures necessarily follow these activities, for we would choose them if no pleasure resulted. It is obvious, therefore, that pleasure is not a good in itself (per se), that not every pleasure is desirable, and that some pleasures are desirable in themselves, being different from the others in kind or in their sources. We have now treated sufficiently the opinions about pleasure and pain.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
1997. After the Philosopher has disproved the three arguments of the Platonists concluding that pleasure does not belong to the category of good, he now [a, iv] refutes a fourth argument that they draw from the vileness of some pleasures. The Platonists adduce certain disgraceful pleasures, like adultery and drunkenness, to show that pleasures do not come under the category of good. But Aristotle answers this argument in a threefold manner.
1998. First [iv, x], as someone might observe, disgraceful pleasures are not pleasant in the absolute sense. If some pleasures are delightful to the ill-disposed, it does not follow that they are pleasing in themselves but only to persons prone to vice. just as the things that seem healthful to the sick are not in themselves healthful, so the things that seem sweet or bitter to people with perverted taste are not in themselves sweet or bitter; nor are objects that seem white to persons with diseased eyes really white. This solution proceeds on the assumption that unqualified pleasure for man is what is pleasant according to reason—a circumstance not possible with physical pleasures of this kind, although they are pleasing to the senses.
1999. He presents the second refutation [iv, y] at “Or we may concede.” It can be admitted that all pleasures are desirable but not in relation to all persons. For example, it is good to be enriched, but it is not good for a traitor to his country to be enriched because in this way he can do more harm. Likewise health is good but not for one who has eaten something harmful. Thus eating a snake sometimes cures a leper although it may destroy health. Similarly bestial pleasures are certainly desirable for animals but not for men.
2000. At “Again, we may say” [iv, z] he offers the third refutation, observing that pleasures differ in kind. Pleasures resulting from virtuous actions differ in kind from those resulting from shameful actions, for passions differ according to their objects. The unjust man cannot enjoy the pleasure proper to the just man, just as an unmusical person cannot enjoy a musician’s delight. And the same applies to other pleasures.
2001. Then [2, b], at “The distinction between,” he proves that pleasure is not a good in itself (per se) and in a universal sense, for three reasons. Concerning the first reason [b, i] he remarks: the difference between a friend and a flatterer shows that pleasure is not a good or that there are different kinds of pleasure some honorable and others base. A friend converses with a friend to some go purpose, but the flatterer to please. Hence a flatterer is blamed with reproach but a friend is praised, and so it is clear that they converse out of different motives. Therefore pleasure is one thing and good another.
2002. He presents the second reason [b, ii] at “And certainly no one.” No man, he says, would choose to retain a childish mind all his life so that he might always have the so-called pleasures of childhood. Nor would anyone choose to take pleasure in doing cxtremely shameful actions throughout his life even if he might never have to suffer pain. This statement is made against the Epicureans who maintain that shameful pleasures are to be shunned only because they bring about greater suffering. Thus it is clear that pleasure is not a good in itself (per se), because it would have to be chosen under every circumstance.
2003. He states the third reason [b, iii] at “Likewise, there are.” Obviously there are many things a man should be eager about even though no pleasure results from them, for example, sight, memory, knowledge, the possession of virtue. It makes no difference in the case whether pleasures follow from these activities, because he would choose them even if they brought about no pleasure. But that which is good in itself (per se) is of such a nature that without it nothing is desirable, as is evident concerning happiness. Therefore pleasure is not a good in itself (per se).
2004. Finally, he summarizes in conclusion that it seems obvious from the premises that pleasure is not a good in itself (per se), and that not every pleasure is desirable; and that some pleasures are desirable even in themselves, being different from evil pleasures either in their kind or in their sources. We have now discussed sufficiently the opinions of others on pleasure and pain.
LECTURE 5
Pleasure Is Neither a Motion Nor a Process of Change
Chapter 4
I. HE SHOWS THAT PLEASURE DOES NOT COME UNDER THE CATEGORY OF MOTION.
A. He proposes his intention. — 2005
The nature and quality of pleasure will become clearer if we take up the question again from the beginning.
B. He carries out his proposition.
1. A PRINCIPLE NECESSARY FOR AN EXPLANATION. — 2006-2007
Now, seeing seems perfect at any moment whatsoever, for it does not require anything coming later to complete its form. But pleasure appears to be a thing of this nature: it is a whole, and at no time can anyone find a pleasure whose form will be completed if it lasts longer.
