Liber Contra Impugnantes Dei Cultum et Religionem

PART 1

What is Meant by Religion? What Does its Perfection Consist In?

IN order to understand the meaning of religion, we must know the etymology of the word. St. Augustine, in his book De vera religione considers it to be derived from re-ligare (to re-bind). One thing is bound to another, when it is so joined to it, that it cannot separate from it, and unite itself to anything else. The word re-binding, however, implies that one thing, though united to another, has begun, in some degree, to disconnect itself from that other. Now every creature existed, originally, rather in God than in itself. By creation, however, it came forth from God, and, in a certain measure, it began, in its essence, to have an existence apart from Him. Hence every rational creature ought to be reunited to God, to whom it was united before it existed apart from Him, even as “unto the place whence the rivers come, they return to flow again” (Ecclesiast. i.). Therefore, St. Augustine says, (De vera religione), “ Religion reunites us to the one Almighty God.” We find the same idea expressed in the commentary of the Gloss, on the words, “for of Him, and by Him” (Rom. xi. 36).

The first bond whereby man is united to God, is that of Faith. For, “ he who comes to God must believe” (Heb. xi. 6). Latria, which is the worship of God as the Beginning of all things, is the duty of man in this life. Hence religion, primarily and chiefly, signifies latria, which renders worship to God by the expression of the true Faith. St. Augustine makes the same observation in his De civitate Dei (book 10), where he says, “Religion signifies not worship of any kind, but the worship of God.” Cicero in his ancient Rhetoric gives almost the same definition of religion. He says that “Religion is that which presents certain homage and ceremonies to a higher nature, which men call the Divine Nature.” Hence all that belongs to the true Faith, and the homage of latria which we owe to God, are the primary and chief elements of religion. But, religion is affected, in a secondary manner, by everything by which we manifest our service to God. For, as St. Augustine says in his Enchiridion, “God is worshipped not only by faith, but likewise by hope and charity. Hence all offices of charity may be called works of religion. In in this sense St. James says (i. 27), “Religion clean and undefiled before God and the Father, is this: to visit the orphans and the widow in their tribulation,” etc.

Religion then bears a twofold meaning. its first signification is that re-binding, which the word implies, whereby a man unites himself to God, by faith and fitting worship. Every Christian, at his Baptism, when he renounces Satan and all his pomps, is made partaker of the true religion. The second meaning of religion is the obligation whereby a man binds himself to serve God in a peculiar manner, by specified works of charity, and by renunciation of the world. It is in this sense that we intend to use the word religion at, present. By charity, befitting homage is rendered to God. This homage may be paid to Him by the exercise of either te active or the contemplative life. Homage is paid to Him by the various duties of the active life, whereby works of charity are performed towards our neighbour. Therefore, some religious orders, such as the monastic and hermetical, are instituted for the worship of God by contemplation. Others have been established to serve God in His members, by action. Such are the Orders wherein the brethren devote themselves to assisting the sick, redeeming captives, and to similar works of mercy. There is no work of mercy for the performance of which a religious order may not be instituted; even though one be not as yet established for that specific purpose.

As by Baptism man is re-united to God by the religion of faith, and dies to sin; so, by the vows of the religious life, he dies, not only to sin, but also to the world, in order to live solely for God in that work in which he has dedicated himself to the Divine service. As the life of the soul is destroyed by sin; so likewise the service of Christ is hindered by worldly occupations. For, as St, Paul says (2 Tim. ii. 4), “No man being a soldier to God, entangles himself with secular businesses.” It is on this account, that, by the vows of religion, sacrifice is made of all those things in which the heart of man is wont to be especially absorbed, and which are, consequently, his chief obstacles in the service of God.

That which, first and chiefly, engrosses man is marriage. Hence St. Paul writes (1 Cor. vii. 23). “I would have you to be without solicitude. He who is without a wife is solicitous for the things that belong to the Lord, how he may please God. But he who is with a wife, is solicitous for the things of the world, how he may please his wife; and he is divided.”

The second thing that fills man’s heart, is the possession of earthly riches. “The care of this world and the deceitfulness of riches chokes the word, and he becomes fruitless” (Mat xiii. 22). Hence the Gloss, commenting on the words of Luke (viii.), “But that which fell among thorns,” etc., says, “Riches, although men seem to take pleasure in them, become as thorns to their possessors. They pierce the hearts of such as covetously desire, and avariciously hoard them.”

The third thing on which man is inclined to centre his heart, is his own will. He who is his own master has the care of directing his life. Therefore, we are counselled to commit the disposal of ourselves to Divine Providence, “casting all your care upon Him, for He has care of you” (1 Peter v. 7). “Have confidence in the Lord with all your heart, and lean not upon, your own prudence” (Prov. iii. 5).

Hence perfect religion is consecrated to God by a three-fold vow: by the vow of chastity whereby marriage is renounced, by the vow of poverty, whereby riches are sacrificed, and by the vow of obedience, whereby self-will is immolated. By these three vows man offers to God the sacrifice of all that he possesses. By the vow of chastity, he offers his body, according, to the words of St. Paul, “Present your bodies a living sacrifice” (Rom. xii. 1). By the vow of poverty, he makes an offering to God of all his external possessions, as did St. Paul, who says, “that the oblation of my service may be acceptable in Jerusalem to the Saints” (Rom. xv. 31). By the vow of obedience, he offers to God that sacrifice of the spirit of which David says, “the sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit” etc. (Ps. l. 19).

But these three vows are, in the sight of God, not a sacrifice only, but also a holocaust. This, in the Old Law, was the most acceptable form of sacrifice. St. Gregory says (8 Homil. II. part. on Ezech.), “When a man vows to God one part only of his possessions, he offers a sacrifice. When, however, he offers all that he has, all that he loves, and his entire life to the Almighty, he presents to Him a holocaust.” Hence religion, understood in its secondary sense, in so far as it presents a sacrifice to God, imitates religion taken in its primary sense. There are some who renounce a part of the things which are sacrificed by the religious vows; but this partial renunciation is not perfect religion. The observances customary in religious orders are intended to be helps, either to the avoidance of what has been renounced by the vows, or to the accomplishment of the promises which religious make to God.

Hence we see that in a certain sense (secundum quid) one religious Order may be judged more perfect than another. The complete perfection of anything consists in its prosecution of the end to which it is ordained. The perfection of a religious Order depends, chiefly, upon two things. First, it depends upon the purpose for which the Order was instituted. That Order is the most perfect which is destined to the noblest work. Thus a comparison may be made between the active and contemplative Orders, according to the comparative utility and dignity of the active and contemplative life. Secondly, a religious Order is more or less perfect in proportion as it fulfils the end whereto it was instituted. It is not enough for an order to be established for a specific purpose, unless its customs and observances be adapted to the attainment of that purpose. It two Orders be founded for the sake of contemplation, that one in which contemplation is chiefly facilitated, must be considered the more perfect of the two. But because, in the words of St. Augustine, “ None can begin a new life, unless he repent of his old life,” any religious Order, in which a man begins to lead a new life, must be a state of penance, whereby he may be purged of his old life.

For this reason, a third comparison may be made between religious Orders. That one being reputed the most perfect, wherein the most austerities and penitential exercises, such as fasts and poverty, are practised. But the first points which we have mentioned are the most essential to religious life. A conclusion as to the perfection of an Order, must, therefore, be based upon the perfection with which these points are observed. For perfection of religious life depends more upon interior justice, than upon external abstinence.

We see then what is the nature of religion; or the religious life, and in what religious perfection consists. Our next task will be to repeat the arguments adduced by the adversaries of Religion, and then to refute them.

We shall proceed, therefore, in the following order. We shall enquire:

1. Whether it be lawful for a religious to teach.

2. Whether a religious may lawfully belong to a college of secular teachers.

3. Whether a religious, not charged with the care of souls, may lawfully preach and hear Confessions.

4. Whether a religious be bound to manual labour.

5. Whether a religious may lawfully renounce all that he possesses, retaining no property, either private or common.

6. Whether a religious, especially one belonging to a Mendicant Order, may, lawfully, live on alms.

PART 2

CHAPTER 1

Is it Lawful for A Religious to Teach?

CONSTANT efforts have been made to hinder religious from becoming learned, and thereby, to ensure their inability to teach. The words of our Lord, “But be not ‘you called, Rabbi” (Matt. xxiii. 8), have been quoted in defence of these measures. It has been maintained, that, as, these words are a counsel to be observed by the perfect, Religious, as professors of perfection, ought in deference to them, to abstain from, teaching. St. Jerome, likewise has been brought forward as an advocate against the propriety of teaching being undertaken by religious. This saint, in his epistle to Riparius and Desiderius against Vigilantius (and the words are quoted in Gratian, xvi. Quaest. I), writes thus: “The office of a monk is to mourn, not to teach.” Again, in VII. Quaest. I, cap. Hoc nequaquam, it is said, “The life of monks is one of subjection and discipline, not of teaching, nor ruling, nor of being pastors over others.” And as canons regular and other religious are classed as monks (as it is stated in Extra de postulando, ex parte, and Quod Dei timor), it follows that no religious way lawfully teach.

It is further argued, that teaching is contrary to the vow of a religious, whereby he renounces the world. “For all that is in the world is the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life,” by which we understand riches, pleasures, and honour. Now teaching is considered to be an honour; and this theory is thought to be supported by the Gloss upon the words of St, Matthew (iv. 5), “He set Him upon the pinnacle.” “In Palestine,” says the Gloss, “ the roofs were flat, and the Doctors sat thereon, and spoke to the people. The devil seduced many of them with vainglory. For they were puffed up by the honour of teaching.” On these words is based the conclusion that teaching is contrary to the vow of religious.

Again, it is urged, that, Religious are bound as stringently, to practise perfect humility, as they are obliged to observe perfect poverty. As their vow of poverty forbids them to possess anything of their own, so the humility, to which they are bound, does not permit them to enjoy any honour. Teaching is, as has been proved, an honour. It is not lawful, consequently, for religious to teach.