2. HE PROVES THE PROPOSITION (BY TWO ARGUMENTS).
a. First.
i. He ... states a conclusion. — 2008-2009
Therefore, pleasure is not a form of motion.
ii. The major of the previous argument.
x. CONCERNING THE PROCESS OF GENERATION. — 2010-2012
For every motion involves duration and is a means to an end, e.g., the process of building that is perfect when it effect ts what it aims at—a thing achieved either over the whole time or at the final moment. All the movements are imperfect during the portions of that time and are different in kind from the completed process and from one another. Thus in building a temple the fitting of the stones is different from the fluting of a column, and both are different from the construction of the whole edifice. And while the building of the temple is a perfect process requiring nothing more to achieve the end, laying the foundation and constructing the triglyph are imperfect processes (each produces only a part). Therefore they differ in kind, and it is not possible to find motion specifically perfect at any one moment but, if at all, only in the whole space of time.
y. CONCERNING LOCOMOTION. — 2013-2017
The same is true of walking and other movements. For, if locomotion is motion from one point in space to another, it also has differences in kind-flying, walking, leaping, and so on. And not only this, but there are differences in walking itself; for the starting and finishing points of the whole racecourse are not the same as those of a part of the course, nor are those of one part the same as those of another; nor is the motion of traversing this line and that line the same, since a runner not only travels along a line but along a line existing in place and this line is in a different place b from that. We have adequately discussed motion in another work, and it seems that motion is not complete at any moment but there are many incomplete motions differing in kind, since the starting and finishing points specify the motion. On the other hand pleasure is specifically complete at any and every moment. It is obvious then that motions are different from one another and that pleasure belongs to the things which are whole and complete.
b. Second (argument). — 2018-2019
Likewise, this is thought to be the case because motion necessarily occupies a space of time, but pleasure does not because that which occurs in a moment is a whole.
3. HE CONCLUDES WHAT HE PRINCIPALLY INTENDED. — 2020-2021
From these considerations it is obviously a mistake to speak of pleasure as motion or a process of generation. For these attributes cannot be predicated of all things but only of such as are divisible and not wholes. Thus there is no process of generation in the act of seeing, in a point or in unity, nor is there any motion in them. Consequently there is no motion or process in pleasure either, for it is a whole.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
2005. After the Philosopher has outlined other opinions about pleasures, he now gives the real definition. First [I] he shows that pleasure does not come under the category of motion or process of generation, as the Platonists held. Then [Lect. 6; II], at “Again, every sense etc.” (B. 1174 b 14), he defines its nature and characteristic quality. He treats the first point from two aspects. First [I, A] he proposes his intention and method of procedure, remarking that the natureof pleasure (according to its genus) and its quality (whether it is good or bad) will be made clearer from the following discussion if we take up this question again from the beginning.
2006. Next [I, B], at “Now, seeing seems,” he carries out his proposition. He does this in a threefold manner. First [B, 1] he introduces a principle necessary for an explanation of the proposition. Then [B, 2], at “Therefore, etc.,” he proves the proposition. Third [B, 3], at “From these considerations etc.,” he concludes what he principally intended. He says first that the operation of the sense of sight called seeing is complete at any moment whatsoever. It does not require anything coming later to perfect its form. This is so because seeing is completed in the first instant of time. Now if time were needed for its completion, no time whatsoever would suffice but a certain duration would be necessary, as is the case with other activities occurring in time whose generation requires a particular measure of time. But seeing is perfected in a moment. The same is true of pleasure.
2007. Pleasure is a whole, i.e., something completed in the first instant of its inception. Thus a space of time cannot be assigned in which pleasure may take place, in the sense that more time is needed to complete its form, as in those activities whose generation requires an interval of time. The moment of human generation can be indicated because more time is necessary to perfect the human form.
2008. At “Therefore” [B, 2] he proves the proposition by two arguments. The first [2, a]: every movement or process of generation is perfected after a lapse of time and the motion is not yet completed in a part of that time. This is not true of pleasure. Therefore pleasure is neither a movement nor a process of generation.
2009. In connection with this argument he first [a, i] states a conclusion deducing from the preceding principle—in which virtually the whole reason is contained—that pleasure is not a motion.
2010. Next [a, ii], at “For every motion,” he presents the major of the previous argument: every motion involves duration; and every motion is a means to an end, i.e., has an end to which it is ordered and which it attains with the lapse of time. He shows this first [ii, x] concerning the process of generation, For the art of building perfects its operation when it completes what it intends, namely, a house. It does this in some whole interval of time; and all the processes are imperfect during the portions of that time and are different in kind—and even among themselves—from the complete process. The reason for this is that generation receives its species from the form which is the end of the process.
2011. But the form of the whole operation is one thing and the forms of the individual parts are another. Hence the processes also differ from one another in kind. For if a temple is constructed in a certain period of time, one portion of time is occupied in fitting the stones for the building of the wall, another portion in fluting (virgantur) the columns, i.e., sculpturing them in the manner of rods (virgarum). But during the whole time the temple itself is constructed. And these three operations differ in kind: the fitting of the stones, the fluting of the columns, and the construction of the temple.
2012. On this point we should note that, as the form of the whole temple is perfect but the forms of the parts are imperfect, so also the building of the temple itself is a perfect process—it requires nothing else to complete the plan of the builder—but laying the foundation is an imperfect process, as is also constructing the triglyph or the sculptured columns arranged in three rows above the foundation. And both of these are the making of a part having the nature of what is imperfect. It is evident then that the preceding constructions of the whole and of the parts differ specifically; and that we are not to understand that motion is specifically perfect at any part of the time but is completed in the whole period of time.
2013. Then [ii, y], at “The same is true,” he shows the same thing concerning locomotion. He observes that what is said about the process of generation seems also to be true about walking and all other movements, for it is obvious that all locomotion or local movement is motion from one point in space to another, i.e., from one term to another. Thus motion must be differentiated in kind according to a difference of terms. There are different kinds of locomotion among the animals: flying (suitable to birds), walking (suitable to gressorial creatures), leaping (suitable to grasshoppers) and other movements of this kind. These differ according to the different kinds of moving principles, for the souls of different animals do not belong to the same classification.
2014. The kinds of locomotion differ not only in the foregoing manner but also in one of these species, for instance, walking which is of different kinds. For traveling the whole racecourse and traveling a part of it do not have the same starting point and finishing line, i.e., the same terms a quo and ad quem. And the case is similar to traveling this or that part of the course because the boundaries are not the same. The motion of traversing this line and that line is not the same specifically, although all lines as such belong to the same species.
2015. As motions are constituted in a determined position or location, they are understood as differing specifically according to the difference of places, which is taken according to a different disposition in regard to the first encompassing spice. Now a runner not only travels along a line but along a line existing in place because this line is in a different place from that. Clearly then the whole locomotion differs specifically from each of its parts according to the difference of boundaries, in such a way however that the whole motion is perfect specifically but the parts imperfectly so.
2016. Because complete knowledge of the nature of motion might be required for a clarification of these points, he adds that a precise, i.e., adequate and complete, account of motion has been given in another work, the Physics (Bk. III, Ch. 1-3, 200 b 12-202 b 29; St. Th. Lect. 1-5, 275-325). But it is enough to say here that motion is not perfect at every moment, but there are many imperfect motions differing in the different parts of time from the fact that the starting points and the finishing lines, i.e., the terms of the motion, specify the motion.
217. Having thus explained the major of the proposition he then adds the minor, that the form of pleasure is complete at any and every momentthis has been shown from previous discussions (2007). He concludes then that pleasure and generation or change obviously differ from one another, and that pleasure is numbered among things that are whole and complete because pleasure has the completion of its form in every part.
2018. He proposes the second argument [2, b] at “Likewise, this is thought.” It is that motion is impossible except in a space of time, as proved in the sixth book of the Physics (Ch. 3, 234 a 24-234 b 9; St. Th. Lect. 5, 794-795), but pleasure is possible without an interval of time. It has been pointed out that a feeling of pleasure is a whole for the reason that this feeling occurs in a moment and is completed immediately. Therefore pleasure is not a motion.
2019. We should note that the difference from which this argument proceeds is the cause of the difference from which the first argument proceeded. Therefore the form of pleasure is complete at every moment but not so motion, because pleasure is instantaneous while all motion occupies an interval of time. And the Philosopher’s way of speaking shows this when he says “Likewise, this is thought to be the case etc.”
2020. Then [ B, 3], at “From these considerations,” he concludes from the premises what he principally intended. He remarks it is clear from the premises (2006-2019) that philosophers are mistaken in speaking of pleasure as a motion or process of generation. The concept of motion and generation cannot be predicated of everything but only of divisible things that are not whole and are not completed immediately.
2021. Neither is it possible to speak of seeing as a process of generation in such a way that seeing attains completion successively. Nor can we speak of a point or unity in a similar fashion. For these are not generated but accompany certain things. Likewise motion cannot be attributed to them, and consequently not to pleasure, which is also a whole, i.e., has its perfection in being indivisible.