A passage from Dionysius (V. cap. Eccles. hierarch), is quoted as a proof that religious ought not to teach. This writer divides the hierarchy into three classes, those who perform sacred functions; those who share in these functions; and those who merely, receive the benefit of them. In the same chapter, he divides these functions likewise into three classes, viz., that of cleansing, which is the office of deacons; that of enlightening, which is, the office of priests; and that of making others perfect, which is the office of bishops. Those that receive the benefit of these sacred functions are also, again, divided into three classes, Of these, the first consists of the unclean, who are purified by the deacons; the second is composed of the holy people of God who are enlightened by priests ; and, the third class is formed by monks, who are of a higher rank than the other classes), and these are perfected by bishops. Hence the function of monks is to receive holiness, not to impart it to others. And as they who teach must instruct their pupils in sacred science, teaching is not the lawful work of monks.

Again, the scholastic office is more remote from the monastic life than is the ecclesiastical. But we find (XVI, quaest. I), that “no one can exercise the priestly functions, and persevere in the due observance of monastic rules.” Much less then can a monk devote himself to the scholastic office, by teaching or listening.

It is likewise supposed to be contrary to the doctrine of the Apostles for religious to teach. For St. Paul says (2 Cor. x. 13), “We will not glory beyond our measure, but according to the measure of the rule which, God has measured to us.” On these words, the Gloss thus comments: “We use power in-so-far as it has been given to us by the Author of our being: but we do not go beyond the limit, or measure, of our power.” The argument, drawn from these words, is that any religious, overstepping the measure of power assigned by the author of his rule, contravenes ths Apostolic doctrine. An no religious order originally included teachers, no monk ought to be promoted to the scholastic office.

Some enemies of religion, however, failing in their attempt to completely prevent religious from teaching, try to prove, that no religious community ought to have many teachers. In support of this theory they quote the words of St. James (iii. 1), “Let not many of you become teachers, my brethren.” These words the Gloss explains to mean, “Do not desire to have many teachers in the Church.” Now one community of religious is one Church. Hence there ought not to be many masters in a religious community. St. Jerome writes thus to Rusticus—and the words are quoted in VII. quaest. 1.—“Bees have one queen. Cranes follow one leader. There is one captain to a vessel. And one lord in a house.” Hence in one community of religious, it is argued, there ought to be only one master.

 Furthermore, it must be remembered that there are many religious communities. If each college has more than one teacher, there will be so many religions teachers, that secular masters will, from dearth of pupils, be altogether shut out from the profession. There ought, also, to be a definite number of teachers for every branch of learning; but this great multiplicity of religious professors will cause sacred science to be held in low esteem.

These advocates of half measures, commit, in reality, as great an error, as those who desire to see religious totally excluded from the office of teaching. For, all who go astray and cannot keep on the beaten track of truth, fall, in their efforts to avoid one mistake, into the opposite error. Thus, Sabellius, as St. Augustine remarks, striving to keep clear of the Arian heresy of the division of the Divine Essence, fell into the error of confusing the Divine Persons. Boethius also observes that Eutyches, although avoiding the Nestorian heresy of dividing the Person of Christ, fell into the error of teaching that in Him there is unity of nature. The same observation applies to Pelagius, to Manichaeus and to other heretics. On this account St. Paul speaks (2 Tim iii. 8) of “men corrupted in mind, reprobate concerning the faith.” On which text the Gloss enlarges, by saying, that such men “do not stay in the faith, but walk round about it, never remaining on the mean line.”

The, passages quoted from the Decretals and the writings of the Fathers against the right of religious to teach owe their origin to the following fact. There existed, formerly, among certain presumptuous monks a mistaken idea, that, because they were monks, they, had a right to usurp the office of teachers. This assumption of authority, on their part, gave rise to considerable disturbance to the Church. We find this fact stated in XVI quaest. I, “Certain monks, bearing no commission from their own bishop, come to Constantinople, and cause confusion to arise in the church of that city.” This statement is fully corroborated in ecclesiastical history. The Fathers used every effort, both by arguments and decrees, to suppress these presumptuous monks.

But certain men of our own day, being “unlearned and unstable, wrest” these decrees, “as they do also the other Scriptures, to their own destruction” (2 Peter iii. 16). They, thus, fall into an opposite error to that which the Fathers strove to rectify. For, it is now asserted by the enemies of religion, that no religions has any right to exercise, or to undertake, the function of teaching; and that such an office. ought not to be open to religious orders. We will produce proofs that such a conclusion is utterly unfounded. We will then proceed to confute the arguments adduced in its support.

First, we quote the authority of St. Jerome, who writes thus to Rusticus (the words are cited in XVI, quaest. I), “Lead such a life in your monastery, that you may deserve to become a cleric. Learn, for a long time, that which, hereafter, you may teach,” Again he continues in the following, chapter, “If the desire for the priesthood attract you, learn what you can teach.” From these words it is plain that monks may accept the office of teaching. The same fact is proved by the example of the Saints, who taught while living in religious orders. We read in the History of the Church, that St. Gregory of Nazianzen, a monk, was sent to Constantinople, in order to teach Holy Scripture. St. Damasus, likewise a monk; instructed his scholars, not only in Scripture, but in liberal arts, We have proof of this in the book De miraculis beatae Virginis. St. Jerome, also, although a monk, promises, in his prologue to the Bible, to instruct Paulinus, (also a monk), in Holy Scripture, and he exhorts him to its study. St. Augustine, knew, we are told, after he had founded the monastery in which he lived by the rule drawn up by the Apostles, wrote books and instructed the unlearned. In fact, some of the greatest Doctors of the Church—such as Sts. Gregory, Basil, Chrysostom, and many others—were religious.

Our Lord Himself has set the same example. For, as we read (Acts i. 1), “Jesus began to do and to teach.” The Gloss thus comments on these words, “Christ, by beginning to do and to teach, shows that a good teacher must do what he teaches.” The Gospels contain not only doctrine, but likewise counsels. Therefore, he who not only instructs others in the Evangelical precepts, but likewise himself observes the counsels (as do religious) are the most fit exponents of the Scriptures.

Again, when a man dies, he passes away from the works belonging to the life which he quits. When he begins a new life, those works best beseem him which belong to the life on which he enters. Dionysius (2 cap. Eccles. Hierarch.)shows that before Baptism, whereby man receives Divine life, he is incapable of any Divine operation; for life must precede work. In like manner a religious, by his vows, dies to, the world in order to live to God. Hence he is excluded from any share in secular business, such as commerce; but he is not forbidden to perform those Divine functions which require for their exercise life in God. Among such offices, is that of giving praise to God, which is only rightly done by those who have knowledge of sacred things. “The dead shall not praise you, O Lord... But we who live” (Ps. cxiii. 17).

Another office from which religious are not excluded by their vows is that of teaching. On the contrary, being rendered by contemplation capable of understanding Divine things, they are certainly the most fit to impart them to others. Hence St. Gregory says (6, Moral.), “Those who contemplate with undistracted mind, drink in that knowledge, which they afterwards, when they are busied in speech, communicate to others.” Now religious are chiefly set apart for contemplation. Thus then we see, that religious become, by their vocation, more, rather than less, fit for teaching.

It is ridiculous to assert, that a man is rendered incapable of teaching, because he has adopted a life which gives him more quiet and greater facility for study and learning. It would be as reasonable to say that a person is debarred from running, because he avoids the obstacles on his course. Now religious, as we have already seen, renounce by their vows all those things that chiefly disquiet the human heart. They, therefore, are the men beat adapted for study and for teaching. “Write wisdom (i.e., Divine wisdom, according to the Gloss) upon the tables of your heart” (Prov. vii. 3). “The wisdom of a scribe, comes by his time of leisure and he who is less in action, shall receive wisdom (Eccli. xxxviii. 25).

St. Jerome teaches, that the poor of Christ have a special claim to the knowledge of the Scripture. They know,” he says, (in prol. Hebraicarum quaestionum, super Gen.), “that we are poor and lowly, and do not own property nor accept alms. They know likewise that none can possess the treasure of Christ, i.e., the knowledge of the Scriptures, together with the riches of the world.” But it behoves those to teach, who have knowledge of the Scripture. Hence religious, who profess poverty, are peculiarly fitted to teach.

We have already pointed out that religious Orders may be founded for the prosecution of any work of charity. Now teaching is numbered amongst the spiritual works of mercy. Therefore a religious Order may be instituted for the purpose of teaching.

Certain religious Orders exist in the Church for the purpose of defending her against her enemies by force of arms, although there is no dearth of secular princes who are her official champions. Surely, warfare with sword and shield, must appear less consonant with a religious life, than is that spiritual combat waged against heresy by sacred writings, and suchlike intellectual weapons against heresy. It is of this spiritual armour that St. Paul says, “the weapons of our warfare are not carnal, but powerful through God,” etc. (2 Cor. x. 4). Why then may not Orders be lawfully founded for the purpose of teaching, and thus of defending the Church against her enemies, although she has other defenders who are not religious?

We must remember, once more, that he who is fit for a greater thing in which a lesser is included ought to be accounted fit for the lesser, included in the greater one. Now a religious, even if he does not belong to an order founded for teaching, may, as we know (De monachis, cap. XVI. quaest. I), be promoted to the office of a prelate. As, therefore, the office of prelate is greater than that of a doctor (which is exercised by the masters who hold professorships in the schools), and, as a prelate is bound to be versed in sacred learning, it ought not to appear unseemly for a monk, by permission of lawful authority, to undertake the function of teaching.

“Lesser goods may be sacrificed for greater ones,” the Gloss remarks on the words, “Go, and preach the kingdom of God” (Luke ix. 60); but the common welfare must always be preferred to any private advantage. Now while a monk is observing his rule in his cloister, he is working only for his personal advantage, i.e., for his own salvation. When, however, he is instructing many, his efforts redound to the profit of the whole Church. Hence it is not unseemly for a religious to live outside his monastery, in order, by permission of lawful authority, to exercise the office of teaching.