LECTURE 6
The Nature and Properties of Pleasure
Chapter 4
II. HE NOW EXPLAINS THE NATURE AND PROPERTIES OF PLEASURE.
A. What pleasure is.
1. PLEASURE IS A PERFECTION OF ACTIVITY.
a. What is the perfect activity.
i. He explains his proposition. — 2022-2023
Again, every sense functions in relation to its object, and functions perfectly when it is in good condition and directed to the finest object falling under it. This seems to be the best description of perfect activity.
ii. He mentions a doubt. — 2024
It does not seem to make any difference whether the sense itself acts or man in whom the sense resides; in either case the most perfect activity proceeds from the best-conditioned agent in relation to the most excellent of the objects falling within its competence.
b. Pleasure is the perfection of activity. — 2025-2026
And this activity is most perfect and most pleasant, for there is a pleasure corresponding to each sense, and also to thought and contemplation. Now, that activity is most pleasant that is most perfect, and the most perfect activity belongs to the best-conditioned faculty in relation to the most excellent object falling within its competence.
c. How pleasure can perfect activity. — 2027
However, pleasure does not perfect the activity in the same way as the sensible object and the sense-both of which are good-perfect it, just as health and a doctor are not in the same way the cause of being healthy.
2. HE CLARIFIES WHAT HE HAS SAID.
a. First. — 2028
That there is a pleasure corresponding to each sense is obvious, for we speak of sights and sounds as pleasant.
b. Second. — 2029
It is also obvious that pleasure is greatest when the sense is keenest and active in relation to its corresponding object. So long, then, as the sensible object and the perceiving subject remain in this condition, the pleasure will continue since the agent and the recipient are both at hand.
c. Finally. — 2030-2031
But pleasure perfects activity not as an inherent habit but as a kind of supervenient end like the bloom of health perfects youth.
B. The properties of pleasure.
1. THE DURATION OF PLEASURE.
a. How long pleasure should last. — 2032
So long then as the sensible or intelligible object and the discerning or contemplative subject are as they should be, there will be pleasure in the activity. For while the active and passive elements are unchanged in themselves and in their relation to one another the same result is produced.
b. Why pleasure cannot be continuous. — 2033
How is it then that no one can feel pleasure continuously? Is it from fatigue? Certainly no creature with a body is capable of uninterrupted activity. Therefore pleasure also is not continuous, for it accompanies activity.
c. Why new things are more pleasing. — 2034-2035
Some things give us pleasure when new but later do not, because at first the mind is stimulated and is intensely active about them. This is so in the case of sight when we look at something intently; later however our reaction is not of this nature but becomes relaxed. For this reason pleasure too slackens.
2. DESIRABILITY (OF PLEASURE).
a. He explains his proposition. — 2036
It might be thought that all men seek pleasure because they desire life. Now life is a form of activity, and everyone is concerned with the things he loves most and devotes himself to their activities. For example, a musician pays close attention to good music, a student of philosophy is intent on intellectual problems, and so on. Since then pleasure perfects these activities, it also perfects life, which all desire. Consequently it is reasonable that men seek pleasure, for it perfects life which is desirable to everyone.
b. He raises a doubt. — 2037-2038
The question whether we choose life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of life can be dismissed for the present. Indeed they seem to be united and not to admit of separation, since there is no pleasure without activity.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
2022. After the Philosopher has shown that pleasure is not in the category of motion, as some thinkers maintained, he now [II] explains the nature and properties of pleasure. First he shows what pleasure is. Then [Lect. 7], at “Consequently pleasures etc.” (B. 1175 a 22), he treats the variations among pleasures. The first point is discussed in a twofold fashion. First [II, A] he shows what pleasure is. Next [II, B], at “So long then etc.,” from this he defines the properties of pleasure. He considers the first point under two headings. First [A, 1] he shows that pleasure is a perfection of activity. Second [A, 2], at “That there is a pleasure etc.,” he clarifies what he has said. He handles the first point in a threefold manner. First [A, 1, a] he explains what is the perfect activity. Then [A, 1, b], at “And this activity etc.,” he shows that pleasure is the perfection of activity. Third [A, 1. c], at “However, pleasure etc.,” he shows how pleasure can perfect activity. He discusses the first point from two aspects. First [a, i] he explains his proposition.
2023. He observes that the activity of each sense is the functioning of an agent in respect to a sensible thing that is the sense’s object. Hence in the activity of sense two elements are considered: the sense itself that is the active principle, and the sensible thing that is the object of the activity. Consequently, the best condition on the part of both sense and object is required for the perfect activity of sense. For this reason he adds that sense functions perfectly when the activity of sense is well-conditioned in relation to the finest or fittest of the objects falling under the sense. This activity seems to be especially perfect which proceeds from sense in relation to an object of this kind.