Neither is it a valid objection to urge, that monks ought not to act thus at present, while there is no dearth of secular teachers. For, the common welfare ought not to be sought by any means that may offer, but by the surest means possible. Now a plurality of teachers is greatly to the public advantage; for one will be well versed in subjects of which another is ignorant. Hence we read in Wisdom vi., 26, “The multitude of the wise is the welfare of the whole world.” “O that all the people might prophesy,” Moses cried out in his zeal for knowledge (Numb. xi. 29). The Gloss remarks upon his words, that, “a faithful preacher would have all men utter the truth, which he himself does not suffice to declare.” And, in another place, the Gloss continues, in the same strain, “He” (i.e., Moses) “wished all men to prophesy; for he was not jealous of the gift bestowed upon him.”

It matters little whether teaching be conveyed by the word of a master who is present, or by the writing of one who is absent. To quote St. Paul (2 Cor. x. 11), “Such as we are in word by epistles when absent; such we will be in deed when present.” Now no one has seen the libraries of books, composed by monks, for the instruction of the Church, doubts that they can teach by writing, when absent. Therefore, it is lawful for them to teach by word, when present.

We will now proceed to the easy task of confuting the objections brought against the right of religious to teach.

The first argument, namely, that Our Lord gave a counsel to His disciples not to be masters, is, for several reasons, misleading. First, because the works of supererogation, concerning which the counsels are given, are rewarded by a peculiar recompense. “Whatever you spend over and above, I, at my return, will repay you” (Luke x. 33). These words are applied by the Gloss to works of supererogation. Hence it cannot be a counsel to abstain from works that are to be specially rewarded. Now teachers, like virgins, are promised a peculiar recompense. For we read in Daniel xii. 3, “Those who instruct” (ie., by word and example, as the Gloss explains) “many to justice, (shall shine) as stars for all eternity.” Hence there is no better ground for saying that it is a counsel to refrain from the function of teaching, than there is for maintaining that it is a matter of counsel to abstain from virginity, or from martyrdom.

Again, there cannot be a counsel which is contradictory either by another counsel, or by a precept. But teaching is a matter both of precept and of counsel. For our Lord said: “ Go, therefore, teach all nations” (Matt. viii. 19). St. Paul also writes: “You, who are spiritual, instruct such a one in the spirit of meekness” (Gal. vi. 1). Hence there can be no counsel forbidding us to teach.

Again, our Lord willed that His Apostles, should themselves put, His counsels in practice, in order that by their example, others should be led to their observance. Hence St. Paul, giving the counsel of virginity, says, (1 Cor. vii. 7), “I wish all were as I myself am.” But the Apostles certainly did not observe the so-called counsel not to teach. For they themselves were sent forth to teach over the whole world. Thus, there can be no counsel against teaching.

It is unreasonable to say that it is a counsel to abstain from those things that embrace the dignity of teaching. Solemnities pertaining to an office are not a cause of personal elation. Otherwise all men would be bound to shun them; since it is the duty of all to avoid pride. External insignia merely demonstrate the exalted character of an office. Hence as it is not imperfect for a priest to sit above a deacon, or to wear costly vestments, it can certainly be no imperfection to make use of the insignia pertaining to the scholastic office. Our Lord said of the Pharisees, “They love the first places at feasts” (Matt. iii. 6); but “He did not” (as the Gloss remarks) “forbid masters to occupy the first seats; he merely reproved the desire to have or not to have them.” It is truly absurd to say that, though it be not a counsel to refrain from teaching, it is a counsel to refuse the name of master. There cannot be a counsel or a precept regarding what is not in ourselves but in another. To teach or not to teach is our own concern, and we have shown that it is not a matter of counsel. But the fact that we are called master or doctor, is no affair of ours. It regards those who give us these names. Therefore, to refrain from being called master, cannot be a counsel.

Further, as names are used to mean certain things, it is foolish to say that a name is forbidden, while the thing signified by it is allowed. Likewise, the observance of the Counsels was primarily the duty of the Apostles. It is only through their instrumentality that they are observed by any other persons. Now the name of Master cannot be forbidden by any counsel, since the Apostles called themselves both masters and teachers. “I am appointed a preacher and an apostle—I say the truth and do not lie—a doctor of the Gentiles in faith and truth” (1 Tim. ii. 7). “In which I am appointed a preacher and an apostle, and a teacher of the Gentiles” (2 Tim. i. 11).

It remains to be considered that our Lord’s words: “Do not be called Rabbi” are not a counsel but a precept, by which all men are bound. He did not wish to forbid the office of teaching, but the sin of ambition. Neither, when He added, “ nor masters,” did He forbid us to teach, nor yet to bear the name of master. What His words signify, according to the Gloss, is: “Do not desire to be called masters.” He forbids the desire of place. He does not forbid all such desire, but only such as is inordinate, and therefore unlawful. This has been proved both by a foregoing quotation from the Gloss, and also by Christ’s words about the Pharisees, “They love the first places,” etc. Nevertheless, these words, may (says the Gloss) bear another interpretation. If our Lord forbids us to be called by the name of master and teacher, He equally prohibits our bearing the name of Father; for we have one Father who is in Heaven and one Master Christ. “For God” (as the Gloss says) “is by nature both our Father and our Master.” A man may be called father to signify his tenderness; and master to denote the authority which he exercises. That which our Lord forbids is that to any man should be attributed either right over physical or spiritual life, or plenitude of wisdom. Hence the commentary of the Gloss on this prohibition of Christ is as follows: “Do not be called masters, as assuming to yourselves what is due to God. Do not you call others Rabbi, as paying to man Divine homage.” And in another place we find the following commentary on the same passage: “A man may be called father, as a mark of respect to his age, but not to denote that he is the author of life.” In the same way, a man may be addressed as master, meaning that he is united to the true master, and that we reverence Him whose commission he holds. But, if our Lord had absolutely forbidden, either by counsel or precept, the name of master to be given to men, the Fathers of the Church would certainly not have allowed monastic superiors to be called Abbots, a word equivalent to father. If the name father were forbidden, how could the Vicar of Christ, who ought to set an example of perfection, be called Pope or father? Again, both St. Augustine and St. Jerome frequently addressed bishops as popes or fathers. Hence it is the height of folly to pretend that the words, “Do not be called Rabbi,” are to be understood as a counsel.

But, even granted that these words were intended by our Lord as a counsel, it does not follow that all such as are perfect would be bound to observe it. For, those who make profession of the state of perfection are not under an obligation to obey all the counsels, but only such as they, by their vows, are bound to observe. Were it otherwise, the Apostles, who were in the state of perfection, would have been bound to perform the work of supererogation which St. Paul practised in taking no stipend from the churches in which he preached; and they would have sinned had they acted otherwise (1 Cor ix.). Were all religious equally bound to observe every counsel, and to perform every work of supererogation, great confusion would ensue, and the distinctions which now differentiate the various Orders would be abolished. Those who are in a state of perfection are not bound to observe all the Counsels, but only those to which their vows oblige them.

The argument; that the office of a religious is not to teach, but to mourn, carries no weight. St. Jerome meant, by the words quoted, that the chief duty of a monk, as a monk, is to do penance, not to teach. He thereby shows that a monk is not, by virtue of his profession, bound to teach; and he rebukes the presumption of those religious who claimed the function of teaching as their special prerogative. He writes in the same sense in his epistle to Vigilantius. But it does not, by any means, follow that, although a monk has not the office of teaching, it may not at some future time be imposed upon him. It is not the duty of a subdeacon to read the Gospel, but that does not prove that this office will never fall to his share, as Gratian points out (XVI quaest. I, Superiori). St. Jerome wished to emphasise the distinction between the person of a monk and that of a cleric, and to show, that certain duties were peculiar to the office of each. One function belongs to a monk, as a monk; another to an ecclesiastic as an ecclesiastic. The duty peculiar to a monk, by reason of his state of life, is to mourn for his own sins and those of others. The task especially allotted to an ecclesiastic is that of preaching to and instructing the people. This distinction appears still more clearly in another chapter of Gratian, in which be treats of the teaching conveyed by preaching, which is the, special duty of prelates, not of scholastic teaching in which they are not specially well practised. Hence in raising this objection against the right of religious to teach, our adversaries are begging the question.

But, even supposing that it be not lawful for a monk to teach, that does not prove that it is not right for Canons regular to teach; since these are counted as ecclesiastics. St. Augustine, in his sermon De communi vita clericorm (quoted XII quaest. I, Nemo), says, speaking of Canons regular: “He who possesses, or desires to possess private property and to live on his own means, virtually renounces his life with me, and is not a cleric.” This passage shows that those who lived under the rule of this Saint, in the practice of poverty, were recognised as clerics. Although St. Augustine withdrew the assertion that no one was a cleric who retained private property, he never contradicted his words, that those who lived under him without possessing anything of their own, were clerics (see cap. Certe ego sum, quaest. eadem).

When canons regular and monks are said to be equally counted as religious, it is to be understood, that they are equal in observance of the points common to all religious Orders, i.e., the renunciation of private property, abstention from commerce or from legal business, and the like. Unless this be made clear, it might be thought, that canons regular were bound to certain observances, e.g. the disuse of wearing linen apparel, to which monks are bound. Even if it be not lawful for monks to teach, this function is certainly permissible to religious belonging to Orders instituted for the purpose; just as it is lawful for the Knights Templar to bear arms, although the use of armour is forbidden to monks.

The objection, that the exercise of the teaching office is contrary to the religious vows, is, on several accounts, ill-founded. Religious do not renounce the world in the sense that they can make no use of secular things. They renounce a worldly life, i.e. they are not allowed, by their vows, to be employed in secular affairs. Even among men, living in the world, there are some who are not of the world, ie. who are disengaged from temporal interests. But religious do not act contrary to their vows, by making use of the riches or even, at times, of the pleasures of the world. Otherwise occasional feasting would for them be a mortal sin. Which is, of course, out of the question. If it be not against the religious vows to make use of secular riches or pleasure, why should it be contrary to these vows, to make use of worldly honour?