2024. Ncxt [a, ii], at “it does not seem,” he mentions a doubt. Since he has just said that sense is active (2023) and—in the first book of the De Anima (Ch. 4, 408 b 11-18; St. Th. Lect. 10, 151-162)—that the soul does not act but man acts by means of the soul, consequently he adds that it makes no difference to our purpose whether it is the sense itself that acts or man (or animal) in whom the sense resides. The reason is: no matter which is affirmed, obviously it is true concerning each that the most perfect activity proceeds from the best-conditioned agent with respect to the most excellent object failing within the competence of such an agent. For the perfection of the activity seems to depend especially on these two: the active principle and the object.
2025. Then [A, i, b], at “And this activity,” he shows that pleasure is a perfection of activity. We shall see that the same activity which we said is most perfect is also most pleasant; wherever a perfect activity is found in any percipient, there also a pleasant activity is found, for a pleasure corresponds not only to touch and taste but also to every sense—not only to sense but also to contemplation inasmuch as the intellect contemplates some truth with certitude.
2026. Among these activities of sense and intellect, that is most pleasant which is most perfect. But the most perfect is that belonging to sense or intellect well-conditioned in relation to the best of the objects that fall under sense or intellect. If then perfect activity is pleasant, and most perfect activity most pleasant, it follows that activity is pleasant to the extent that it is perfect. Therefore pleasure is the perfection of activity.
2027. At “However, pleasure” [A, 1, c] he shows how pleasure can perfect activity. He observes that pleasure does not perfect activity (of sense, for example) in the same way as the object (which is the sensible) and the active principle (which is the sense)—all of which are good elements contributing excellence to the activity—perfect it. Thus health and a doctor are not in the same manner the cause of being healthy, but health is a cause by way of form and a doctor by way of agent. Likewise pleasure, the perfection of activity, perfects activity by way of form; a wellconditioned sense, a mover that is moved, by way of agent; but a suitable sensible object perfects activity, as a mover that is unmoved. The same reasoning is also valid concerning the intellect.
2028. Next [A, 2.], at “That there is,” he clarifies what he has said. First [A, 2, a] it is clear, he states, that there is a pleasure corresponding to each sense-as was just pointed out (2025).from the fact that we say and perceive that there are pleasant sights like beautiful forms and sounds like melodious songs.
2029. Second [A, 2, b], at “It is also,” he clarifies another premise by remarking that it is clear from experience that seeing, hearing, and every activity of sense are exceedingly pleasant when the sense is keenest or strongest and acts in relation to its corresponding best object. So long as the sensible object itself and the animal possessing the sense remain in this condition, the pleasure remains, as is apparent also in other activities. And so long as the condition of the agent and recipient are the same, the effect is necessarily the same.
2030. Finally [A, 2, c], at “But pleasure perfects,” he clarifies a previous statement (2027) about the manner in which pleasure perfects activity. For it was stated that pleasure perfects activity not efficiently but formally. Now, formal perfection is twofold. One is intrinsic constituting a thing’s essence, but the other is added to a thing already constituted in its species.
2031. He says first that pleasure perfects activity not as a habit that is inherent, i.e., not as a form intrinsic to the essence of the thing, but as a kind of end or supervenient perfection, like the bloom of health comes to young people not as being of the essence of youth but as following from a favorable condition of the causes of youth. Likewise pleasure follows from a favorable condition of the causes of activity.
2032. Then [II, B], at “So long then,” he defines the reasons for certain properties of pleasure from what has been defined about its nature. First [B, 1] he considers1the duration of pleasure; next [B, 2], at “It miaht be thought etc.,” its desirability. He discussed the first point from three aspects. First [B, 1, a] he shows how long pleasure should last. He observes that there will be pleasure in activity so long as, on the one hand, the object (sensible or intelligible) and, on the other, the agent itself (which perceives by sense or contemplates by intellect) are well-conditioned. The reason for this is that as long as the condition of the active and passive elements remains the same and the relation between them remains the same, so long will the effect remain the same. Hence if the good condition of the knowing faculty and of the object is the cause of pleasure, as long as this lasts pleasure necessarily lasts.
2033. Next [B, 1, b], at “How is it then,” he assigns the reason why pleasure cannot be continuous. No one, he says, continuously feels pleasure since he grows weary from activity that pleasure accompanies, and in this way activity is not pleasant. This is so because all creatures with bodies capable of suffering are unable to be continuously active, for their bodies are changed in their condition by motion connected with activity. The body itself is subservient in some manner to every activity of the being whose body it is: either immediately to sensitive activity, which is produced by a bodily organ, or mediately to intellectual activity, which uses the activities of the sensitive powers generated by bodily organs. Therefore activity cannot be continuous on the part of its productive principle; and so pleasure also cannot be continuous, for it accompanies activity (155, 1486, 1496).