Not only religious, but all men are, in one sense, bound to renounce the world, as we learn from the words of St. John already quoted (1 Jn. ii. 15), “If any man love the world the charity of the Father is not in him, for all that is in the world is the concupiscence of the flesh and the concupiscence of the eyes, and the pride of life.” The Gloss says that “lovers of the world have nothing except these three things, viz. the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, from which sources spring every vice.” Hence we see, that it is not riches or pleasure simply, which are said to belong to the world, but the inordinate desire for them; and that not honour, but ambition, is forbidden, not to religious alone, but to all mankind. “The pride of life,” says the Gloss, “signifies worldly ambition.” But, even if honour be simply understood as belonging to the world, this would not be true of every kind of honour, but only of such as consists of worldly things. The honour of the priesthood cannot be said to belong to the world. Neither can the honour given to a teacher, when the teaching which is honoured concerns spiritual things. Thus, if religious do not, by their vows, renounce the priesthood, they need not renounce the office of teaching. Again, it is untrue to say that the act of teaching is an honour. It is the teacher’s office which is honourable. And, even if religious renounce all honours, they cannot renounce all honourable functions; otherwise they would renounce all those works of mercy which are most deserving of honour. “Honour,” to quote Aristotle, “is the reward of virtue” (I Ethic.). That the devil deceives some do men and fills them with pride on account of their office as teachers, is no more reason for refusing the work of teaching than it is for declining to do any virtuous actions. For, as St. Augustine says, “Pride insinuates itself into good works, to make them worthless.”

The assertion, that, religious profess perfect humility is absolutely untrue. They make no vow of humility. Their vow is of obedience. Neither humility, nor any other virtue, is a matter of vow. Acts of virtue, being a matter of precept, are a necessity. Vows are only concerned with that which is voluntary. Again, no one can make a vow of perfect humility, or of perfect charity. For perfection is a gift of God; it does not depend upon our will.

Granted, however, that religious were bound to perfect humility, that would not hinder their receiving certain honours. The possession of property is certainly contrary to perfect poverty, but the acceptance of honours is not contrary to humility. For pride consists not in possessing honours, but in being unduly elated by them. Hence St. Bernard says (in Libro de consideratione), “Even in the time of the Sovereign Pontiff there is no jewel brighter than humility! He who is in a more exalted position than others, becomes, by humility, superior to himself.” And in the book of Sirach iii. 20 we read: “The greater you are, the more you should humble yourself in all things.” Who would dare to say that St. Gregory became less humble by being promoted to the highest ecclesiastical honour? Moreover, as we have said, the function of teaching is not an honour. Therefore, objections brought against it, on that ground, are, worthless.

Another argument brought against the right of religious to teach is that Dionysius distinguishes monks as apart from deacons, priests, and bishops. We know from ecclesiastical history that the monks of the primitive Church, until the time of Eusebius, Zozimus, and Siricius, were not clerics (XVI, quaest I, Superiori). Therefore, as it is of these monks that Dionysius speaks, we cannot, from his words, come to any conclusion about the monks who were bishops, prieds, or deacons. Any difficulty on the point, arises from misunderstanding of the words of Dionysius. This author calls the Sacraments of the Church sacred actions. Baptism he terms cleansing and illumination. Confirmation and the Blessed Eucharist he names perfecting (IV cap. Eccl. hierarch.). Now it is not lawful for any, save bishops, priests or deacons, to perform these sacred functions. Teaching in the schools, however, is not one of the holy rites, or sacred actions, whereof he speaks; otherwise it could be undertaken by none save by a priest, or a deacon. Again, ordained monks can consecrate the Body of our Lord, a power pertaining to none but priests. Why then should they not exercise the function of teaching, for which no Orders are required?

It is further urged, that, as no monk can be employed in ecclesiastical duties, and yet keep his monastic rule aright, much less can he combine the work of teaching with regular observance. Our answer is that, as we have already shown, this objection does not hold good with regard to the essentials of religious life. For these can be practised by those who hold ecclesiastical office. As for such religious observances as silence, vigils, and the like, it is shown in another chapter, that, “he who is obliged to serve daily in the ministry of the Church, practises the strictness of his monastic life.” But it is not unseemly if anyone neglect regular observance for the sake of performing an action such as teaching, which is for the common good. Thus religious who are called to the office of prelates, sometimes while they are still in their monastery, accept a dispensation for such reason. There are also religious living in their cloister in strict observance, who exercise the function of teaching, because it is enjoined by their rule.

The seventh objection to the right of a religious to teach is, that by so doing, be oversteps his measure, or, as the Gloss says, goes further than is permitted to him. Now when we say that a thing is permitted, we mean that it is not forbidden by any law. Hence if a religious do something not prohibited by his rule, even though the thing be not mentioned in the Rule, he does not overstep his measure. Otherwise, religious who live under a mitigated rule, would have no right to undertake the customs and usages of a more perfect life. Such a prohibition would be opposed to the sentiments of St. Paul (Philipp. iii.), who says that, forgetting the things that were behind, he stretched forth himself to those that were before. We must further remember that some religious are, by the rule of their Order, destined for teaching. To them, of course, the foregoing objection cannot apply.

The suggestion, that in one community of religious there ought not to be two teachers is manifestly unfair. Religious, as we have shown, are not less humble than are seculars; and their position in the office of teaching ought not to be worse than that of seculars. But, if the suggestion, to which we have alluded, were carried out in practice, religious would have far less chance of success in the profession of teaching, than would be the case with seculars. For a whole multitude of religious would have no more opportunity of promotion to a professorship than any individual layman would have who studied alone. Hence the progress of religious would be seriously impeded. We may compare their position to that of wrestlers, whose spirit in their match would be damped, if the prize for which they strove were withdrawn. For, as Aristotle says (III Ethics), “The bravest in the fight are those who despise cowardice, and honour courage.” In like manner, it is a hindrance to a student if the chance of a professorship, the prize for which he is working, be denied him. It would be regarded as a penalty for some offence if a man who, by his learning, had gained a right to some scholastic post, were not allowed to occupy it; and in the same way, a religious would be punished for being a religious, were obstacles placed in the way of his gaining a professorship. Nothing could be more unjust, than thus to punish a man for leading a meritorious life.

The authority of St. James, “be ye not many masters my brethren,” brought forward in support of this suggestion, applies as much to laymen as to religious. For, in the New Testament, all Christians are called brethren; and the Church is called a society of Christians. Neither is a multitude of religious teachers more stringently forbidden by the authority cited than is a multiplicity of secular teachers. For, as St. Augustine says, “by many teachers is meant teachers teaching contrary doctrines. Many who teach alike are but as one teacher.” Hence St. James’ prohibition is directed against divergence of doctrine, not against plurality of masters. His words may also be understood in their literal sense, as meaning that discrimination must be exercised in the choice of teachers; that only such men must be chosen for this office as are discreet and well versed in the Scriptures. But, as the Gloss remarks, there are not many such to be found. In another passage, the Gloss says that “they who are not learned in the word of faith should not be allowed to teach; lest true preachers be hindered in their work.” Or, again, the words of St. James which have been quoted may apply to masters in the sense of prelates of the Church. For it is forbidden for one bishop to govern several churches; or for several bishops to rule over one church. Hence the Gloss says, “Do not desire to be masters, i.e. prelates (who alone are ecclesiastical masters) in many churches; or to have many masters in one church.” For, he who teaches in a community is not a master of a church, although the community to which he belongs may be called a church.

We can answer the second argument of our adversaries by saying that, although there be several masters in one community, they do not rule, as a captain guides a ship, or a queen-bee reigns in a hive. Each master presides over his own school. Hence the words of St. Jerome (“among bees there is one queen”) cannot be understood in the sense in which our opponents use them. They only mean, that there should not be many masters in the same school.

To the third argument brought against a multiplicity of religious teachers, we reply, that the fact that there may be several religious houses, each containing many masters, does not debar laymen from the profession of teaching. There are not always in a community of religious enough men capable of teaching. Again, the fact that in any diocese there may be a sufficiency of teachers does not exclude seculars from this function. Religious and laymen ought to be judged on the same lines; and the most capable masters, be they secular or religious, ought to be selected without distinction of person. We need not fear that the Holy Scriptures will fall into contempt on account of a multiplicity of teachers to expound them. There is more danger of this being the case when the professors of Scripture are few in number. Hence there is no reason why the number of teachers should be limited; or why, through fear of their being too many, men capable of teahing should be excluded from that office.

CHAPTER 2

Can A Religious Lawfully Belong to A College of Secular Teachers?

THOSE who are hostile to religious make a malicious effort to prove that they ought not, in anything pertaining to study, to have dealings with seculars. Their object in thus acting, is to place obstacles in the path of such religious as are employed in teaching, if they cannot entirely hinder them in the exercise of that function. They adduce several authorities in support of their principles.

First they quote the following words of xvii, cap. vii, In nova actione: “Those engaged in the same work, ought not to differ in profession. This was forbidden by the law of Moses, “You shall not plough with an ox and an ass together” (Deut. xxii), which means “You shall not associate in one office men of different professions.” The reason given is, “they whose aims and, desires are dissimilar, cannot unite nor coalesce.” Since then laymen and religious differ in profession, they ought not to be joined in the teaching office. Again, St. Augustine says, that every man ought to adhere to such a manner of life as befits him. Now it does not appear seemly, that the same man should, belong at one and the same time to a secular and to a religious establishment. For, the members of one institute cannot imitate the usages of the other. Hence a religious, belonging to his own community, should not be a member of a secular college.

Again, a legal statute has ruled that, without a dispensation, the same man shall not belong to two lay associations. Much less then ought a religious, belonging to his own community, to be a member of a secular establishment. Again, all who belong to any society are bound to obey its rules. Now religious cannot conform to regulations drawn up for lay professors and scholars; nor can they promise to abide by those ordinances which laymen bind themselves to observe; nor to take the oaths which seculars take, for religious are not their own masters, but live under authority. Hence they cannot belong to secular societies.

But, the malicious enemies of religious, in their desire to exclude them from any intercourse with seculars, strive, in default of legitimate arguments, to accomplish their purpose by calumny. They maintain that religious are a source of offence and scandal to the world; and they exhort their fellows to avoid all communion with them. They quote the words of St. Paul (Rom. xvi. 17), “Now I beseech you, brethren, to, mark them who cause dissensions and offences, contrary to the doctrine which you have learned, and to avoid them.” Religious are accused of living in, idleness. Therefore, according to the words of St. Paul (2 Thes. iii. 6) they ought to be shunned by good men. For, the Apostle says: “We charge you, brethren, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, that you withdraw yourselves from every brother walking disorderly, and not according to the tradition which they have received of us.” St. Paul goes on to speak of the manual labour practised by the Apostles. He then continues, “For you yourselves know how you ought to imitate us.” He concludes his exhortation by the following command: “If any man obey not our word,” (i.e. our injunction to manual labour), “by this epistle, note that man; and do not keep company with him, that he may be ashamed.”

Religious are further denounced by their enemies as being the source of all the evils which are to flood the world in the latter days. Hence they must be shunned by all men. For, St. Paul, writing to Timothy, (2 Tim. iii), gives a most emphatic order on this head. “Know,” he says, that in the last days there shall come dangerous times. Men shall be lovers of themselves, covetous, haughty, etc., having an appearance indeed, of goodness (or of religion, as the Gloss says), but denying the power thereof. Now these avoid.” But, as in the same chapter St. Paul says, “Evil men and seducers shall grow worse and worse, erring and driving into error,” so these defamers of religious, not satisfied with calumny, try to make void the authority of the Apostle, saying that, not even at his bidding, are they bound to admit religious to their society. For, according to civil law, there is no obligation which can compel them to permit religious to associate with them, since society is established on the basis of free will. Hence the Apostolic authority is limited to ecclesiastical affairs. St. Paul himself said (2 Cor. x. 13), “We will not glory beyond our measure, but according to the measure of the rule which God has measured to us.” Now ecclesiastical affairs include the collation of benefices, the administration of the Sacraments, and the like, but not association in studies. Hence secular students are not, by Apostolic authority, bound to admit, religious to their society.

Again, power is committed to the ministers of the church, not “unto destruction, but unto edification” (2, Cor. xiii. 10). Hence as the enemies of religious consider that they have proofs that union between religious and seculars would be “unto destruction,” they hold, that the authority of the Apostles cannot compel them to form such an union.

This opinion, however, is censurable, mistaken and ill-founded. It deserves censure inasmuch as it detracts from that unity in the Church which, as St. Paul says (Rom. xii. 5), is based on the fact that “We, being many, are one body in Christ, and every one members one of another.” The Gloss interprets these words as meaning, that “we are members one of another, since we are of service to each other, and are in need of the assistance of one another.” This is true of all men alike; neither the greater, nor the lesser amongst us being excluded. Hence whosoever hinders one man from serving another, as far as he be able, impairs the unity of the Church. Now the work of teaching is one adapted to religious. St. Paul mentions this, saying, “he who teaches in doctrine.” Thereby the apostle means, says the Gloss, “He who has the gift of teaching, should, by his instruction, prove himself a member of another.” Hence it is a violation of ecclesiastical unity to hinder religious either from teaching others or from learning from them. It is likewise an infraction of charity. For, as Aristotle says (Ethics viii. and x.), “friendship is based on intercourse and by it is fostered.” These words are borne out by the saying of Solomon, “A man amiable in society, shall be more friendly than a brother” (Prov. xviii. 24). Anyone, therefore, who hinders intercourse, in scholastic matters between laymen and religious weakens charity and sows the seed of quarrels and dissensions.

Again, obstacles thrown in the way of such intercourse, will tend to impede the progress made by students. In all social matters, the companionship of others is of great advantage. “A brother that is helped by his brother is like a strong city” says Solomon (Prov. xviii. 19). “It is better, therefore, that two should be together than one: for they have the advantage of their society” (Eccles. iv. 9). But Wis, especially, in study, that society is of use; for among many students some will know or understand that, of which others are ignorant. Hence Aristotle (I Caeli et Mundi) says “that the ancient philosophers, at divers meetings, investigated the truth concerning the heavenly bodies.” The exclusion then any class of men from the society of other students is a manifest injury to the studies of all. This applies, especially, to the exclusion of religious, who are peculiarly well adapted to make progress in learning, since, by their state of life, they are not distracted by worldly anxieties. “He who is less in action, shall receive wisdom” (Eecles. xxxviii. 25).

By excluding religious from studying in common with laymen, an injury is committed against the community of faith, which is called Catholic because it ought to be one. Those who do not associate with each other by agreeing on religious matters, may easily end by teaching different, and even contradictory doctrines. St Paul says of himself (Gal. ii, 1), “Then, after fourteen years, I went up I again to Jerusalem with Barnabas, taking Titus also with me. And I went up according to revelation, and communicated with them the Gospel which I preach among the Gentiles, but apart to them who seemed to be something: lest perhaps I should run, or had run, in vain.” We learn from the Decretals (distinct. XV.cap. canones), that Councils began to be convoked in the time of Constantine. Before that period, there was, on account of frequent and violent persecutions, very little facility for the instruction of the faithful; and, as bishops had no opportunity for meeting to debate together, the Christian religion was torn by many heresies. This fact proves, that there is great danger of schism in matters of doctrine, when the preachers of the faith are not able to assemble for purposes of discussion. Hence any attempt to exclude religious from intercourse with other teachers and students is highly to be condemned.

The reason given for such an exclusion, is likewise ill-founded, being opposed to Apostolic doctrine which cannot err. St, Peter (1 Pet. iv. 10), writes in these terms: “As every man has received grace, minister the same one to another, as good stewards of the manifold grace of God.” The Gloss thus comments on this passage: “The Apostle signifies by the word “grace” any gift of the Holy Spirit which may be used for the assistance of others, in things either temporal or spiritual. He exemplifies his meaning by the words which follow. “If any man speak, let him speak as the words of God.” The Gloss adds, “If any man knows how to speak, let him attribute his knowledge not to himself, but to God.” Let him stand in fear, lest he teach anything contrary to the will of God, the authority of Scripture, or the good of his brethren; or, lest he be silent, when he ought to speak.” Hence the assertion that Religious and laymen ought not mutually to communicate their gift of knowledge is patently, opposed to the teaching of the Apostles.

Again, we read in Ecclesiast. xxxiii. 18, “See that I have not laboured for myself only, but for all that seek discipline.” These words, as the Gloss observes, apply to the teachers of the Church, who, by their writings and instruction, profit not themselves alone, but others also. The wise man, in the text that we have quoted, says, that he has laboured for all men, without exception. Therefore, both religious and secular teachers, ought, by their teaching, to labour for the benefit of all their brethren, whether laymen or religious.

As the body is composed of several members, so in the Church there exist divers offices. This comparison we find in the first Epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians (xii.). Now as in the physical body there are eyes, so in the mystical body of the Church there are teachers. Hence the Gloss understands the text in the Gospel of St. Matthew (xviii. 9): “If your eye scandalises you” etc., to refer to ecclesiastical doctors and counsellors. Physical eyesight is useful to the whole body alike, and one limb subserves another in its functions. For, as St. Paul says (1 Cor. xii. 21), “the eye cannot say to the hand: I need not your help; nor again the head to the feet: I have no need of you.” Therefore, everyone who undertakes the office of teaching must perform it for the benefit of all men, of whatsoever condition they may be. Thus religious must assist laymen; and laymen must help religious.

Again, any person who is competent to perform some special function has a right to be admitted to the society of those who are selected for the exercise of that function. For, an association means the union of men, gathered together for the accomplishment of some specific work. Thus, all soldiers have a right to associate with one another in the same army; for an army is nothing but a society of men, banded together for the purpose of fighting. Hence religious of a military order do not exclude from their society secular soldiers, and vice versa. Now an association of study is a society established with the object of teaching and of learning; and as not only laymen, but also religious, have a right to teach and to learn, there can be no doubt that both these classes may lawfully unite in one society.

The objection made to intercourse between seculars and religious, on matters bearing on study and teaching, are altogether frivolous. They are based on wholly untenable grounds; and they only serve to show the ignorance of their authors. For, as we have already said, a society means a union of men, assembled together for one and the same purpose. Hence as everything ought to be judged with regard to the end for which it is ordained, the different societies which exist ought to be distinguished and judged according to the purpose for which they are formed. Aristotle, (VIII Ethics) classifies different “communications”. By this term he means associations formed for divers objects, wherein the members hold communication one with the other. The Philosopher distinguishes friendships according to these communications. He refers to the friendship of those brought up together, or that based on commercial transactions, or the friendship of men engaged in the same business, Hence arises the distinction between public and private societies. A public society is that wherein men assemble for purposes connected with the commonweal. Thus fellow citizens or compatriots form a public society and become one city or one kingdom. A private society is one established by a few persons for some private end. Thus two or three enter into partnership in a mercantile negotiation. Now each of these classes of society may be either temporary or perpetual. Sometimes a number of men, or only two or three individuals, band together in a perpetual society. This, is the case with those, who, when they become citizens of some city, form an association, choosing that city for their dwelling-place for ever. They thus establish a political society. Again, there may be a perpetual private society, formed between husband and wife, or master and slave, based upon the durable nature of the tie binding together the members of such a society. This is called an economical society. But, when men associate in order to engage in some temporary business, as, for example, to hold a fair, they form a temporary and public society. Or, when two friends are engaged in the management of the same inn, the society which they establish is private, and at at the same time temporary.

Now these various classes of association, must be judged by different standards. To apply the name of association or society indiscriminately to all is to prove one’s own ignorance. For this, reason, we shall have no difficulty in answering the objections brought at the association of seculars and religious.

We are told, first of all, that “men of different professions ought not to be associated in the same offices.” Then words are quoted, “you shall not join together men of different professions.” This objection is perfectly true if it be understood to mean that men of different professions should not be associated in matters upon which they differ. Hence laymen and clerics should not be associated in ecclesiastical matters. Therefore the following words are found before the words just quoted: “A bishop ought not to have a lay vicar; and the clergy ought not to be judged in lay courts of justice.” For the same reason, religious cannot associate with laymen in commercial and mercantile transactions, in which religious are forbidden to take part. “No man being a soldier of God entangleth himself with secular businesses” (2 Tim. ii. 4). But, as we have seen, the exercise of teaching and of learning concerns both seculars and religious. Hence there is no reason against religious being associated with laymen in scholastic, affairs. For, men of different conditions, who, agree in unity of faith, form the body of the Church. “There is neither Jew nor Greek: there is neither bond nor free: there is neither male nor female. For you are all one in Christ Jesus” (Gal. iii. 28). It is objected that, although in an association of laymen and religious there are some points common, to both classes there are likewise some on which they differ. Thus, there may be a purely secular society, formed of members whose interests are limited to secular affairs. Or, there may be an exclusively religious institute, of which the system is directed towards the formation of the religious life. There is, however, one, point which is common both to laymen sad to religious. For, religious and seculars have this in common, viz., that. they belong to the society of the one Church of Christ, by that agreement in one faith whereby the unity of the Church is made perfect. Hence as teaching and learning are functions pertaining alike to seculars and religious, an association of study ought not to be known as exclusively either a lay or a religious college; but, rather, as a college including both seculars and religious.