2034. Third [B, 1, c], at “Some things,” he gives the reason why new things are more pleasing. He remarks that things when new are more delightful but later are not equally so. The reason for this is that at first the mind is eagerly inclined toward such things on account of desire and curiosity and so is intensely or vehemently active about them.
2035. Vehement pleasure accompanies this, as is evident in people who, from curiosity, look hard at something they have not seen previously. Later though, when they become accustomed to the sight, their reaction is not of such a nature that they look so intently or do anything else as before. But they act in a relaxed manner and for this reason the pleasure also fades, i.e., is felt less keenly.
2036. The [B, 2], at “It might be thought,” he presents the reason why pleasure is desired by everyone. He treats this point in a twofold manner. First [B, 2, a] he explains his proposition, observing that a man can judge with reason that all men naturally seek pleasure because they all naturally desire life. But life according to its ultimate perfection consists in a form of activity, as pointed out in the ninth book (1846). Therefore everyone is especially active about those things which he loves most of all and devotes himself to their activities. Thus a musician listens most attentively to good music; a lover of wisdom applies himself especially to the contemplation of intellectual problems or studies. Since then pleasure perfects activityas was indicated (2036).consequently it perfects life itself which all desire. Thus it is reasonable that everyone should seek pleasure from the fact that it perfects life which is desirable to everybody.
2037. Next [B, 2, b], at “The question whether,” he raises a doubt by reason of the discussion. We have stated that all desire pleasure and likewise all desire life which is perfected in activity. But objects of desire, as well as objects of knowledge, have an order among themselves. Therefore a doubt can arise whether men seek life for the sake of pleasure or, conversely, pleasure for the sake of life.
2038. He says that the doubt must two questions are so joined that they do not admit,of any separation. For there is no pleasure without activity, and on the other hand there can be no perfect activity without pleasure, as has been noted (2025, 2026). However activity, rather than pleasure, seems to be principal. For pleasure is a repose of the appetite in a pleasing object which a person enjoys by means of activity. But a person desires repose in a thing only inasmuch as he judges it agreeable to him. Consequently the activity itself that gives pleasure as a pleasing object seems to be desirable be dismissed at present because these prior to pleasure.
LECTURE 7
Pleasures Differ in Kind
Chapter 5
I. HE EXPLAINS THE DIFFERENCE OF PLEASURES TAKEN ON THE PART OF THE ACTIVITIES.
A. How pleasures may differ in kind according to... activities.
1. HE SHOWS (THIS) BY REASON.
a. First. — 2039-2041
Consequently pleasures seem to differ in kind. For we judge that different kinds of things are perfected by different perfections. This is thought to be true both of natural organisms and of productions of art, for instance, animals, trees, paintings, statues, a house, and a receptacle. Likewise, activities differing in kind are perfected by things differing in kind. Moreover, activities of intellect differ from those of the senses; and the latter differ from one another, and so then do the pleasures that perfect them.
2. HE MANIFESTS THE SAME PROPOSITION BY INDICATIONS.
a. First. — 2042-2043
This will also be evident from the fact that each pleasure is akin to the activity it perfects, for an activity is stimulated by a pleasure proper to it. People who work pleasurably judge each thing better and investigate them more accurately. For example, those who find pleasure in the study of geometry become geometricians and grasp each problem more clearly. Similarly, those who love music, architecture, and other arts make progress in their own field when they enjoy their work. But pleasure intensifies activity and what intensifies a thing is proper to it. Therefore properties of things differing in kind must themselves differ in kind.
b. Another indication.
i. He shows the difference among pleasures (from the hindrance of other activities). — 2044-2047
A still clearer indication of this is given by the fact that activities are hindered by pleasures arising from other activities. For people who love the flute are incapable of paying attention to a discussion when they hear someone playing the flute because they enjoy the music more than their present activity. Therefore, the pleasure connected with flute-playing destroys that activity which is concerned with discussion. A similar thing happens in other cases where a person tries to do two things at the same time; the more pleasant activity drives out the other, and if it is much more pleasant it does so more effectively so that the other ceases altogether. For this reason when we take intense pleasure in something we can scarcely do anything else; and when we take relaxed pleasure in some things we can be engaged in others. For example, people who eat sweets at stage-plays do so especially when the actors are poor. Since then pleasure proper to activities strengthens, prolongs and improves them, and since other pleasures injure these activities, it is clear that pleasures differ greatly.
ii. He compares alien pleasures with pains belonging to the activities. — 2048-2049
Indeed alien pleasures produce nearly the same effect as proper pains, for activities are destroyed by their proper pains. For instance, if writing or doing sums proves to be an unpleasant and painful task, a person neither writes nor does sums because the activity is painful. Activities then are affected in a different manner by their proper pleasures and pains-these arise from the nature of the activities. But alien pleasures are said to have an effect resembling pain, for they both destroy activity although not to the same degree.