The objection that no one can belong to two associations is, for three reasons, untenable. First, because a part cannot be numerically accounted as opposed to the whole. A private society is part of a public society, as a house is part of a city. The fact that a man forms part of a family causes him to form part of a city, which is composed of many families. Nevertheless, he does not, on this account, belong to two distinct associations. Now as an association of studies is a public association, a man who forms part of a private society (be it secular or religious), wherein a few students meet together for the purposes of study, belongs on this very account to a general scholastic association. But he does not, for this reason, belong to two associations. Again, there is no law to prohibit a man from belonging to some public, perpetual association, and at the same time from forming part of a public or private temporary society. Thus, a man who belongs to some civic society may likewise form part of a military association; and the member of a family, may be associated with others in an inn. Now an institute of studies is a temporary, not a perpetual, association. For men attend it, not as a permanent residence, but they go and come at their own convenience. Hence there is no reason why a man belonging to a perpetual society, such as a religious, order, should not also attend a scholastic establishment. The third reason which stultifies the objection to the admission of religious to secular colleges is that this objection applies the particular to the general. The assertion, that a man cannot, belong to two associations was originally formulated about ecclesiastical societies. Thus, a man cannot be a canon in two churches, without a dispensation or a legitimate reason. We read (XXI quaest. I), “From this date, no cleric shall be attached to two churches.” But this rule does not apply to other associations. For, the same man can be a citizen of two cities. Therefore, as a scholastic association is not an ecclesiastical society, there is no reason why a man belonging to a religious or secular association, should not also be a member of a scholastic society.

The fourth reasoin given for the exclusion of religious from association with secular students is that religious cannot either teach or study without the authorisation and permission of their superiors, who have the power to absolve their subjects from their oaths and other engagements in order to enable them to belong to such an association. Now we must remember that, as the perfection of a whole consists in the union of its parts, a whole cannot exist unless its parts agree. Hence any decrees drawn up for the welfare of a state and city ought to be formulated with a view to the advantage of all its members. Any statutes which would hinder the unity of a commonwealth ought to be abolished. For laws are established in order to preserve the concord of a state and not to promote internal dissension. In the same way, there ought not to exist in any scholastic association statutes which do not suit all students alike. The words of the Apostle, (Rom. xvi. 17), “Now I beseech you, brethren,” etc., quoted by our opponents in support of their objections, are no argument on their side. First because the words of St. Paul do not apply to religious, but to heretics, and to schismatics. This is clearly shown in the text, wherein St. Paul warns the Romans to avoid such as cause dissensions “contrary to the doctrine which they had learned,” learned that is, as the Gloss explains, “from the true Apostles.” Those against whom St. Paul gave this warning, were men who strove to impose the Jewish law upon the Gentiles. Again the words (2 Thes. iii. 6), “We charge you, brethren,” etc., were not uttered against religious, but against men who passed their time in idleness and misdeeds. Of these St. Paul says, “we have heard there are some among you who walk disorderly, working not at all, but curiously meddling,” or as, the Gloss says, “providing for their necessities by iniquitous means.” Again the words (2 Tim. iii. 1), “Know also this,” etc., were written not to religious, but to heretics, “blasphemers” as St. Paul calls them, “who by their heresy blaspheme God” (Gloss). “As Jannes and Manbres resisted Moses so these also (i.e. heretics) resist the truth,” continues the Apostle, “ men corrupted in mind, reprobate concerning the faith.” It is true that he says, that the heretics of whom he speaks, had an appearance indeed of godliness,” ie., of religion; but religion in this passage signifies latria, which makes a profession of faith. In this sense, it is, as St. Augustine says, (X De civitate Dei), equivalent to piety.

But even granted that all or some religious were as infamous as certain men consider them to be, that would be ho reason for excluding them from intercourse with others. The Gloss, referring to the passage of St. Paul (1 Cor. v.,), concerning the man guilty of. incest, wherein he bids the Corinthians not so much as to eat with such an one, observes that, “the Apostle’s words, ‘if anyone that is named a brother,’ show that men are not to condemn each other rashly and carelessly, but that it is only after judgment has been pronounced that any sinner is to be excluded from communion with the Church. If such a sinner cannot be judicially excommunicated, he must be tolerated.” We have no right to exclude any man from the society of his fellows, unless he be, by his own confession, found guilty of some crime, or be denounced and convicted by some secular or ecclesiastical tribunal. Hence a man may not be condemned on suspicion, or by someone usurping the office of judge. He must be tried, accused and convicted according to the law of God, interpreted by the Church. Hence even were religious as reprobate as they are said to be, they ought not to be excluded from intercourse with the laity, unless they have been brought to judgment, and have been condemned.

The attempt to derogate from the authority of the Apostles, is not only based on false premises, but is closely akin to heresy. For we find in the Decretals (dist. XXII. cap. Omnes) the following passage: “Whoever endeavours to wrest from the Roman Church the privilege bequeathed to her by the supreme head of all the churches is undoubtedly guilty of heresy.” And again, “ He acts contrary to faith, who acts against her who is the Mother of the Faith.” Now Christ granted to the Roman Church the privilege of being obeyed by all, as He Himself is obeyed, in order, as says St. Cyril, bishop of Alexandria (II Thesaurorum), “that we may continue to be members under our Head, the Roman Pontiff, seated on the throne of the Apostles. From him must we learn what we are to believe and uphold. We are bound to revere him, and to entreat him for all things. To him alone does it belong to rebuke and to correct and to unloose, in the place of Him who has established him. To none other has this power been given, but to him alone, before whom all men do, by the divine command, abase their heads, and who is, by all the princes of the world, obeyed as if he were our Lord Jesus Christ Himself.” Hence it is clear that anyone who maintains that the Pope need not be obeyed is a heretic.

The objection that, according to law, no one can be forced to join an association against his will, applies only to a private society, established by two or three members. But a man can be compelled to form part of a public association, which cannot exist without the consent of authority. Thus, a prince may force the inhabitants of a certain city to accept an individual as their fellow-citizen; and an ecclesiastical society can be compelled to accept a man as a canon, or a brother. Hence as any general scholastic association is, in a certain sense, a society, any man may be obliged, by the authority of a superior, to belong to it.

The assertion that the Apostolic authority is limited to ecclesiastical affairs, is false. The president of a republic is bound to provide food for those over whom he rules, and to undertake the proper education and training of the young (X Ethic). He is likewise obliged to supervise the legislation of his republic, and to establish rules for the well-being of the citizens (I Ethic). Thus we see that the legislation concerning education is one of the duties of the president of a republic. It must, therefore, come under the authority of the Apostolic See, by which the whole Church is governed.

The last objection is founded on an absolute falsehood. The association of religious with the laity in matters concerning education is not intended for the destruction, but rather for the advancement, of learning. Hence there can be no possible doubt that, by the authority of the Apostolic See, seculirs may be compelled to admit religious into their scholastic societies.

CHAPTER 3

Is it Lawful for A Religious, Who Has Not the Care of Souls, to Preach and Hear Confessions?

THE enemies of religious, not content with trying to hinder them from producing fruit in the Church by teaching and expounding the Holy Scriptures, endeavour to do still further and greater harm, by preventing them from preaching and hearing confessions, in the hopes that thus they may be rendered unable either to encourage the faithful in virtue, or to eradicate vice. Those who act in this manner, clearly show themselves to be those persecutors of the Church, who, as St. Gregory says (20 Moral, on the words Quasi caputio tunicae), “make a special effort to hinder the word of preaching.”

These enemies of religion adduce several arguments in support of their persecution. First, they quote the words which occur XVI, quaest. I, “The office of a monk is one thing, that of a cleric is another. Clerics feed their sheep: I (being a monk) am fed.” Again in VII, quaest. I, cap. Nequaquam, the following words are found: “The duty of the monastic life is not to teach nor to preside nor to feed others with the word of God, but to be subject.” To preach is to feed with the Divine Word, as is seen in John xxi. 17. The Gloss on the words “feed my sheep,” says, that “to feed the sheep of Christ is to strengthen the faithful lest they fall away.” Hence monks, and religious who are counted as monks, cannot preach. This is more clearly laid down in XVI, quaest. I, cap. adjicimus, in which the following passage occurs: “We declare that, with the exception of the priests of the Lord, no one has license to preach, be he layman or monk, no matter how great a reputation for learning he may enjoy.” Again, in cap. Juxta we read as follows: “ We ordain that monks shall cease entirely from preaching to the people.” St. Bernard likewise says in his work on the Canticles: “Preaching does not beseem a monk; it is not expedient for a novice; it is not permitted to anyone who is not sent to preach.”

Again, it is, argued that they who nourish the people with the word of God ought also to minister to their temporal necessities. For, as the Gloss says, “to feed the sheep of Christ, means to strengthen the faithful lest they fall away; and, if necessary, to provide for their temporal needs.” As religious are, by their profession of poverty, unable to supply the people with material necessities, they cannot feed them, by preaching the word of God.

The prophet Ezekiel asks: “Should not the flocks be fed by, the shepherds?” (xxxiv. 2). By “shepherds,” says the Gloss, are signified bishops, priests, and deacons, to, whom the flock is committed. Hence religious, being neither bishops, priests nor deacons, and having no charge of the flock, may not preach.

Again, we read, (Ron. x. 15), “How shall they preach, unless they be sent? “ But, our Lord has sent none but the twelve Apostles (Luke ix), and the seventy-two disciples (Luke x). The “twelve Apostles,” says the Gloss, represent bishops, and the “seventy-two disciples” the priests of the second rank, or parish priests. St. Paul likewise (1 Cor. xii.) speaks of it “helps,” meaning those who assist their superiors, as Titus helped St. Paul, or as archdeacons help bishops. Religious, therefore, being neither bishops, parish priests, nor archdeacons, have no right to preach.

We read in the Decretals (dist. LXVIII), “Chorepiscopi” are strictly forbidden both to this Holy See and to all bishoprics throughout the entire world. This institution is an abuse and corruption.” The reason of the prohibition is given in these words, “For, our Lord only, as we know, established two orders: the twelve Apostles, and the seventy-two disciples. Whence this order arose, we do not know, but, as there is no reason for its existence, it must be abolished.” Preaching religious (our adversaries add), being neither bishops (i.e. successors of the Apostles), nor parish priests (i.e., successors to the seventy-two disciples), ought likewise to be suppressed.

Dionysius (VI Ecclesiast. hierarch.), says that the monastic Order ought not to be in a position of superiority to others,” or, according to another version, “is not instituted for the purpose of guiding other men.” Now men are led to God by teaching and preaching. Hence neither monks, nor other religious, ought to preach, or to teach.

The hierarchy of the Church is modelled on the celestial hierarchy, according to the words (Exod. xxv, 40), “Look, and make it according to the pattern that was shown you in the mount.” Now in Heaven angels of an inferior rank never exercise the functiona proper to those of a superior degree. Since then the monastic order is counted among the lesser orders of the Church, monks and other religious ought not to perform the office of preaching, which belongs to bishops and other prelates of a higher rank (Dionyslus, VI Ecclesiast. hierarch.).

Again, when a religious preaches, he does so either with power or without power. If he preaches without power, he is a false apostle. If he preaches with power, he has a right to demand the means of subsistence. Our Lord, when sending forth His Apostles to preach, told them to take nothing with them on the way save only a staff (Mark vi.). This staff signifies, (according to the Gloss), the power of accepting the necessities of life from those subject to them. Now it does not seem fitting that religious should demand the means of support. Therefore, they ought not to preach.

Bishops have more right to preach than have religious, who are, not entrusted with the cure of souls. But, a bishop cannot preach outside his diocese, unless he be requested to do so by other bishops or priests. For it is clearly laid down (IX, quaest. III), “Let no Primate or Metropolitan presume to judge the church or parish or anyone belonging to the parish of another diocese”; and the same rule is given in several other chapters. Therefore, religious, who have neither diocese nor parishes, may not preach, unless specially invited to do so.

A preacher ought not to build upon another man’s foundation, nor to glory in another man’s converts. He ought, rather, to imitate St. Paul who says (Rom. xv. 20), “1 have so preached this gospel, not where Christ was named, lest I should build upon another man’s foundation.” And, again, the same Apostle says (2 Cor. x. 15), “Not glorying beyond measure in other men’s labours,” which words the Gloss explains as meaning “not glorying where another has laid the foundation of faith, which would be to glory beyond measure.” In the same chapter, St. Paul uses the expression, “not to glory in another man’s rule,” which the Gloss interprets as signifying not to glory in those who are under the government of another.” Therefore, those who have not the care of souls ought not to preach to such of the faithful as are entrusted to others. They ought, rather, to lay the foundation of the faith among unbelievers.

The adversaries of religious, not content with these efforts to prevent them from preaching, endeavour likewise to prove that they have no right to hear confessions. In support of this opinion, they quote from XVI, quaest. I, cap. Placuit: “We positively and irrevocably decree that no monk shall administer penance to anyone.” And in another chapter we find the words: “ Let no monk presume to administer penance, to receive a child to baptism, to visit or anoint the sick, to bury the dead, or to meddle with any office of the kind.” Again (Cap. Interdicimus), the following words occur: “We forbid abbots and monks to impose public penance, or to visit or anoint the sick.” From all these passages it appears evident, that monks and religious, (who are included under the same laws), have no right to hear confessions.

Further, in the book of Proverbs (xxvii. 23) the following exhortation is addressed to priests in charge of, churches: “Be diligent to know the countenance of your cattle.” The Gloss thus comments on these words: “The Pastor of a church is bidden to take diligent care of those committed to him. He must know their doings, and he must remember to correct the vices which he may observe among them.” But how is the pastor of a church to know the actions and failings of those under him, save by confession? Hence the faithful should not confess to any except to their own parish priest.

We further find that the following words were pronounced by Pope Innocent in a general council (extra de paenitentiis et remissis): “Every one of the faithful, of both sexes, shall, on reaching years of discretion, confess all his sins privately at least once a year to his own priest. He who is thus absolved of his sins, need not confess them again.” Hence it follows that if any, save a parish priest, had the right to hear confessions and to give absolution, the faithful would not be bound once in the year to make their confession to their own parish priest. Now as religious are not parish priests, and have not charge of the faithful, they ought not to hear confessions nor to absolve penitents.

The faithful are likewise bound, according to the same decretal, to receive the sacraments from their own priests. None but those in due dispositions ought to receive the sacraments. As a priest can only by means of confession judge of the state of soul of him to whom he administers the sacraments, it follows that only parish priests can be empowered to hear confessions and to give absolution.

It is necessary that the Church should avoid not only sin, but the risk of sin, “that I may cut off the occasion from them,” as St. Paul says (2 Cor. xi. 12). Now if the faithful are at liberty to confess to others besides to their own priests, many may say that they have been to confession, and yet approach the sacraments without confession. The parish priest would be powerless to hinder this abuse. Therefore, Religious ought not to be allowed to hear confessions, as they are not parish priests.

The power to absolve sinners, belongs only to him, whose duty it is to correct them. Dionysius, in his epistle to Demophylus the monk, expressly says that correction is the office, not of monks, but of priests. Hence religious ought not to administer absolution to penitents. As religious have no defined province or diocese or parish, they may, if they be allowed to preach or hear confessions at all, do so anywhere. Their power therefore exceeds that of bishops, primates or patriarchs, who are not universal rulers. Even the Pope has forbidden himself to be called Bishop of the Universe. And in the Decretals (dist. XCIX) it is distinctly laid down that “no Patriarch shall ever make use of the name “Universal.” The same prohibition is repeated in the next chapter.

Arguments are further brought forward to prove that religious cannot, by authority of bishops, preach or hear confessions. It is objected, that a man no longer possesses what he gives away; and, therefore, if bishops commit the charge of parishes to parish priests, the care of those parishes belongs no longer to the bishops themselves, but to the parish priests. Hence they cannot give to religious faculties to preach and hear confessions without the consent of the parish priests. Again, it is urged that, by laying on a priest the care of a parish, the bishop frees himself from its responsibility, which rests on the priest to whom the charge is committed: “Keep this man; if he slips away, your life shall be for his life” (1 Kings xx. 39). If a bishop were answerable for all the parishes in his diocese, his responsibility and burthen would be intolerable. The care of each parish belongs to the priest appointed to take charge of it; and the bishop should not interfere with it further.

It is further maintained, that, as a bishop is subject to his archbishop, so are priests subject to their bishops. But archbishops cannot meddle with the subjects of a bishop, unless he be proved guilty of negligence. “Let archbishops do nothing in matters concerning the affairs of the bishops without taking counsel with them” (IX, quaest. III). On the same grounds, bishops must not meddle with the affairs of parish priests, without their consent; unless a priest be proved guilty of negligence or fault. Each parish priest is the bridegroom of the church entrusted to him. But, if other clergy, besides those commissioned by the bishops, exercise in parish churches the ministry of preaching or hearing confessions, the Church win have many bridegrooms. This state of affairs would clearly be opposed ,to the decree (VII quaest. I), ordaining that “as it is unlawful for a wife to commit adultery, or to be judged or disposed of during the lifetime of her husband without his permission; so the spouse of a bishop (i.e., his church or parish) may not during his lifetime be, without his will and consent, judged or disposed of; neither is it lawful to exercise ministry in such a church or parish.” And this prohibition, as Gratian says, applies not only to bishops, but to all ministers of the Church.

Our opponents, also, endeavour to prove that religious are not, even by the permission of the Apostolic See, allowed to preach or hear confessions. For not even the authority of the Pope can establish any custom, or make any law opposed to the statutes of the Fathers. This is clearly expressed XXV, quaest. I, cap. Contra statuta: “If it be against the statutes of the early Fathers that any should preach or hear confessions, save only the priests of the Lord, permission so to do can be given to no one, even as a privilege granted by the Pope” (Cf also XVI. quaest. I). We also find in XXV, quaest. I, cap. Sunt quidam, the following words: “If, which God forbid, the Roman Pontiff should try to overthrow the teaching of the Apostles and Prophets, he would be convicted, not of giving an opinion, but of falling into error.” If then there be an Apostolic ordinance “not to glory in another man’s rule” (2 Cor. x.), the Pope, were he to confer the privilege just mentioned upon any man, would commit an error.

It is a law that, when a sovereign grants permission to a man to erect a building in a public place, it is understood that he to whom this privilege is conceded may only use it in so far as it be not to the prejudice of anyone. (See Ne quid in loco publico aedificare, lib. I. Si quis a principe) And in XXV, quaest. II. cap. de ecclesiasticis, St. Gregory says: “As we defend our own property, so let each one of us be jealous for the rights of his own church. I will not, through partiality, concede to any man more than he deserves; nor shall any cunning cause me to refuse to anyone that which is his right.” But if a man preach or hear confessions in a church uninvited, he is doing an injustice to the parish priest. Hence no permission for the exercise of these functions ought to be granted, without the consent of the clergy of the parish.

Again, if a sovereign grants any individual freedom to make a will, he does not thereby give him permission to do more than to draw up an ordinary and legitimate will. It is not conceivable that a Roman governor, the protector of law, should desire by one word to prevent the observance of the statutes concerning wills which have been framed with such laborious care. (De inoffic. testament. lib. Si quando) In like manner, if the Pope should grant to any persons the privilege of preaching or hearing confessions, the permission ought to be understood in its usual sense, i.e., subject to the wishes of parish priests.