COMMENTARY OF ST. THOMAS
2039. After the Philosopher has explained the nature and properties of pleasure, he now explains the difference among pleasures. He discusses this point from two aspects. First [I] he explains the difference of pleasures taken on the part of the activities; then [Lect. 8; II] at-“It is thought etc.” (B. 1176 a 3), the difference taken on the part of the subject. He treats the first point in a twofold manner. First [I, A] he shows how pleasures may differ in kind according to the difference among activities; next [Lect. 8; I, B], at “Since activities differ etc.” (B. 1175 b 25), how they differ in goodness and badness. He handles the first point in two ways. First [A, 1] he shows by reason that pleasures differ in kind on the basis of differing activities; then [A, 2], at “This will also etc.,” he manifests the same proposition by indications. He observes first: since pleasure is the perfection of activity, it follows that just as activities differ in kind so pleasures too seem to differ. Thus we commonly judge as intrinsically evident (per se notum) that those things that differ in kind are perfected by specifically different perfections. Certainly this is obvious concerning essential perfections which constitute a species. And it is necessarily the same with other consequent perfections, provided they are proper, because they follow the essential principles of the species. We see this happen in the case both of natural and artistic objects.
2040. In natural objects surely, because the perfection of animals, which consists in keenness of sense, is one thing; and the perfection of trees, which consists in their fruitfulness, is another. And in artistic objects, because the perfection of paintings—that they be characterized by pleasing colors—is one thing, and the perfection of statues—that they aptly represent the individuals, whose images they are—is another. Likewise the perfection of a house—that it be a solid dwelling—is one thing, and the perfection of a receptacle—that it have a large capacityis another. Consequently activities differing specifically must be perfected by specifically different pleasures.
2041. It is clear that activities of mind or intellect differ in kind from activities of the senses; similarly the activities of the senses differ from one another. The reason is that they are differentiated according to objects and according to the faculties which are principles of activities. Consequently pleasures that perfect activities differ specifically.
2042. Then [A, 2], at “This will also,” he manifests the same proposition by indications. First [2, a] by the fact that activity is stimulated by its own pleasure.’ He observes first that this difference among pleasures corresponding to activities is evident from the fact that each pleasure is ascribed by a kind of affinity to the activity it perfects, because each activity is intensified by its own pleasure, as everything is naturally intensified by what is similar and agreeable.
2043. We notice that people who do any intellectual work with pleasure can judge each point better and investigate accurately the questions which pleasantly engage their attention. For example, geometricians who take pleasure in the study of geometry can grasp more clearly each problem of this science because their mind is detained longer by that which is pleasant. And the same reason holds for all others (similarly occupied), for instance, those who love music and delight in it, those who love architecture, and so on-that because they find pleasure in such work they make great progress in their art. Evidently then pleasures intensify activities. But it is clear that what intensifies an action is proper to it. Consequently things that are different are intensified by different things. Therefore if activities, which are intensified by’ pleasure, differ in kind—as we have shown (2039-2040—the intensifying pleasures themselves should be specifically different.
2044. At “A still clearer” [2, b] he presents another indication taken from the hindrance to the activities derived from other activities. First [b, i] from this he shows the difference among pleasures. Next [b, ii], at “Indeed alien pleasures etc.,” he compares alien pleasures with pains belonging to the activities. He says first that the remarks (2042-2043) about the difference among pleasures corresponding to the activities are more apparent from the fact that the activities are hindered by the pleasures arising from other occupations. From this then our contention is more evidently sustained because the fact that pleasures intensify activities might, be ascribed to the general nature of pleasure but not to the particular nature of this pleasure according to which pleasures differ from one another.
2045. But it is very clear that pleasures differ in kind. when we discover that activity is promoted by its own pleasure but impeded by extraneous pleasure. For we see that flute-favorers simply cannot hear people talking to them when listening to flute-playing because they take more pleasure in the music of the flute than in their present activity, i.e., hearing talk intended for them. Evidently then pleasure arising from flute-playing impedes the mind’s reflective activities. The same thing apparently happens in other situations when someone is doing two things at once.
2046. For it is obvious that the more pleasant activity drives out the other, to the extent that if there is a great difference in the amount of pleasure, a person entirely neglects the activity less pleasurable to him. Consequently when we take vehement pleasure in something we are incapable of doing anything else. But when something pleases us quietly, i.e., mildly or hardly at all, we can be doing other things too, as is evident of people at a show. Those who find little amusement in what they see there can be busy eating sweets-a diversion only moderately pleasant. People do this especially when watching athletes fighting poorly in public games, so that viewing such a contest is not pleasing to them.