A monk receiving priestly Orders has not the faculties for performing the functions attached to the sacerdotal office (e.g. the administration of the Sacraments), unless he be canonically appointed to the care of a parish. We further find it laid down (XVI, quaest. I, cap. Adjicimus Monachi autem): “If the office of preaching be, by, a Papal privilege, committed to any man, he cannot exercise it when souls have not been entrusted to him.”

Moreover, neither the Pope nor any other mortal man can overturn or alter the eccesiastical hierarchy which has been divinely instituted. For this power has been given to no one “unto destruction, but unto edification” (2 Cor. x). But, in the order of the Church, monks are among those who are to be made perfect (see cap. VI. Ecclesiast. hierarch.). Nothing, therefore, can so alter this order as to place monks among those whose office it is to make others perfect.

Those who argue in this manner strive further to prove that religious have no right to seek permission from bishops or parish priests to preach or hear confessions. If they do so, they are actuated by an ambitious desire of usurping the ecclesiastical office. In VIII, quaest. I, cap. Sciendum, we meet with the following words: “When a command is laid upon a man to assume an exalted position, he who obeys the order loses the merit of obedience, if he ambitiously aspires to the post.” Now preaching and hearing confessions are duties of the ecclesiastical state and, therefore, confer dignity and power. Hence religious cannot, without notable ambition, ask for permission to preach and hear confessions. They can only do so when required. Here then is the source from which the error mentioned before has arisen. For as Boethius says, the road of faith runs between two heresies; just as virtue keeps on the centre line between vice. For virtue consists in preserving the due balance of things, and by doing too much or too little man falls from virtue. In the same way, he who holds either more or less than the truth, falls into error; but truth is the centre line of faith. Now it must be remembered that there have been certain heretics, and some now exist, who consider that the power of the ecclesiastical ministry depends upon sanctity of life, and that he who is not holy loses this power, and that this power is increased in proportion to a man’s holiness.

This opinion does not concern our point; but let us, for the moment presume it to be erroneous. From this error has arisen the presumption of certain men, especially of monks, who, elated by their holiness, have, at their own pleasure, usurped the functions of ecclesiastics—preaching, and giving absolution, without any episcopal commission. We find their audacity rebuked (XVI, quaest. I, Pervenit ad nos), in the following terms: “We are astonished that in your parish, certain monks, and abbots, have, contrary to the decrees of the holy Fathers, arrogated to themselves the rights and functions of bishops. They administer penance and remission of sins, bring about reconciliations, and dispose of tithes and churches. They ought not to presume to act thus, without license from the bishop, or authority of the Apostolic See,” Now in their condemnation of the presumption of these monks, certain men have fallen into the error of rashly saying that religious are unfitted to perform the duties just enumerated, even though they be appointed thereto by the authority of the Bishop. This error is thus mentioned (XVII, quaest. I), “There are certain men, filled rather with bitter jealousy than with love of truth, who, without any grounds for their assertion, have the presumption to state that monks, who have died to the world in order to live to God, are unworthy of exercising the priestly office, and are incapable of administering penance, of teaching Christianity, or of giving absolution, in spite of the power divinely committed to them at their ordination. But this is a complete error.” Other men, again, are led by their audacity into another mistake. They assert that religious are not merely precluded, by their state of life, from exercising the sacerdotal functions, but that, bishops cannot, without the consent of the parish priests, grant them faculties for their performance. Nay, the Pope himself, they say, cannot qualify religious to act as priests. Thus, this error leads to the same result as that which we have previously mentioned. For while one error detracts from the ecclesiastical power, the other asserts that the power of the church depends upon sanctity of life.

Our next task will be to refute this error, and we shall proceed in the following order:

First, we shall show that bishops and superior prelates can preach and absolve those who are under the care of priests, without needing the permission of those priests.

Secondly, we shall prove that they can empower others to act in like manner.

Thirdly, we shall make clear that religious are, when commissioned by a bishop, capable of exercising these functions.

Fourthly, we shall demonstrate that it is expedient for the welfare of souls that others, besides parish priests, should be allowed to preach, and hear confessions.

Fifthly, it will be shown that a religious order may advantageously be founded for the purpose of preaching and hearing confessions, with license from the bishops.

Sixthly, we shall reply to the objections of our adversaries.

1. The fact that a bishop has, in any parish of his diocese, all the powers of a priest, is proved by these words from X, quaest. I, cap. Sic quidam: “All that has been established in the Church, by her ancient constitution, belongs to the office and power of a bishop.” Again, in the next chapter, the same is laid down. Now the temporal things of the Church exist for the sake of that which is spiritual. Hence with far greater reason, the spiritual concerns of parishes are committed to the bishops. Again, in the same question it is said that “every parish is to be administered under the care and supervision of the bishop, by the priest or the other clerics whom he shall appoint, in the fear of God.” In the following chapter, we likewise read that, “a church must be governed and conducted according to the judgment and power of the bishop, who is charged with the souls of his whole flock.”

Again, a priest in charge of a parish can do nothing in it, without a general or particular permission from his bishop. Hence XVI, quaest. I, cap. Cunctis fidelibus, we find the following passage: “All priests, deacons, and other ecclesiastics must, above all things, bear in mind that they may do nothing without license from their respective bishop. Without this license, a priest cannot in his own parish say Mass, baptise, or perform any other office.” Hence a bishop has more power in each parish of his diocese than have the priests of those parishes. For they can do nothing without the Bishop’s leave.

The Gloss commenting on the words (1 Cor. i.), “in every place of theirs and ours,” says: “These words signify in every place originally committed to me,” and the Apostle was speaking of suffragan churches, i.e. churches subject to the Church of Corinth. If then bishops are the successors of the Apostles and retain their office, as appears from the commentary in the Gloss on Luke x., the chief power in a parish belongs rather to the bishop than to the parish priest. For the words, “in every place of theirs and ours,” cannot mean that the church was first entrusted to St. Paul, and then taken from him and given to another, else it would have ceased to be his.

Apollo was a priest, ministering to the Corinthians, as we know from the words (1 Cor. iii. 6), “Apollo watered,” i.e., “by baptism,” (Gloss). Nevertheless, St, Paul regulated the affairs of the Church of Corinth, as we learn from his own words, “The rest I will set in order, when I come” (2 Cor. ii. 34). And again, “For what I have pardoned, if I have pardoned anything, for your sake have I done it in the person of Christ” (2 Cor. ii. 10). And, again, he writes to the Corinthians (1 Cor. iv. 21): “What do you want? Shall I come to you with a rod? or in the spirit of meekness and charity?” Again, “according to the measure of the rule which God has measured to us, a measure to reach even to you” (2 Cor. x. 18). In another chapter, he says “Therefore, I write these things being absent, that being present, I may not deal more severely according to the power which the Lord has given me” (2 Cor. xiii. 10). This “power,” as the Gloss says, was that of “binding and loosing.” Hence we clearly see that a bishop retains full jurisdiction over the people entrusted to priests.

Again, priests are said to be successors of the seventytwo disciples, and bishops successors of the twelve Apostles (cf. Gloss on Luke x). Now it would be absurd to maintain that the apostles had no power of binding or loosing and of performing other spiritual works without permission from the seventy-two disciples. This argument holds good in like manner, with regard to the relations between bishops and priests.

Dionysius, furthermore, says (V Eccl. Hier.) that “although the duty of the episcopate is to perfect others, that of the priesthood to enlighten them, and that of the diaconate to cleanse them, nevertheless, bishops are bound not only to perfect but likewise to enlighten and to purify their people. In like manner, it is the office of priests not only to enlighten, but likewise to purify their flocks.” He gives the following reason for his assertion: “Inferior powers cannot become capable of the higher works; and it would be unjust were they to aspire to such a dignity. But the more divine powers are able to perform inferior operations, as we see by the words of Maximus.”

It is plain then that if a priest can do the work of a deacon, a bishop can accomplish all and more than that is done by a priest. A priest can, without permission from his deacon, read the gospel in his church. Therefore a bishop can, without license from the parish priest, absolve and administer the other Sacraments in any parish church of his diocese. What a man does through the agency of another he can do himself ; but when priests give absolution it is their bishop who is said to absolve by their instrumentality. Hence Dionysius (VI, cap. Eccles. Hiear.) writes: “He who, according to us, is the high priest does, by means of priests, his ministers, cleanse and illuminate us. It is he who is said to exercise these functions; because he entrusts others with the power of performing these sacred actions in his stead.” Hence a bishop may, in his own person, give absolution or preach.

Again, the inferior clergy owe obedience to their prelates, in all that regards their care of souls. Thus St. Paul says (Hebr. xiii. 17), “Obey your prelates and be subject to them. For they watch (i.e., they are solicitous for you in preaching) as being to render an account of your souls.” A parishioner is more stringently bound to obey his bishop than his parish priest. For, as the Gloss says in the commentary on the words Rom. xiii., obedience must be paid rather to the higher than to the lower power; thus a proconsul must be obeyed rather than a governor, and an Emperor rather than a proconsul. For, obedience must be proportioned to rank. This maxim applies to spiritual far more strongly than to temporal affairs. Hence bishops, who are invested with power superior to that of parish priests, are at the same time more fully responsible for the people. The words of the book of Proverbs (xxvii. 25): “Be diligent to know the countenance of your cattle,” refer to the care of souls, and are chiefly carried out by hearing confessions. Therefore, it beseems bishops, even more than parish priests, to hear the confessions of the faithful.

As the seventy-two elders, of whom we read (Nun. vi.), were given to Moses as assistants; so priests are appointed as coadjutors to bishops, who could not bear their burdens unaided. Hence at the ordination of a priest, the bishop makes use of the following, and other similar words: “The weaker we are, the more do we stand in need of assistance.” But the fact that a bishop has a coadjutor does not deprive him of his own powers; for he still continues to “be their primary agent, and priests are his ministers. Hence bishops have as good, yes a better right, than priests to perform every sacerdotal office without the permission of any priest.

Further, bishops hold, in the Church, the place of our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore Dionysius says (V Eccles. Hier.), “The Pontifical order is the first of divine ordinances, and supreme in the hierarchy of the Church. In it all degrees of the ecclesiastical hierarchy are consummated, and made perfect. As we behold the universal hierarchy summed up in Jesus, so each particular hierarch