2047. A proper pleasure then (a) strengthens the activities from which it proceeds, so that a person exerts himself more vigorously in them; (b) it prolongs the activities, so that a person stays longer at them; (c) it improves the activities so they attain their end more perfectly. Likewise other pleasures—those accompanying other activities—obstruct or harm all this; hence these facts clearly demonstrate that pleasures differ much from one another, for what one pleasure helps, another hinders.
2048. Next [b, ii], at “Indeed alien pleasures,” he compares extraneous pleasures with pains proper (to the activities) so that the difference among pleasures may in this way be more obvious. He observes that extraneous pleasure (which is caused by some other activity) and proper pain (according to which a person suffers from the activity itself) produce nearly the same effect on an activity. For, evidently, pain arising from an activity destroys it. For instance, if it is unpleasant or rather trying for someone to write or tally figures he will neither write nor tally, owing to the painful nature of such activity.
2049. In this way then activities are affected in a different manner by proper pleasures and pains, as it were being caused by these very activities; but extraneous pleasures are caused by other activities. We have just noted (2045-2046) that extraneous pleasures have an effect resembling proper pain. For in either case activity is destroyed (“although not in the same manner”) but more so by proper pain which is directly and by reason of itself opposed to pleasure. On the other hand the contrariety of extraneous pleasure arises from another source, viz., activity.
LECTURE 8
The Morality of Pleasures
Chapter 5
B. Pleasures differ in goodness and evil according to the difference of activities.
1. IN MORAL GOODNESS.
a. He states his proposition. — 2050
Since activities differ in goodness and badness, and some are to be chosen, others to be avoided, and still others are indifferent, the same is true also of their pleasures; for a proper pleasure corresponds to each activity. Thus the pleasure proper to a virtuous activity is good and that proper to a vicious activity is bad.
b. He proves his proposition. — 2051-2055
just as desires for honorable things are praiseworthy, those for base things are blameworthy. But pleasures accompanying activities are more proper to them than the desires. For the latter are separated in time and distinct in nature from activities, while the former are intimately connected with them and so closely linked as to raise a doubt whether activity is identical with pleasure. However, we are not to understand that pleasure is thought or sensation—this would be unreasonable—although some people have identified them because they are connected. Therefore, just as activities are different, so too are their pleasures.
2. IN PHYSICAL GOODNESS. — 2056
Now sight differs in purity from touch, and hearing and smell from taste; similarly pleasures of intellect diffcr from those of the senses, and each class iias differences within itself.
II. HE SHOWS WHAT THE DIFFERENCE OF PLEASURE IS RELATIVE TO THE SUBJECT.
A. In regard to animals. — 2057-2058
It is thought that each creature has its own pleasure just as it has its own activity, for pleasure corresponds to activity. This will be apparent to a person who considers each thing. Certainly a horse, a dog, a man have different pleasures. As Heraclitus says: an ass prefers grass to gold, since food is more pleasant than gold to asses. Therefore creatures differing in species have different kinds of pleasures. On the other hand it is reasonable to hold that things of the same species have similar pleasures.
B. In regard to men.
1. MEN HAVE DIFFERENT PLEASURES. — 2059-2061
However, pleasures differ considerably among men. For the same things delight some men but sadden others, and things distressing and odious to some are pleasant and attractive to others. This happens in the case of things sweet to the taste, since the same objects do not seem sweet to a sick man and to one in good condition; nor does the same temperature feel warm to an invalid and to a healthy man. The same holds good in other cases too.
2. THE PRINCIPAL PLEASURE IS FOUND IN THE VIRTUOUS MAN. — 2062-2063
In all cases, that seems to be really so which appears to the good man. If this is correct, as it seems to be, and if the measure of everything is virtue and the good man as such, then the things that appear to him to be pleasures are really pleasures and the things that he enjoys are really pleasant. Wherefore it is not surprising that things painful to him are evidently pleasant to someone. For men are subject to much perversion and deterioration. But these things are not pleasant (in themselves) but only to these people an] others similarly inclined. It is obvious then that pleasures admittedly disreputable are pleasures only to men of perverted taste.
3. WHICH IS THE PRINCIPAL PLEASURE. — 2064
But of the pleasures that seem to be virtuous we must discuss which kind and which particular pleasure are peculiarly human. This will be clear from the activities, for the pleasures result from the activities. Therefore, whether the perfect and happy man has one or many activities, it will be the pleasures perfecting these that will be called human in the principal sense. The other pleasures will be so only in various secondary ways, as are the activities.